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SUMMARY
This study of the establishment of British rule and its influences
during the first three decades of the Sierra Leone Protectorate is one of the
origins and nature of the administrative structure, the tax and the judicial
systems. The prevailing attitudes of colonial administrators towards edu-
/
cated Africans is shown to have played a major role in the type of use to
which such people were put as Government officials, and the extent and na¬
ture of Government-sponsored education in the Protectorate. The response
of the indigenous population to colonial rule and the effects of the presence
of administrators, and of their policies and practices, are integral parts of
this investigation. Resistance to British rule after the 1898 Hut Tax Rebel¬
lion is found largely in less overt forms of expression than outright revolt.
The influence and activities of secret societies are considered in this con¬
text.
The form of indirect rule which characterized the administration of
the Sierra Leone Protectorate during the years under review had inherent
contradictions. The governing policy sought at one and the same time to
maintain the status quo and to undertake such disruptive activities as the
construction of roads, railways, and schools deemed necessary to tap the
resources for revenue purposes and to rule effectively. Investigation into
the manners in which indigenous rulers, chiefdom political units, and politi¬
cal organizations were identified and utilized by the Government reveals
iv
sources of alteration within the traditional power structure as well as in the
relationship between the rulers and their subjects.
s
Differential response to British rule, as well as its effects on the
institutions and the inhabitants of diverse parts of the Protectorate, is no¬
ticeable as a result of a variety of factors. Among the considerations in this
context are the extent and nature of contact with Europeans prior to the de¬
claration of the Protectorate, the degree to which chiefdom rulers alienated
their subjects by collaborating with the Administration or by converting their
political positions into economic advantage, and the European decisions
where to locate schools, missions, rail lines, experimental farms and other
undertakings of an invariably disruptive and modernizing nature.
The impact of British rule on the majority of the inhabitants of the
Sierra Leone Protectorate was limited during the early years under review.
By the 1920's education policy was being revised, department staffs being
enlarged and specialized, Paramount Chiefs being selected to sit with the
Legislative Council, and the abolition of domestic slavery being planned.
These and other changes signalled a new era of Protectorate administration
which was to affect an increasing percentage of the people. The establish¬
ment of order and the mechanics of rule had been accomplished to a large
extent. Colonial officials now turned their attentions to the development and
the future of the Protectorate.
INTRODUCTION
On the 31st of August 1896 a Protectorate was declared over the
hinterland adjacent to the Colony of Sierra Leone. This act was the cul¬
mination of decades of varying degrees of interference by the Sierra Leone
Government with the inhabitants of the territory in attempts to protect com¬
mercial interests vital to the economy of the Colony. Considerations of
British political and economic policies, domestic and foreign, were instru¬
mental in determining the nature of the relationship between the Freetown
Government and the sovereign rulers of the areas in proximity to the
Colony.
Matters of practicality and conviction dictated the type of administra¬
tion designed by the government officials in Sierra Leone under the watch¬
ful eyes of colonial officers in Whitehall. It was not only the assessment
of the colonial situation which resulted in governing through the indigenous
rulers. Such a policy also reflected the desire to not alter existing insti¬
tutions or basic patterns of living beyond purging them of practices which
were considered by the British to be unjust or inhumane.
The Protectorate, an area of over 27,000 square miles with a popu¬
lation officially estimated at less than a million, was divided into five ad¬
ministrative districts which conformed where possible to what were be¬




assigned a European District Commissioner and a European District Sur¬
geon; a complement of African staff to serve as Court messengers, inter¬
preters, clerks and gaolers; and a company of Frontier Police. *
The Frontier Police were to keep the peace; the District Commis¬
sioner to administer justice, collect taxes and oversee the administration
of the country through the chiefs and native authorities. Justice was to be
obtained through a system of three courts which would provide British jus¬
tice for British subjects in the Protectorate, while leaving the chiefs to
judge their subjects in accordance with tribal law except for the more seri¬
ous disputes and crimes which directly threatened British interests.
Throughout the years of British rule over the Sierra Leone Protec¬
torate, ordinances delineating the powers and responsibilities of each level
in the administrative hierarchy from the chiefs through the District Com¬
missioners were altered. Often such revisions were attempts at clarifica¬
tion of the existing roles. However, legislation was also enacted in response
to conditions arising from such situations as the Hut Tax Rebellion of 1898
and the influx of 'strangers' into parts of the Protectorate exposed by the
railway.
Consideration of the mechanics of colonial administrative structure
will reveal initiative left to various levels of the hierarchy and circum-
1. Stephan, Paul B. Jr. Origins of the Sierra Leone Protectorate
1880-1900 (PhD. Yale, 1958) p. 14
The Ronietta District reportedly had only a half company of Frontiers
assigned to it in 1896.
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stances for curtailment of that initiative by the upper echelons. Within
these contexts it will be possible to see that the individuals who filled the
posts brought to their jobs their own abilities, interests and senses of
priorities and left the stamp of diverse personalities on the matrix of Pro¬
tectorate administration.
This study of the establishment of British rule during the first three
decades of the Sierra Leone Protectorate is one not only of the origins and
nature of the administrative structure and the judicial system. The re¬
sponse of the inhabitants of the Protectorate to colonial rule and the effects
of the presence of administrators no less than of their policies and prac¬
tices also form integral parts of this investigation.
Despite the existence since 1890 of such institutions anticipating a
protectorate as the Frontier Police and Travelling Commissioners, it will
be argued that the indigenous rulers had little reason to suspect the ulti¬
mate violation of that 'working partnership' in which they largely had been
regarded as sovereign powers.
The 1898 Hut Tax Rebellion will be examined only in terms of con¬
stituting the most overt response of previously independent people to the
assumption of rule by the British. Subsequently it is necessary to identify
resistance to colonial administration in more subtle forms. The influence
and activities of secret societies will be considered in this context. It is
equally important to indicate positive response to British rule and the
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changes it brought to life in the Protectorate.
That essentially pragmatic form of indirect rule which character¬
ised the administration of the Sierra Leone Protectorate during the years
under review had inherent contradictions. A governing policy which sought
at one and the same time to maintain the status quo and to undertake such
disruptive activities as the construction of roads, railways, and schools
deemed necessary for the effective rule of the Protectorate was not without
discernible effects on the governed. It also will be argued that an element
of racism was part of the philosophical basis of the type of colonial rule
found in the Sierra Leone Protectorate in the first quarter of the twentieth
century, and was reflected in the actions and attitudes of the Protectorate
administrators.
The essence of indirect rule was to use the individuals and institu¬
tions which customarily commanded respect and authority to control and
govern the people. However, an investigation into the manner in which the
chiefs and chiefdom political organisations were identified and utilised by
the Government will reveal sources of alteration within the traditional power
structure as well as in the relationship between the rulers and their sub¬
jects. Exclusion of the powerful secret societies such as the Poro from
the administrative hierarchy; recognition of rulers of smaller areas as
having status equal to that of their overlords; the inclusion of previously
independent communities into one chiefdom under a Paramount chief to
y . v * v v . * i 11 • t ; . . 1 .
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whom no prior allegiance had existed; the signing of treaties with minor,
subordinate chiefs are all indicative of situations which will be seen to have
affected the position of the chief both as a government agent and as an in¬
digenous ruler.
This study will show that it was a consequence of the system of
British rule in the Protectorate that having dictated certain individuals and
institutions to be those to which the responsibilities of administration would
be entrusted, the Colonial Government quite frequently found it necessary
to intervene to preserve this system and to uphold the authority of their
chiefs. The more the Government sought to deter the decay of the indige¬
nous system and the presumably traditional bases of the chiefs' powers the
more these efforts of support in fact undermined the institutions which the
Government was striving to maintain.
Differential response to British rule, as well as its effects on the
institutions and the inhabitants in diverse parts of the Protectorate, will be
noticed as resulting from variation in several factors. Among the consider¬
ations in this context are the extent and nature of contact with Europeans
prior to the declaration of the Protectorate, the degree to which chiefs
converted their political positions into economic advantage, and the Euro¬
pean decisions where to locate schools, rail lines, roads, experimental
farms and other undertakings of an invariably modernising nature.
Problems of insufficient information, sources biased by the im-
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print of personal prejudices as much as by ignorance or ulterior motive,
and achievement of a clear understanding of a given situation plagued the
colonial officials no less than they plague the researcher and writer of co¬
lonial history half a century later. The district officers had difficulties of
linguistic and cultural interpretation to overcome to transmit orders, and to
ensure that laws, directives, obligations and restrictions were compre¬
hended. Each colonial administrator perceived his role and the way the
Protectorate African reacted to British rule in a unique way which inevita¬
bly influenced the records he left as much as it did the practices he insti¬
tuted and his implementation of policies.
A description and assessment of British rule in the Sierra Leone
Protectorate during the years 1896-1924 depended largely on the records of
the British Colonial Office staff and the Sierra Leone Government. Unfortu¬
nately these sources are deficient in certain respects. It should be recalled
throughout this thesis that those primary accounts of reaction to and effect
of colonial rule fall into two classes: reports and interpretations made by
Europeans and Creoles of conditions or events; and written complaints and
statements made by or on the behalf of people indigenous to the Protectorate.
Interpretative material of the first category, and all documents of the latter
type do not exist in quantity, and are not equally distributed over the years
under review.
A further difficulty for the purposes of this study derived from the
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fact that a disproportionate amount of the available material presents, not
unnaturally, the non-African point of view. Colonial administrators dili¬
gently kept records; missionaries, merchants and military officers alike
scrutinized their alien African surroundings and neighbours and left their
observations for posterity. Not only are the accounts by the indigenous pop¬
ulation few in number but they are unquestionably of a particular bias and
cannot be regarded as representative of the majority of the inhabitants of
the Protectorate. The very fact, for example, of a chief sending a hand¬
written complaint to the Governor against traders resident in his town
cheating him is indicative of a level of education, orientation to European
political procedures and involvement in commercial activities by no means
possessed by chiefs throughout the Protectorate. Such sources are invalu¬
able for analysing various influences of British rule in the Sierra Leone
Protectorate on a segment of the population. However, there are no first¬
hand accounts of internal reaction to and effect of the Protectorate adminis¬
tration and the consequent development of trade and transportation by any of
the vast majority of the indigenous population.
It was consistent with the nature of the relationship between the
Colonial Office and its Colonial Governments that copies of much of the
locally circulated material were not sent to London nor were all matters
reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The consequences of
archival losses also are apparent when attempting to trace a proposal to
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fruition or failure or to discover the if, how and when of the implementation
of policies and projects introduced but never concluded in the records.
A description of the establishment of British rule in the Sierra
Leone Protectorate and an examination of its effects and the indigenous re¬
sponse necessarily requires a degree of enlightened speculation and deduc¬
tion. Whatever the limitation of the sources, certain definite patterns e-
merge in addition to the readily apparent effects and reactions, and the
available material concerning the Protectorate in the early years of the




A PROTECTORATE IN SIERRA LEONE
Prelude to the Protectorate
As the great existing imperial power, Britain engaged in an essen¬
tially defensive foreign policy until the late 1800's. Such a policy was char¬
acterised by reluctance to acquire additional area, and doing so only for
strategic purposes; to protect existing possessions or to prevent control
of vital routes from passing into other hands. Official attitudes toward West
Africa during much of the second half of the 19th century reflect the princi¬
ples and factors which determined British foreign affairs worldwide.
Within the framework of British imperial policy, West Africa did
not assume an essential position. Indeed, prior to the time when its value
as a pawn was recognised, the majority of the British territories were
regarded as expendable. A Select Committee of Parliamentary Enquiry
had recommended in 1865 that there be no further extension of British
power. Furthermore, the Committee looked forward to the ultimate with¬
drawal of Britain from all West Africa except Sierra Leone. The exception
made to Sierra Leone derived from several sources, well delineated by
9
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Hargreaves in his comprehensive coverage of this period. * It is his con¬
tention that Sierra Leone was singled out, not just in deference to humani¬
tarians, but also to the Navy which appreciated the value of Freetown
Harbour, and to the fact that the Colony had achieved a balanced budget and
2
an expanding trade.
However much Sierra Leone's continued prosperity depended on
revenue drawn from trade with an interior which bore constant surveillance,
the Home Government's policy toward Sierra Leone was influenced by sev¬
eral factors in Britain. Successive Governments demonstrated their sensi¬
tivity to criticism in Parliament with respect to official action in West
Africa. The opposition to territorial annexation which had been formally
stated in 1865 continued. Aversion to imposing British dominion by force
was evidently not the sole source of opposition as areas voluntarily ceded
to Sierra Leone were received with mixed blessings.
It was a relatively small group of Englishmen who, with direct
financial interest in Sierra Leone, kept the British Government advised as
to the best ways to foster British commercial interests. The principle
1. Although coverage of the events preceding the establishment of a Pro¬
tectorate in Sierra Leone is provided in a number of sources, the most
comprehensive is A History of Sierra Leone by Christopher Fyfe.
The unpublished doctoral theses of John Barry Riddell and John J.
Grace, and published works of Professors Michael Crowder and John
D. Hargreaves have been useful for valuable information and insight
into this period.
2. Hargreaves, John D. Prelude to the Partition of West Africa
(London, 1966) p. 77
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means of relaying such information were the African sections of the Liver¬
pool, London, and Manchester Chambers of Commerce which bureaus had
been formed for that express purpose. British merchants were themselves
generally opposed to direct methods of rule. It was not clear that direct
exercise of authority would help commerce. Indeed, the consensus of
opinion among both merchants and politicians was that the imposition of di¬
rect rule, presumably by military force, would disrupt not foster trade.
Furthermore, the extension of regular colonial administration would incur
expenses that neither the British Government nor the merchants were eager
to underwrite. Consequently there was little pressure on the Colonial
Office from sources within Britain to provide formal extension of power
over the Sierra Leone hinterland.
The European and Creole traders in Sierra Leone were, for the
most part, content to have government intervention limited to coming to
their assistance and securing conditions which would further their interests.
The resulting bases of the Sierra Leone Government's policy toward the
adjoining territories until the latter years of the 19th century were to pro¬
tect the Colony from attack and to protect the prosperity of the Colony by
maintaining sufficient peace for inland trade.
Although the implementation of this policy was left to their dis¬
cretion, Governors of Sierra Leone during these years found that it was not
always possible to uphold the interests of the Colony and at the same time
act in accord with Colonial Office directives. Different means employed by
successive Governors to fulfill frequently contradictory objectives reflect
not only divergence in personal inclinations but also changing conditions in
the Sierra Leone hinterland and in European foreign affairs.
British influence had been established in the first half of the 19th
century along the seaboards North to the Mellacouri River and South to
Liberia, and up coastal rivers and streams to their heads of navigation. It
was a major feature of Governor Kennedy's administrative strategy to in¬
voke the treaties of friendship which had been made previously with chiefs
in these areas and to induce their cooperation in keeping the peace and un¬
obstructed trade routes by the payment of annual stipends. The friendly
relations he established with other chiefs were also perpetuated by stipend¬
iary payments conditional on the provision of safe conduct and transit of
trade.
The system Kennedy had relied on became increasingly inopera¬
tive as it depended on political and economic conditions which were beyond
the control of the Colonial Government. Chiefs who had seen Creole mer¬
chants prosper entered trade themselves and sought to extend their influ¬
ence over strategic trade routes. Such acts of aggression aggravated the
hostility aroused in non-treaty chiefs by the treaty chiefs, who with their
various advantages were competing more successfully in the limited
existing palm market. The result of such conditions was a succession
13
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of wars between rival factions.
Slave labour was used by the indigenous people in the Sierra Leone
4
hinterland to cultivate, gather, and transport crops. As African involve¬
ment in legitimate commerce increased, so did the quest for slaves to meet
the greater labour demand. The slave raids and wars which ensued contrib¬
uted greatly to the unsettled state of the areas beyond the Colony. Coming
a full causal circle the very trade which had originally generated the need
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for more slaves was severely disrupted.
The warfare which characterised the late 1870's and 1880's was
not confined to the areas to the East and Southeast of the Colony but also
included regions which lay on the caravan routes that went North-northeast
from Port Loko to Falaba and beyond. Samory's extension of his empire
3. In addition to the general studies cited above, see Allen M. Howard's
unpublished thesis Big Men, Traders, and Chiefs: Power, Commerce,
and Spatial Change in the Sierra Leone-Guinea Plain, 1865-95~
(PhD. University of Wisconsin, 1972. )
4. In 1871 Governor Kennedy attributed Britain's flourishing commerce
in West Africa to slave labour. Of the over 1,000,000 of produce
being exported annually—nearly half of which was from Sierra Leone—
only 1,000 was a result of free labour, and all European Merchan¬
dise was being carried inland by slaves. Grace, John J. The Prob¬
lem of Domestic Slavery in British West Africa with Particular Re¬
ference to the Sierra Leone Protectorate, 1896-1927.
(PhD. Aberdeen, 1972) p. 44
5. In his unpublished PhD. thesis, A History of the Temne in the 19th
Century (Edinburgh, 1968), E. Ade Ijagbemi comments on the paradox
of yet another circular effect concerning these events. The origins of
the Sierra Leone Protectorate lay in the wars engendered by the legiti¬
mate commerce which its earlier proponents had hoped would end war
and slavery in the territories adjoining the Colony, pp. iv, 303
affected territories far greater than those actually attacked or conquered by
his marauding Sofas as trade was choked off at various intervals along the
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routes as well as disrupted at its sources. So seriously was the pros¬
perity of the Colony affected by the events taking place in the lands sur¬
rounding it that Government intervention took the form of punitive military
expeditions as well as of peaceful visitations.
Officials at the Colonial Office found it difficult to follow the in-
tracacies of many of the conditions in Sierra Leone. The extent to which
they condemned, tolerated or applauded the actions and decisions of the
Governors depended largely on the current state of affairs in European
diplomatic relations, particularly with France. In the opinion of Lord
Salisbury situations in West Africa were certainly not significant enough
to jeopardise good relations with France, which he rated as being of the
7
highest priority.
Throughout the 1880's the French were extending their domains
and pursuing Samory with the effect that they were encircling the Sierra
Leone hinterland along to the Liberian border. However, Salisbury was
not yet prepared to allow the Sierra Leone Government to actively counter
6. Samory is among those cited by Hargreaves as responsible for the
internal wars which closed roads early in 1879 and caused the number
of caravans visiting Freetown to drop by 80%. op. cit. p. 244
7. Hargreaves ibid, p. 225
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with any treaty-making forays which might antagonise the French.
Whitehall was about to relent by the end of 1888 when the newly-
arrived Governor, Captain James Shaw Hay, conveyed warnings of the need
to make treaties to counter the costly French encroachment, and plans for
achieving this end and that of securing peace. The three-fold proposal was
for Travelling Commissioners to obtain agreements providing for freedom
of trade, keeping the peace, and referral of disputes with neighbours to the
Government; the construction of a road joining the riverheads and thereby
creating a frontier road running roughly parallel to the coast thirty miles
inland; and the establishment of a para-military police force along the
9
road. Early in 1889 the Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed to this
new policy but instructed that no decisive action be taken until the Anglo-
French boundary settlement was completed.
This change of heart was brought about by a variety of factors.
The Colonial Office believed that wars and expenditures similar to the
Yoni expedition in 1887 could be avoided by Hay's policy. International
8. Indeed, it is the opinion of Robinson and Gallagher that the Foreign
Secretary was not at all sorry to encourage French aspirations in
West Africa if that would help divert their efforts from Egypt and the
Nile. Gallagher, J. and Robinson, R. D. with Denny, A. Africa and
the Victorians (London, 1961) pp. 382-4
9. 'Para-military' is a phrase often used to describe the uses to which
the Frontier Police and latterly the West African Frontier Forceswere
put. These included such duties as punitive expeditions, putting down
interrofccfne wars, combatting the slave trade, providing escort for
Government officials as shows of force and for prisoners to the gaol.
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agreements, in particular the Brussels Act, obligated Britain to end the
slave trade. Efforts to attain this end were made not so much for reasons
of diligence as expedience lest the French use the apparent failure of the
British to accept their responsibility as a pretext for invading the British
sphere. A further incentive for the Colonial Office to support measures
which would end the traffic in slaves was no doubt the recognition of the
detrimental effect on Sierra Leone's trade and revenue of the slave raids
and wars. With these wider considerations, the British Government could
with self-justification pursue a policy of extension of British influence and
effective occupation. ^
The Anglo-French Agreement was signed on the 10th of August
1889 and went into effect on the first day of the new year. On that day
Knutsford dispatched to Hay details for achieving more effective control and
extension as far as possible of the region reserved to Britain. Peaceful
methods would accomplish these ends more effectively and less expensively
than military conquest. The proposals earlier made by Hay were deemed
the best means of implementing the new policy.
The two Travelling Commissioners were given a wide range of
instructions and dispatched in February 1890. To T. N. Garrett and T. J.
10. In discussing these considerations Grace notes that the effect if not
the avowed intent of international agreements was that claims to Afri¬
can territory be followed by effective occupation, op. cit. p. 101
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Alldridge fell the enormous and arduous task of contacting the numerous
chiefs in the isolated, unfamiliar reaches of the lands over which Britain
had acquired jurisdiction, and to enter into treaties of friendship with those
'not yet bound by engagements to any other foreign power. The Travel¬
ling Commissioners were to impress upon the indigenous rulers the desire
of the Government to open up their countries and develop their resources,
which could not be done without the cooperation of the chiefs in maintaining
good roads and keeping the peace.
Garrett, a Customs inspector stationed at Bonthe who had often in
the past been employed by the Government to do reconnaisance and arbitra¬
tion work, had a special mission. He was to travel North along what is now
the Guinean boundary to the distant lands under the sway of Samory and to
obtain the cessation of the closure of the roads against the trade caravans.
Alldridge ventured into the more removed parts of Mendiland in the south
and eastern outreaches of the British sphere of influence at the same time
that Hay was touring areas nearer the the Colony and making treaties.
By ordinance a Frontier Police Force was created in January 1890
by initially recruiting the ranks from the Sierra Leone Police Force; and
11. Public Record Office, Colonial Office series 267 contains Governors'
dispatches to the Secretary of State and letters to the Colonial Office
relating to Sierra Leone from other government departments, public
agencies, and individuals. References will be to volume, date, dis¬
patch number (if any), sender, and Secretary of State.
P. R. O. 267/381 24 February 1890 c. 6 Hay-Knutsford
the European officers, an Inspector General and two Inspectors, from the
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regular army. Small detachments were scattered around, originally
within the perimeters of the frontier road, and posted in the more impor¬
tant towns and in chiefdoms where the rulers agreed to accept them. The
constant patrols were instructed to maintain peace, and keep the roads
open for trade. Various of their other duties included dealing with crimes
of murder and violent robbery, stopping slave caravans, and detecting
cases of trading without licences. The Frontier Police were specifically
forbidden to interfere with chiefdom affairs, an instruction whose reitera-
13
tion indicates that it was not followed.
After the delimitation of areas of British and French jurisdiction
in 1889 it was considered necessary to regulate the activities of the inhabi¬
tants of the British sphere of influence more rigidly so that the British
Government would not be open to censure for failure to prevent raids across
the border, with France in particular. Limba and Temne pursuit of the
Susu warrior Karimu (Carimoo) across the Scarcies in the early 1890's
brought complaints from the French. As a consequence a British expedition
against Karimu was launched in February 1892 and an agreement made with
the Scarcies chiefs in March that they not cross the Scarcies in war again.
12. P. R. O. 267/381 16 January 1890 #18 Hay-Kuntsford; Fyfe, Christo¬
pher A History of Sierra Leone (London, 1962) p. 487
13. Fyfe ibid. ; Grace op cit. pp. 113-4; Crowder, Michael West
Africa Under Colonial Rule (London, 1968) p. 154
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The assumption of responsibility to contain the hinterland popula¬
tions and the desire to maintain conditions conducive to trade required the
Sierra Leone Government to intervene more actively and frequently in
tribal affairs and to exert more control than had previously existed. The
methods varied with the actual circumstances and with the way situations
were assessed and handled by the government officials. The various his¬
torical accounts of this period contain many instances of hasty or ill -
conceived action with regrettable consequences.
The ideal sequence of events would be that if the issuing of in¬
creasingly stern warnings against warring failed to restore peaceful con¬
ditions, a senior officer would be sent to stress the displeasure of the
Governor and to obtain a reaffirmation of allegiance. No doubt the mere
presence of an armed escort on many occasions helped convince the people
of the merits of the Government's position and prevented recourse to the
last resort, military force.
In the eyes of Sir David Chalmers and other contemporary observers
the nature and degree of Government intervention into internal tribal affairs
may have varied throughout the years preceding the Protectorate but the re-
14
lationship between treaty signatories was that of sovereign powers.
14. Kenneth Little, in The Mende of Sierra Leone (London, 1951 revised
1967), feels this is evident from Alldridge's account of his treaty-
making expeditions, p. 54 However it is not clear that Alldridge
establishes that there was in fact a relationship of equals or merely
that Alldridge interpreted the African's demeanour to indicate that
this was their understanding of the situation.
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The reports of both Chalmers of his investigation into the 1898 Hut Tax
Rebellion and District Commissioner James Crawford Maxwell of Native
Laws and Customs written in 1908 for distribution among colonial officers
have the tone of propaganda statements but no doubt present what each be¬
lieved to be an accurate appraisal of pre-Protectorate conditions. Chalmers
maintained that in treaties from the foundation of the Colony to the latest one
in 1895 the character of the Chiefs as owners and sovereigns of territory
and as independent contracting Powers was unequivocably and universally
recognised. In the few later treaties which provided for the assumption of
sovereignty and full control of territory by the Crown such could only be
15
done if the chiefs did not fulfill their treaty engagements.
Maxwell brought to his fourteen years as a Sierra Leone District
Commissioner the thoroughness of one trained in medicine and the forth-
rightness of one born a Scotfl. Like Chalmers, Maxwell used a moderate
tone, describing the role of the Government in the 70 years preceding the
establishment of the Protectorate as claiming and exercising 'the right of
intervention in any disputes which led to intertribal wars or interfered with
trade. ' However, he declared, 'beyond this and the stopping of slave raid-
16
ing there had been very little interference with the different chiefdoms. '
15. Parliamentary Papers 1899 Vol. LX c. 9388 'Report to Her Majesty's
Commissioner and Correspondence on the Subject of the insurrection
in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, 1898. ' p. 15
16. P. R. O. 267/503 25 April 1908 #209 Probyn-Crewe Maxwell
enclosure
Whatever the interpretations, the practical effect of acts of inter¬
vention and the policy of scattering Frontier Police throughout the British
sphere of influence was British dominance. Thus the Declaration of the
Protectorate over the hinterland of Sierra Leone, which was not made until
after the 1895 Boundary Agreement with France, merely gave formal rec¬
ognition to the 'de facto' protectorate which already existed. The meetings
between Governor Cardew and the chiefs of the interior in 1896, to be dis¬
cussed in a later section, must be viewed in the light of this fact.
Proclamation of the Protectorate
Administrative Districts
The Protectorate was proclaimed on the 31st day of August 1896,
and Ordinances 20 of 9 September and 21 of 16 October were passed to de¬
termine the mode of exercising jurisdiction, and to define the limits of the
Protectorate, respectively. The area approximately the size of Eire was
left divided in the five districts which had existed for Frontier Police con¬
trol. Four of the major interior police posts—Karene, Panguma, Banda-
juma, and Falaba—were designated headquarters, in addition to the village
17
of Kwellu in Ronietta.
Although it was maintained that the boundaries of the districts fol-
17. Riddell, John Barry Structure, Diffusion and Response: The Spatial
Dynamics of Modernization in Sierra Leone (PhD. Penn State Univer¬
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lowed tribal boundaries wherever possible, it is unlikely that this claim was
more than superficially accurate. It is open to conjecture how much know¬
ledge colonial officials had of such ephemeral delineations as the tribal
boundaries at the time the original districts were being outlined in the early
18
1890's. Subsequent adjustments in district boundaries to group compatible
chiefdoms, as well as major redisricting for admittedly pragmatic reasons,
indicate both that recognition of presumed traditional borders had not been
achieved and were not likely to be unless coincidentally.
In discussing the changes of the Protectorate administrative regions,
Riddell speaks in terms of them being 'periodically redefined as adminis¬
trative objectives were reevaluated and as geographical space was continu¬
ously restructured and refocused by the evolving transportation and com-
19 i
munications networks. ' The effect of the Railway on the country through
which it passed was the main criterion for the major reshuffling of chief¬
doms which resulted by 1907 in the creation of the Railway and North Sher-
bro Districts and the dissolution of the Panguma and Bandajuma Districts.
Economizing administrative power along the Railway because of easier
communication was meant to free officers for the better administration of
20
the more remote areas. In reality, other effects of the Railway required
18. T. N. Goddard in The Handbook of Sierra Leone (London, 1925) de¬
scribes the division of the Protectorate as being arbitrary and dictated
by considerations of administrative efficiency, p. 168
19. Riddell, op.cit. p. 12
20. P. R. O. 267/488 6 October 1906 #394 Probyn-Elgin
the political staff of that district to be increased beyond that of the other
districts.
The division of the Protectorate into three Provinces of four Dis¬
tricts apiece in 1919 reflected to a very real extent the transportation system
at that time. The opening up of the Northern branch of the Railway and the
renewed importance of river systems required the shifting of administrative
personnel. The Northern Province contained the branch line and the Rokelle
and Scarcies water systems, while the main Railway and its feeder roads
were included in the Central Province. The Sherbro waterways were loca-
21
ted in the new Southern Province. Wilkinson's original reorganisation
proposal, of July 1916, had apparently been intended primarily to allow
greater hierarchical distinctions within the Protectorate Administration.
Officials at the Colonial Office felt! there were other ways to reward length
of service and were able to conveniently put by the question until after the
22
war.
Although the 1919 and the 1907 changes were allegedly 'guided by con-
23
siderations of language and race' as well as 'communication' the latter was
the prime factor. However, in addition to general lumping of chiefdoms pre¬
sumed to be akin to one another, the Government was not unresponsive to
requests to correct their assumptions about ancestry and traditional alle-
21. P. R. O. 267/583 25 September 1919 #432 Wilkinson-Milner
22. P. R.O. 267/571 28 July 1916 #307 Wilkinson-Bonar Law
23. P. R.O. 267/583 25 September 1919 #432 Wilkinson-Milner
giances. Many of the minor alterations in existing boundaries, and major
changes in district revision plans, particularly in the creation in 1906 and
1909 respectively of the short-lived Central and Headquarters Districts,
were made in deference to such considerations. It should not be assumed
that pure altruism moved the colonial administrators to rearrange projected
and actual boundaries to separate enemies and reunite closely related peo¬
ples. The fear of tribal animosities flaring into warfare reminiscent of pre-
Protectorate times, and the threat of petitioners to move out of the Protec¬
torate were undoubtedly the main factors in this accommodating policy.
Stanley's settlement of the border between the Koinadugu and Karene
Districts was ultimately determined by the fact that "for years Limbas,
Lokkos, and to some extent Mandingoes.. . have been living together in peace
and friendship and intermarrying ahd settling in each others' villages with-
24
out considering the question of a boundary between the two chiefdoms. "
Placing them in separate districts would have resulted not only in the 'great
confusion' Stanley sought to avoid, but also in great discontent. Bloodshed
was the implied consequence if the people of the Mapaki, Malal and Bambali
chiefdoms were removed from Karene District and made to cross the Rokelle
River to deal with the District Commissioner of the proposed Central Dis-
24. Sierra Leone Archives material will be identified by the number affixed
to the minute paper or by the designation of the document which identi¬
fies either its origins or the nature of its contents, followed by the year,
the date, and the author if known.
S. L. A0 D. C. Koinadugu #9 1915 19 February Stanley
trict. It was their belief that God put that there as a natural boundary be-
25
tween them and their mortal enemies, the Koniki and Yonni Timinis.
The Administration in the Protectorate
The legacy of treaties and the fact that the Sierra Leone hinterland
had required for the most part no military conquest made it possible to es¬
tablish a skeletal administration over the indigenous population. In addi¬
tion to the District Commissioner and his staff, medical and postal services
and Frontier Police were assigned to each district. According to Riddell,
the location of the early medical and postal facilities corresponded to those
of the colonial administrative hierarchy as such existed largely to serve the
district officers and their staffs. The postal, and to a lesser extent the
Government medical, services, gradually expanded as 'the administrative
system responded to more realistic perceptions of population distribution
and to the space-shrinking effect of the Railway. '
The practical side of the administration was left almost entirely in
the hands of the Frontier Police whose methods of maintaining law and or¬
der will be discussed subsequently. The primary responsibilities of the
District Commissioners were the administering of justice and the collec¬
tion of the tax on dwellings which was provided for in the Protectorate
25. S. L. A. 8630 1908 17 September D. C. Karene, Oswell, forwards 10
September petition of chiefs of Mapaki, Malal and Bombali chiefdoms
26. Riddell, op. cit. pp. 66, 96
Ordinance. A number of other tasks fell to the colonial officers in the Pro¬
tectorate by virtue of the very type of indirect rule being administered as
27
much as by the specifications of Ordinances.
As areas of government and commercial activity increased so too did
the responsibilities of the District Commissioners who had to protect the
interests of both the indigenous population and the Government departments
in such matters as the establishment of Bush Fire Protective Belts, Forest
Reserves, and Sanitary Districts*^® Similarly the District Commissioner's
iV
administrative, executive and advisory roles were extended by the Protec¬
torate Native Law Ordinance of 1905 and the various Concessions Ordi-
29
nances. The effect of these Ordinances was to make him a go-between
for non-indigenous people seeking Protectorate land from the chiefdom rul¬
ers, and for 'settlers or residents' and 'natives', particularly in the larger
towns and trade centres. These laws also required his offices to be used
for the filing of requests and deeds and his consent to be obtained to the
terms of grants.
27. Ordinances can be found, among other places, in the P. R. O. Colonial
Office series 269. Citations are all for Sierra Leone Ordinances and
will consist of the Ordinance number and year. In addition to the Pro¬
tectorate Ordinance #20 of 1896, and its amended versions #11 of 1897
and #33 of 1901, the Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction Ordinance #6 of
1903 and the Protectorate Native Law Ordinance #16 of 1905 enumerate
powers and responsibilities of the District Commissioners.
28. See Ordinances #5 of 1906, #8 of 1912 and #10 of 1915 respectively.
29. See Ordinances and Schedules of Rules attached, #18 of 1903 and #7 of
1913; and Ordinances #16 of 1905 and #29 of 1906.
* See Appendix A
27
As many of the non-legislated duties evolved guidelines for their
o r)
execution were laid out in Circulars and Standing Instructions. The orig¬
inal Protectorate Ordinance and all subsequent ones during the period under
review contained a section comparable to the 'elastic clause' of the Ameri¬
can Constitution. By empowering the District Commissioner to settle any
31
matters 'which if not promptly settled might lead to breaches of the peace
the District Commissioner could legally intervene wherever he judged nec¬
essary. As the Ordinances do not provide for him to assist in the election
of chiefs norBH^^IB for t0 ""tiate deposition proceedings it can
be assumed such actions were considered a natural extension of his duties
defensible, if necessary, under the broad terms of this section.*
Justice in the Sierra Leone Protectorate was to be administered by
32
the three courts provided for in th4 Protectorate Ordinance. The distinc¬
tions in jurisdiction enabled British subjects to obtain British justice at the
Court of the District Commissioner and the chiefs to judge their own sub¬
jects in accordance with customary law, except in certain cases. Matters
relating to land titles were dealt with in the Court of the District Commis¬
sioner while the chief's jurisdiction over capital offences was removed to
30. See subsequent sections for discussion of these Government 'communi¬
ques' and specific areas, such as tax collection, where District Com-
sioners' duties were delineated by Instructions not Ordinances.
31. Ordinance #20 of 1896, section LXXI; repeated in #33 of 1901, section
101; #16 of 1913, section 3
32. Detailed discussion of the court system in the Sierra Leone Protecto¬
rate is the subject of a separate chapter.
* See Appendices C and D
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the Court of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs. The judicial
power of the chief was further curtailed by the restrictions on the manner
and harshness of punishment he was now allowed to mete out.
In the administration of justice as in other respects the traditional
rulers were left to manage their own affairs so long as they met basic Brit¬
ish objectives. The 'basic British objectives' are best understood by ex¬
amining more closely the system of rule introduced in the Sierra Leone
Protectorate and the various factors and philosophies which contributed to
its formation.
Determination of the Method of Protectorate Rule
The realities of the colonial situation, as assessed by Parkes, the
Secretary for Native Affairs, and confirmed by Cardew and the Secretary of
State in 1894, determined the mode of administration to be introduced in the
Protectorate. The primary concerns of the Government had been to obtain
conditions conducive to trade and to secure the safety of traders and transit.
Whatever system of rule was to be instituted would therefore seek to further
these interests without creating unrest. Relatively effective control had
been obtained without recourse to military conquest, largely through the
agency of the Frontier Police Force. Consequently direct administrative
control was not deemed necessary. Furthermore it was undesirable from
several points of view.
British Government attitudes toward the acquisition of territories
29
may have altered since the 1860's but the central principle of colonial policy
remained that they meet the costs of their own administrations. Joseph
Chamberlain was prepared to advance money for transportation improve¬
ments and other development proposals but not for the establishment of an
33
administrative system in the Protectorate. Not only could the Sierra
Leone Government not afford a direct administration but unless necessary
for security reasons such a choice would have been inconsistent with the
attitudes of the day.
There was an increasing disenchantment with the 'Black Englishmen'
and an outright lack of confidence in Creole officials on the part of Cardew.
Such feelings no doubt contributed to the undercurrent of racism in the
philosophy and practice of retaining as far as possible the indigenous sys¬
tem of rule in the Sierra Leone hiAterland. In reply to Cardew's adminis¬
trative proposals Chamberlain expressed a prevalent sentiment of Victorian
imperalists:
"The existence of a Protectorate in an uncivilised country carries
with it a right on the part of the protecting power to exercise such
authority and jurisdiction—the attributes of Sovereignty—as re¬
quired for due discharge of duties of a Protector-i. e. -protecting
the native from subjects of civilised powers and vice versa, and
from each other, and from ill-treatment and oppression by their
rulers and raids of slave-dealers.
Grace discussed the 'Anthropologists' whom he contends influenced
33. Fyfe, op. cit. , p. 543; Grace, op. cit. p. 164
34. P. R.O. 267/411 16 October 1895 Chamberlain reply to Cardew
9 June 1894 c. 45
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imperial policy. The central idea was that the indigenous people had their
own institutions which had evolved to fit their needs and should be left intact
wherever they did not offend the laws of humanity and civilization as deter¬
mined by the British. 3^ A corollary of the 'Anthropologists' point of view
was that it was not only undesirable but disastrous to attempt to Europeanize
the inhabitants of the Protectorate for it would merely produce a corrupted,
semi-civilised breed 'having destroyed a good thing which they have got
O
without the creation of an effective substitute.'
The stated futility of attempting to cultivate European ways within or
graft them onto African cultures is racist in its notion of the unsuitability of
the customs and institutions of one culture for another, and in its implied
superiority of one set over the other. This type of sentiment did not fade with
t -■
the advent of the twentieth century!but was reinforced by experiences in the
eyes of H. C. Luke.
"The Africans can no more be jerked successfully from a civilisa¬
tion under which they have lived for centuries into one which is
utterly at variance with it, than could a community of Europeans
adopt with satisfactory results the African tribal system, a plu¬
rality of wives, and a discontinuance of boots."3"
The philosophical convictions were quite suited to pragmatic eonside-
35. Grace, op. cit. pp. 99-100. Among those cited, the opinions of Major
Festing, the Government emissary sent to meet Samory in 1888, are
particularly lucid.
36. P. R. O. 267/522 17 April 1910 c. Probyn-Crewe Lukach enclosure
introduction to his Bibliography of Sierra Leone published in 1925
under the name of H. C. Luke
37. Ibid.
rations. It was both fitting and expedient to ensure the cooperation of the
inhabitants of the Protectorate, particularly in developing and maintaining
profitable trade, by ruling them through their chiefs and by their custom¬
ary laws. The type of rule established in the Sierra Leone Protectorate,
complete with its inconsistencies and inherent weaknesses, was therefore a
result of policy formulated by such a concept of the colonial situation.
Those matters which had been explosive in the past were removed
from the jurisdiction of the chiefs. Disputes between chiefs and chiefdoms,
and matters concerning land were two major areas which had caused unrest
in the past and were likely to do so increasingly as more Africans became
involved in a cash-crop economy. Control over non-indigenous people in
the Protectorate also fell to the colonial administrators not the traditional
rulers. Not only did the Government seek peace by assuming judicial re¬
sponsibility for previously or potentially controversial matters and by re¬
fraining from overturning political institutions which existed. They also
did not interfere with the system of 'domestic servitude' the humanitarians
regarded as offensive but which the colonial officials saw as being too en-
3 8
trenched to tamper with without causing widespread disorder.
38. Grace's thesis is a thorough and revealing study of the paradox of
legal recognition of a system of slavery in the Protectorate of a colony
historically associated with the cause of abolition.
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The Structure of British Colonial Government
The Role of the Colonial Office
Consideration of the system in which policy was formulated and
practices reviewed, and the relative position of Sierra Leone in the impe¬
rial scheme of things sheds light on the decisions and dilemmas which
affected administration of British rule in the Sierra Leone Protectorate.
Governors were appointed by Royal Commission, their duties being
defined in Royal Instructions, and were bound to obey the monarch's com¬
mands conveyed him by the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether or
not in accord with the personal views of the Governor. Ordinances enacted
by the Governor 'with the advice and consent' of the Legislative Council,
which in the case of Sierra Leone had been empowered to legislate for the
Protectorate, only became operative upon receiving the Governor's assent
39
and that of the Secretary of State acting for the Crown.
The Secretary of State was the head of the Colonial Office, which was
divided into both geographical and subject departments. The Secretary of
State and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary remained in office conditional
upon their party retaining a majority in Parliament. However an element of
continuity and stability was ensured by the existence of appointed 'permanent'
officials. The departmental nature of the Colonial Office and the erratic use
39. Lugard, F. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh
and London, 1923) pp. 114, 118, 127 In addition, information for this
section is derived from the studies of the Colonial Service by Hall and
Heussler, and deduced from Colonial Office records.
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of subject advisors were not without detrimental effects in the formation of
policy best suited to the conditions in question. It was frequently the case
that dispatches of specifics concerning such areas as welfare, finance and
development, or legal matters were referred to the experts, the advisors
and staff in subject departments. Exercise of their executive authority en¬
abled their decisions, sometimes based largely on theory or imperfect com¬
prehension of local conditions, to override the recommendations of the geo¬
graphical department.
Practical considerations in Britain and West Africa no less than
philosophical inclinations no doubt helped determine the nature of the Colo¬
nial Office's role. Large areas, small staffs, and minimal funds dictated
that much reliance be placed on the individual colonial administrator and
his initiative. Leaving details of policy implementation and a good deal of
its formulation to local administrators was consistent with the lack of di¬
rect control and reliance on indigenous personnel which characterised Pro¬
tectorate rule as well as with the factors which had contributed to its design.
From a purely practical point of view communication and transportation
networks were not sufficiently well developed for the District Commission¬
ers to turn to the Governor nor he to the Secretary of State for review and
approval of each daily decision or emergency procedures.
At all levels in the colonial government hierarchy interference with
levels below them, either in the form of suggested alternatives or disallow-
ance of a proposal, was brought on by recommendations or practices which
diverged from policy. In addition, colonial officials had the opportunity to
exert the prerogative of rank when their advice had been sought or their
authorisation of expenditure required.
There were certain drawbacks to the role of the Colonial Office
which the minute papers of that Office reveal. The recommendations of a
Governor or his resident advisors who possessed not only expertise in their
special fields but also local knowledge were overruled on many occasions by
Colonial Office staff. The opinions of men on the spot might be dismissed
by Whitehall's experts as being unsuitable or outmoded with little considera¬
tion of local conditons, needs, or available resources. More frequently
officials in London took exception to certain specific individuals--usually
Governors--with the result that th^y would block his proposals, take the
word of less qualified and knowledgeable people over his, and generally in¬
capacitate him in many of his efforts.
Such was the fate of Sir Leslie Probyn whose ambitious transporta¬
tion schemes in particular were curbed by such detractors as the Assistant
Under-Secretary of State, Reginald Antrobus, and Fiddian, an experienced
First Class Clerk. Increasingly Probyn's judgment was questioned on a
variety of matters which, although 'containing good points,' were deemed
impulsive, and on courses of action 'which seemed to show that his mind
35
was not well-balanced. Despite efforts to prevent him from returning to
Sierra Leone at the end of his leave in 1908, Probyn was given a clean bill
of physical health by Sir Patrick Manson and allowed to return to Sierra
Leone for a ten month tour. The high hopes Fiddian and Antrobus expressed
for his subsequent pensionning off or transfer 'to some less responsible
post' were anything but realised when Probyn was promoted to the Gover¬
norship of Barbados and later Jamaica.
His successor, Merewether, was scarcely better liked by the Colo¬
nial Office but his tendency toward caution and inaction at least spared him
frequent conflict with Whitehall. Richard Wilkinson arrived in Sierra Leone
under a cloud of Colonial Office disfavour after 27 years of varied experi-
to
ence in the Far East. His overt antagonism wf all branches of the Colonial
Service in Sierra Leone no less than the European community there blinded
Colonial Office personnel to the merits of many of his proposals, whichwere
41
put by until his departure.
Although there were indeed occasions when the distrust and skepti¬
cism of the Colonial Office of a Governor's competence was warranted, the
40. P. R. O. 267/510 24 August 1908 Probyn letter-Crewe Antrobus
minute of 8 September
41. The Colonial Office minutes, particularly for the years 1917-1919,
abound with disparaging comments and criticisms but always fell back
on the lack of grounds to recall him. However, the extent of disfavour
may be judged by the facts, cited by Grace, that Wilkinson was the only
Sierra Leone Governor not to be knighted. Furthermore he was not
found another post after Sierra Leone but retired at the age of 55 in
apparent good health. Grace, op. cit. p. 353
36
curtailing of initiative was a facet of the system which was not always with¬
out effects more detrimental to the local administration and inhabitants than
to the particular administrator. Rejection of Wilkinson's renewed proposal
in 1919 to end domestic slavery because they lacked 'confidence in his abil¬
ity to deal with such a difficult and delicate matter' was one factor in the
42
postponement of this move which was not undertaken for another 8 years.
Throughout the period under consideration the role of individual co¬
lonial officers is critical. The degree to which, in particular, a District
Commissioner or Governor used, abused or neglected his powers and re¬
sponsibilities shaped events, determined the direction development took and
revenue expended, and shifted emphasis of policy execution. Personality
quirks as much as previous experience were determining factors in how ad¬
ministrators performed their duties. As in the case of Wilkinson, newly
appointed colonial officers more often than not arrived with little or no local
knowledge; and experience, if any, in dissimilar conditions.
The Colonial Office minute papers are laced with staff assessments
of the extent to which various Governors utilised the personnel in Sierra
Leone, and of their personal proclivities and shortcomings. Although
Merewether's lethargy and alleged negrophobia were the subject of commen-
42. P. R. O. 267/580 22 January 1919 c. Wilkinson-Milner Ellis minute
See also Grace for Colonial Office attitudes toward Wilkinson and the
abolition of domestic slavery.
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tary, his abrasive personality and tendency to'squelch zeal in his officers' ^
were the more severely criticised of his defects. It was undoubtedly to a
large extent Wilkinson's 'impatience with advice from officers with West
African experience,' belittling and undercutting his district administrators,
and 'scandalous quarrels' with such as the medical staff which made him
'very unpopular with all Europeans' and which brought down the wrath of the
44
Colonial Office upon him.
A defect in a system which relied heavily on individual initiative was
its susceptibility to the whims, passions, energies, and mental capacities of
constantly changing personnel-Governors and district officers alike. Lack
of continuity in the way policies were implemented due to divergence in in¬
terpretation and shift in emphasis between one colonial administrator and
the next was inefficient as well as disruptive as seen in the assessment of
'conchoes' for tax purposes. A further source of confusion to the indigenous
population must have been the all too human tendency to abandon the under¬
takings of one's predecessors and commence new pet projects.
The performance record of any organisation is as good or bad, out¬
standing or mediocre, as the individuals concerned. To an even greater
degree, a system of rule based to a large extent on the initiative of its
43. P. R. O. 267/559 29 July 1914 Merewether-Harcourt
44. P. R. O. 267/575 17 September 1917 secret Wilkinson-Long; /577
17 March 1918 c. Wilkinson-Long; /580 22 January 1919 c.
Wilkinson-Milner Colonial Office minutes
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members is open to the rise of outstanding contributors but also is more
susceptible to the defects and weaknesses possessed by its component
members. As a consequence, the recruitment of colonial service person¬
nel was of critical importance and an investigation of the selection of officers
for Sierra Leone is of particular interest.
The Selection of Colonial Government Officials
By the time the Protectorate was established, the first requirement
of an applicant for a senior position in the Sierra Leone Government was
that he be European. In the eyes of many British the experiment 'to pro-
duce a superior Negro race' of the Settlers, Liberated Africans and
their descendants in the Sierra Leone Colony had failed. This change of
heart was reflected by an alteration in the relationship between the Creoles,
as this group was called, and the Colonial Government. Although there had
46
been portents of things to come in Freetown Government posts, the trend
of relegating Creoles to secondary positions became most apparent when
the Protectorate Administration was being planned. Parkes' suggestion for
administering the proposed Protectorate by Creole Agents was rejected by
the Colonial Office as it was felt that it would be impossible to get a suffi-
47
cient number of qualified Creoles. Thus from 1893 on, the role of the
45. Lewis op. cit. pp. 32, 33
46. See Fyfe op. cit. and Porter, Arthir Creoledom (London, 1963)
for specific manifestations of this trend
47. Porter op. cit. p. 61
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Creole in the Protectorate Administration was to be a subordinate one, and
remained so throughout the period under consideration.
The Role of Creoles in the Protectorate Administration
Creoles in the corps of the Court Messengers and Frontier Police,
later the West African Frontier Force, will be discussed in a subsequent
section. There were two further categories in which they were employed in
Protectorate service: on the District Commissioners' staffs; and attached
to other Government departments.
'Non-natives,' a term used widely in ordinances and records to refer
to the Creoles, monopolized the secondary level in the Protectorate of such
departments as Roads, Railway, Agriculture, and the medical, forestry and
sanitary services. Their positions were clerical cum administrative but the
records indicate that with the frequent turnovers and vacancies among the
European staffs the continuity and continuation of programs often devolved to
a large extent upon this class of people who rarely received recognition for
their efforts or credit for their accomplishments.
The attitude of the British administrators is characterised by the
rapidity with which shortcomings or errors of the Creole personnel were
pointed out, and the reluctance or outright refusal to admit them to positions
of authority. A case in point was the refusal of the Assistant District Com¬
missioner of the Koinadugu District to allow a fully accredited Creole audi¬
tor to examine the District accounts. Berney's grounds for objection were
40
4q
that it was derogatory to the dignity of his office for a native official to
examine his accounts and claimed the right to submit them only to a Euro¬
pean. 49 As a consequence of this incident the Medical Officer and the Com¬
manding Officer of the Frontier Force also refused to allow Maxwell to see
their accounts and the Government was put to considerable expense by having
to send someone else to this furthest-removed Headquarters.
Displaying the traditional pattern of protecting one's own, the Chief
Medical Officer defended Dr. Burrow's action by attributing 'a regretable (sic)
5 0 v-
sensitiveness to his colour' to Mr. Maxwell. With Dr. Front's attitude in
mind, it is not surprising that the West African Medical Service was one of
the great bastions of racial conservatism. It was official policy to exclude
African doctors from this Service, which was the result of the amalgamation
in 1902 of the various West Africaii Medical Departments. The Tittle reli-
51
ance placed on the certificates of native medical practitioners' was despite
the fact that by the turn of the century over twenty Creoles had qualified in
Britain as doctors, and several had served in chief positions in government
52
and military medical branches.
48. In the nomenclature of the times, references to any non-Europeans
were as 'natives' unless a distinction was being made between the
people indigenous to the Protectorate and the descendants of the
Settlers and Liberated Africans. In such instances, they were
'native' and 'non-native' respectively.
49. P. R. O. 267/477 14 May 1905 c. Probyn-Lyttleton
50. P. R. O. 267/477 14 May 1905 c. Probyn-Lyttleton Chief Medical
Officer Prout enclosure
51. P. R.O. C.O. 879/112 999 21 April 1913 Merewether-Hareourt
52. Fyfe, Christopher Sierra Leone Inheritance (London, 1964) p. 299
In 1913 the question arose of allowing 'native employees of the Gov-
KO
ernment to be attended by native medical practitioners.' ° Merewether sup¬
ported the Acting Principal Medical Officer's decision to continue the policy
of restriction which Collette based on, among other reasons, the fact that
such appointments would be highly prejudicial to the status and prestige of
the West African Medical Staff. ^ They were of similar belief that:
"The young men who are educated in England work hard while
they are there, and many of them obtain good degrees and
diplomas; but when they return to the Coast racial characteris¬
tics and the influence of their surroundings appear to be too
strong for them, and most of them sintto a level of hopeless
mediocrity, not to say incompetence.
Merewether was merely more outspoken than most colonial adminis¬
trators. A similar negativism can be seen in the majority of the reports of
District Commissioners when speaking of various of their staff members. Dr.
Maxwell, and to a lesser extent Warren, were the exceptions to the human
tendency most district officers and department heads displayed in referring
to their non-European clerks, interpreters, gaolers, warders and Native
Assistant District Commissioners only when these employees had abused
their positions or neglected their responsibilities. On the whole there was
a markedly patronizing tone to the assessment of the ways in which district
53. P. R.O. 879/112 999 21 April 1913 Merewether-Harcourt
54. P. R.O. 879/112 999 21 April 1913 Merewether-Harcourt Acting
Chief Medical Officer Collett enclosure
55. P. R.O. 879/112 999 21 April 1913 Merewether-Harcourt
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staffs carried out their duties. Although it can be presumed that a great
amount of responsibility fell to them in the frequent absences of the District
and Assistant District Commissioners, and in tasks which sent the African
official away from Headquarters on his own, rarely are examples of initia¬
tive, resourcefulness or even competence cited.
As the non-European staff perceived that the district officer expected
only mediocrity and regarded petty criminal or extortionate practices as
inevitable, and that there was little or no opportunity for advancement or
likelihood of recognition of exceptional efforts, it can be suggested that they
found little incentive to do anything but fulfill his 'expectations' of them.
This pattern of measuring up only to the standard of which you are deemed
capable would be re-enforced by the job security that apparently prevailed.
Individual dismissals occurred when cases of serious criminal of¬
fences or exploitation of the Government uniform were brought to the notice
of the District Commissioner. Richard Harte Keating Willans showed typi¬
cal reluctance to be inconvenienced by turnover and re-training of personnel
when, as Acting District Commissioner of the Northern Sherbro District in
1912, he discovered that his entire clerical staff at district Headquarters
was involved in an extortion racket. He was only on loan from the Frontier
Force, overwhelmed with the massive arrests of alleged Human Leopards
and deficient of many soldiers and Court Messengers already convicted of
robbing natives. Willans felt, not unreasonably from his point of view, that
it was therefore impossible for him to sentence his whole clerical staff to
imprisonment. The Colonial Secretary's position was one of greater de¬
tachment and wider priorities. Consequently he was unsympathetic and had
staff sent from other districts to replace the offenders whose prompt punish¬
ment he instructed.
The position of Assistant District Commissioner was created by
Ordinance #24 of 1899 to augment the Protectorate staff in its efforts to re¬
store order and administration to the area after the 1898 Rebellion. This
official could perform any of the duties and enjoy all of the powers of the
District Commissioner in the course of carrying out his assignments.
King-Harmon specifically excluded what he referred to as Sierra Leoneans
from this position on the grounds that the chiefs hated them and they would
thus be unable to command respect and authority. ^ Consequently, when the
use of Creoles was made to increase the Protectorate staff without spending
money for more Europeans, the role of Native Assistant District Commis¬
sioner varied greatly from that of his European counterpart.
The duties laid out for N. H. Boston who was appointed in 1905 on a
trial basis as Native Assistant District Commissioner in the Bandajuma
District were essentially those of a glorified clerk. He was specifically re¬
stricted from 'any dealings with the Chiefs or the aborigines,' but if neces-
56. S. L. A. C203 1912 4 October Acting D. C. Willans N. Sherbro
57. P. R. O. 267/458 13 June 1901 #202 King-Harman -Chamberlain
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sary might be detailed to try small cases between Sierra Leoneans. Beyond
that he was chiefly to be employed in helping with office or routine work.
Even at that, his services were terminated within the year for 'neglect or
59
incapacity in Treasury matters.'
Some years later Dr. Maxwell, who had been District Commissioner
of Bandajuma at that time, identified the difficulty in drawing a sharp line
between matters that might be dealt with by the Native Assistant District
Commissioner and those which should be left for the return of the Assistant
District Commissioner and District Commissioner from patrol. As no fur¬
ther delineation of duties appears in the records it can be assumed that either
the subsequent Native Assistant District Commissioners themselves drew the
line at the appropriate place or their superiors allowed them more initiative
t
and offered them more guidance.
John Adolphus Songo Davies, formerly sub-accountant in Sulima and
Postmaster at Bonthe, was Native District Commissioner under Maxwell in
the Railway District from 1906 until his retirement for medical reasons in
1911. A dozen years later Governor Slater interviewed Davies and was fa-
58. S. L. A. 4358 1904 4 November King-Harmon; P. R. O. 267/478
15 June 1905 #262 Probyn-Lyttleton; S. L. A. 437 1906 16 January
Probyn
59. Noted in P. R. O. 267/604 17 June 1924 c. Slater-Thomas overall
study of 'policy followed locally in matter of appointing natives to
Colonial Service'
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vourably impressed with his keen and intelligent interest in the affairs of the
fin
Protectorate, particularly its economic development. This interest ap¬
pears especially commendable in view of the fact that his retirement appli¬
cation for land lease from a chief to start a kola, rubber and cocao plantation
fi 1
was turned down as being against Colonial Regulations.
Despite Davies' 'exceptional record as a trustworthy and capable offi¬
cer' at the time of his appointment to the Railway District administration,
and his scholarly achievements in Mende,®^ the years of his association witji
-*ri
Maxwell did not convince the Scotsman of the merits of Native Assistant Dis¬
trict Commissioners. Although there were by 1911 two other such officers,
Tuboku-Metzger appointed in 1908 and Valantin the following year, Maxwell's
recommendation against the hiring of any further Creoles for administrative
posts was accepted. !
There were many British officials in Sierra Leone and London who
shared the opinion of Haddon-Smith, as the Officer Administering the Govern¬
ment, that:
"The experiment of appointing native, OR RATHER CREOLE,
Assistant District Commissioners, has not been attended with
success. They do not enjoy the confidence of their own class
or the Protectorate natives, which detracts from their value
as district officers; nor have they the necessary qualifications
for magisterial work."®^
60. Ibid.
61. P. R. O. 267/530 7 March 1911 Merewether-Harcourt
62. P. R.O. 267/487 24 August 1906 #315 Probyn-Elgin;
P. R.O. 267/488 31 October 1906 #332 Probyn-Elgin
63. P. R.O. 267/533 5 September 1911 c. O.A.G. Haddon-Smith - Harcourt
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The latter was the specific criticism at that time of Valantin who retired
from the Headquarters District four years later. Although there were only
four chiefdoms in that district it was felt that a European should replace
him. Tuboku-Metzger was retired in 1917 under the age limit clause to
provide him a graceful exit from his position which, under Fairtlough in
Northern Sherbro, he had reportedly seriously abused. ^
For the years remaining during the period under review, the titles
changed but the job descriptions of positions open to Africans of any sort in
the Protectorate Administration remained the same. Whereas the title
'senior clerk' was felt in 1910 to imply more than 'the financial and clerical
65
power which natives and Creoles were to be limited to, 'Office Assistants'
were created in 1920. Each of the three Provincial Commissioners had one
of these 'deserving subordinates' ^ho were to take charge of the office in
his absence but assume no political duties. The purpose stated by Wilkinson
for its inception was that this post would 'provide openings of more respon¬
sible work for officers recruited locally whose service has shown them capa-
66
ble and trustworthy.'
The qualification of prior service was the basis on which the Governor
64. P. R. O. 267/558 4 May 1914 #252 Merewether-Harcourt;
P. R.O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long;
P. R. O. 267/574 14 February 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long;
P. R.O. 267/604 17 June 1924 c. Slater-Thomas
65. P. R.O. 267/524 11 August 1910 #386 Probyn-Hareourt
66. P. R.O. 267/587 20 August 1902 #387 Wilkinson-Milner
rejected the earlier application of R. Awunor-Renner, a barrister then read¬
ing in Chambers in England, for appointment as an Assistant District Com-
. . 67
missioner.
As Colonial Secretary in the Gold Coast Colony, A. Ransford Slater
had shown decided opposition to the principle of exclusion of 'native medical
practitioners' from the West African Medical Service when such had been
put forth by the Advisory Medical and Sanitary Committee for Tropical
68Africa. As Governor of Sierra Leone, however, he expressed to the Leg¬
islative Council his opinion that 'it would be inappropriate to place any chief
under the authority either of a native from the Colony, or of a native from
the Protectorate who would necessarily be either one of his subjects or the
subject of another Chief.' Confidentially, to the Secretary of State, he did
admit the possibility that a man 'of!such ability, character and influence as
to command universal respect and confidence' might at some future date be
found who could receive an appointment to the Political Administration in
the Protectorate.
European Government Officials
The first District Commissioners for the Sierra Leone Protectorate,
67. P. R. O. 267/604 17 June 1924 c. Slater-Thomas
68. P. R.O. 879/116 1031 21 January 1915 c. Clifford-Harcourt
Slater enclosure
69. P. R.O. 267/604 17 June 1924 c. Slater-Thomas
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and many of their successors and Assistants, were recruited from the
Frontier Police. Not only was Cardew moved to promote officers to avoid
friction between the administration and Police by bringing in outsiders; he
also chose this course because the Colonial Office had restricted expendi-
70
ture on the establishment of an administration in the Protectorate.
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The 'firm and strong hand in dealing with natives' for which Fairt-
lough in later years was criticised were the qualities best suited for insti¬
tuting rule. It will become apparent that these same authoritarian charac¬
teristics were not necessarily considered virtues in the subsequent years of
a more consolidated, diversified administration. Many of the surviving
pioneer administrators were temperamentally unable or unwilling to take up
new responsibilities and innovations as the needs and circumstances of ad¬
ministration altered and the demand for strong-arm tactics to instill law and
order was greatly reduced.
In a plea for Chamberlain's approval of another District Commis¬
sioner and four Assistants, King-HarmAn offered one of the most succinct
descriptions of the duties of the administration in the Protectorate:
"Expenditure is necessary not only to develop the country but
to also satisfy the people that the Government was not estab¬
lished to plunder but to benefit them. In addition to these ele¬
mentary responsibilities there falls on the administration of
these districts the necessity of keeping close watch over the
people and the chiefs, encouraging loyalty, investigating and
70. Fyfe History op. cit. p. 548; Grace op. cit. p. 176
71. P. R. O. 207/572 28 October 1916 c. Wilkinson-Bonar Law
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if possible redressing grievances, judging quarrels, sup¬
pressing discontent and disatisfaction, and by constant and
frequent intercourse with them, maintaining the authority of
the Crown.
The Secretary of State, traditionally parsimonious in matters of
administrative expenditure, was sufficiently impressed by King-Harman's
defence to allow the staff increase.
The certain type of person desired for such an undertaking was a man
k
of high moral character with either successful military or administrative
70
experience in 'the treatment and management of coloured races.' The
underlying criterion was and remained that Protectorate administrators be:
74
"men of character who could answer in every sense to the term 'gentlemen.
Particular jobs had specific additional requirements, and although
tact and dignity were considered more important than educational attain¬
ments in the search for a teacher and Assistant Master at the Bo School for
sons of Chiefs, the Principal was especially anxious that no Scotsman be
selected. It was Mr. Proudfoot's belief that 'the hard ability found in
Scottish elementary and higher grade schools does not carry with it the
rjc
essential necessary for teaching sons of chiefs.'
72. P. R. O. 267/457 2 March 1901 #66 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
73. Ibid.
74. P. R. O. 267/552 11 November 1913 #570 O. A. G. Mollis-Harcourt
75. P.R.O. 267/552 11 November 1913 #570 O. A. G. Mollis-Harcourt
Proudfoot enclosure
As conditions in the Protectorate settled in the early years of this
century, the Government identified the need for people with special skills
in other departments and also within the district administrative staff. Al¬
though created to free the District Commissioner from some of his duties
and to relieve him in his absence, the post of Assistant District Commis¬
sioner came to be regarded as one which could incorporate certain more
specialized abilities and training, such as in law and indigenous languages,
which the District Commissioners did not possess. The system existing in
1908 of appointing 'half-educated Army men as Assistant District Commis¬
sioners and shifting them continually from station to station' was deprecated
76
by Fiddian at the Colonial Office on several grounds.
Not only did it undermine the effectiveness of the administration to
have people of questionable competence assuming such responsibility, but
also the constant turnover did not take advantage of knowledge acquired of
the customs, history and language of a particular area. As a result there
emerged a tendency for Assistant District Commissioners to fall into two
categories: those more or less permanently attached to one district; and
those who had proven themselves especially able or possessed of legal quali¬
fications who were used in a capacity of troubleshooters or roving legal con¬
sultants and prosecutors as situations required.
76. P. R. O. 267/501 5 January 1908 #3 Probyn-Elgin Fiddian minute
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The function of the Government slowly changed from being concerned
just with the maintenance of law and order to being increasingly interested
in social and economic development. The diversification and complexity of
undertakings of the Protectorate Administration which separated the old and
new generation of colonial officer also constituted a divisive factor between
many of those district officers who had involved themselves in early inno¬
vation, and the experts who were latterly brought in to further such interests
as public health, forestry, and agriculture in the Protectorate.
Some districts were therefore under the jurisdiction of authoritarian,
old guard administrators who were not committed to or involved in, for
example, agricultural experiments or sanitation schemes as were the more
recently appointed, younger, 'new blood.' In addition to their presumed
good health and vigour, the latter possessed training which was not only
more recent but in many cases more specialised. In other districts, in¬
volved political officers came in conflict with the imported specialists
whose presence and interference they resented, and whose judgement in
matters pertaining to the indigenous population they questioned if not con¬
demned. It is a matter of conjecture whether these divergences among
personnel were a liability to modernization as Kilson would no doubt con¬
tend, a stabilising factor and safeguard of the interests of the indigenous
population, or of minimal impact on either the ultimate development of the
Protectorate or its inhabitants.
It was the case with such District Commissioners as Maxwell,
Warren and Stanley that they offered constructive criticisms as to modifica¬
tions of, in particular, proposed restricted areas and forest reserves, and
public health regulations and establishment of sanitary districts. When act¬
ing in conjunction with the experts such officials were able to suggest the best
way to introduce such innovations without defeating the Government's own
77
purposes and stirring up strong opposition or creating unrest. It was
fortunate that officers of such capabilities and initiative served in Sierra
Leone during the Governorship of Merewether, who distinguished himself
by being argumentative and thwarting, in particular, the efforts of the Med¬
ical and Sanitary Officers with his petty and persistent complaints and lack
of cooperation.
Although Fiddian, as well ab district administrators, complained of
'half-educated' Assistant District Commissioners, the fact of the matter was
that this position did not often attract more qualified individuals. This truth
does not apply only to the Assistant District Commissioners but also to their
more senior administrators. The promotion opportunities as much as the
recruitment processes weighed on the calibre of the administrators obtained
for service in Sierra Leone, and consequently on the effects of the Protecto¬
rate Administration.
77. See P. R. O. 267/559 30 August 1914 #502 Merewether-Harcourt;
P. R.O. 207/561 4 November 1914 #589 Merewether-Harcourt;
P. R. O. 267/600 21 June 1923 #286 Slater-Devonshire
In the imperial scheme of things, West Africa was singled out as a
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region without much room for advancement. Beyond that, the position of
District Commissioner in Sierra Leone was identified as 'lacking the same
79
prospects of promotion as in Nigeria or Gold Coast.' A further detraction
from accepting an appointment to Sierra Leone, or remaining there any
longer than necessary, was its inferior salary schedule. As the District
Commissioners were admittedly 'less liberally paid for their duties than
80
elsewhere' it can be questioned if in fact those administrators who stayed
on for considerable years did so out of dedication or desperation, altruism
or lack of alternative.
Fiddian would agree with the complaint that in the years after the es¬
tablishment of the Protectorate, there were not enough qualified officers in
the Frontier Police from which to bhoose District Commissioners. As a re¬
sult, those appointed were often too young and inexperienced, or lacking the
training and educational attainments of their colleagues in the Colonial Ser¬
vice of other areas.
Non-ranking officers who were successful as Assistant District Com¬
missioners were promoted to District Commissioners, while a few officers
78. P. R. O. 267/491 9 July 1906 C.O. to self Anderson minute
79. P. R. O. 267/500 4 February 1907 Probyn letter to Elgin
80. P. R. O. 267/500 4 February 1907 Probyn letter to Elgin
Anderson minute
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like Captain W. B. Stanley, were directly appointed to the senior Protecto¬
rate administrative position. On the whole Sierra Leone appeared to be a
proving ground from which capable, eager and ambitious officials were pro¬
moted, perhaps one day to return in a far more elevated capacity. Although
this tendency would no doubt be present throughout the Colonial Service, it
can be suggested that the systems of recruitment and promotion and the
relatively low status of Sierra Leone affected the quality of administration
in the Sierra Leone Protectorate.
It is possible that the seemingly rigid pecking order for top Govern¬
ment positions excluded some who would have excelled and made valuable
contributions. Stanley's accomplishments, excellent record, and high
commendations from the likes of Wilkinson did not outweigh the deficiencies
| Q i
in his education when being considered for Colonial Secretary. Stanley's
sturdy but undistinguished service in the Gambia and Sierra Leone contrasts
vividly with the opportunities and achievements of James Crawford Maxwell,
M. D. , LL. D. , University of Edinburgh. After more than a dozen years as a
District Commissioner in Sierra Leone, he was a Resident in Nigeria. Max¬
well returned to Sierra Leone as Colonial Secretary in 1921 en route to the
same post in the Gold Coast, and the Governorship of Northern Rhodesia.
The consequences of the promotion system affected the Protectorate
81. P. R.O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long
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people directly in the case of Fairtlough who became of impaired usefulness
in the eyes of Wilkinson because he was allegedly soured by domestic prob¬
lems and lack of advancement?^ If such were the case his>£900 a year,
D. S. O. , and C. M. G. presumably were not of sufficient consolation to pre¬
vent him from inflicting the people of the Northern Sherbro District with an
administration which was ultimately proven to be chaotic as well as abusive.
A back-handed compliment to the critical role of the District Com¬
missioner in colonial administrative hierarchy was the tendency for a less
lenient view to be taken of their transgressions than those of either lesser
administrative officials or of Governors. Presumably it was felt that the
ranking political officers in a district were in the position to do the most
damage to the causes of the Government in the administration of the Protec¬
torate. !
Although it is impossible from the study of cases to determine a hard
and fast rule of what specific offences or types of errors tipped the scales
against a government official, a pattern emerges of the limits of improper
or ill-advised behaviour which were tolerated from the various levels of the
hierarchy.
The case in 1901 against J. Benton) Johnson, a Creole Sub-Inspector
of the Frontier Police Force, was based on a wide range of charges from
82. Ibid.
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having his concubine carried in a hammock by forced labour and attended by
an escort of Frontiers, to extortion and interference in court decisions.
Dr. Hood was sent to 'enquire with an open mind and found that all Fairt-
lough had said was true of Johnson's living an immoral life and taking ad¬
vantage of his official position to have his concubine's mother made chief
83
of Mokassi.' Johnson then was allowed to go on his own to collect testi¬
monies in his own defence. Not surprisingly the evidence he gathered upset
the findings of the two District Commissioners. Although Hudson, acting as
Attorney General, realised the possibility of the witnesses having been 'got
at' the question of Johnson's suspension was referred to the Executive Coun¬
cil for their consideration. After being favourably impressed by the defence
made orally by Johnson, the Executive Council came to the unanimous de¬
cision that he: !
".. . had interfered improperly and unjustifiably with the
internal affairs of the people; that he had exceeded his
duty and gone beyond his province in intriguing in respect
of succession to chiefdoms, and that he had shown a lack
of judgement and discretion in dealing with the natives...
that he had openly led an immoral life, setting a bad
example to his men and forfeiting the respect due his
office."84
By reason of his past good service and straitforward personal defence,
Johnson received a severe reprimand and a transfer to service in Freetown.
83. S. L. A. 479 1902 22 January D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta Acting
Attorney General Hudson 12 August
84. S. L. A. 479 1902 22 January D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta
King-Harmon 24 August
Assistant District Commissioner Berney's incompetence and nar¬
row escape from causing bloodshed in tax collection problems in the Safroko
Limba area of Koinadugu in 1904 was the final in a series of incidents of
poor judgement linked to his name. Before King-Harman's departure he
made it a point of record that in the event Berney returned to Sierra Leone
after his leave, he not be entrusted with the administration of a district
85
under any circumstances. His successor, Leslie Probyn, apparently re¬
garded the matter with lenience similar to that King-Harman had shown
Johnson. Berney served nearly another full term in the Protectorate Ad¬
ministration before he was transferred to another Colony.
Inconclusive accusations against Graham D'Arcy Anderson, District
Commissioner of Panguma and the Central Districts from 1901 to 1909,
centred on his burning of a dwelling*^ and were nowhere as well substantia¬
ted or as serious as those of tax and judicial maladministration brought
87
against Fairtlough. Anderson was speedily removed but Fairtlough al¬
lowed to see out the remaining year of his tour before being granted his
pension. It can be suggested that the former's tendency to 'close associ-
85. S. L. A. C46 1904 10 April Acting D. C. Berney Koinadugu
King-Harmon 25 May
86. P. R. O. 267/517 20 November 1909 c. Probyn-Crewe;
P. R. O. 267/520 21 December 1909 Probyn letter to Crewe
87. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long
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ation with the natives' and antagonism of his fellow District Commissioners^
was viewed with greater disfavour and considered a more serious departure
from accepted behaviour than Fairtlough's rough handling of the indigenous
population and inept handling of administrative details.
In all cases of charges against government officials there appeared a
sense of protecting one's own and allowing face- and pens ion-saving arrange¬
ments which would be least embarrassing. Although such a sense of fair
play served to the advantage of the individual administrator as well as to the
preservation of the image of the administration in general, it can be ques¬
tioned what the effects of such a policy were on the Protectorate peoples. If
the state of the Northern Sherbro District's affairs after Fairtlough's lame
duck year are any example, it can be supposed that in most cases where ad¬
ministrative officials were left to finish out their tours of duty they would do
so in a barely perfunctory manner. W. R. Lyon found records hopelessly
mixed up and use of them almost impossible due to the confused state of the
office and of the filing system. In addition, large numbers of outstanding
complaints and over 200 prisoners in a 100-person gaol awaited the arrival
89
of the replacement District Commissioner.
88. P. R. O. 267/500 18 January 1907 Anderson letter to Elgin;
P. R. O. 267/492 22 March 1907 c. Probyn-Elgin;
P. R. O. 267/517 20 November 1909 c. Probyn-Crewe;
P. R. O. 267/520 21 December 1909 Probyn letter to Crewe
89. S. L. A. C247 1919 12 December D. C. Lyon Ronietta
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The Mechanics of Administration
The presence of only a limited number of British officials to effect
British rule throughout some 27, 000 virtually roadless square miles posed
certain logistical problems. The citation by Chalmers that it was a 14 days'
journey between Freetown and two of the district Headquarters, Falaba and
90
Panguma, does not seem unreasonable. Not only the terrain worked
against rapid communication, but also the climate. During the rains, roads
and footpaths became impassable, bridges washed out, and fording places
flooded. Even after the Railway and major feeder roads had been completed
and administration consolidated it was not unusual for District Commissioners
to report the existence of villages not previously encountered and the state
of affairs of others visited annually at best.
Communication problems, infrequency and irregularity of patrols to
remoter parts of a district, and frequent turnover in European personnel
made it essential for procedures concerning administrative affairs to be
systematized. However, lack of standardization of such procedures and the
consequent variation between the methods of a District Commissioner and his
predecessor, and his colleagues in other districts caused discrepancies within
the administration of one district and from one district to the next which af¬
fected the indigenous population.
Reviewing the way the steps to be followed in the settlement of bounda-
90. Parliamentary Papers 1899 vol. LX c. 9391 p. 673
ries were arrived at is instructive because disputes over chiefdom bounda¬
ries, in particular, were taken very seriously. They were regarded not
only as a potential source of unrest but also of tax dislocation. Informal
rules of thumb and intuition guided the district officers until King-Harmon
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issued a circular on the settlement of Protectorate land disputes in 1902.
This document apparently had little impact on the procedures followed by the
individual political officers. The reports of these men continued to abound
with boundary cases complicated by lack of records from predecessors, the
tendency of chiefs to appeal long-standing but previously settled grievances
to each successive District Commissioner, and lack of uniformity in map
terminologies and frames of reference.
Restatement of the obvious was apparently deemed necessary. In¬
structions of September 1906 called for the rapid settlement of any land dis¬
pute, and outlined procedures which were designed to discourage the re-open¬
ing of cases; those of the following July discussed the use of assessor chiefs
in boundary palavers. 92 Throughout the period under review, district ad¬
ministrators were instructed against re-opening cases settled by their pre¬
decessors, and admonished when they did so. Although it was recognized
that there were occasions when the appeals were of valid grievances on con¬
ditions which had altered to make an earlier decision inoperable, 'cheap
91.
92.
S. L. A. 834 1902 22 February
Sierra Leone Standing Instructions of 29 September 1906 and
9 July 1907, respectively
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local popularity at the expense of the efficiency of the Government' was
considered to be the main result of re-opening cases and reversing decisions.
Despite efforts to formalize practices and precedents in the settle¬
ment of land disputes, Protectorate administrators obviously were not apply¬
ing them uniformly, as revealed by the records of such disputes and by a
1917 report made by Warren. The then District Commissioner of Karene
forwarded not only specific criticisms but, in anticipation of a postwar sur¬
vey of the Protectorate which would require clearly defined chiefdom boun¬
daries, he made proposals for steps to be taken when disputes arose in the
determination of such boundaries.
Warren, whose own attention to details was a commendable feature of
his reports, found that records throughout the Protectorate were often lack¬
ing in such useful 'extras' as the mimes of Government officials, such as
Court Messengers, who were present at boundary agreements. Cases were
justifiably re-opened, in his opinion, when the descriptions of the physical
boundary could not be followed by the people either due to discrepancy in
place names or to bearing no relationship to geographical realities. Warren
maintained that such defects were often the result of the areas concerned not
94
having been visited by the political officer making the decision. The sug¬
gestions of this experienced First Class District Commissioner were incor-
93. S. L. A. D. C. Railway #20 1919 28 March Bowden
94. S. L. A. D. C. Karene #60 1917 29 June Warren; Standing
Instructions of 17 August 1917
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porated Into Standing Instruction #1 of 1917* Although not all of his col¬
leagues agreed with the required use of assessor chiefs they were denied any
options by Governor Wilkinson.
The problems deriving from poor maps existed throughout the period
under review for as late as 1924 there was no Survey Department in Sierra
Leone and the existing maps for the Protectorate had been compiled by the
District Commissioners over the years. The differences in the details pro¬
vided and apparent attempts made at accuracy in scale, area, place names
and locations between the maps required of the five District Commissioners
95
in 1904 is very evident even to one not trained in cartography.
In 1904 Captain Warren, District Commissioner of Bandajuma, had
conveyed to King-Harmon details of a record-keeping system. These sug¬
gestions were among the active fil4s left when Sir Charles assumed the post
of High Commissioner of Cyprus. Upon the arrival of Probyn as Governor
they were incorporated into Standing Instruction #47 of 1904.
The system of Standing Instructions themselves is worthy of mention.
They were a method instituted by Probyn to circulate to District Commis¬
sioners for their guidance explanations of general principles and 'detailed
statements of policy especially on matters which are either not quite ripe for
legislation or on which the issue of formal Regulations under an Ordinance
95. S. L. A. 3986 1904
* See Appendix E.
63
96
would be premature.' Over the years Standing Instructions were issued
on diverse topics ranging from Sanitation of Towns in the Protectorate, to
97
The Authority of District Commissioners over Chiefs. These Instructions
were not themselves legally enforceable, but beyond being useful guides for
desired innovations they often sought to standardize the details of procedures
in such mandated actions as The Deposition of Chiefs, and the Collection of
98
the House Tax. The use of Circulars was another means of relaying infor¬
mation, of a more general nature, to district administrators.
Hudson, formerly a district officer and now as Circuit Judge, was used
throughout his 1905 circuit to help obtain uniformity among the District Com¬
missioners in the setting up of Decree and Intelligence Books. The contents
of these books vary greatly, the most comprehensive entries of diligent and
imaginative district administrators including not only the requisite reports
of deaths and elections of chiefs, court decisions and boundary agreements,
tax assessments, circulars received and orders dispatched. The explana¬
tions of decisions and procedures also found in Decree Books were no doubt
of interest and assistance to succeeding officers who availed themselves of
the information. Of even greater value must have been those entries in In¬
telligence Books which would qualify as the Michelin Guide to the Sierra
96. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long
97. Standing Instructions #5 of 1909 26 April, and #9 of 1910 22 August,
respectively. See Appendices A and C.
98. Standing Instructions #10 of 1910 22 August, and #4 of 1910 30 April,
respectively. See Appendices D and B.
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Leone Protectorate. Not only were distances and states of roads reported,
but also flora and fauna described and the best places to stay recommended.
Hudson's first report of the working of this system included the ob¬
servation that the Intelligence Books were of the greatest value and reflected
99
the intelligence of the officers who kept them. Certainly the potential val¬
ue of these books was enormous for more immediate uses than those of the
historian. It must have been gratifying for Sierra Leone administrators to
hear that an inspection of the books in 1924 revealed to Furley, who had ex¬
tensive experience of such matters, that 'the Provincial Commissioners in
the Gold Coast Colony have nothing so valuable to show.
It was his belief that the great value of such work would be more
appreciated in the years to come as the country developed. Not only did
such assume the utilization of the Records but also the preservation thereof.
The practice of sending duplicate entries to Freetown to be entered in the
Colonial Secretary's Office Decree Book was not adhered to regularly and
and did not save them from perdition. Certainly those copies, and later
the originals sent to Freetown, stood a greater chance of being protected
from the ravages of time, silverfish, flood and careless handling than the
101
ones which remained in district headquarters. However, the surviving
contents of the Sierra Leone Archives are not an encouraging testimony to
99. P. R. O. 267/478 5 June 1905 #234 Probyn-Lyttleton Hudson
enclosure
100. P. R. O. 267/603 2 February 1924 #39 Slater Thomas Furley enclosure
101. See Howard, Allen "Survey of Provincial & District Archives, Nor¬
thern Province, Sierra Leone" Sierra Leone Studies n. s. No. 19
July, 1966
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the system of record-keeping which prevailed in Freetown.
Unfortunately the fulfillment of the potential of the Decree and Intel¬
ligence Books seen by Probyn and Hudson depended on the men implementing
the system as much as on those who came later using and preserving the in¬
formation. The Standing Instruction did not guarantee that District and As¬
sistant District Commissioners would in fact maintain the record books in the
desired fashion, if at all. Nor did it specify contents or format for cata¬
loguing information. Consequently great variations and inconsistencies
exist in place names, statistics recorded, and the types and amounts of de¬
tails such as vote tally for chiefs' elections and names of assessor chiefs in
attendance. As a result some district administrators were of the opinion
that the records were more confounding that no records at all.
Such was the nature of the System of colonial administration that it
was not at all unusual for passing comments of administrators in the field to
trigger off enquiries which in turn gave rise to formal directives of legisla¬
tion. A query by the District Commissioner of the Panguma District, G. D.
Anderson, about a chief's stipend caused the newly-arrived Probyn to re¬
quire a full accounting from District Commissioners and the Colonial Treas¬
urer of all stipendary and other similar payments. This was the first com¬
plete rendering of this information and the records were found to be 'hope¬
lessly fouled up' by abrogations resulting from the 1898 Uprising, unreported
deaths and disappearances of stipendary chiefs, payments in arrears for
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chiefs elected but not reported, and payments not requested. *02
Probyn's penchant for organisation provided administrators at the
time and since, as well as historians, with valuable records, updated annu¬
ally, of stipends and annual presents to chiefs including the reasons for and
dates of origin of these payments. These lists did not, however, include the
deaths and elections of the many chiefs and sub-chiefs who were not recipi¬
ents of such awards. Comprehensive accounts of this nature, and particulars
of successors, were not reported until 1912 at which time highly informative
and interesting assessments of the existing chiefs were submitted by the
103
District Commissioners.
It was most common for the Governor to initiate a poll of the Dis¬
trict Commissioners' recommendations on such matters as the deposition of
chiefs and the recruitment of Court! Messengers. However it was not unknown
for the Secretary of State to take the initiative, and require an accounting of
practices or opinions of not only the Governor but also the District Commis¬
sioners. As much as the human element precluded the reliable and uniform
use of established procedures by all the district administrators, it made
equally unpredictable to what extent if any the suggestions of the political
officers in the Protectorate would be given proper consideration.
All the factors which affected the amount a Governor was left to his
102. S. L. A. 2868 1904 4 October D. C. Anderson Panguma
103. S. L. A. C37 1913
discretion, the extent to which he relied on his staff and paid heed to Colo¬
nial Office cautions, and received the blessing of the Secretary of State are
shown vividly in the way Cardew established a Protectorate. Officials at the
Colonial Office may have regretted that he tended to act on his own, counseled
him to proceed slowly and carefully with the introduction of the tax, and dis¬
allowed major portions of the Protectorate Ordinance which he presented for
approval virtually sight unseen. However the fact remains that though by no
means exonerated of responsibility for the 1898 Uprising, Cardew was re¬
tained to establish British rule once again in the Sierra Leone Protectorate.
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CHAPTER II
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT
OF BRITISH RULE IN THE PROTECTORATE
The Protectorate Inhabitants
It is not the purpose of this study to reiterate the findings of the di-
i
verse contemporary observers, historians, and anthropologists who have
dealt specifically with the institutions and ways of life of the various Protec¬
torate peoples. However, the similarities and diversities of heritages;
customs; and political, economic, and social systems of the pre-Protecto-
rate period have bearing on the effects, both discernible and presumed of the
imposition of an alien administration.
"It should be remembered that it was not a No Man's Land which was
being dealt with . .. but a populous territory which had been for ages par¬
celled out and under definite government, though the plane of civilization
2
might be far removed from a European standard."
The fact of original inhabitants of an area sometimes absorbing or
being absorbed by invaders makes it difficult to determine the number of
1. The material in this section is based primarily on the works of Finne-
gan for the Limba; Dorjahn and Thomas for the Temne; Little for the
Mende; and McCulloch and Maxwell (see Chapter I, footnote 16) for
the Protectorate peoples in general. In addition there are articles
and monographs too numerous to mention in both the old and new
series of Sierra Leone Studies.
2. Parliamentary Papers 1899 vol. LX (The Chalmers Report)
c. 9388 Part I p. 23
'tribes,' or ethnic groups, which existed in the Sierra Leone hinterland at
the end of the last century. Harvey and Dalby distinguish between 17 ethnic
and 13 major indigenous linguistic groups found presently in what was the
Protectorate. The distinction is that although several ethnic groups may
now speak one language, there may be several languages spoken by the peo-
3
pie considered to belong to one major ethnic group. Whichever criterion
is used, it is apparent that there are now a significant number of different
peoples in this area, and it cannot be expected that any change in this num¬
ber since the founding of the Protectorate would be one of increase.
Within a major classification, such as the Mende, there was, and is,
great diversity as a result of differing contacts with outsiders; geographical
location, which affected economic activity and the proximity of people of
similar and different ethnic origin; and the extent of political and economic
independence.
Just as there was great linguistic and ethnic diversity among the peo¬
ple of the hinterland, there were enormous differences in the political sys¬
tems. Variables in this respect related to the process by which a person
became ruler and the extent to which the ruler held the position of actual
power and authority.
Authority and power rested with the person or persons who made the
3. Dalby, T. D. P. "Languages" and Harvey, M. E. "Ethnic Groups"
in J. I. Clarke's Sierra Leone in Maps (London, 1966) pp. 38, 36
respectively
laws and judgements, and saw to their enforcement. There were areas
where the ruler exercised these powers and carried out these duties on his
own behalf. In other areas the influence of the ruler derived, in part or in
total, from the important men of the chiefdom. These men were, in some
cases, part of a hierarchy readily apparent even to outsiders. In others
they constituted a virtually invisible power behind the throne, often ema¬
nating from the inner circles of a secret society, such as the Poro.
As a generalization it can be said that the Temne had one of the most
organised, structured political systems. Their rulers incorporated religious
and social functions as well as political and, as a rule, were chosen, like the
Susu, Limba and Koranko, from the hereditary ruling family in the chiefdom.
The Vai, Krim and Bullom rulers were also of hereditary descent, but more
often of more than one, or alternating, families.
Although some Mende chiefdoms had established a definite line of
succession during the 1800's, many were ruled by the person who exerted
the greatest influence at the time of election. 'Influence' can be variously
construed to mean bribery, intimidation, or military might, as all had their
part in the selection of Mende, and other, rulers.
Succession of descent in all cases would be disrupted by such contin¬
gencies as the absence of any rightful claimant, the overwhelming unpopu¬
larity of a successor too weak to enforce his claim, or the necessity of
deferring in times of war to one who would be a better leader.
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This latter consideration was largely responsible for the fact that, in
the majority of the hinterland areas, there existed, to a greater or lesser
extent at different times, a fluid state in both the number of rulers and their
relative ranking. It was not uncommon for independent headmen to give
fealty to a strong warrior chief, join against a common enemy, and revert to
the former status. Instances of subordinates with equal power as their over¬
lord no doubt derived from.such circumstances.
There is a distinction between rulers who paid allegiance to another
by virtue of conquest or other obligatory situations, and those who were vol¬
untarily under another's influence. In the latter cases the ruler in the su¬
perior position was not necessarily of greater authority or hierarchical rank.
He owed his role as consultant and arbiter to the fact he was thusly regarded
by other rulers, not to his imposition of his will.
The number of rulers with great power was small; the number with
equal powers inconstant. Such conditions bore significantly on the similarly
fluid state of chiefdom boundaries. It was the observation of Dr. Maxwell,
who became a District Commissioner in 1900, that:
"chiefdoms vary very greatly in area, some being only twenty
or thirty square miles, some being several hundred square
miles. They also vary in age, some dating back if tradition
is to be relied on to the settlement of the people in the country,
others having sprung up shortly before the administration of the
Protectorate began. There were continuing wars in the country
even between the different sections of the same people, and in
consequence up to 1896 the chiefdoms were continually altering."
4. P. R. O. 267/503 25 April 1908 #209 Probyn-Crewe Maxwell enclosure
Vague, indeterminate spheres of influence coexisted in the hinter¬
land with ones which were well-defined. On the one hand areas were con¬
quered by invaders and subsequently controlled or absorbed. On the other
hand, it was not unusual to give lands as payment for defence. Such a pro¬
cedure could work in one of several ways, for not only could areas be given
to a protector, but also as a bribe to a threatening invader. Margai I of
Mabanta was alleged to have traded part of his chiefdom in 1894 as a bribe to
5
prevent tribal massacre.
As a consequence of human nature, and a history of trade competition,
and of warfare, each group of peoples or chiefdom or the Sierra Leone hin¬
terland had some people who had traditionally been their enemies, some who
had been their allies, and some who had at different times been both. The
animosities between various groups of people has already been shown to have
been a factor in the determination of district boundaries by the Protectorate
administrators.
In the years prior to 1896 the British Government had made treaties
with individuals whom they believed or were led to believe were the rulers of
various areas. At the time of the establishment of the Protectorate adminis¬
tration, the Government recognized these and others as being the Chiefs and
5. See S. L. A. 4557 1901
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Paramount Chiefs through whom British rule would be administered. The
records do not reveal any process by which either the non-treaty chiefs or
the ranking of any of the rulers was determined.
The various situations described above were the ones on which a uni¬
form system of administration was imposed. To a varying extent adminis¬
trators were aware of and appreciated the conditions which had prevailed
prior to the establishment of the Protectorate, and the diversity within these
conditions. Nevertheless they proceeded in a generally inflexible manner
that was not without consequences for the inhabitants of the Protectorate and
their indigenous institutions.
The Reception by the Protectorate Inhabitants
of the Establishment of a British Administration
Although Cardew had made extensive tours of the hinterlands the two
preceding years, his marathon journey in the early part of 1896 was for the
express purpose of explaining the proposed Protectorate administration to
the chiefs who assembled along the 700 mile route. The assessments of these
meetings after the fact of the 1898 Rebellion were undoubtedly coloured by
that experience. However, neither Cardew nor J. C. E. Parkes, his Secre¬
tary for Native Affairs who accompanied him as Interpreter, ventured un-
waiving confidence of the chiefs' comprehension of the terms and conditions
6. These distinctions and terminologies date from the Protectorate
Ordinance #20 of 1896. See also Fyfe, History ... op. cit. p. 542
74
of the intended policy that Alldridge maintained had characterised his earlier
7
treaty-making experiences.
It was the conclusion of Sir David Chalmers, who investigated the
Insurrection, that there had been nothing in the meetings to indicate to the
chiefs any change in the relationship which had previously existed with the
g
Government. However, Chalmers' mistake was in examining 'the content
of these meetings to see if and how much they created a basis of consent on
the part of the Chiefs for future legislation by which Cardew intended the
country should be governed.' For present purposes the paving of the way for
the Protectorate must be considered in view of the facts that a 'de facto'
Protectorate already existed, and the right to dominate the inhabitants of the
hinterland had never been challenged but indeed confirmed by international
agreements, Parliament, and British and Creole public opinion. Cardew's
tour must be seen as an act of etiquette. A stubborn, impatient man such as
he, lacking time or appreciation for subtleties, would regard any reaction
short of over-dissent as acquiescence.^ By his own admission Cardew at¬
tached no importance to the consents of chiefs, nor thought he had obtained
'any active assents, nor dissentient voices.'"^ Certainly he was not seeking
a mandate to the Protectorate but merely preparing the people to ensure its
7. S. L. A. 1264 1904 17 July D. C. Alldridge Sherbro
8. Parliamentary Papers 1899 vol. LX c. 9388 p. 23
9. Ibid, p. 21
10. Ibid.
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peaceful reception. ^ In the absence of any tangible opposition to his pro¬
posals Cardew no doubt assumed the details of the forthcoming administration
were comprehended, if not whole-heartedly accepted.
19
The various chiefs' petitions and delegations during the year and a
half interval between the proclamation of the Protectorate and the outbreak of
the 1898 Rebellion testify to the fact that the Protectorate Ordinances were
13
not clearly understood and certainly not well received. It is scarcely sur¬
prising that the chiefs found the terms of the Protectorate Ordinances diffi¬
cult to understand. The original ordinance sent to Chamberlain in September
1896 required major alterations. The land clauses, cause of much distress to
the Protectorate rulers, were not allowed. However, with this change and
the many incorporated into the revised Protectorate Ordinance #11 of 1897,
the first impression was the lasting one. For the most part, the extent to
which the conditions of the Protectorate were understood by the indigenous
population, they were understood in the terms of the original ordinance.
11. P. R. O. 267/421 21 October 1895 Cardew-Chamberlain
12. See Parliamentary Papers 1899 vol. LX c. 9391 pp. 568-583
13. The events leading up to and surrounding the 1898 Uprisings in the
Sierra Leone Protectorate are covered by many people from many
points of view. For contemporary works, see Wallis, C. B.
The Advance of Our West African Empire (London, 1903) and the
evidence gathered by the Royal Commission which sat in Freetown
immediately after the suppression of the Rebellion, Parliamentary
Papers 1899 vol. LX (The Chalmers Report) c. 9391 Part II.
Fyfe's History ... op. cit. puts this period in its historical per¬
spective, and the recent publications of L. Denzer offer the most
complete and scholarly coverages.
This author does not subscribe to Grace's thesis that there is a cor¬
relation between the numerous references in the 1897 Native Affairs Letter
Book to chiefs dealing directly with Freetown and their ignorance of the new
administration and the fact that they were now required to deal with district
officers.^ In light of the fact that Chalmers cited that chiefs had in 1896
and 1897 voiced objections to being cut off from Freetown and made to go,
sometimes a much greater distance, to district Headquarters, the incidence
of persistence in dealing with officials in Freetown directly could be con¬
strued as perverse resistance to and non-acceptance of orders to deal with
the District Commissioners.
The events which led up to and culminated in the 1898 Rebellion are
significant to this study in that they were the initial reaction of the peoples of
the Sierra Leone hinterland to the establishment of a British Protectorate
over them. It is important to examine the factors which contributed to the
Rebellion as they reveal the features of British rule which were opposed.
Together with a determination of what adjustments were made to the system
of rule as a result of these grievances and of the recommendations made by
Her Majesty's Commissioner investigating the Insurrection, the reception of
the Protectorate by the indigenous population constituted the basis on which
the administration was laid. It will be a matter of subsequent discussion to
what extent the grievances of this period may have persisted and influenced
14. Grace, op. cit. p. 179
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the consolidation of British rule in the Sierra Leone Protectorate during the
first quarter of this century.
Official investigation and contemporary observation pointed to numer¬
ous reasons for what was termed the Hut Tax Rebellion by proponents of the
single-answer theory. The hut tax was but one issue of many which revolved
around the extent and nature of British influence which had evolved during the
years previous to the declaration of a Protectorate and culminated in the Pro¬
tectorate Ordinances. Interference and mistreatment by the Frontier Police;
cessation of the slave trade; limitation of power and interference with cus¬
tomary practices; departure from the former relationship of sovereign and
equal powers; failure to comprehend the requirements and implications of
the Protectorate Ordinances; and misconception of British military power
were factors which affected, to varying degrees, the inhabitants of the hin¬
terland and which led them to active rebellion.
Throughout the 1890's the clearest indication of British presence had
been the Frontier Force. Prior to the Rebellion and during the enquiry into
its causes, numerous allegations were made of Frontier Police interference
in the affairs of the indigenous population, over and above those centring on
1 R
the abuses related to the collection of the hut tax.
15. See Parliamentary Papers 1899 vol. LX c. 9391 pp. 563-565 for
'Frontier Police convictions against natives of the Protectorate'
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It was the recollection of the wife of a United Brethren in Christ mis¬
sionary that the agents of the Government ruthlessly collected the tax, plus
their own 'side earnings.' Measures such as intimidation, burning and
plundering, and binding and flogging the chiefs and treating them like com-
17
mon criminals were used to enforce payment of the tax and the extortions.
The very nature of the duties of the Frontiers constituted interference
although the Government made a distinction between activities which were
permissible and those which were not, and which could be, even in their
18
eyes, construed as intervention in the internal affairs of chiefdoms. How¬
ever, using the terminology 'interference' in the latter sense, many of the
recorded grievances were not without basis. Terror tactics were used to in¬
timidate the people and enable the Frontiers to obtain material and political
advantages. Despotic powers were assumed, chiefs installed against the will
of the people, property seized, and the people generally and specifically
abused. ^
Grace maintains that a lot of the criticism aimed at discrediting the
16. Hough, op. cit.
17. Little, The Mende ... op. cit. p. 58
18. P. R. O. C.O. 271/5 fol. 22 January 1889 Frontier Police Instruc¬
tions Sierra Leone Royal Gazette
19. Among the places where such occurrences are documented are Fyfe,
History .. . op. cit. , and Grace, op. cit. , and the testimony of
J. C. E. Parkes Parliamentary Papers 1899 vol. LX c. 9391
pp. 561-562. The unpublished M. Litt. thesis of N. H. R. Etheridge
is specifically concerned with The Sierra Leone Frontier Police: A
Study in the Functions and Employment of a Colonial Force~
(Aberdeen, 1967)
Frontier Police was made by those most threatened by the Frontiers—the
20
traditional ruling and slave-owning classes. Indeed it would be these
powerful men who, receiving little or no satisfaction from the Government
in their appeals against the Frontiers, would become increasingly resentful
of the alien power, and its representatives who prevented them from revert¬
ing to the order of things which prevailed before the coming of the British.
It would be irrelevant to these chiefs, as it is to this study, whether or not
their complaints specified their desire to continue slave trading and identi¬
fied their attendant loss of revenue and power as a source of grievance. The
fact remains that it is a matter of record that the Government did little to
assuage these grievances besides reprimanding the Frontiers and issuing
assurances that they were ordered not to interfere with domestic institu-
21
tions. As the Police lacked adequate supervision and were scattered in
small groups all over the hinterland, the Government, in the eyes of the
people, did nothing to improve the aggrieved conditions.
Although the motive for the 1898 Rebellion of wanting to return to a
former state of affairs is mostly attributed to the Mende, it would have va¬
ried in intensity from one Mende chief to the next, and would not be a senti¬
ment exclusive to the Mende. This variation would depend on the degree to
which internal chiefdom affairs and customary practices had been interfered
20. Grace, op. cit. p. 119
21. Ibid. pp. 113, 117-118
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with.
The nature of the relationship which had existed between the British
Government and the chiefs prior to 1896 varied greatly. As a result there
was a divergence in the chiefs' understanding of the new conditions as well
as in their reaction to them. Chiefs in the vicinity of the coast, navigable
rivers and along caravan routes, who had long been actively involved in the
slave and/or legitimate trade, would have had much more experience with
British traders, troops and treaty-makers than chiefs of the more remote
areas visited perhaps only by Garrett or Alldridge on their recent treaty-
making expeditions.
Lack of comprehension of the Protectorate Ordinances on the part of
many of the indigenous rulers who had enjoyed a long and equitable associa¬
tion with the British Government assumed the form of disbelief at this de¬
parture from the established pattern. Temne chiefs petitioned the Legisla¬
tive Council in October 1897 to the effect that their initial silences, construed
to mean acceptance, were hesitations caused by the assumption that they had
misunderstood the implications of the Protectorate Ordinances which were
'unlike the spirit of the English people with whom (we) have had to deal now
22
over 110 years.' The loss of their faith in the British Government which
failed to put everything right was eloquently expressed by their resistance to
22. P. R. O. 267/435 8 December 1897 c. 49 Cardew-Chamberlain
Temne chiefs enclosure of 15 October 1897
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28
taxation, Cardew's anticipation of no such difficulties aside.
Certainly many of these and other chiefs had not felt the effect of
British authority and influence to the forewarning extent of rulers whose af¬
fairs had been increasingly and arbitrarily interfered with during the 1890's.
These latter rulers might well be in a position to understand the implications
of the Protectorate Ordinances but were not prepared to acquiesce to the
terms thereof. In the opinion of a missionary sent to reestablish the Rotifunk
mission after the Mende Uprising, to those whom'the benefits of the Govern¬
ment and the Protectorate were not apparent,' let alone desired, 'the tax was
94
not understandable.' Either by reason of inadequate explanation or incom¬
prehensibility as an unprecedented concept, the institution of the tax, let
alone its collection, was regarded by the chiefs in the Protectorate as a con¬
troversial and ultimately explosive issue.
It would be a mistake to suggest a direct correlation between the type
of contact with the British Government and the degree of comprehension of
their new regime. Among the other factors which bore on the way the Pro¬
tectorate was received was the way the indigenous population was informed.
The meetings Cardew held with chiefs were not only a bad basis on
which to judge their response but also were an ineffective means of dispersing
information about the new administration. The evidence given Chalmers, es-
23. P. R. O. 267/427 14 December 1896 c. 61 Cardew-Chamberlain
24. Hough, op. cit.
pecially by Parkes, pointed to the fact that many of the meetings were not
attended by the Paramount Chiefs, but by their sub-chiefs who were to con-
25
vey the Governor's word to their paramount chiefs. Not only was the num¬
ber of chiefs Cardew saw not representative of general opinion, but also the
absent chiefs were left to infer what they liked from those who had met with
the Governor or from second-hand accounts or worse. Such an indirect
means of conveying the details and explanations of a radically new system of
rule was open to the inevitable distortions, exaggerations, and misconstruc¬
tions of word-of-mouth transmission.
Difficulties in interpretation would have the effect of further confusing
Cardew's message even before it was passed on to others. Little feels it is
open to question how far the various provisions of the proposed ordinance
were properly comprehended by the chiefs Cardew did meet as there would
have been the necessity, in a number of instances, of re-translating. In
circumstances of trying to convey novel and culturally alien ideas, confusion
27
and misunderstanding often results from such a process.
The circular sent in October 1896 from the Native Affairs Department
to chiefs was not any more a reliable or successful means of explaining the
Protectorate Ordinance than had been the meetings. The number of chiefs
25. Parliamentary Papers 1899 vol. LX c. 9391 evidence of Parkes
and others, pp. 7130-43
26. Little, The Mende ... op. cit. p. 58
27. Ibid.
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able to read such a document, let alone appreciate its novel concepts, was
miniscule; many of the people turned to by the chiefs for assistance in de¬
ciphering this message would be semi-literate at best. Distortion would
have resulted, either accidentally or deliberately by those seeking political
28
or pecuniary advantage at the cost of the chiefs.
The use of District Commissioners to reveal the contents of the cir¬
cular and explain the new administration was little more effective, as some
OQ
did not receive a copy, and the efforts of others were impeded by the same
difficulties of interpretation and translation which plagued Cardew's meetings.
Grace adds a further dimension to the introduction of the administra¬
tive system. In order to bring about change amid conservative people, men
of patience and tact who would be trusted were needed. Cardew had filled
the posts of District Commissioner from the ranks of the Frontier Police
officers who were accustomed to dealing in an authoritative manner and
lacked the qualities necessary to ensure understanding and cooperation. The
District Commissioners' efforts to introduce the new regime would be further
complicated by the fact that they would be regarded with the same distrust
and hatred which the people felt toward the rank and file of the Frontier
Police.30
28. Fyfe, in his History ... op. cit. , colourfully describes the circular
and some of the resulting misconceptions, p. 552
29. Parliamentary Papers 1899 vol. LX c. 9391 evidence of D. C.
Fairtlough of Ronietta, pp. 4946-49
30. Grace, op. cit. p. 176
The military factor bore on the 1898 Rebellion in two respects.
Little contends that Mende chiefs knew of only one precedent by which people
could claim the right to dominate and regulate the affairs of another—mili-
31
tary conquest. In view of the facts that the majority of the treaties had not
been made at gunpoint, and the greater part of Mendeland had little or no ex¬
perience with the real power of the British, it is not surprising that the
Mende not only rejected the as-yet unproven claim of the British to rule them
but did so forcibly.
It has been similarly argued that many of the chiefs who threw in their
lot on the side of rebellion would not likely have done so had they ever been
32
in the position to correctly assess the military might of the British.
The fact that neither colonial officials on the scene or in London, nor
contemporary observers, could agree on the cause of the 1898 Rebellion—
although they did distinguish between the Bai Bureh War and the Mende massa¬
cres—indicates that they did not understand the inhabitants of the Protecto¬
rate. Such a lack of comprehension, which resulted from lack of inclination
to fathom the minds of the protected peoples, then and in years to come ren¬
dered the administrators unable to perceive accurately how policies and in¬
structions were being interpreted, or misinterpreted.
From the time of the crushing defeat at the hands of the British,
31. Little, The Mende ... op. cit. p. 56
32. P. R. O. 267/440 23 August 1898 c. 68 Cardew-Chamberlain
Fairtlough enclosure of 4 August
Protectorate chiefs were not again inclined to express their dissatisfaction,
discontent, or opposition by forms of outward rebellion. To find subsequent
negative reactions to British rule of the Protectorate one must look for more
subtle expressions of resistance, such as non-cooperation with Government
directives, or acts designed to undermine the undertakings and supporters
of the administration.
Consolidation of Protectorate Administration
Following the 1898 Rebellion
Introduction
The effects of the 1898 Rebellion on the administration of the Sierra
Leone Protectorate were many and long-lived. In addition to the changes
which were made in the administrative structure, the Government removed
and replaced a number of chiefs and redistributed the chiefdoms of others'.
The repercussions of these alterations in chiefship lineages and in chiefdom
boundaries and allegiances were expressed in such forms as chieftaincy
claims and land disputes. These issues were by no means settled in the
years immediately following 1898, as many were still being raised at the end
of the period under examination. The attitudes of the colonial administrators
and Protectorate population toward each other were also affected by the ex¬
periences of the establishment of the Protectorate and the 1898 Rebellion.
The British officials were jarred out of the apparent complacent be¬
lief that the indigenous population was docile and accepting of the Protecto-
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rate, rumours to the contrary aside. In the years that followed the Rebel¬
lion, British colonial and military officers demonstrated wariness and
skepticism that sometimes bordered on the paranoic. Such underlying sus¬
picion no doubt caused some officials to act hastily and show poor judgement
which in many of those cases resulted in ruthlessness and oppression. Cer¬
tainly they could not be faulted in the future for dismissing rumours and
warnings of impending disturbances without action or due consideration.
The chiefs and their subjects learned the bitter lesson that active
resistance to British rule was futile. Such opposition as did exist to speci¬
fic colonial policies or to colonial administration in general was subsequently
expressed in a variety of forms but never again in organized military revolt.
The re-establishment of order and British rule in the Protectorate
was accomplished by both immediate stop-gap efforts to restore a state of
normalcy, and by measures taken with more deliberation and designed to
reach the roots of the problems which had presumably caused the Rebellion.
It is evident that although peaceful conditions were obtained by methods such
as displays of military force and increases in European Protectorate staff,
the consolidation of British administration was by no means achieved in a
short period of time.
Reprisals against chiefs who had rebelled against the Government in
1898 were received by the Protectorate people largely without complaint.
Subsequent appeals for reinstatement of banished chiefs or for restoration
of re-allocated territories are considerations independent from the fact that
loss of position, land, and life was anticipated and accepted treatment of
leaders defeated in war. Indeed it could be argued that the consequences
suffered by the chiefs involved in the 1898 Rebellion were of far greater pre¬
cedent and comprehension to them than the very factors which had brought on
the Rebellion.
The fact of tribal rulers being removed from authority caused some
chiefdoms to be absorbed by or be placed under the paramountcy of other,
loyal, chiefs. In other cases vacancies were filled by nominees chosen
either by traditional means or by Government appointment. The lack of op¬
position at the time to the majority of such acts no doubt derived equally
from fear of further retaliation at the hands of the Government and from a
sense of just retribution.
A distinction must therefore be made between the negligible reaction
to the actions taken both as reprisals and as efforts to restore administration
in various chiefdoms, and subsequent effects of these actions and numerous
attempts to regain lineages or boundaries which had existed prior to 1898.
However much colonial administrators might have sought just solutions to
disputed successions and borders, they were unlikely always to have reached
decisions which were to the satisfaction of all concerned. In every case
there would be an aggrieved party deprived of the lands or position he con¬
sidered his either by tradition or by usage since 1898.
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The indigenous population did not escape the effects of these disputes.
Contesting parties might employ methods of coercion or intimidation to gain
their support, or might subject them to payment of dual tax and tribute. The
placement of a Poro restriction on the collection of produce from disputed
33
areas would also directly affect the people.
Alterations in Chieftaincies
The treatment of chiefs who revolted against the Government varied
greatly, depending on the nature of their involvement and crimes, as well
as of the extent of their influence in the Protectorate. A distinction was
made in the charges, punishment, and remission of sentence between chiefs
such as Nyagua and Bai Bureh--who 'fought fairly and honestly' against Gov¬
ernment troops--and the leaders of the Mende Rising in which many civilians
were slaughtered. While the former were deported to the Gold Coast for
their parts in the Rebellion, their Mende counterparts faced charges of
murder.
Gbana Lewis of Sherbro Island, who had led the 'one word Poro'
against Sherbro trade in 1897, was also deported and imprisoned in Chris-
tiansborg. This action was taken not so much for any proven part in the
Mende Rising as for fear of continued disruptive use of his considerable
influence. Other participants in the Rebellion who did not fall under the
33. See Chapter 5, footnote 12
terms of the amnesty were detained or received prison sentences of varying
duration. Fyfe records that of the 233 cases which centred on the Mende
Massacres there were 158 convictions, with recommendations of mercy for
those who had merely carried out chiefs' orders. Although the Executive
Council confirmed the death sentences on 96, Cardew only officially reported
84
83 hangings.
Some of those whose sentences were commuted to life imprisonment
were twice favoured with mercy by the Colonial Government, as in the case
of Bereweh of Bumpe. This 'aged and powerless' chief was pardoned and re¬
leased in 1907.As any of the convicted chiefs were released from prison
and went back to the Protectorate, the Government was faced with the prob¬
lem of whether or not to reinstate them to their former positions or to re¬
store their property.
The Government's official line on both these matters, and that of the
actual release of the leaders of the Rebellion, was one of stern magnaminity.
From outward appearances it would seem that the colonial administration
subscribed to the theory of rehabilitation by punishment and prevention by
example. Appeals for the release of prisoners were viewed in terms of
whether or not the punishment had been severe enough to discourage future
disloyalty to the Government.
34. Fyfe, History . .. op. cit. p. 589
35. S. L. A. 5027 1905 2~8 September Acting D. C. Paling Bandajuma
9 July 1907 Executive Council pardon
The district officer sent to discuss the conditions under which Bai
Bureh was being allowed to return was instructed by Haddon-Smith 'to make
it out as a most humane and graceful act (that) the Government not only lets
him return but approves of his being chief, proving the justice of the British
o
Government against those who rebelled against them.'
The aspect of his re-instatement is not substantiated by any prior or
subsequent instructions but the reports do show 'the people under a misap¬
prehension' in believing Bai Bureh was to be allowed to act in his Para-
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mount Chief capacity. Presumably the misapprehension derived either
from having been misinformed, or from being told of a decision which was
o o
later reversed. However, there is nothing in the records to suggest
whether or not at one time the Government did plan to allow Bai Bureh to
resume his position as Paramount Chief of Kasse(h). The fact remains that
he ultimately did not, and the anticipation and then disappointment of his
people were probably more harmful to the cause of a settled state of affairs
than he as an aged and infirm ruler would have been.
A generally lenient but realistic approach was made to considerations
of whom to release and under what conditions. As in 1899 when Major
Nathan, as the Officer Administering the Government, had contemplated
36. S. L. A. CI 15 1905 31 July Acting D. C. Oswell Karene
11 August 1906 Haddon-Smith-Oswell
37. S. L. A. 3844 1905 8 May Govt. Probyn
38. S. L. A. 3844 1905; S. L. A. C115 1905; P. R. O. 267/480
11 September 1905 #412 O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-Lyttleton
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allowing Bai Bureh and Nyagua to return to their countries, cases were
assessed in terms of the use to which the chiefs' influence might be put and
of the internal stability of the chiefdom at the time of the appeal. Whereas
(Sori) Bai Fo(r)ki of Mafo(r)ki (Port Lokko) was thought likely to be tempted
to use his considerable power to do mischief upon finding dissatisfaction
40
already at hand in his chiefdom, other chiefs virtually were sent home to
restore order. The criterion in all cases was to avoid unrest. Consequently
particularly in cases of lesser personages, the Government sought to re¬
store those chiefs whom the people wanted and agreed on but as a rule re-
41
fused to 'make the people return' to a chief against their will.
The adjustments necessitated by the return and re-instatement of
Alimami (Sattan) Lahai of Rowula are also indicative of the lengths gone to
by the Government to minimize friction. In his absence the country of the
39. It is ironic that Nyagua, whom Nathan was on the verge of sending
back to Panguma 'as he would be useful in re-establishing peaceful
and orderly conditons' died in the Gold Coast while Bai Bureh, by
far the greater threat to internal security in Nathan's eyes, later
returned to die in his own country. The promise King-Harmon made
in an address at Panguma in 1902 (P. R. O. 267/462 29 January 1902
#25 King-Harmon-Chamberlain) to allow Nyagua to come back and
be re-instated was never kept although it is hardly likely that the
'pending boundary disputes and several confused chiefdoms (that had
to be) properly organised' before his return remained an impediment
until Nyagua's death in 1906. There is no evidence of any decision
to reverse this promise, nor of any effort to communicate further
with the people, who had broken out in'a pandemonium, expressive
of unallayed delight' at the time of King-Harmon's announcement.
40. P. R. O. 267/458 27 May 1901 #175 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
41. See S. L. A. 1001 1901 28 February Govt. King-Harmon; S. L. A.
4109 1903 6 October King-Harmon to D. C. Anderson Panguma
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Alimami had been administered by one Bai Secca who had, since 1898, 'been
loyal, able and instrumental to peace.' As a consideration for the Chief's
42
efforts King-Harmon felt he should be appointed an independent chiefttena.
In this case and others it was quite sensibly realized that the presence of a
former chief who had the support of the people would undermine the power of
one appointed in his stead. Although there is no further information in the
48
papers related to this case, the inventory of chiefs and chiefdoms sent by
the District Commissioners in 1904 for the creation of Local Assemblies
gives evidence that this arrangement for two chiefdoms was carried out.
In the same way that there was no simple formula for determining
whether or not to allow a chief to return to his country and/or to be re¬
instated as chief, there were many factors to consider in claims to chief¬
taincies disputed as a result of the 1898 upheavals. Throughout the period
under review, a significant number of the claimants to chieftaincies base
their grievance on successions which were allegedly disrupted in 1898. It
was difficult for colonial administrators at the time to arrive at the truth of
many of these matters; it is virtually impossible for an observer after the
fact and hindered by gaps in the records to do so. However, the validity of
the claims aside, the fact of so many claims indicates that the period during
and after the Rebellion was regarded by many inhabitants of the Protectorate
42. P. R. O. 267/458 27 May 1901 #175 King-Harman-Chamberlain
43. See S. L. A. 3986 1904
as one of unsettled conditions. It is a matter of conjecture how many false
claims were made in hopes of taking advantage of the sparsity of records,
turnover of administrative personnel, and general confusion associated with
this period. There is no certain way of knowing how many rightful claims
were not allowed, nor how many contrived ones recognized by those adminis¬
trators who tended to accept petitions for the restoration of pre-Rebellion
conditions as probable, and as potentially disruptive if ignored.
It was certainly a disruption to all concerned when 500 people of
Tungea in the Gorama country of the Railway District camped in Lamboi's
Ipa Mendi chiefdom in Ronietta for over half a year. Fairtlough, the Dis¬
trict Commissioner at Moyamba, felt their claim for a chiefdom independent
of Madam Fangowa of Wando was not without merit. It was his recollection,
and reminder to Maxwell in Kenema, that they had been separate chiefdoms
up to the time of the execution of Dambeh, chief of Gorama, for the murder
of a Corporal Thomas during the 1898 Rebellion. The right of the people to
their own chiefdom was never denied. However, Dr. Maxwell, using the dis¬
cretion explicitly given him by Probyn, did not deem it an appropriate time
to divide the country lest it appear he had given into what he considered open
44
defiance of his orders to 'sit down with' Madam Fangowa. It was not until
1915, following Maxwell's departure from the Railway District and the Pro¬
tectorate that Gorama and Wando once more became separate chiefdoms.
44. S. L. A. 4327 1908 23 February 1909 D. C. Maxwell Railway
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It was not always the case that the Government was so readily able
to arrive at the truth of statements of claims based on conditions dating from
the upheaval of the Rebellion and its aftermath. Where the migration of the
Gorama people was costly to themselves and to their reluctant host, the
events surrounding the election, and almost immediate deposition and candi¬
dature for re-election, of Lahai Conteh as Paramount Chief must have been
unsettling in a different manner for the people of the Jawi chiefdom in the
Railway District.
The arrest and pending trial of Interpreter Ahamadu for bribery in
another issue was the deed that undid Lahai Conteh's 1913 election. The
leading men of Jawi, freed from the alleged threats that had fenced them
thus far, took their grievance to Captain LeMesurier who, as Acting District
Commissioner, had presided over the election. The complaint was that
Conteh had won by use of bribery and undue influence in colloboration with
45
Ahamadu.
Dr. Maxwell, consulted on leave, was one among many of the colonial
administrators who did not believe in Acting District Commissioners handling
sensitive enquiries or making important decisions. He was overridden in his
opinion that LeMesurier should not procede without him by Merewether, who
rarely supported his senior administrative staff, and by E. E. Evelyn. The
Colonial Secretary's reasoning was irrefutable: "postponement until the
45. S. L. A. C201 1913 14 October Acting D. C. LeMesurier Railway
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District Commissioner's return would have a very injurious effect on the
authority of Acting District Commissioners and Assistant District Commis¬
sioners."^
The question of appearances and the possibility of adverse effects on
governmental authority was in this, the Gorama, and many other cases a
factor which outweighed expediency and right.
The Acting District Commissioner found that Lahai Conteh was the
descendant of the warrior chief, Gpawor Gumbay, whose charms were made
by Forray Gbey, a Mohammedan 'stranger' and the grandfather of Forray
Vong against whom the complaint was being made. It was alleged by Lahai
Conteh, and not challenged by other witnesses, that after 1898 the land was
unsettled, and chieftaincy vacant, and Forray Gbey's son, Vandy Vong, 'de¬
puted to treat with the District Commissioner for the settlement of the
47
country and the regular payment of the tax.' It was stated by Conteh that
when the District Commissioner advised a new chief be set up, Kponi, the
rightful successor of the house which allegedly always held the chiefship,
voluntarily waived his right in favour of Vandy Vong who was an older and
far more experienced man and had been brought up as his foster brother.
After the death of this 'stranger' chief, Kponi and his brother Gumba Kra,
46. S. L. A. C201 1913 14 October Acting D. C. LeMesurier Railway 1,
and 5 November C. S. Evelyn-LeMesurier
47. S. L. A. C114 1913 24 December D. C. Maxwell Railway Lahai
Conteh petition of 19 December to O. A. G. Hollis
both maternal uncles of Lahai Conteh, were chosen at successive elections
at each of which sons of Vandy Vong had stood and been rejected.
In the second election between Lahai Conteh and Forray Vong, the
latter received a majority of the votes. An interesting point of issue raised
by Lahai Conteh was the reportedly hitherto unknown feature of taking votes
48
per capita rather than per headmen.
Upon Maxwell's return to the area of which his intimate knowledge
49
previously had been commended, he expressed such skepticism of the en¬
tire incident that the act of reholding the election no less than its outcome
becomes suspect. Maxwell's assessment of the proceedings should have
been carved over the door of each district Headquarters: "at every con¬
tested election there is a certain amount of wire-pulling and intrigue on both
sides by the candidates and supporters, and too much importance should not
be put to it unless some very improper act can be established." u
It is ironic that LeMesurier himself admitted that it was hard for a
European to know what went on behind the scenes of an election,^ * but does
not consider the possibility that undue influences might have been at work in
the second election to prevent Lahai Conteh's election. Maxwell was now
left to live with a situation and deal with a Paramount Chief created by having
48. Ibid.
49. P. R. O. 267 /468 16 April 1903 #83 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
50. S. L. A. C201 1913 14 October Acting D. C. LeMesurier Railway
D. C. Maxwell 2 December minute
51. S. L. A. C201 1913 14 October Acting D. C. LeMesurier Railway
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left the initiative to a person not closely familiar with the people and whose
interpretation of what constituted 'an improper act' seemingly differed
greatly from his own.
Such a case has implications not only for the peaceful state of a chief-
dom and for the authority of a chief whose claim and election might be invalid.
It also reveals highly questionable election proceedings, administrators at
serious variance with each other, and the type of situation which the condi¬
tions after 1898 gave rise to.
In addition to cases of re-instatement, the lenient attitude of the
Government toward the Karene chiefs is apparent in the records of payments
of stipends. The majority of these, and a few other, stipendary chiefs abro¬
gated their treaties 'as a consequence of the active part taken in the Rebel-
52
lion of 1898.' It was stipulated that the stipends were payable during good
behaviour. The records indicate a rapid return to this state was either
achieved or aspired in the eyes of the Government for by 1901 almost all
stipends had not only been re-instated, but increased. The few chiefs who
were still deprived of stipends because of the more serious transgressions
53
of their predecessors were awarded annual presents.
Alterations in Chiefdoms
The delineation of chiefdoms for purposes of Protectorate adminis-
52. See S. L. A. 2868 1904
53. See S. L. A. 419 1901
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tration, the amalgamation or division of chiefdoms as a result of the 1898
Rebellion, and the later re-distribution of some of these altered territories
were matters which affected a great number of people more directly than
did the questions of succession. In both types of disputes the people would
be subject to various forms of coercion to get support of claims. However,
in issues that were concerned with the creation or dissolution of chiefdoms,
the inhabitants of an area were likely additionally to be taxed and have cus¬
tomary tribute exacted from them, not only by the chief under whom the
Government had placed them, but also by the one to whom they had formerly
paid allegiance.
Although the Government could confer an area and a title they could
not guarantee the prestige of the chief nor the loyalty of the people to a
Government-appointed ruler. This trust was most evident in the instances
of palavers being taken out of chiefdoms to chiefs who no longer had juris¬
diction.
"As it would be against all precedent for one chief to settle disputes
between other Paramount Chiefs, all being of the same rank," Allimany
Samba of Lunge, Bullomland, was not allowed to go into another chiefdom
54
in 1901 to settle a quarrel. Government officials did not deny, in this case
or others such as a 1914 incident in Koinadugu, the claim of association with
the disputing parties, their voluntary request of help, or that in times past
54. S. L. A. 3851 1901 6 September Acting D. C. Page Sherbro
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the chiefs had acted in this capacity. When approached by Paramount Chief
Bafarra of Kalliyang chiefdom and one of his chiefs, Fabol Karifam, to set¬
tle a dispute between them, Bamba Farra, who was described as being of the
old school of Paramount Chiefs, decided 'in good faith' that the sub-chief
should be an independent chief of his own territory. Stanley readily admitted
that Bamba Farra:
". .. in the days before the advent of the government exercised
an undoubtable authority over the Kalliyang chiefdom as well
as over his own and had in fact originally been responsible after
the Samori raids for the positions of the present Paramount
Chief and the^ub-chief, both being regarded as sub-chiefs
under him. "55
The reprimands and explanations of the facts that the Government
had to support all Paramount Chiefs equally and that the Governor alone had
the power to appoint Paramount Chiefs must have been all the more confusing
when the District Commissioner proceeded to approve the very division made
by Bamba Farra.
As a general rule,the Government gave special and serious conside¬
ration to situations and petitions which arose from chiefdoms reshaped by
the events of 1898. Following the removal of rulers as a result of partici¬
pation in the Rebellion, the people of a number of chiefdoms either volun¬
tarily placed themselves or were put by the Government under the authority
55. S. L. A. C90 1914 4 May D. C. Stanley Koinadugu
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of neighbouring, loyal chiefs. With the passage of time and the settling of
conditions in the Protectorate, there was an increased tendency for these
groups to petition for their independent chiefdom status to be restored. In
cases, as Dambarra in Panguma, where the ascendancy of the chief, Madam
56
Margbeh of Garlu, had been obtained by Frontier Police coercion; and, as
in Mokassi, where the inhabitants had sought the protection of another chief—
57
in this case Madam Nancy Tucker of Bagru (Bargrue) —the Government
made every apparent effort to restore the traditional boundaries.
Not all reconstitutions of chiefdoms altered as a result of the Rebel¬
lion came about because of petitions from aggrieved parties. The re-division
of the approximately 1, 000 square mile Sanda chiefdom in Karene was insti¬
gated by the District Commissioner in 1914. Warren believed that the recent
death of the Paramount Chief, who had been appointed by the Government over
four previously independent chiefdoms after 1898, created the opportune mo¬
ment to dissolve the unwieldly and, by his implication, unjust union and elect
four separate Paramount Chiefs. His investigations had revealed that:
"On the suppression of 1898 Brima Sanda, who as Santiggi Dura
had previously—as it now appears—been a dependent ruler and
not a member of a truly royal house, was appointed by the Gover¬
nor to collect tax of these four chiefdoms (Sanda Lokko, Sanda
Chainrarain, Sanda Robunko, and Sanda Mabolunto), with the aid
of an escort of Frontier Police. He was chosen as regent owing
to his unswerving loyalty to the Government during 1898; he was
56.
57.
S. L. A. 1346 1902; S. L. A. 993 1904 13 January 1905
D. C. Anderson Panguma
S. L. A. 479 1901 22 January D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta
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afterward appointed Paramount Chief, partly in recognition
of this fact and partly due to the fact that the people of the
country were not wholly agreed on the election of anyone
else. Their unanimity was confined to their unwillingness
to elect him, due to his lack of royal birth. "
Warren stressed the implied non-acceptance of the people of Brima Sanda by
noting that although Brima Sanda was a reigning Paramount Chief at the time
of his death he was not buried in the ground set apart by custom for the in-
terment of the chiefs of Sanda.
For such a case as the one cited above, the question must be raised
to what extent Brima Sanda had been able during his sixteen-year term to
exert the authority the Government expected of its Paramount Chiefs. The
absence in the records of any outward resistance to his rule can by no means
be accepted as meaning that he was the locus of power in the chiefdom.
Neither can it be assumed that he was able to use any influence on behalf of
the Government beyond such basic requirements as tax payment and labour
recruitment.
The absence of early records was not the sole impediment to making
acceptable boundaries. Part of the procedural difficulties already discussed
were related to the critical one of discerning the wishes of the people. Re¬
ports of boundary investigations often show the district officer making what
he believed was a popular decision only to record not long after the grievances
58. S. L. A. D. C. Karene #90 1914 11 September Warren
59. Ibid.
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of a segment of the population whose opinions had not been polled.
The pattern of shifting allegiances among the Safroko Limba in the
days before the Protectorate did not commend itself to a fixed administra¬
tion. As a result, colonial administrators either ignored the wishes of the
people or found them difficult to assess. According to the "Precis of Events
in the Safroko Limba Chiefdom, " written by a District Commissioner of the
area, the people originally were under a number of practically independent
n G 1
headmen. From this account as well as archival material it would ap¬
pear that at the time of the 1898 Rebellion the people in this chiefdom were,
to a certain extent,, under the influences of both Massa Paki of Mapaki and
Suluku of Biriwa Limba. Hollins' contention that the movement to include
the chiefdom in Biriwa Limba, exempt from paying the tax in 1898 by virtue
of being in the Koinadugu District, was supported by the people does not seem
unreasonable. The records reveal that it was placed in the Karene District
by Captain Sharpe who was 'apparently influenced by the desire to make a
convenient geographical boundary and overlooked the very decided wishes of
the people.'®2
After extensive enquiry in 1901 it was decided that the Safroko Limbas
were not properly subject to the District Commissioner of Karene, as they
60. Hollins, N. C. "Precis of Events in the Safroko Limba Chiefdom"
Sierra Leone Studies VII July 1925 p. 35
61. P. R. O. 267/459 28 August 1901 #293 King-Harmon-Chamberlain;
S. L. A. C46 1904 10 April Acting D. C. Berney Koinadugu
62. P. R. O. 267/459 28 August 1901 #293 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
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purportedly recognised Suluku as their rightful head. Accordingly the chief-
dom was transferred to the Koinadugu District and joined with the Biriwa
fio
Limba under Suluku of Bumban.
In 1904 an unseasoned and impulsive Lieutenant of the Frontier Force
acting as a district administrator reported 'an open state of rebellion' against
ft4 '
the tax collection in the Safroko country. Lt. Bayley's alarmist tendencies
were compounded by the want of judgement of the Acting District Commis¬
sioner. Berney dispatched a full company of Frontiers to rescue Bayley
whose attempts to arrest one of the ringleaders had failed as the chief had
been'surrounded by three or four hundred armed natives.' By dint of luck
and the timely intervention of first Oswell from the Karene District, and
then Dr. Maxwell sent to take charge of Koinadugu, actual open rebellion
was averted and the roots of the problem uncovered.
It became apparent to these more experienced administrative officers
that the resistance to the tax was merely the outward expression of a certain
65
undercurrent of dissatisfaction in some parts of Safroko Limba country.
It was noted that although the people recognised and obeyed Suluku they
jealously differentiated their country from that of the Biriwa Limbas, a dis¬
tinction the Government did not make in terms of even allowing some of the
63. Ibid.
64. S. L. A. C46 1904 10 April Acting D. C. Berney Koinadugu
9 April report
65. S. L. A. C46 1904 10 April Acting D. C. Berney Koinadugu 14 April
Acting D. C. Oswell Karene; 4 June D. C. Maxwell Koinadugu
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headmen of Safroko Limba to be appointed sub-chiefs.
The precarious union between the two chiefdoms was maintained
throughout the remaining three years of Suluku's life, more out of a sense of
discipline for the rebellious than of respect for Suluku. The recurring minor
disturbances and reports of discontent among the Safroko Limba during this
period indicate that the determination of the Government that Safroko Limba
stay with the Paramount Chief they allegedly chose did little to further the
cause of peace and stable administration in the Protectorate.
Whereas colonial administrators appear to have been sincere in their
belief that the 1901 arrangement made for the Safroko Limba to adjust the
1898 determination of their chiefdom was a permanent one popularly sup¬
ported, they had no such confidence about the cohesion of Madam Yoko's Gpa
Mendi chiefdom upon her demise. This vast chiefdom owed itself to a vari¬
ety of factors including her acquisitive instincts reinforced by the Govern¬
ment support she enjoyed. As a consequence, many surrounding areas
found themselves, voluntarily or otherwise, under her protection during the
wars which preceded the establishment of the Protectorate and during the
1898 Rebellion. Indeed, the basis of all boundary problems along the
Ronietta-Panguma border was identified as being the ascendancy of Madam
Yoko over various chiefdoms as a result of her tacitly assuming control
fifi
when their chiefs had fallen into trouble with the Government.
66. S. L. A. 1346 1902 30 December Acting D. C. Hood re: Ronietta
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As early as 1898 the Government had established the precedent that
headmen and chief rulers did not have the right to secede from a chiefdom
when their predecessors had voluntarily attached themselves to it. Pro¬
gressively with the increasing number of attempts on the part of supposedly
subordinate rulers to break away from Madam Yoko after the turn of the
century, Government officials began to question the wisdom of adhering to
this policy in these cases. Although they continued to maintain the policy,
no administrator expressed any hope for the retention of the Gpa Mendi
chiefdom in its considerable form under her successor.
When Madam Yoko's brother Lamboi, succeeded, Probyn tried to
bring about the breakup of the chiefdom and 'to the surprise of all the whole
68
country insisted the chiefdom be left intact.' Throughout Lamboi's rule
there were none of the persistent claims to independence which had accom¬
panied his sister's reign. Indeed, despite his 'weakening power, paralysis
and no fitting successor' Lamboi's efforts to reorganize the chiefdom for
separation were not met with enthusiasm or cooperation from the twelve
69
component parts.
The continued cohesion of the Gpa Mendi chiefdom contrasts with the
67. S. L. A. 4365 1907 29 October D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta review
of policy on:
68. S. L. A. 2109 1909 19 June Govr. Probyn
69. P. R.O. 267/531 5 May 1911 #238 Probyn-Bonar-Law; P.R.O.





experience of other amalgamated chiefdoms, and highlights the fact that the
allegiances of the people to physical chiefdom units and independent lines of
succession in the hinterland at the time of the Protectorate differed greatly.
It is argumentative whether or not the restoration of such boundaries after
so many years was of very great importance to the people concerned. In the
intervening years the attachment to the chiefdom configuration arrived at by
investigating officials might be far less than to the unit in which they were
presently living.
There are other implications of the adjustments made in chiefdoms
and chieftaincies as a result of post-Rebellion claims beside the possibility
of being an inaccurate or irrelevant decision. It is not unlikely that oppor¬
tunists took advantage of the wave of realterations in the early years of the
century and succeeded in establishing themselves in independent units which
lacked traditional basis and any administrative justification beyond the re¬
cognition of a presumably valid claim.
In such cases it would be difficult for district officers to unravel the
facts from the fiction to arrive at the truth of subsequent petitions against
such independent rulers. Furthermore, colonial administrators showed, in
many cases, an understandable skepticism of claims for chieftaincy and
chiefdom alterations brought before them after many years. The suspicion
of district officers that their lack of familiarity with a new district was be¬
ing taken advantage of no doubt coloured their objectivity and was responsible,
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in large part, for the prejudice against the petitioner which shows clearly in
the reports of many such cases. The reluctance to re-open, let alone re¬
verse, the decision of a predecessor was as much to maintain the integrity
of administrative officials as a whole as to prevent the district officer in
question from being inundated with appeals. In either case, the burden of
proof lay more heavily on the claimant than in claims which had not lain
dormant for so long.
Although the vast majority of/; : numerous chiefdom boundary cases
the first 25 years of the Protectorate Administration occurred in the early
years of British rule, it would be a mistake to attribute this phenomenon ex¬
clusively to the disruptive effects of the 1898 Rebellion. The fixing of per¬
manent lines between chiefdoms which had previously been of a different con¬
figuration no less than of those whose borders had been dynamic contributed
to petitions for boundary adjustments. In addition there may have been dis¬
putes which dated from the establishment of the Protectorate or before but
had not been resolved prior to the outbreak of war.
The incidence of early claims deriving from alterations made in 1898
also coincided with the boundary delineations necessitated by the 1901 Order-
in-Council fixing Protectorate district boundaries. The impact of this action
is evidenced by the complaints brought before King-Harmon on his tours of
the Protectorate during that year, the grievances and claims filed, and the
reports of disputes handled by the District Commissioners.
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Throughout the years under review chiefdom disputes abounded for
reasons based on procedural and pragmatic factors. The absence for many
years of a clear cut formula to be used in boundary investigations has been
discussed. The desire for a 'just verdict' or to arrive at the truth of these
matters is relative when it is recalled that in many places where the British
administrators were looking for something definite to put on their maps and
tax rolls there had been no constant, fixed boundary.
Although headmen would know the areas under their jurisdictions,
they themselves may have been either independent or under different rulers
at different times, as conditions had changed. The unswerving loyalty to a
single ruler of paramountcy which the Government wanted to exist for their
administrative convenience had not prevailed among the peoples of the Sierra
Leone hinterland.
The Government sought the determination of boundaries to remove
sources of friction and dispute, as well as to facilitate tax collection in par¬
ticular and administration in general. The criteria of peace and payment of
the tax especially dominated the years immediately following 1898. These
two objectives were by no means compatible. The very act of fixing the
boundaries aggravated old conflicts and created new ones. Furthermore,
tranquil conditions were unlikely in those chiefdoms which were adjusted by
decisions of 'tax collection convenience.' It took thirteen years of ignored
complaints before 32 towns in Karene and another 4 in the Railway District
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succeeded in being restored to their rightful chiefdoms.^
However much these particular areas did not show their discontent in
overt forms of resistance, it cannot be expected that the position of the chief
in the assigned chiefdoms was enhanced. Although the 'constant friction' be¬
tween the 32 towns and the successive Paramount Chiefs of Upper Lokko East
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III was not detailed, it can be imagined that at least part of the difficulty
would stem from 'belonging to' and giving labour to the chief of traditional
allegiance, and the tax and nominal recognition to the one assigned by the
Government.
Such were the distinctions made by the 'embittered' people of the bor¬
der towns of Gotohun, Julian, Deegah and Tungea between the Dodo and Lep-
piama chiefdoms of the Railway District. So separated from Leppiama in
1902, the inhabitants of these towns succeeded in having the issue looked into
in 1905 and again in 1911. Both times the administrators were 'unwilling to
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make changes in the decision of a predecessor.' The credibility of Anderson,
the District Commissioner who originally made the arrangement had been se¬
verely questioned by both Probyn and Maxwell, but their doubts were not in
this case applied to the decision he had made.
Hindsight is perhaps more dangerously applied to the judgement of
70. S. L. A. D. C. Karene #41 1913 25 March Addison (Acting);
S. L. A. D. C. Railway #68 1913 27 June LeMesurier (Acting)
71. S. L. A. D. C. Karene #41 1913 25 March Addison (Acting)
72. S. L. A. D. C. Railway #68 1913 27 June LeMesurier (Acting)
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decisions made in disputed boundaries than in any other type of issue dealt
with by colonial administrators. Not only does the present-day critic lack
complete records in many cases, but also the advantage of being able to see
the locales in question. Furthermore, not a few district officers realised
that allegiances to chiefdoms were not always of great depth and duration,
and thus felt that administrative considerations could be given priority.
The greatest single category of complaints facing district officers
were these sensitive and potentially explosive boundary questions. On the
whole, they were handled as fairly and thoroughly as the enumerated diffi¬
culties and the demands on the Government officials permitted.
Alterations in the System of Administration
If many of the people of the Protectorate had previously little or no
exposure to Europeans or the military might of the British Government, the
three columns which traversed the length and breadth of the Protectorate dur¬
ing the end of 1898 and the early months of 1899 corrected that fault. What
was officially described as a small expeditionary force covered 2,629 miles
'to re-establish British authority and prestige in remoter parts of the Pro-
78
tectorate.' It can be imagined that the 995 troops under the command of
74
56 officers and accompanied by 4,295 carriers succeeded in these objectives.
73. Parliamentary Papers 1899 LXH Sierra Leone Government Report
for 1898 No. 273 p. 541
74. Fyfe, History... op. cit. p. 591
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In addition to subduing the populace they mapped many parts of the
Protectorate which had previously been unfamiliar. These efforts contribu¬
ted greatly to the boundary alterations and determinations already discussed.
A further physical change in the Protectorate districts was the transfer in
1901 of three of the five Headquarters. Batkanu became the new district
Headquarters of Karene, while Kabala and Moyamba became the administra¬
tive centres of the Koinadugu and Ronietta Districts, respectively.
Whether in response to complaints registered against the system of
rule provided for by the Protectorate Ordinance #20 of 1896, internal re¬
assessment, or in compliance with Colonial Office directives, the fact re¬
mains that the Sierra Leone Government made most of the major changes in
the Protectorate Administration in the revised Protectorate Ordinance, #11
of 1897. Scrutiny of the Protectorate Ordinances of 1896, 1897 and 1901 re¬
veals that although substantial differences in the tax and judicial systems
exist between the two former versions, few innovations are to be found in
75
the latter. The Protectorate Ordinance of 1901, #33, appears as a com¬
posite of its predecessors and of those laws which were enacted to contend
with immediate situations which the Rebellion had created.
Practical considerations of control and prevention of similar incidents
had been incorporated into legislation in 1899 making it an offence to make
war against Her Majesty, build war fences, stockades or other defensive
75. See subsequent chapters for particulars on the tax and court systems.
112
structures; and which created the post of Assistant District Commissioner
to augment existing staff in the Protectorate.^® The Assistant District Com¬
missioner was originally to be 'a temporary appointment of assistance' but
grew over the years along with the size and complexity of the administration.
From the original five posts in 1900—of which four were vacant until
mid-1901—the number of Assistant District Commissioners increased to a
dozen in 1909. Posts which fell empty were not always filled as soon as the
Sierra Leone Government would have liked, but the activities of the unlawful
societies in 1912 prompted the rapid filling of six vacancies in the course of
a few months. As a result the Assistant District Commissioners in 1913
numbered sixteen, the peak number during the years under consideration.
Two of the sixteen were 'native Assistant District Commissioners,' a phe¬
nomenon already discussed.
During the first quarter of the 20th century the function of the Govern¬
ment in the Sierra Leone Protectorate changed gradually from its initial con¬
cern with securing peace and introducing law and order, to a wider scope of
interests and undertakings. As involvement in or encouragement of transpor¬
tation, agricultural, sanitation schemes and the like increased, so did the
size and diversification of the staff.
The Department of Public Works, which for a time had been respon¬
sible for the transportation facilities in the Protectorate, was superseded
76. Ordinances #6 and #24 of 1899, respectively
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first by the Railway Department, and in 1905 by the Department of Protecto¬
rate Roads. The latter department especially had an increasing staff of
Europeans and Africans as more and more feeder roads to the Railway were
constructed. The first main group was built between 1905 and 1911, and
the second surge of road-building activity commenced in 1917.
By 1911 there was a Forestry Officer in the Department of Agricul¬
ture which itself had been restructured that year, partly to accommodate the
greater undertakings of Agricultural staff in the supervision of experimental
farms and other projects in the Protectorate. A Senior Sanitary Officer was
at this time still shared with the rest of British West Africa, but his staff
was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Principal Medical Officer.
With the legislation providing for the establishment of sanitary dis¬
tricts and the introduction of public health regulations, and the creation and
77
maintenance of forest reserves and restricted areas, the Protectorate
staffs of the two respective departments grew steadily until the War, and
thereafter for the remaining years under review.
The European staff in the Protectorate by 1924 included three Pro¬
vincial and thirteen District Commissioners; an Assistant Conservator of
Forests and an expert Agricultural Officer in each Province; a collection of
medical, public health and education staff permanently attached to the Pro-
77. Public Health Ordinance #10 1915 of 26 May; Public Health Rules
gazetted 17 July 1915; Forestry Ordinance #8 1912 of 2 August;
subsequent Governor's Orders and Orders-in-Council
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tectorate and additional ones who—like such agricultural experts as the bot¬
anists, soil specialists and entomologist--spent much of their tour working
in the Protectorate.
The necessity for additional personnel to restore and maintain order
and British rule after the 1898 Rebellion is reflected not only in the creation
of the post of the Assistant District Commissioner but also in the alterations
and expansion of the non-European District staffs and forces of the Frontier
Police and Court Messengers.
Frontier Police, Frontier Force, and Court Messengers
However valid the complaints against the Frontier Police prior to the
1898 Rebellion may or may not have been, there was no disagreement that
the abuses and misconduct of the Frontiers in the collection of the tax figured
prominently in the Risings.
Despite the recommendations of Chalmers and Chamberlain, Cardew
did not undertake any reorganization or reduction of the Frontier Police.
However, within months of his appointment in December 1900, the new Gov¬
ernor, Sir Charles Anthony King-Harmon, had introduced the matter to the
Secretary of State. Acting on the assessment and recommendations of War¬
ren, then Acting Inspector General of the Frontier Police, he instituted a
revision of the Force by which small outstations run by 'illiterate NCOs'
were closed down and the Force concentrated at district Headquarters where
they would be under direct supervision of European officers. Under the new
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system patrols would only be made under European officers. At the same
time King-Harmon altered the system of Court Messengers who until then
had been essentially errand boys.
Stationing Frontier Police alongside Court Messengers at district
headquarters created a duplication of effort in many of the non-military re¬
sponsibilities of the Frontiers. King-Harmon proposed to remove all civil
administrative jobs from the Police, making it a purely military body which
79
would hopefully be better trained and more efficient.
The duties and the numbers of the Court Messengers were greatly
increased as a result of these proposals, and of usage and expansion over
the years. In 1900 there were 10 in each of the five districts. By 1903
their numbers had swollen to 136, ranging from 22 in Koinadugu to 34 in
Karene. Distribution among the districts fluctuated according to local needs
but the total complement of Court Messengers increased steadily. The force
of 158 Messengers which existed by the end of 1907 after the revision of the
recruitment system doubled by 1924.
Insistence on the 1901 revisions despite the Colonial Office's unen-
thusiastic reaction, and rapid consolidation of the new systems, were no
78. P. R. O. 267/457 1 February 1901 #33 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
79. P. R. O. 267/458 17 July 1901 #248 King-Harmon-Chamberlain;
P. R. O. 267/459 4 September 1901 #304 King-Harmon-Chamberlain;
P. R. O. 267/459 18 October 1901 #348 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
doubt due to the findings of investigations throughout 1901 into alleged inter¬
ference in 'native affairs' and abuses suffered by inhabitants of the Protecto-
OA
rate at the hands of the Frontiers. King-Harmon showed at this early stage
of his term the good judgement and reliance on experienced staff that were
to characterise his administration. The assurances of an Acting District
Commissioner of three months duration, on loan from the Frontier Police,
that 'neither Court Messengers nor Frontier Police were given any oppor-
O 1
tunity of abusing their powers, where preventable' were overridden by
the far less encouraging but more realistic statements of more experienced
officials. Fairtlough, one of the pioneer District Commissioners and him¬
self a former Frontier Officer, warned of the difficulty in obtaining evidence
for charges resulting from the fear of reporting against (Frontiers) 'who
82
were a permanency in the district while the white officers were not.'
It is reassuring to find that not all such novice political officers from
the ranks of the Frontiers showed the same blind spots in assessing the falli¬
bility of their men. Lt. Greaves, who succeeded Eames as Acting District
Commissioner in Panguma, transferred the case in question to an unbiased
80. S. L. A. 2124 1901 8 May Govr. King-Harmon re: Suluku of Bumban;
S. L. A. 334 1901 31 January J. R. Mannah (later Paramount Chief
Mannah-Kpaka) n'Jala; S. L. A. 479 1901 22 January D. C. Fairt¬
lough Ronietta; S. L. A. 4817 1901 14 October Acting D. C. Greaves
Panguma; S. L. A. 273 1901 14 January Govr. King-Harmon
81. S. L. A. 334 1901 31 January J. R. Mannah 8 February Acting D. C.
Eames Panguma
82. S. L. A. 479 1901 22 January D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta
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authority who found the charges against the Frontiers based largely on faulty
OO
orders and supervision by the commanding officers.
After 1901 the Frontier Police, re-organised as the Sierra Leone
84
Battalion of the West African Frontier Force, receded into the background.
As a supervised military force it was employed in the Protectorate by District
Commissioners to enforce a disobeyed order or as a show or force, and in
other parts of British West Africa when required. It was an anathema to va¬
rious administrators that the West African Regiment posted in Sierra Leone
was regarded as 'an Imperial force for the defence of the Colony' and not
available for internal use or 'regular emergencies.' Both Probyn and Fairt-
lough at various times sought the disbandment of the West African Frontier
Force and the hiring of the West African Regiment to assume the duties of
the Frontiers.
The duties of the Court Messengers varied greatly. Their responsi¬
bilities to the District Commissioners and Circuit Courts included assisting
the warders in looking after prisoners and escorting prisoners being trans¬
ferred. They also acted as bailiffs, served writs and summonses, and is¬
sued warrants. Police work of Court Messengers included bringing to the
attention of the District Commissioner any breaches of the law which were
noticed only when, theoretically, travelling on duty; and maintaining order
83. S. L. A. 4816 1901 14 October Acting D. C. Greaves^ Panguma
84. Ordinance #22 of 1901 18 May
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until the District Commissioner could reach the scene of the alleged crime.
The delineation of duties which Probyn used as ammunition to win from
Lyttleton increases in the number of Messengers and changes in their re¬
cruitment and salary systems described the necessity of having six Messen¬
gers for each of the District Commissioners and Assistant District Commis¬
sioners to provide 'an escort to maintain the dignity of the Officer and to act
as reliable messengers.
On the 27th of November 1907, Ordinance #31 1907 went into effect and
incorporated the efforts of almost three years of researches among the dis¬
trict officers and negotiations with the Colonial Office on the part of Probyn.
Under the new recruitment system every Court Messenger was required to
be the nominee of a Paramount Chief, the District Commissioner selecting
the best men from among the candidates. Additional changes were made in
the wage and pension systems in the hope that such incentives would ensure
getting intelligent and reliable recruits of respectable families who were other-
86
wise joining the more financially-rewarding Frontier Force.
Much of Probyn's sales-pitch to Lord Elgin was that these reforms
were necessary to obtain recruits with sufficient intelligence to learn English,
85. P. R. O. 267/477 24 May 1905 c. Probyn-Lyttleton; also P. R. O.
267/476 22 March 1907 #31 O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-Elgin; P. R. O.
267/540 17 May 1912 #210 Merewether-Bonar-Law Warren Karene
report; P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long
enclosures and minutes on:
86. P. R. O. 267/484 30 May 1906 c. Probyn-Elgin
119
which was critical for the job. It was understandable that the district reports
of the years immediately following the introduction of the new system refer to
the inability of the Messengers to write or read, and in some cases compre¬
hend, English. However the habitual use of Court Messengers to double as
interpreters continued to be problematical owing to what were considered the
deficiencies in the mental capacities as well as the linguistic abilities of the
Messengers.
Addison, renown for being the champion of the underdog and the pro¬
ponent of schemes which depended on the resources of the indigenous popula¬
tion, was particularly outspoken against having to call upon Court Messengers
to translate to someone who then translated to the tribe. He felt that this
lengthy process was beset with dangers to the administration for several
reasons. None the least of these reasons was that few Court Messengers had
the intelligence and the knowledge of English to avoid misinterpretation of
^ 87orders.
It is appropriate to consider the role of the interpreter in the admin¬
istration of the Protectorate in this context as well as that of the courts.
From the establishment of the Protectorate, each District Commissioner was
provided with an interpreter on his staff. However, many districts contained
more languages than were known to the interpreter, with the result that dis¬
trict administrators often had to rely on Court Messengers or even non-
87. S. L. A. D. C. Karene #39 1913 28 March Addison (Acting)
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Government individuals. Furthermore, as was often the case, the position
of interpreter would become vacant, leaving the translation and transmission
of orders until a replacement arrived to people not qualified and not always
without advantages to be gained by misrepresenting the directives of the
Government.
It must be acknowledged that the interpreters themselves were by no
means above deliberate bias or accidental misrepresentation, with the same
consequences as when the offence or error was committed by a Court Mes¬
senger or local trader. Equally serious as the possibility of orders and
ordinances being misunderstood was the inability of District Commissioners
to know what was happening behind the scenes when the interpreter was
biased.
The merits of the system of recruitment of Messengers through Para¬
mount Chiefs was a point of continual controversy among colonial administra¬
tors in Sierra Leone throughout the years under review. Every District Com¬
missioner, when queried by Probyn in 1905, had cited potential defects and
89had expressed opinions ranging from skepticism to outright opposition. It
was feared that this method of recruitment would be more open to corruption
and abuse than random selection or appointment from the ranks of the Frontier
Force. Among the variety of reasons included was that candidates might re-
88. S. L. A. C201 1913 14 October Acting D. C. LeMesurier Railway
89. S. L. A. 418 1905 23 January Govr. Probyn
121
sort to bribery to obtain nomination and chiefs to coercion to guarantee
loyalty.90
The aspects of the system most lauded by its advocates—the close
liaison with the chiefs and the assurance of having recruits of prominent
families with standing in the country—were in fact at the root of the corrup¬
tion and undue influence which were found to exist time and time again. Cer¬
tainly it does not stretch the imagination to believe that these Messengers
were able in the course of their unsupervised duties to combine to their own
advantage the authority bestowed on them by the uniform of a Government
official with their local standing and support of the chief.
The numerous alleged Human Leopard murders of 1912 gave rise to
accusations that the greatest fears of the District Commissioners in 1905
had been realised. Throughout the districts plagued by these cases came
charges that Court Messengers were either playing into the hands of the Para¬
mount Chiefs or conspiring with them to mislead the District Commissioners.
Fairtlough was convinced that any chief involved with the Leopard Society
would make certain that either a fellow 'Leopard' or someone sympathetic
91
to the activities of the Society be chosen as Court Messengers.
The recommendations made by Fairtlough at this time were in effect
to revert to the system of 1896 of an armed constabulary taking the place of
90. S. L. A. 418 1905 23 January Govr. Probyn D. C. enclosures
91. P.R.O. 267/551 17 September 1913 c. Merewether-Long
Fairtlough enclosure
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the Frontier Force and of the Court Messengers' police duties. Although
such a reactionary suggestion was not adopted, it did serve to reveal dramat¬
ically the defects in the existing system and to achieve some reform in the
selection methods. From that time forth district officers were allowed the
local option of recruiting from other branches of His Majesty's Service if
92
the nominees of chiefs were not deemed reliable.
Despite periodic reforms and re-organisation instituted in the years
to come, complaints and charges of intimidation and undue influence of the
Fraontiers and Messengers persisted. The direct relationship between the
responsibilities of a corps of non-Europeans and the frequency of complaints
filed against them was not coincidental. When the civil administrative jobs
of the Frontier Police were transferred to the Court Messengers, who were
then required to venture out unsupervised from the district headquarters,
the charges of extortion and intimidation likewise shifted.
The system of administration in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, with
its minimal European staff, was virtually at the mercy of the groups con¬
sidered above. The Court Messengers were the eyes and ears, the interpre¬
ters the mouth, the Frontiers the fists of the Protectorate administrators.
It cannot be denied that the Court Messengers and Interpreters, in particu¬
lar, were known to mislead district officers and to misrepresent facts when
92. P. R. O. 267/560 16 October 1914 #561 Merewether-Long
Fairtlough N. Sherbro report
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they stood to gain pecuniary or political advantage by so doing. However,
this would appear to be an unavoidable evil in a system with such weak links
in the chain of command as language dependency on a staff which was largely
unsupervised in the execution of its considerable responsibilities.
The indictments of the Court Messengers and Frontier Forces were
almost always aimed at abuses committed while not under European super¬
vision. Few administrators would go as far as Shorunkeh-Sawyerr's scath¬
ing evaluation:
"Court Messengers and Government Interpreters appear to be
the bane of healthy administration. Generally may be a useful
body of men when under efficient control, but what are pro¬
clivities and actions without control? Most of them are men
of no character, born with objectionable tendencies, and hail¬
ing from the dregs of the population."^
Most would agree with the opinion of Dr. Maxwell that the reliability
of these forces as of 'the police forces in civilized countires' was in direct
proportion to the strictness of the discipline and the temptations to which
they were exposed.^ Such an observation is equally applicable in this day
and age.
Reliance on the initiative and discretion of European officers was
fundamental to the system of colonial rule but was nowhere more risky than
in the areas where judgement of character and human nature, and delegation
93. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long 17 January
Shorunkeh-Sawyerr enclosure
94. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long Maxwell
enclosure
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of authority, were concerned.
As long as philosophical and pragmatic considerations kept the Euro¬
pean administrative staff in the Protectorate at a minimum, and non-European
personnel with scant training and education, it could be expected that abuses
would occur. The Court Messengers, Interpreters, and members of the
Frontier Force all, to varying extents, were dispatched to carry out assign¬
ments which were likely to be unpopular with the indigenous population. These
Government officials were thus placed in compromising situations as they were
not only subject to bribes to, for example, ignore testimonies of chiefly op¬
pression, but also in many cases liable to actively seek to exploit their posi¬
tion. The continuation throughout the years under review of such interfer¬
ence and extortion, no matter how 'understandable' to students of human na¬
ture, did little to commend the Protectorate Government to the inhabitants
who suffered and knew only that their oppressors wore Government uniforms.
Protectorate Administrators and the Protected Peoples
It is more difficult to determine the attitude of the indigenous popula¬
tion during the years following the 1898 Rebellion than the underlying tone of
the British colonial administrators.
The subject matter and tone of Governors' dispatches to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies, let alone of local minute papers, in the first years
of King-Harmon's administration contrasts markedly with that of the last two
years of Cardew's. Cardew's waning health and spirit, and his desire to
exonerate himself from the blame for the Rebellion may have coloured his
appraisal of conditions in the Protectorate during 1899 and 1900. Another
explanation for the discrepancy between Cardew's assurances that peace pre-
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vailed and King-Harmon's skepticism could be that the newly-arrived
Governor had of inclination and necessity to rely on the opinions of others.
The extent to which he paid heed to the reports from traders in particular,
and Sierra Leoneans and Europeans in the Protectorate in general, would af¬
fect his assessment of the state of affairs in the Protectorate. Events, and
the records, had shown these groups to be alarmist, albeit understandably in
light of their losses in the Mende Uprising, and consequently given to spread¬
ing rumours.
However much the new Governor came to modify his original impres¬
sions he was never so naive as to take the chiefs' protestations of loyalty at
face value. King-Harmon maintained a healthy skepticism of their sincerity
and the nature of their secret feelings; and a realistic distinction between
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loyalty, and gratitude for particular blessings of British rule.
The documented concern over reports of unrest and threatened ris¬
ings—both the investigation into the possibility of their veracity and the
discussion of means to contendwith the sources of such rumours—reflects
95. P. R. O. 267/457 14 January 1901 c. 5 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
discussing Cardew interview in London's Daily Mail
96. P. R. O. 267/462 29 January 1902 #25 King-Harmon-Chamberlain;
P. R. O. 267/468 16 April 1903 #83 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
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the alertness and lack of complacency which distinguished the Government
after 1898 from that of before. Certainly King-Harmon could not be faulted,
as Cardew, for ignoring reports of disturbances. If he erred on the side of
indiscriminately dispatching troops or District Commissioners to alleged
scenes of unrest such a wariness could only be deemed understandable and
commendable.
In addition to the tone of caution and vigilance in the investigation of
reported unrest there is considerable evidence of patient explanation, and in
some cases introduction, of the Protectorate Administration and the tax to
the indigenous population.
The trek of the West African Regiment in 1898-1899 was but the first
in a series of tours by Governors, periodic excursions of Frontiers, and, as
frequently as possible, patrols of District Commissioners. These expedi¬
tions were considered essential for the re-establishment of British rule not
only by making the presence of the Government known but also by being avail¬
able to explain any such confusing aspects of the administration as the fact
that the death of the Queen and the departure of Cardew did not signal the end
of the hut tax.^
The tours were useful in allaying the fears and suspicions of others
than the Protectorate inhabitants. Reports thereof were printed for Parlia¬
ment to:
97. P. R. O. 267/458 1 May 1901 #140 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
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". . . prevent the circulation of misleading accounts of what the
Government is doing ... and to show that the Government is
much more in touch with native chiefs and people of the Pro¬
tectorate and understands them better than those in this (Britain)
country who profess to be their friends but are mainly inspired
by the semi-educated natives of the coast."9®
Resistance to payment of the hut tax was regarded by colonial admin¬
istrators as a matter of grave importance not only for fiscal reasons. Such
actions also were often rightly considered as reaction against British rule
in general, or a particular aspect thereof. A distinction must be made be¬
tween the refusal of the people to pay tax to their rulers, and their rulers'
failure to pay the Government.
A further distinction must be made to allow for ignorance of the tax
and its collection procedures. However, it is unlikely that this cause applied
to very many cases of non-payment of the tax. It would be more relevant to
the instances of over - and under-assessment which will be examined in the
following chapter.
Although King-Harmon charitably allowed for the trouble given by the
Sella Limbas in Kamakwea in the tax collection as being due to their limited
QQ
contact with the protecting Government, it is interesting to note that other
similarly remote areas were credited with rapid and unresisting payment.
The Governor's concession was despite the fact of economic hardship found
P. R. O. 267/459 9 October 1901c. 32 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
Antrobus minute






to prevail in many of the areas he visited in the Koinadugu District. This
state of affairs had been caused first by the effects of Samory's raids and
then of the French embargo on trade crossing the frontier.
Neither Berney nor Warren found that the chiefs' limited understand¬
ing of the tax, their powers and obligations, as a result of isolation from the
102
mainstream of Protectorate rule, affected their payment of the tax. In¬
deed simple equations between payment and comprehension or even loyalty
and comprehension cannot be made. The people of Upper and Lower Soa
country in Panguma professed both their loyalty and their confusion as to why
1 no
they had to pay a tax.
It can be expected that collection and payment of the tax in not just a
few cases was motivated by nothing greater than fear of reprisal for failing
to do so. The statement that "the people objected among themselves but old
men persuaded them saying the white man has come now, he's burnt out
towns, he's shot and put in jail all our big men we must agree to what he
says" would apply equally well to the tax as to the election dispute in which
it was made.
101. See Howard, Allen Big Men, Traders, and Chiefs: Power, Com¬
merce, and Spatial Change in the Sierra Leone-Guinea Plain, 1855-95
(PhD. University of Wisconsin, 1972)
102. S. L. A. 3354 1902 18 August Acting D. C. Berney Koinadugu;
S. L. A. 3488 1902 6 August Acting D. C. Berney Koinadugu;
P. R. O. 267/475 18 January 1905 #28 D. C. Warren Koinadugu
103. S. L. A. 1713 1901 5 April Acting D. C. Greaves Panguma
104. S. L. A. 1172 1905 2 March D. C. Anderson Panguma
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Cases of tax non-payment as outright resistance to British adminis¬
tration were few and limited to the first few years after 1898. King-Harmon
observed during his tour of Karene in 1901 that the people in some areas were
105
being incited to open rebellion by chiefs and headmen. Bai Sebura of Bom-
bali II was one ruler who was imprisoned for trying to organize resistance to
1 OR
the tax. Thereafter the reluctance or failure to pay tax was expressed in
a variety of forms and for different reasons but not as active revolt against
the Government.
It was not unusual for the subjects of an unpopular chief to use these
means to express a 'vote of no confidence' in their ruler and/or to draw the
Government's attention to unsatisfactory conditions in a locality. However
it would be a mistake to construe all acts of tax dislocation as being a reac¬
tion against chiefs who were closely allied with or owed their positions to the
Government. It would be equally the case that the inhabitants of a chiefdom
would use refusal to pay the tax as a 'modern' means of opposition to an op¬
pressive chief against whom in earlier times more violent methods might
have been employed.
The tax not being brought in in part of the Safroko Limba chiefdom
has been seen as but a symptom of underlying dissatisfaction with situations
in the chiefdom. Although actual bloodshed was narrowly averted in that
105. P. R. O. 267/458 1 May 1901 #140 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
106. S. L. A. C37 1913 3 April 1912 D. C. Warren Karene
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case, similar hasty action and poor judgement of political and military offi¬
cers could be considered significant factors in the killing of ten 'natives' and
the burning of a town in the Sandoh (Sanda) chiefdom of Konnoh country.
Since 1907 'tribal' dissension had been reported in this area. The
same quality characterized the differing opinions of the Railway District ad¬
ministrators, for Dr. Maxwell did not agree with Captain LeMesurier's con-
107
tention that there was serious unrest among the people. In this instance
the military view prevailed, no doubt as Probyn was receiving 'numerous
rumours' from other parts of the Protectorate 'similar as to the Mende
108
raid.' As a result a company of the West African Frontier Force, armed
for war, was sent to patrol the Railway-Central District border and thus con¬
vey confidence. It can be seriously doubted that such a convoy, purportedly
going to inspect a new site, would accomplish its objective of restoring con¬
fidence in the Government which was erroneously equated with restoring
settled conditions and consequently trade. Maxwell did not at this time come
to consider the situation as being as serious as did Probyn. The Governor,
in his polling of District Commissioners as to conditions in their areas and
in his instructions to the Commanding Officer of the Frontier Force, urged
109that 'the utmost secrecy and care be used as if a rising were imminent.'
107. S. L. A. C184 1907 25 December Officer Commanding theWest African
Frontier Forces LeMesurier; 25 December D. C. Maxwell Railway
108. P. R. O. 267/498 24 December 1907 c. Probyn-Elgin
109. Ibid.
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The District Commissioner of Karene diagnosed the problem in the Konnoh
country simply as deriving from the time when Nyagua's area was divided
and the new Paramount Chiefs were not unanimously elected and from the
fact of attempts to discredit them.*^
Such an understanding of the background to unsettled conditions in the
Sandoh chiefdom was not apparent in the handling of the non-payment of the
tax which occurred at the end of 1912. Sixty of 118 headmen refused to bring
the tax first to Acting Chief Sonsiama, who was Regent for his father Fa
Suluku, and then to Maxwell. The Frontiers who then were sent to collect
the tax and arrest the ringleaders met with resistance and 'were obliged to
fire.' *** Following on this incident where ten 'natives' were killed and the
village of Tayia burned by the Assistant District Commissioner, N. G. Frere,
an additional half company of Frontiers were diverted from the Northern Sher-
bro District, and the virtually unprecedented offer of Imperial troops made
112
by the Governor.
Maxwell, who in other contexts had been correctly assessed as 'not
113
being given to hyperboles or flights of fancy,' was forced to declare the
Sandoh chiefdom in a state of rebellion after more than a month's active
110. P. R.O. 267/492 29 March 1908 c. Probyn-Elgin
111. P. R. O. 267/543 29 October 1912 c. Merewether-Harcourt;
S. L. A. C157 1912 30 August D. C. Maxwell Railway, 18 September,
and 3 October telegram
112. S. L. A. C157 1912 30 August D. C. Maxwell Railway 3 October
telegram; 27 October Merewether-Maxwell
113. P. R. O. 267/468 16 April 1903 #83 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
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resistance. He reported the instructions of the Frontier officer, Captain
Coghill, as being to give the people four days to surrender after which time
115
it would be necessary to take more drastic steps to force them to submit.
Fortunately further violence was avoided by the surrender and tax payment
of many of the rebels within the given time.
A key factor throughout the disturbances had been the protection of
loyal areas, particularly Sonsiama's as the great opposition to him also was
1 1 fi
shown in attacks on his towns. The Government could not allow defiance
of a chief's orders to pay tax, however much the district officers recognised
it as being first and foremost an expression of resistance to the chief's au¬
thority, more than of the Government's. In a like manner in July 1913 Le-
Mesurier, acting for Maxwell, was forced to imprison several sub-chiefs
who, though loyal and helpful to the Government during the 1912 disturbances,
117
refused to obey Sonsiama's summonses.
As the current of discontent which had existed since 1907 still ran
through the chiefdom, the debates between Maxwell and LeMesurier as to
where to lay the blame became increasingly irrelevant. Whether or not orig¬
inally an oppressive ruler, Sonsiama's treatment of those who had opposed
114. S. L. A. C157 1912 30 August D. C. Maxwell Railway 27 October
telegram
115. S. L. A. C157 1912 30 August D. C. Maxwell Railway 1 November
to C. S. Haddon-Smith
116. S. L. A. C157 1912 30 August D. C. Maxwell Railway 24 October
A. D. C. Frere report, 25 October Maxwell-Merewether
117. S. L. A. C153 1913 30 July Acting D. C. LeMesurier Railway
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him aggravated conditions in the chiefdom and cost him the confidence of even
his staunchest supporters among the colonial administrators. In addition to
his systematic campaign to discredit and have deported all possible contenders
in the election which would follow Suluku's death, the Regent apparently
'thought it his duty to punish the rebels instead of trying to win their confi¬
dence and regard.' The Assistant District Commissioner in charge of the
Konnoh sub-district reported that Sonsiama 'had very foolishly kept practi¬
cally the whole of the country employed in making an absurdly wide road
through the country and in building some 200 large houses in Kayima during
118
the most busy farming months.'
Such a method may have been customary, and even lenient, treatment
of suppressed rebels. However, his opposition had not been put down by his
own might or influence. In addition, Sonsiama's failure to win over the dis¬
contented factions in the chiefdom by 'acts of clemency and fair play' further
undermined his position, and consequently the Government's by having to
119
uphold his authority against the better judgement of the administrators.
The possibility must be considered that methods of evasion of pay¬
ment of the tax such as alleged multiple family dwellings and under-assess¬
ment were forms of resistance to the tax in the sense of being resistance to
British rule. However, as will be seenmore fully in the discussion of the
118. S. L. A. C153 1913 30 July Acting D. C. LeMesurier Railway
A. D. C. Roper report
119. S. L. A. C153 1913 30 July Acting D. C. LeMesurier 8 August
taxing procedures, most cases were probably purely fraudulent and with no
intended political significance.
This pragmatic interpretation of tax evasion applies equally to chiefs
and to their subjects, and to finding ways to beat the tax system as well as to
moving beyond its reach. It was reported of the Jong chiefdom that the only
time when it was possible to collect the tax was when the people had come
into the towns at night to go to bed. Although it would seem logical that such
might be the likely collection time under any circumstance, Page was spe¬
cifically referring to the fact that the people ran away into the bush when the
120
chiefs came to collect. It can be suggested that a natural desire on the
part of many people to get away without paying tax would be compounded if
they felt assured that the chief, to avoid trouble with the Government, one
way or another would raise the assessed amount.
Alleged overland migration to Liberia due to the unpopularity of the
hut tax grew from being an occasional and minor point in reports to a major
issue in 1904 when King-Harmon was informed that 'such an impression pre-
121
vailed in some quarters in England.' By Sierra Leone Government terms,
a very thorough investigation was made, and revealed 'that the evidence
122
was contradictory and the matter should be put aside.' The former part
120. S. L. A. C58 1905 31 January D. C. Page Bandajuma
121. S. L. A. C42 1904 20 June 1903 Govr. King-Harmon;
See Grace, op. cit. for discussion of these migrations
122. S. L. A. C42 1904 20 June 1903 Govr. King-Harmon D. C. enclos¬
ures; 20 November King-Harmon
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of King-Harmon's conclusion cannot be challenged, although the methods of
interrogation might be. Not surprisingly, the evidence that Warren gathered
was the most strongly opposed to the tax. He would be virtually guaranteed
an affirmative reply to the question "Do you think that they ever crossed to
123
escape the payment of the tax?'^
Reasons for the 'mass exodus' included to get slaves, to avoid road
work, to earn money for the tax, and to leave the village. The entire matter
is of interest not so much for the negligible revelations about discontent over
the tax but for what is revealed by the importance the Government officials
attached to the migrations. Beyond the troublesome aspect of bad publicity
in Britain was undoubtedly the simple aversion to having people leave their
chiefdoms, for whatever reasons and in whatever numbers. Few adminis¬
trators seemed prepared to accept the simple explanation that it was not un¬
precedented for young men, in particular, to leave their homes in search of
many of the same things which might have motivated Government officials to
join the Colonial Service. There is nothing to indicate that there was any¬
thing unusual about the migrations to Liberia excepting the fact that until
1904 they had not received a great deal of attention. Certainly the investi¬
gations did not reveal any sources of discontent or oppression which were
widespread or not previously known.
123. S. L. A. C42 1904 20 June 1903 Govr. King-Harmon D. C. Warren
Bandajuma enclosure
The manner in which this episode was pursued is indicative of the
attitude of the many Protectorate administrators who in the years after the
Rebellion looked for resistance to the tax, or to the British Administration
in general, in every scene of unrest. Although it was perhaps a mistake,
albeit understandable, to construe many of the incidents as being ones of re¬
sistance it was equally wrong to minimize or overlook the various distur¬
bances and expressions of discontent as did Wilkinson and Slater in their
retrenchment proposals.
Suggestions of both of these Governors to cut back on the West Afri¬
can Frontier Force were made in the belief that 'one Double Company would
12'
be ample for safety, there being no longer any need to overawe the people'
in view of 'the peaceful condition of the Protectorate during the last 20
years.
This proposal coming from Wilkinson confirmed the low opinion of
him held by many at the Colonial Office. Although he had been on leave at
the time, Wilkinson's tenure had encompassed the Syrian riots of July 1919.
Originally caused by trade jealousy between the Creoles and Syrians, the
indigenous population soon had joined the raids on Syrian property in Boia,
Moyamba, Mano, Makump, Waterloo, Port Lokko, and Bonthe. Members
of the West African Frontier Force sent in when Evelyn, as the Officer Ad-
124. P.R.O. 267/590 21 April 1921 c. Wilkinson-Milner
125. P.R.O. 267/597 12 October 1922 c. Slater-Churchill
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ministering the Government, had declared martial law, also were involved
1
in the plundering and looting which lasted well into August. Two of the
major reports of the riots were made after Wilkinson had returned to Free-
127
town, so he could not have been ignorant of the events.
Slater not only lacked first hand experience with disturbances in the
Protectorate, he also was misguided by Stanley who assured the newly-
arrived Governor that with the exception of the improper use of troops in
1919 he 'could not remember having ever heard of any incident since the Re¬
bellion of 1898 which necessitated the use of even Court Messengers in a
128
semi-military capacity.' It can only be presumed that this Protectorate
administrator, first appointed a District Commissioner in 1910, was suffer¬
ing from limitations in either his memory or in his awareness of events tak¬
ing place in parts of the Protectorate other than his own.
Although such incidents as the migrations to Liberia, the Human
Leopard murders, the disturbances in the Safroko Limba and Sandoh chief-
doms, and the 1919 Syrian riots can be interpreted in various ways and
attributed to factors not directly related to British rule, the fact remains
126. P. R. O. 267/582 telegrams and dispatches from 19 July 1919 to
7 August 1919 O. A. G. Evelyn-Milner reporting events as they
occurred; from 7 August 1919--29 January 1920 O. A. G. Evelyn
and Wilkinson-Milner analysis of the occurrences.
127. P. R. O. 267/583 9 October 1919 #456 Wilkinson-Milner;
P. R. O. 267.585 29 January 1920 c. Wilkinson-Milner
128. P. R. O. 267/597 12 October 1922 c. Slater-Churchill Stanley
enclosure
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that such events were not indicative of the settled, contented conditions
colonial administrators strove for and often, between incidents, believed
existed.
In the eyes of some administrators and probably many of the indige¬
nous population the consolidation of British rule after 1898, in terms of a
settled, peaceful state of affairs, was not achieved rapidly or smoothly.
CHAPTER HI
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THE PROTECTORATE HOUSE TAX
Introduction
The hut tax was retained after the 1898 Rebellion; and the prolonged
debates over its retention, and recommendations for alterations in the sys¬
tem of collection caused-very few immediate changes. The major changes
in the tax laws are found to exist between the 1896 and 1897 Protectorate
Ordinances, not between those of 1897 and 1901. At Chamberlain's direction
certain variations were made in the tax system before it was put into effect.
By making the amount of tax a uniform five shillings, exempting some areas,
and having collection by indigenous rulers who would receive rebates for
their efforts, the Protectorate Ordinance of 1897 was undoubtedly viewed as
means to also mollify the chiefs who felt they were being stripped of their
powers and to facilitate collection by the understaffed Protectorate adminis¬
tration.
As can be seen in the testimonies given Chalmers, collection of the
tax from the indigenous rulers was in many cases carried out by the Frontier
Police in lieu of district officers. Although their oppressive and extortionate
methods were a major source of grievance, this sytem was not discontinued
until 1901 despite instructions from Chamberlain that Frontiers always be
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accompanied by European officers.* Cardew's interpretation thereof specifi¬
cally did not include supervision of matters concerning tax collection. This
was most apparent in his support of Hood's request to detail Frontier Police
2
to accompany all Bandajuma chiefs when they collected from their subjects.
Not surprisingly the Bandajuma chiefs, at the time of the next tax collection,
were reported as having 'no objection to the tax but taking exception to the
methods of assessment and collection.' ^ It is doubtful that Cardew was
blinded by naive loyalty to the Frontier Force he had nurtured; it is more
likely that the various afflictions Fyfe describes as plaguing Cardew in 1897^
had by this time made him not only irascible but more single-minded than
ever.
Upon his assumption of the Governorship in the beginning of 1901,
King-Harmon opened investigations into the tax collection systems which re¬
sulted not only in prohibiting the use of Frontiers to collect the tax from the
chiefs but also, via the 1901 Protectorate Ordinance, #33 of 1901, in the
clarification of the assessment system alluded to in the 1897 Protectorate
Ordinance. Although the Protectorate Ordinance of 1901 required that the
assessment provided for in 1897 be done every five years, neither pieces of
1. P. R. O. 267/453 2 May 1900 #110 Cardew-Chamberlain
8 September 1899 cited on:
2. P. R. O. 267/453 2 May 1900 #110 Cardew-Chamberlain
16 April Hood enclosure
3. P. R. O. 267/457 26 February 1901 #50 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
4. Fyfe, History... op. cit. p. 549
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legislation specified who was to do the registration or assessments thus
called for.
The practice of using unsupervised Frontiers, and later Court Mes¬
sengers, for registration of houses for tax assessment purposes was an ex¬
pedient that was found to be criticized on the same grounds of fostering con¬
ditions for extortion, corruption and oppression as was the equally pragma¬
tic employment of such personnel to collect the tax. Although the latter
practice had been specifically curtailed, it remained the practice for Court
Messengers to compile the registers until this responsibility was officially
5
delegated to the chiefs in 1906. With the unavoidable realities of European
staff shortages and the tendencies to poor judgement on the parts of some
district officers it is likely that the Court Messengers continued to be em¬
ployed in the registration of houses and the collection of the tax from the
chiefs. It was accepted practice for many years to use them to check assess¬
ments, a duty as open to corruption as making the original determination of
the assessment.
Not all chiefs shared the sentiments of Pa Nembana of Kwaia who re¬
quested that 'if the great burden imposed on them of paying the tax was to be
continued no member of the Frontier Police or Court Messengers be allowed
to interfere in it.' He cited the case, later investigated and found to be
5. S. L. A. Circular 30 October 1906
6. S. L. A. 963 1901 27 February Pa Nembana of Kwaia to C. S. Gore
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essentially true, of Court Messengers from Moyamba forcing payment of an
additional/1/10 for each of 374 towns. This levy was made in the name of
the District Commissioner for a 'farm tax.' The chiefs who refused to pay
7
were reported to have been tied, flogged and heavily fined. The facts that
much extortion was done in the name of the Government, and that the sources
of grievance in 1898 had not yet been removed, could have done little to in¬
still confidence of the Protectorate Administration in the protected peoples.
King-Harmon also received reports of chiefs who appealed to Dis¬
trict Commissioners for the assistance of Court Messengers and Frontier
Police to collect from their subjects.^ However, it is neither inconsistent
nor incomprehensible that some chiefs found the presence of such personnel
oppressive and detrimental to their own authority while others found such
Government officials helpful in carrying out duties they might otherwise be
powerless to execute. A less noble motive for seeking the aid of Court Mes¬
sengers and Frontiers would be to lend the appearance of Government sanc¬
tion to any additional levy which might be made and shared between the ruler
and the official.
% The House Tax
and the Principles of Protectorate Administration
The shortcomings of the methods employed to determine and collect
7. Ibid.
8. STL. A. 273 1901 14 January Govr. King-Harmon 27 February
Acting D. C. Eames Panguma re: Konnoh country
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the Protectorate house tax were inherent in a tax system conceived in the
requirements and philosophy which determined the Protectorate Administra¬
tion. As the Protectorate had to be financed locally and Cardew was reluc¬
tant to impose financial burden on the Colony, he looked to direct taxation
in the Protectorate as a major source of revenue. Cardew was familiar with
the successful imposition of taxes directly on poll, property and dwellings in
other African territories and felt that the inhabitants of the Sierra Leone
Protectorate were capable of paying a tax on their places of residence.^
Considering the role that economic factors played in the assumption of the
Protectorate, and Cardew's interest in the development of the resources of
the country, it is likely that he subscribed to the theory that taxation was a
stimulus to the productivity of the indigenous population.
Lugard, the author of the system of Indirect Rule which in many ways
resembled the administration introduced by Cardew in the Sierra Leone Pro¬
tectorate, placed the utmost value on the institution of taxes. Beyond being
a necessary source of revenue he felt it marked the recognition by the com¬
munity of the Suzerainty of the protecting power and the corresponding obli¬
gation to refrain from lawless acts. Lugard maintained and colonial admin¬
istrators at the turn of the century would have agreed that failure to impose
it was regarded as a sign of weakness or of fear. He was, however, ex-
9. Fyfe, History .. . op, cit. p. 543
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pressly opposed to direct taxation assuming the form of a house tax.
Once it was decided that a tax was to be imposed in the Protectorate
it was a matter of both financial expediency and of principle that the chiefs
be the agents responsible for the collection of the tax from their subjects.
From time to time Government officials, despairing of the deficien¬
cies of a system dependent on individuals allegedly so unsuited for the re¬
quirements of the job, had to be reminded that the collection system was
part of the fundamental policy of government. To set aside the vitally im¬
portant matter of recognizing and upholding the authority of the chiefs over
the people and governing the people in fact through the chiefs would, in the
belief of King-Harmon, result in setting the chiefs against the Government.
Destruction of chiefly authority, a state of rebellion, dissatisfaction and
chaos would also be caused by bypassing the chiefs in tax or other governing
matters. **
Fairtlough condemned a complex register scheme proposed by the
Auditor in 1902 on the grounds that it would not only require a large and
costly staff, but also would constitute interference between the chiefs and
Government. In the opinion of this former Frontier officer who had years
10. Lugard, F. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London,
1923) pp. 218, 237, 252; Lord Hailey, in Native Administration in
the British African Territories Parts 1-3 (London, 1950) provides
a succinct coverage of the theories and practices governing the
imposition of taxes in other parts of British Africa.
11. S. L. A. 3419 1902 2 August Acting D. C. Wallis Bandajuma,
10 December Govr. King-Harmon-Wallis
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of experience in the Sierra Leone hinterlands, "one of the chief causes of the
late agitation against the tax was the idea that the chief would no longer be
the medium of communication between the Government and the people, and
12
that thus their power would slip away from them." Fairtlough predicted
that anything which tended to revive this idea would lead to the same 'unde-
sireable complications' described by King-Harmon.
Such was one side of the rationalization for use of chiefs in the Pro¬
tectorate Administration, and particularly in the tax system. However,
philosophical defence of the use of indigenous rulers rarely distorted the
ability of most colonial administrators to perceive the advantages of direct
assessment and collection by European staff. This appreciation is no more
clearly stated than in Probyn's Standing Instruction on the House Tax Collec¬
tion circulated to the District Commissioners in 1910. "If the political staff
were sufficiently numerous it would be the best course for the assessment of
all the Chiefdoms in a District to be made by the District Commissioner or
by Officers acting under him. This is not practicable at present and conse-
13
quently the assessment has to be left to the Paramount Chiefs."
Fairtlough's description of the situation in Ronietta in 1902 serves to
substantiate Probyn's point and to provide the modern reader with a better
impression of conditions which determined the mode of Administration:
12. S. L. A. 3354 1902 19 August D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta
13. Standing Instruction #4 of 1910, 30 April (Appendix B)
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"This district is at present assessed at 8, 000 in round numbers.
This sum represents a total of 32,000 houses which are scat¬
tered over an expanse of about 5,600 miles in groups usually
varying in size from 4-40 houses. There are very few large
towns like Taiama and Mokelleh which contain over 150 houses.
These villages are generally 10 - 15 miles apart and except
on the main roads are difficult of access and it is absolutely
impossible for the District Commissioner to visit one half of
his district in any one year even supposing he devoted all his
time to travelling which in view of his other multifarious duties
he cannot do." ^
Given the requisite use of indigenous rulers, the history of the tax in
the Sierra Leone Protectorate and the actual and anticipated abuses of the
registration, assessment, and collection systems is one of attempts to de¬
termine the lesser evils.
The House Tax System
Description of the System in 1901
The system which prevailed by the end of 1901, with variations ac¬
cording to district conditions and Commissioners, was that a register of the
houses in a chiefdom was compiled by a government official, usually non-
European, in the company of the chief. Although the assessment of each
area had only to be revised within every five years, lists of the amount due
annually were sent to the chiefs several months before the beginning of the
year for which the tax was to be collected. Theoretically the chief would
have this time to appeal any inaccurate parts, to employ clerks to keep
14. S. L. A. 3354 1902 19 August D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta
accounts and issue receipts, and to divide the collection duties among his
sub-chiefs. The sub-chiefs in turn called upon their headmen to collect for
each house under their immediate authority, and to pay it to the sub-chief
who then conveyed it to the chief for payment to the District Commissioner at
Headquarters or another appointed centre. The Paramount chief received
from the District Commissioner a bundle of receipts made out for the a -
mounts reportedly paid by each town, village and fakai which he was to dis¬
tribute to the respective sub-chiefs.
Abuses of the Tax System
The record of the Protectorate tax during its first twenty-five years
reveals the consequence of inability, corruption, illiteracy, incomprehen¬
sion, and shrewd manipulation. The foibles of human nature--temptation,
laziness, ignorance, incompetence, avarice, ambition--were no less present
among the indigenous rulers than among the Government officials.
The opportunities for honest mistakes and calculated fraud were many.
To the credit of the Protectorate chiefs, many of the investigated cases of
alleged extortion and exploitation of the tax system were found to be merely
the result of the inability of the chiefs to understand the tax system or lists;
or to read, write, and count and thus keep proper records and issue receipts.
Another source of misunderstanding and complaint, and admittedly of abuse,
was the custom of chiefs' messengers receiving presents from any town to
148
15
which they carried the chiefs' word. This was a privilege of the chiefs
which the Government was not prepared to interfere with, and one which the
1 fi
messengers exploited on their own initiative.
The reports of the district officers do contain a considerable number
of references to instances of deliberate fraud in the handling of tax matters.
However, relatively few of these cases are well-documented and proven.
Several reasons can be offered for the discrepancy between cases suspected
or alluded to and those actually investigated and substantiated, beyond the
difficulties in obtaining evidence. Despite the assumption of many colonial
administrators that oppressed subjects would really file grievances against
their rulers, it is unlikely that this is so. Certainly the majority of the Pro¬
tectorate inhabitants were not as geared to such non-traditional methods as
recourse to the District Commissioner as Fairtlough judged them to be in
1901.
The Irishman always appeared to understand the logistics of a situa¬
tion far better than he did human nature. It was his wholehearted belief that
a chief could not exact more than what was due without his subjects coming
in to complain. 'This might have occurred in previous years but now the
15. A custom referred to by other district officers but most clearly des¬
cribed by Maxwell reporting of his investigation into alleged tax
extortion in Suluku's Saffroko Limba country. S. L. A. C46 1904
10 April Acting D. C. Berney Koinadugu 13 May D. C„ Maxwell
16. S. L. A. C32 1906 5 March D. C. Anderson Panguma
1 April report of Jong chiefdom
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natives perfectly understand that they are only liable for 5 / a house each
17
year and refuse to pay more.'
Complaints which were made, and received the type of skepticism
which Bowden admittedly attached to 'this type of charge against a chief',
could very possibly have been put aside by a harassed, overworked, preoc¬
cupied, or simply self-righteous, official. Bowden's grounds for his atti¬
tude were that the type of charge in question was 'not infrequently employed
by unscrupulous parties who wish to bring the chief into disrepute with the
Government on account of some petty dissatisfaction they may feel at an ad-
1 O
verse decision at his court.' However true this phenomenon may have
been in the Railway District, such a sentiment, especially from less con¬
scientious administrators, would not bode well for a thorough, unbiased en¬
quiry into complaints.
Bowden might have used his 'discretion' in such a way that prevented
disclosure of extortionate practices. Wallis exercised his initiative to re¬
frain from prosecuting 'all the chiefs who are embezzling' as he assumed
19
that their consequent removal would lead to trouble and unrest. It might
have been the case that removal of oppressive rulers would have just the
opposite effect. The policy of leaving district officers largely to their own
17. S. L. A. 273 1901 15 January Govr. King-Harmon 13 February
D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta
18. S. L. A. 2641 1909 20 June Acting D. C. Bowden Railway
19. S. L. A. 3419 1902 2 August Acting D. C. Wallis Bandajuma
devices was not without drawbacks in this context and in others examined.
Over and above the temptation of chiefs to appropriate some of the
cash which was often randomly collected and accounted for, the incentive of
a 5% rebate on the total tax submitted admittedly provided motivation for
corrupt practices. The methods employed by chiefs with criminal tendencies
varied from 'faking up' the lists sent to the Government of the amounts each
sub-chief had paid and thus taking advantage of their illiteracy, to ensuring
that under-assessment concealed over-collection.
Wallis' report of the trial of Paramount Chief Makavouri of Bumpe
for extortionate collection of the tax showed people 'tied, ill-treated and
20
forced to pay sometimes six times over the 5 shillings.' The system used
was that once the amount that had to be collected for the Government was
known, the chiefs and clerks put a price on the big towns and made the people
pay. The Government portion was then deducted and the balance shared be¬
tween the chief and his collectors. As investigating officer, Wallis did not
attribute much cunning to the 'uneducated savages' but laid the blame for the
'faked lists' and embezzlement in the Bandajuma District on the 'semi-lite-
21
rate unscrupulous native clerks.'
The shrewdness of Chief Soko of Bongor, in the Railway District,





much it may be considered that his talents were misdirected. He was found
to have under-assessed all the large towns in his chiefdom, and to have col¬
lected from only such parts of the chiefdom as were necessary to raise the
funds to pay the Government officer. The levy on the remainder of the chief¬
dom was made after the collector had left the area and kept for the chief's
own use. As with most criminals, he was found out by neglect of detail or
perhaps indulgence in the sin of over-confidence. Contradictory evidence at
his trial was undermining the District Commissioner's case until a search
of Soko's house disclosed the assessment lists showing the villages he
claimed ignorance of and a record of the same sums the headmen claimed
they had paid.22
It was not until 1905 that sub-chiefs and headmen themselves were
permitted to pay the tax collected from their respective areas to the District
Commissioner, and then only when in dispute with their Paramount Chief.
Such an adjustment did not accomplish the intended reduction in opportunities
for chiefly oppression. It would seem more than likely that new sources of
conflict were created between ParamountChiefs and any sub-chiefs or head¬
men who deigned to challenge their authority.
This was not the sort of dispute which found its way into the records
of colonial administrators unless it constituted the basis for a case or an
appeal within the jurisdiction of the District Commissioner's Court. The
22. S. L. A. 2641 1909 20 June Acting D. C. Bowden Railway
152
other condition under which such conflicts were recorded was if disciplinary
2?
action was required against the Paramount Chief's subordinate.
Changes in the Tax Collection System
The first major changes in the tax system since the Protectorate Ordi¬
nance of 1897 came as a result of innovations made in 1905 by Anderson, the
controversial District Commissioner then in the Panguma district. This en-
24
terprising administrator, criticised for being too over-zealous and protective,
went into each chiefdom to collect the tax directly from each sub-chief and
headman at appointed centres. The responsibilities of the ParamountChief
were thus limited to making sure that his sub-chiefs and headmen knew their
assessments and came before the District Commissioner at the proper time,
and to collecting from his own towns. Anderson pointed to three major ad¬
vantages of his method. It was his contention that many of the potential evils
were removed by not having the ParamountChief handle the chiefdom tax
monies, but by continuing to award him the full rebate as incentive that full
collection by his subordinates would be ensured. Those aspects were more
likely to strike a sympathetic note with his fellow administrators than his
third cited benefit--increased contact with all the rulers and opportunity to
25
discuss changes, Government projects and any problems with them.
23. See Standing Instruction #9 of 1910 The Authority of District Com¬
missioners over Paramount Chiefs, Appendix C
24. P. R.O. 267/517 20 November 1909 O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-Crewe
25. S. L. A. C32 1906 5 March D. C. Anderson Panguma
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Of all the accusations made about Anderson, Haddon-Smith's judge -
26
ment that he was not suited for the job was probably the most accurate as it
would appear that Anderson was essentially a man ahead of his time. Lugard
would have approved of Anderson, for the former considered the chief value
of a direct tax to be 'the close contact between officials and natives which
assessment and collection necessitates, and the consequent mutual under -
>27
standing and confidence which invariably results. Although this may be
something of an overstatement in the case of Sierra Leone in the early years
of this century, Anderson's more enlightened colleagues, Bowden and Max-
28
well, did come to appreciate the value of these meetings.
Although there is no record of the details of Anderson's innovations
being transmitted to the other district officers either as information or di¬
rectives, his tax practices had been instituted throughout the Protectorate
by the time the collection was made at the beginning of 1907. Despite com¬
plaints ofthe additional burden placed on them by having to visit the chief-
doms, the annual reports of the District Commissioners contain an unusual
degree of unanimity and praise for the collection system.
Not only did the District Commissioners appreciate the changes but
also they reported that the new system was welcomed by the chiefs. The
26. P. R. O. 267/517 20 November 1909 c. O. A. G. Haddon-»Smith-Crewe
27. Lugard, op. cit. pp. 233, 250
28. P. R. O. 267/532 1 June 1911 #267 Merewether-Crewe Maxwell
Railway District report; P. R. O. 267/570 3 March 1916 #83
O. A. G. Hollis-Bonar-Law Bowden Railway District report
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reasons for this attitude included freeing them from malaccusations of ex¬
tortion and from a job which allegedly was inconsistent with the patriarchal
form of government. The effect of impairing their authority over their sub¬
jects was presumably the result of 'unedifying disputes between chiefs and
subjects' referred to by Page in his discussion of the merits of the new col-
29
lection system as seen in the Northern Sherbro District.
There was no suggestion during this period of the possibility of col¬
laboration between chiefs intent upon a substantial rebate, and sub-chiefs
and headmen. For all that Anderson's innovations were marked improve¬
ments, they did not ensure accuracy nor the elimination of extortion or in¬
competence.
The System of Receipts
Literacy was a considerable factor in the assessment and the collec¬
tion of the tax and in the system of receipts. Finding bundles of tied receipt
tickets, dirty and abandoned in the corner of a chief's house did not surprise
District Commissioners who realized that few of the chiefs, and fewer of the
sub-chiefs and headmen who were to have received them, could read or un-
30
derstand the receipts. With the institution of collection direct from the
29. P. R. O. 267/495 23 July 1907 #299 Probyn-Elgin Page Northern
Sherbro District report
30. Although it was Wallis who reported coming across the actual bundles, -
Bowden and Berney in their investigations of tax abuses discuss the ir¬
relevancy to illiterates of these receipts. S. L. A. 3419 1902 2 August
Acting D. C. Wallis Bandajuma; S. L. A. 3488 1902 6 August Acting
D. C. Berney Koinadugu; S. L. A. 2641 1909 20 June Acting D. C.
Bowden Railway
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local rulers, District Commissioners handed out the receipts themselves.
However, no proof of payment for the individual house-owners was attempted
31
until the introduction of the house-card system in 1908.
Also provided for in 1908 was the system of giving the Paramount
Chief one receipt for the gross amount paid. This reverted in 1910 to the
earlier practice of issuing itemized receipts to each sub-chief and headman
32
for his own area, but the house-card system was retained. Unfortunately
the elaborate plan of distinctively coloured and printed house tax cards for
successive years depended on the accurate distribution by the headmen.
There was no way of ensuring that the cards would not be handed out for each
house regardless of whether or not tax had been paid or withheld from some
who had paid. Certainly there was nothing in the system which guaranteed
improved comprehension of the indigenous rulers or subjects of the signifi¬
cance of these cardboard tokens.
The theory set forth in the Standing Instruction #4 of 1910 on the House
Tax Collection was that the house-card system 'enables every house owner
to receive a Government token showing that the money he paid has reached
33
the hands of the Government.' It is likely that even if these cards were
distributed as intended, upon request to produce them many people would be
unable to, either from wear and tear or loss because their value was not
31. Standing Instruction #2 of 1908, 25 April
32. Standing Instruction #2 of 1908; Standing Instruction #4 of 1910,
30 April (Appendix B)
33. Standing Instruction #4 of 1910 (Appendix B)
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appreciated and their construction not of an enduring nature.
Abuses in the Assessment System
A. J. Berney, who was detailed from the Frontier Police to act as
District Commissioner in Koinadugu in 1901, was of the breed of colonial
administrator better suited to desks and policy-formulations than patrols and
practical solutions. His inertia and inability to put into effect cures for the
diverse evils he pinpointed in administrative systems caused his perceptive
observations to be largely ignored by his superiors in Freetown. The fallacy
in the tax system lay, in his opinion, in the assumption that the chiefs would
be able to arrive at a knowledge of the contents of assessment lists written
in English and at an understanding of how to make an accurate and equitable
collection. In the Koinadugu District the majority of the chiefs were reported
as not only being themselves illiterate but also lacking clerks or writers who
could check the lists or keep accounts. Berney's contention was that if the
04
lists were in Arabic most of the rulers would be able to get them read.
However he did nothing to bring about such an innovation.
The Acting District Commissioner viewed the cumulative effect of the
system's deficiencies as being that 'a Paramount chief who does not know ac¬
curately the amount of tax he is assessed for is collecting money from head-
35
men who do not know how much they ought to pay! Specific situations which
34. S. L. A. 3488 1902 6 August Acting D. C. Berney Koinadugu
35. Ibid.
157
resulted from the literacy and comprehension problems included chiefs
bringing in lump sums with no idea from which towns, or with itemized ac¬
counts which did not correspond to the amounts. One desperate, and ingeni¬
ous, chief herded all his sub-chiefs and headmen to district Headquarters to
deliver whatever sums they considered to be correct as he was 'totally con¬
fused. '
A further defect of the assessment system was pointed up by com¬
plaints from chiefs themselves, who appealed for it to be done annually.
Whether or not they were 'out of pocket' as claimed by making up the amount
required, the chiefs did have a valid grievance that migration, deterioration
and abandonment of houses altered the number of taxable dwellings in a chief-
37
dom far more frequently than the register was compiled. It must be noted
that it would be equally true that neither did new constructions go onto the
tax rolls. This fact was pointed out by government officials attempting to
justify the retention of the three-yearly assessment system introduced in 1902.
The basis of their argument was that, staff shortage aside, houses that were
O O
newly built were probably balanced out by ones that had fallen into disuse.
36- Ibid.
37. S. L. A. 879 1903 19 January Chiefs and sub-chiefs of Jong, Banda-
juma petition; P. R. O. 267/467 23 February 1903 #36
King-Harmon-Chamberlain
38. P. R. O. 267/464 6 October 1902 #256 King-Harmon-Chamberlain;
Ordinance #15 of 1902; P. R. O. 267/467 23 February 1903 #36
King-Harmon-Chamberlain
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The responsibility for assessment was not shifted to the indigenous
39
rulers until 1905, presumably as the chiefs' acceptance of the tax and cooper-
ration with its collection were not considered sufficiently secure until that
date. Under the new system a small stone was collected for each house and
carried before the District Commissioner who, with the Paramount Chief,
counted them and made the register. As the system became more refined the
piles for each sub-chief's and headman's area were kept separate and notched
sticks were made to represent the amount owed.
The chiefs were now considered to be in the position to distinguish be¬
tween used and disused and newly built houses, and to report these changes to
the District Commissioner when the assessment list came out. In this way
the necessary modifications of the District Commissioner's original assess¬
ment were to be made. Alleviation of many of the problems and grievances
was anticipated by the hopeful colonial administrators. It was not, however,
40
until 1910 that annual assessment was instituted.
Although the assessment system of 1905 did succeed in quieting the
chiefs' complaints, it created an increased variety of situations which the
District Commissioners had reason to regret. Giving the chiefs the duty of
39. S. L. A. 3166 1907 8 August C. S. Haddon-Smith proposed ordinance
circulated to District Commissioners re: system instituted 1905,
instructions and procedures detailed in Circular #137 30 October
1906; new instructions and proposed legislation sent to Secretary of
State P. R. O. 267/489 6 November 1906 #450 Probyn-Elgin
40. P. R. O. 367/525 11 October 1910 #509 Probyn-Harcourt
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assessment also gave them more opportunity to abuse their position. In addi¬
tion to the continued difficulties caused by misunderstanding of orders and by
illiteracy were major discrepancies which resulted from deliberate failure
to report increases in population, particularly in those areas near the rail¬
way and trade centres.
Registration by sub-chiefs and headmen of their own areas became
widespread practice by 1908. However, the avenues of chiefly extortion un¬
doubtedly only were diverted, not decreased. If chiefs had been successful
in falsifying assessments by coercing or otherwise convincing principal men
and sub-chiefs of the benefits of cooperation, so too could the enterprising
sub-chief or headman in the same position. Furthermore, it was extremely
unlikely that the chiefs were going to forego their lucrative practices just be¬
cause their subordinates had been given the responsibility for assessment and
collection. Indeed, if this were the case there would be very few proven
charges of extortion against chiefs after 1908.
In addition to assessment alterations suggested by the chiefs, District
Commissioners were instructed to check in detail one or more chiefdoms
41
every year. Although there are occasional references to such in the re¬
cords, for the most part a check on the assessment by political officers con-
42
sisted of counting huts when on patrol. Conditions in many parts of the Pro-
41. Standing Instruction #4 of 1910, 30 April (Appendix B)
42. P. R. O. 267/572 28 October 1916 c. Wilkinson-Bonar-Law
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tectorate did not alter much throughout the period under review from those
described by Fairtlough in 1902, and the demands on the perpetually limited
i
European staff increased yearly. Although the Instructions acknowledged that
the system would not enable the District Commissioner to detect every error
43
in the assessment, it is unlikely that the cursory tally on patrol turned up
many instances of abuse or malfunctioning of the tax system. It can be sug¬
gested that glaring discrepancies between the assessment and the amount of
tax submitted were needed before the majority of the District Commissioners
or their Assistants would journey to a chiefdom specifically to examine the
register, assessment and receipts.
Whether or not the District Commissioners had this power of review
by law or by usage became a subject of a comprehensive memo from Shorunkeh-
Sawyerr after the 1917 disclosures of maladministration in the Northern Sher-
bro District which centred on Fairtlough's assessment checks. The Creole
barrister pointed out that although the Standing Instruction #4 of 1910 made
provision for such checks, the directives in these circulars had no legal
standing. A Governor's Order of March 1910 was cited as having revoked the
District Commissioner's power to check assessments given in Ordinance #13
44
of 1905, Although Shorunkeh-Sawyerr surmised that the Governor's Order
was no doubt intended to clear the way for the system introduced the following
43. Standing Instruction #4 of 1910, 30 April (Appendix B)




month in the Standing Instruction, the fact remained that for years there was
no legal basis for whatever assessments were checked and revised by the
political staff of the Protectorate.
The hardships faulty assessments may have caused the indigenous
population often were insignificant compared to those inflicted by the Court
Messengers who were sent in the District Commissioner's stead to investi¬
gate the lists.
As in the case of collection of the tax, the system of assessment lent
itself to intentional corruption and accidental abuse by indigenous rulers no
less than by Government officials. Paramount Chief Soko reported his town
as having 64 houses but Bowden's investigation showed 85. 'Glaring discrep¬
ancies' of a greater order were noted in the payments for Bendu, a town of
90 houses, and Manhoma, which had a building count of 145. These two com-
45
munities were assessed as having 58 and 111 houses, respectively.
The sums exacted from the people in the Northern Sherbo District by
Major Fairtlough and his staff more than made up for the losses sustained
due to Soko's misappropriations over the years. Fairtlough's conviction and
imprisonment of six Paramount Chiefs within thirteen months during 1915 and
1916 aroused the suspicions of Wilkinson, newly arrived at his first African
post. Enquiries revealed that in 1915 the Assistant District Commissioner
in charge of the Gbangbama sub-district, scene of the recent Leopard Society
45. S. L. A. 2641 1909 20 June Acting D. C. Bowden Railway
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activities, had initiated a campaign against alleged evasions. Berry, who
was one of the Assistant District Commissioners appointed in 1912 to assist
with the local crisis, sent out clerks and Court Messengers to 'check' re¬
turns. Fines of ,£414 were imposed on 552 houses and his 'informers' award¬
ed £55/4/8.^ W. B. Stanley, transferred from Ronietta to take over from
Fairtlough at the outset of the revelations, found that the information of the
Court Messengers and clerks was not checked by any European. His evi¬
dence showed that as the additional levy came only to 8/ a house, the people
paid without serious protest.^7
As the exactions increased under Fairtlough's personal campaign,
which began in April 1916, so did the rewards for his staff and the discontent
of the population. As the 'assessors were rewarded by results,' the junior
clerks and Court Messengers he 'sent out in all directions' granted scant
mercy. In Sembehun Stanley counted 73 houses; the tax records of January
1915 showed they had paid for 86. In 1916 the assessors made the headman
pay the tax and three years' arrears on a further 96 houses, bringing what
should have been a tax of £18/5 to <fll7. ^8
In the later stages of the enquiries, R. S. Hooker, sent to act for
Stanley as District Commissioner of Northern Sherbro, found a similar.
46. P. R. O. 267/572 28 October 1916 c. Wilkinson-Long Stanley report
47. Ibid. It was later revealed that complaints made in 1915 to Major
Fairtlough of Berry's actions were ignored. P. R. O. 267/574
24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long Hooker report.
48. P. R. O. 267/572 28 October 1916 c. Wilkinson-Long Stanley report
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pattern to exist in the tax records of 59 villages. Comprised of a total of
2,031 houses, these villages had first paid on 2,631 units, and then in 1916
49
on 1,333 additional for the 'three years arrears.'
The Government did not receive all the profits, for the incentives paid
Dehu and Johnny Bobo (Borbor) for their efforts in June 1916 alone were typi¬
cal of Fairtlough's reward system. Dehu, a sixth grade clerk whose salary
was jf34 a year, made<&3, as did Interpreter Bobo, who made <^38 per an-
50
num.
As a result of the investigations into the 'maladministration' of the
Northern Sherbro District numerous clerks and Court Messengers were tried
before the Circuit Court Judge, and the three political officers' termination
of service arranged. Wilkinson and Colonial Officer staff considered that the
incident had raised many general questions about the administration of the
51
Protectorate, Tike the whole question of the tax.' Certain defects in the
Protectorate judicial administration which were revealed will be discussed
in the following chapter.
One 'question' about the tax was answered by Circuit Judge Parodi in
the course of the trials of clerks and Court Messengers, many of whom were
52
convicted of conspiracy to extort money from tax-payers. In the course of
49. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long Hooker report
50. P. R. O. 267/572 28 October 1916 c. Wilkinson-Long Stanley report
51. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long and Colonial
Office minutes on:
52. P. R. O. 267/572 20 December 1916 c. Wilkinson-Long Circuit
Judge Parodi report
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his decisions he ruled that the tax could not be levied on separate families
alleged to be living under one roof, but only the dwellings themselves could
53
be assessed. One of the methods by which the excessive over-assessment
had been accomplished was by the practice of considering 'conchos,' or what
were believed to be multiple family dwellings, as liable to more than one
tax payment.
The Native Assistant District Commissioner, Tuboku-Metzger, was
retired under the age clause; Fairtlough, who had been transferred to an¬
other district, was allowed to finish his tour before being pensionned off.
The career of L. H. Berry, the young Assistant, in the Colonial Government
of Sierra Leone, came to an abrupt halt. His 'painfully misdirected zeal'
was a problem which could have been overcome by guidance from his senior
officers; however, 'his impatience of native complaints militated against his
future usefulness.' ^
Protectorate Administrators and the Tax
Colonial administrators affected the institution and implementation of
the house tax in the Sierra Leone Protectorate in many ways. Faulty assess¬
ments were caused equally by incompetence and overzealousness; arbitrary
or unjust actions resulted from, among other things, a tendency to view the
handling of tax matters by the indigenous rulers with suspicion. Nowhere
53. Ibid.
54. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long
165
was the contact between District Commissioners and Protectorate chiefs as
great as in the assessment and collection of the tax. Therefore the initiative
left to the political officers and the manners in which they used their dis¬
cretion were of critical importance in this respect.
Few administrators were seen to have displayed the effort of George
William Page who, succeeding the armchair critic Berney in Koinadugu at
the end of 1902, set about to correct the faulty registration done by the Fron¬
tiers in 1898. Whether he was a man of exceptional immodesty or excep¬
tional energy the fact remains that he alone of the District Commissioners
during the years under review reported such an undertaking as spending 80
55
of his first 112 days in the district on patrol compiling new registers. His
self-acclaimed ability to go through the lists with the chiefs and headmen in
three languages would be an advantage not apparently shared by his colleagues
who had to depend on less reliable means of revising their registrations.
Throughout his eighteen years of service in the Protectorate Page
showed great interest in issues concerning the house tax. Had the 'District
Commissioner's Patrol House Tax Book' which he introduced been adopted by
all the Protectorate administrators valuable contributions to demographic
and economic studies would have been made. This enterprising and highly
organised District Commissioner scrutinized the tax returns for increases
55. S. L. A. 3488 1902 6 August Acting D. C. Berney Koinadugu
3 January 1903 Acting D. C. Page
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and decreases, and recorded any apparent reasons for changes. In addition
the 'movement of people to other towns was noted for future reference' and
56
his opinions on the migration patterns offered.
However much the District Commissioners may have turned blind eyes
to abuses in the tax system or have been incapable of detecting them, as a
body they must be given credit for the overall apparently genuine attempt to
carry out their tax-related duties as best they could under the adverse cir¬
cumstances of inadequate staff, large territories, and frequent transfer.
Without a doubt certain district officers, such as Maxwell, Page and Fairt-
lough, applied themselves to tax matters with a thoroughness which seeming¬
ly derived from a greater personal conviction of the need for the tax than was
possessed by many of their fellow district officers. It can be suggested that
Fairtlough's attachment to the tax lay more in the tax as a symbol of acknow¬
ledgement of British dominance than in Maxwell's interest in the revenue as¬
pect. Page emerges as a man who thrived on details and the challenge of
coordinating such a massive undertaking as was the Protectorate tax system
in any given district.
The latitude for individual variations within the tax registration, as¬
sessment, and collection was substantial, as seen in cases already cited.
It can only be wondered to what extent the chiefs were further confounded by
56. P. R. O. 267/513 22 April 1909 #165 Probyn-Crewe Page
Northern Sherbro District report
/
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the differing methods, requirements, and vigilance of successive colonial
administrators.
The House or the Family as the Unit of Taxation ?
All the human failings, policy priorities, and conflicts inherent in
57
the Protectorate house tax system emerge most clearly in the 'concho'
controversy which raged throughout most of the first twenty-five years of
colonial rule. Underlying the lack of clarity of Government policy about
taxing these 'conchos' was the lack of agreement on the definition of these
structures. Although district officers were polled about the incidence of this
phenomenon in their respective areas, no attempt was made to reach a con¬
sensual definition. For many years 'conchos' were described in such indefi¬
nite terms as being lean-to attachments to a house. Undoubtedly much of the
subsequent difficulties in assessing and collecting from these constructions
derived from the fact that a new district administrator would have a different
opinion of what was a 'concho' than did his predecessor. In such cases the
assessments would be altered in accordance with the instructions of the new
District Commissioner. Not unusually this meant a chiefdom's assessment
might increase threefold with the change in personnel.^
57, Variously spelled in the records 'konko,' 'kongo,' 'conko,' and
made plural by the addition of either 'es' or 's'.
58. S. L. A. C58 1905 31 March D. C. Page Bandajuma re: Jong;
S. L. A. 194 and 267 1909 D. C. Anderson Central re: Malal,
Mabang, Kolifa
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Until 1917 the underlying point of conflict in tax assessment and col¬
lection was whether the tax unit was the family or the building. Although the
Protectorate Ordinances clearly provided for a five shilling levy on each
house, it was not until Circuit Judge Parodi's decision in the wake of the
Northern Sherbro over-assessments that the practice of counting two families
59
under one roof as two houses was declared illegal.
Although there was no specific definition of the 'concho,' by 1903 a
policy was emerging to deal with this alleged form of tax evasion. Instruc¬
tions circulated to the District Commissioners in time for the tax collection
at the end of the year stated the principle that a levy should be made on each
RO
family living under the same roof. No procedures for determining what
constituted a family or how to find out the number of families in a dwelling
were laid down at this or any other time.
Efforts to end this practice of 'overcrowding' commenced the follow¬
ing year. The indigenous rulers were urged to enforce customary laws which
were presumed to exist against multiple family dwellings. T. J. Alldridge
drew upon his years of experience in Sierra Leone and convinced first King-
Harmon and then Probyn that the chief who allowed more than one family to
live in a house was encouraging departure from 'the native custom by which
each family had its own house.Statements from Protectorate rulers over
59. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. ; 27 April #115 Wilkinson-Long
60. Circular #49 of 1903, 21 September
61. P. R. O. 267/475 3 January 1905 #1 Probyn-Lyttleton Alldridge
and Governor's Instructions enclosures
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the years were elicited to substantiate this belief that customary prohibitions
62
against overcrowding on moral and sanitary grounds were being violated.
Incentive for the rulers to cooperate in the campaign to rid the Pro-
£»q
tectorate of this evil was provided by the threatened loss of their tax rebate.
However, there is no evidence of this threat being carried out, although tem¬
porary withholding of the commissions would not necessarily appear in the
records. It was decided in 1905 and many times subsequently that such al¬
leged overcrowding was best dealt with by the chiefs, not by legislation. As
late as 1922 a law proposed for the assessment of 'double families'was aban¬
doned. As a result there was no statutory basis for such assessments during
the years under review.
Colonial administrators were of the opinion that such buildings had
not existed prior to the Protectorate. Although there is nothing in the records
to indicate whether or not the advent of the 'concho' coincided with that of the
Protectorate, it is unlikely that this rule could be applied to the entire hin¬
terland. The original Protectorate Ordinance, #20 of 1896, provided for a
ten shilling levy on houses with four or more rooms. Such a distinction is
one which implies a double tax was to be collected from larger numbers of
inhabitants. Despite the fact that a uniform tax was put into effect, the prin-
62. See P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long Maxwell
enclosure
63. Circular #58 of 1904, 29 December; P. R.O. 267/475 3 January
1905 #1 Probyn-Lyttleton; S. L. A. 1704 1905 17 April Govr. Probyn
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ciple of collecting a greater amount from larger dwellings would appear to
be the basis for the assessment on 'conchos.'
There is no mention of lean-to attachments in the records until the
turn of the century. It is possible that Government officials had not noticed
their existence until such time as administrators came to regard them as a
form of tax evasion. The priorities of the Government become apparent when
it is seen that on the one hand 'conchos' were deplored because of their al¬
leged unhygienic and immoral conditions and departure from customs. On
the other hand, efforts to do away with them were contradicted by provision
for collecting tax from families allegedly living in these constructions. By
so doing the Government appeared to condone their persistence.
i
The assessment of more than one family living under the same roof
was not made consistently. A situation typical of the consequences of the
non-specific nature of the directives and of the discretion left to district
administrators was the difficulty Anderson experienced in collecting the tax
from the Malal, Magang and Kolifa chiefdoms, then of the Central District.
Upon coming to the district Anderson reportedly had found that "ap¬
proximately one-third of the population was living in 'congoes' and thereby
evading the tax."^^ In Malal alone he numbered the houses as being 370 but
65
the inhabited 'congoes' as being 643. The refusal of the chiefs to pay the
64.
65.
S. L. A. 194 1909 1 January the Massa Kama of Rowalla Kolifa
chiefdom Central 6 January D. C. Anderson
Ibid.
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tax at the end of 1908 and beginning of 1909 stemmed from a meeting the Dis¬
trict Commissioner had held with them in the previous April. At that time
he had told them that "people living in 'congoes' or another room of the house
who were not of the immediate family of the owner had to pay 5/ as well as
the owner of the house."
By 1908 many district administrators had been reporting collections
for 'conchos' for several years. Fairtlough, under whom these chiefdoms
had been prior to their transfer from Ronietta, was no exception. However,
the rulers' contention that they had never paid this tax was supported by An¬
derson who found that Fairtlough had depended on the assessment lists sup-
fi 7
plied by the chiefs themselves who had never counted 'double houses.' Dis¬
closures such as this no doubt formed the basis of Haddon-Smith's accusations
n o
of Anderson antagonizing the other District Commissioners.
Each District Commissioner interpreted the instructions and what
constituted 'immediate family' in different ways. A source of further incon¬
sistency and confusion lay also in the fact that these interpretations of Govern¬
ment officials diverged greatly from those of the indigenous rulers, on whom
the responsibility for assessment ultimately rested. Anderson's 1908 qualifi¬
cation of 'all who were not wives and young children of the owner of the house'
66. Ibid.
67. S. L. A. 194 1909 1 January the Massa Kama of Rowalla Kolifa
chiefdom Central 6 February D. C. Anderson
68. P. R. O. 267/517 20 November 1909 c. O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-Crewe
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69
being subject to the separate family tax is the first recorded definition.
Even he complicated the issue by referring synonomously to 'non-relatives'
of the (^o^iers. The objection of the chiefs in this case centred on the fact
that these rooms were for 'strangers' and family friends whom it was im-
70
proper to house with their wives.
Such an explanation was definitely plausible, and contributes to the
argument that the Government conception of these attachments being recent
in origin and designed to evade the tax was erroneous in many instances.
Government officials could not agree on the question of evasion. Maxwell
disbelieved that the Konnohs of the Central District were defrauding the
Government of 'a disgraceful amount' of revenue by tearing down 'conchos'
71
until the District Commissioner had been and gone. John James Kelynge
Greenway, the former Frontier Force officer who reported this phenomenon,
did not see the relevancy of Maxwell's argument that the labour involved in
such a process would far exceed the amount of the tax which purportedly had
72
been evaded. Not only was the structure built within a day or two, but also
it was the Acting District Commissioner's observation that the Konnohs only
used money for the tax. Labour among themselves was given, if anything,
69. S. L. A. 267 1909 11 November D. C. Anderson Central
70. S. L. A. 194 1909 1 January the Massa Kama of Rowalla Kolifa
chiefdom Central petition
71. S. L. A. 420 1907 14 January Acting D. C. Greenway Panguma




rice or a cloth.
Experience in different parts of the Protectorate not infrequently was
responsible for such divergence of opinions. It can be suggested that Max¬
well's interpretation might have been affected by the fact that much of his ser¬
vice had been spent in the Railway District where a greater premium might
be placed on the cash value of labour. In later years, as the Officer Admin¬
istering the Government, he was to recollect the regional differences in the
occurrence and usage of the 'conchos.'
An influence of British rule other than the tax was responsible for the
'tenement and semi-detached' structures which were found in the Railway Dis¬
trict. Maxwell identified the cause of grouping of more than one family under
74
one roof in Sierra Leone as in England as being economy of construction.
The introduction of long, sub-divided houses, or 'sinbeks,' he traced 'to the
Railway construction begun in 1896 ... for the convenience of housing native
75
labourers.'
Among the Mendfcand Sherbro in the eastern parts of the Protectorate,
Dr. Maxwell had detected a much greater tendency to 'combine to reduce
the incidence of the tax.' It was his contention that over the years he served
in Sierra Leone he had been able to observe the spread of this practice in a
73. S. L. A. 420 1907 14 January Acting D. C. Greenway Panguma
15 March




'westward movement.' Maxwell's alleged ethnic and regional origins of
the 'concho' as a tax evasion method would have accounted for Page's aston¬
ishment at encountering 'as many as eight distinct families herded together'
77
in parts of the Jong chiefdom which was listed as a Sherbro chiefdom in
78
the Local Assembly divisions.
A case cannot be made for the argument that 'overcrowding' began
among the Mend&and Sherbro after the tax was introduced, and that 'multiple
family dwellings' had not existed in other parts of the Protectorate until the
alleged spread of this fraudulent practice. The reports of the district admin¬
istrators themselves belie the truth of such a statement. The chiefdoms of
the Central District in which Anderson saw more 'conchos' than anywhere
79
else in his varied experience were Temne.
However, the important fact of such an argument is that, evidence to
the contrary, many colonial administrators at the time believed it to be true
and assessed accordingly. When district officers of no prior experience with
enlarged dwellings first encountered them they tended to regard these struc¬
tures unquestioningly as the tax-evasion 'conchos' discussed in circulars and
other Government communications.
The 'barrack'houses Maxwell described were dismissed by W. B.
76' rt»id-
77. S. L. A. C58 1905 31 March D. C. Page Bandajuma
78. Sierra Leone Governor's Order #22 of 1907, 19 September
79. S. L. A. 194 1909 1 January the Massa Kama of Rowalla Kolifa
chiefdom Central 20 January Central D. C. Anderson
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Stanley as being uncommon beyond the Railway and were not among the archi¬
tectural styles he discussed and diagramed in 1923. Prior to that time there
is no evidence of his having documented his assertion that the 'kunko,' or
'room,' was a perfectly natural and legitimate feature of the 'native' house
and did not necessarily connote overcrowding. Not since Anderson had any
Sierra Leone Government official referred to the 'concho' in terms of the
family, and even Anderson had done so only for the purposes of clarifying
who was subject to an additional tax. Stanley, on the other hand, maintained
that the number of 'rooms' was determined by the size of the family. If the
number of children increased further than custom or propriety allowed, an¬
other house would be built.
The common sense of this Provincial Commissioner with more than a
dozen years' experience in all parts of the Protectorate was evident in his
suggestion that the custom against houses beyond a certain size might also be
81
related to the structural limitations imposed by thatched roofs. Although
Stanley does not specify who comprised the family of the owner he alone
viewed the house as a family unit and never succumbed to the suspicions of
more than one family living under one roof.
During the years under consideration, Stanley came as close as any
colonial administrator to addressing himself to the possibility that additional
80. P. R. O. 267/499 8 January 1923 c. Slater-Devonshire Acting
C. S. Stanley enclosure
81. Ibid.
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rooms or even lean-to attachments in some areas might be customary ar¬
rangements for extended and polygynous families. Marriage and family pat-
82
terns varied among the peoples of the Protectorate, but generally speaking
in those places where a man had more than one wife, each wife had her own
house. There were also well-established traditions concerning the domestic
arrangements for children, newly-weds, widows, the elderly, and the infirm.
Government officials did not take these factors into consideration in the as¬
sessment of 'other families,' presumably as they felt it best left to the deter¬
mination of the indigenous ruler.
District officers admittedly counted only the buildings in their assess¬
ment checks, and enquired about any especially large ones. The policy of
taxing the house, despite the number of rooms, was explained to the chiefs
and headmen responsible for the assessments in terms of 'the native custom-
83
ary definition of house, the dwelling place of one family.' In theory the
local rulers, by knowing the people in their areas, would be able to levy a tax
on each family irrespective of the number of houses. In practice the system
was fraught with many difficulties.
A chief who assessed in accordance with the Government requirements
violated the trust of his people and became a Government agent in their eyes.
A chief who failed to determine the number of additional families in enlarged
82. See Chapter II, footnote 1
83. P. R.O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long Maxwell
enclosure
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dwellings, or who provided a correct assessment of the families in the indige¬
nous understanding of the term, ran the risk of getting in trouble with the
Government. Fairtlough's deposition of numerous chiefs in the Northern Sher-
bro District and ruthless over-assessment were based on his assumption that
the chiefs were presenting fraudulent assessment lists. Fairtlough was
faulted with having totally disregarded the system of leaving the assessment
to the chiefs, and delegating that authority and responsibility to Court Mes¬
sengers and clerks. It can be suggested that his earlier experience with the
Malal, Mabang and Kolifa chiefs, whom he incorrectly had assumed were
assessing the 'conchos,' made him skeptical of leaving this determination to
indigenous rulers. Fairtlough was not a man to be bound by the informal
rules of a system he personally had found to be defective. It could well have
been the case that the Northern Sherbro chiefs were under-assessing. The
tally of the areas concerned during the investigations which followed was
strictly a building count. However, as a result of the latitude for abuse, on
the chiefs' side as well as on the Government's, Judge Parodi decreed that
the 'practice of two families living in one house could not be considered an
offence of the revenue laws.' ^
The years of differing opinions and conflicting practices surrounding
the assessment of 'conchos' might have been expected to end with Parodi's
decision. However, the 'disastrous effects of joining roofs together' during
84. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. ; 27 April #115 Wilkinson-Long
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the 1919 influenza epidemic,and the reported upsurge of 'overcrowding'
and its alleged revenue loss caused Government officials to consider legisla¬
tion mandating assessments by family. The law, drafted by Maxwell when
serving as the Officer Administering the Government, was all but put into ef¬
fect when Slater assumed the Governorship in May 1922. His perusal of the
varying opinions of Maxwell, the Provincial Commissioners, and Stanley,
acting as Colonial Secretary,made him uneasy about attempting to define
'house.'
A tour of the Protectorate convinced the Governor that some of the
structures being referred to, and which would come under the provisions of
the law, were not 'multiple family dwellings.' He abandoned the legislation
as he was unable to see the scale of evasion which many of his political offi¬
cers reported, and which would account for sufficient revenue to make worth
while the unrest which would be caused by the definition of house.
The Colonial Office did not consider Slater's decision the end of the
88
issue, which was still being debated in the closing days of 1924. Theoreti-
85. P. R. O. 267/580 27 March 1919 #164 Wilkinson-Milner Bowden
Ronietta District report
86. P. R. O. 267/597 5 October 1922 Slater-Churchill
87. Ibid.
88. P. R. O. 267/605 9 December 1924 #568 Slater-Amery; It is inter¬
esting to note that a report on the "Methods of Direct Taxation in Brit¬
ish Tropical Africa, Part III West Africa" found that in Sierra Leone
in 1950 tax was 'levied on a family basis, not on the individual hut or
owner of huts. A house is any building used by a family; any building
with more than one family is as many 'houses' as families that use it. "
African Studies Branch, Journal of African Administration No. 1
January 1951 p. 78 —
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cally, from 1917 on, the tax was collected from each house in the Protecto¬
rate. However, there was nothing to guarantee that rulers and administrators
alike would not show the same tendencies to use their own discretion and be
guided by their own interests and senses of priorities as they had throughout
the previous twenty-five years.
The interest of the Government in all considerations of the 'conchos'
appeared to have been as much the desire to curtail any form of tax evasion
as it was to obtain the revenue. Fairtlough and Maxwell were true to charac¬
ter and representative of these two factors in their determinations that units
containing more than one family should pay more than one tax.
The fact that the Government was never able to get rid of even the
untraditional, tax-evasion 'conchos' which undoubtedly existed in some areas
indicates that such an undertaking ran against vested interests of the indige¬
nous rulers who were expected to execute the policy. In such cases, where
the alleged overcrowding in fact was merely a reflection of traditional family
and marriage patterns, it was unlikely that the chiefs and headmen would in¬
terfere. Where tax evasion was occurring it stands to reason that rulers
might profit more from extortion of bribes than by the increased commission
of houses built by people they had forced into separate dwellings. Further¬
more, there were government administrators who recognized the fact that of
those evading the tax by 'multiple family dwellings' the chiefs were them-
OQ
selves the worst offenders.
89. P. R.O. 267/586 6 April 1920 #144 Wilkinson-Milner
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Who Paid the Tax?
Just as there was resistance to payment of the tax, so too there was
evasion. It is not only likely that one such form was the grouping of more
than one family under the same roof. It is also probable that this practice
began in areas of greatest exposure to European influences and the cash
economy, and spread as these factors did. Beyond considerations of resis¬
tance and evasion are ones which apply to the majority of the populace who
were not involved in these activities. How was the tax actually paid and by
whom ?
It is highly doubtful that five shillings was duly collected from the
owner of each house, leaving the question of 'conchos' aside. Existing rec¬
ords deal primarily with the assessment and collection systems, the total
amounts received and differences from one year to the next, and flagrant
cases of abuse and extortion. However, the latter category sheds some
light on the issue of who did pay the tax. The scarcity of available material
for this area of investigation derives no doubt as much from the inability of
some colonial administrators to conceive of the question as from the reluc¬
tance of others to do so.
The overall ability of the Protectorate inhabitants to pay the tax was
only questioned in several recorded instances. The economic hardships in
Koinadugu were taken into account by King-Harmon during his 1901 tour, but
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when raised by Berney the following year were dismissed as not being
insurmountable.®® Anderson was sharply criticised for pleading the case of
the Panguma District people in 1903 who reportedly were having difficulty
raising the money.®* With the exception of occasional exemptions due to
natural disasters the issue of whether or not each house owner could raise
five shillings or its equivalent was not raised again during the first quarter
of this century.
It is unlikely that the owners of each and every house did make a cash
payment to the tax collector. In his economic study of what was known as
the Sierra Leone-Guinea Plain, Howard maintains that most people were
without cash employment. Although the sales of crops brought in some cash,
he states that it was common for taxes on houses of people associated with
92
a compound to be paid by the headman or other ranking persons. All indi¬
cations are that whether a compound were made up of the dwellings of wives
or relatives, the owner paid a tax on each building irrespective of whether
or not he would be reimbursed. It can be presumed that such repayments
as were made assumed the form of goods or labour.
In view of the defects seen in the tax system it is most likely that in
few, if any, chiefdoms were all who were subject to the five shilling levy in
90. S. L. A. 3488 1902 6 August Acting D. C. Berney Koinadugu
91. S. L. A. C42 1904 16 July 1903 D. C. Anderson Panguma
20 June 1903
92. Howard, op. cit. p. 436
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actual fact called upon to pay it. For one thing, the difficulties many chiefs
allegedly experienced in comprehending the assessment lists, and indeed the
entire tax concept, would preclude a thorough and equitable collection from
each house owner.
The same outlay of time and effort Protectorate administrators had
complained of in canvassing chiefdoms would encourage a chief to collect
most or all of the tax from the larger, more accessible villages and towns.
Colonial administrators were not unaware of the tendency to 'levy more than
is properly due from such villages as may appear to be in a better position
93
to pay.' The collection system Wallis described as operating in Banda-
juma chiefdoms in 1902 was one in which 'the chiefs and clerks are very
rarely guided by the number of houses in a town. When a chief sees a big
town he puts a price on it and makes the people pay up.' ^
Such observations were made in reference to extortionate practices
and colonial officials did not dwell on the implications of lack of uniformity
in the tax levy for the people allegedly and actually paying the tax. The short
assessments of Chief Soko's towns indicate the ease with which large sums
could be collected from densely populated areas. District Commissioners
regarded such practices as criminal and deliberately employed to defraud
the Government of tax money or to exact more than the assessed amount un-
93. S. L. A. 273 1901 14 January Govr. King-Harmon
94. S. L. A. 3419 1902 2 August Acting D. C. Wallis Bandajuma
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der the guise of collecting the Administration's tax. However true such sus¬
picions may have been in the instances cited, the same methods were un¬
doubtedly used by loyal and upstanding chiefs to collect the Government's tax
and nothing more.
There need be no corrupt or criminal connotation attached to the
suggestion that the Government tax was not uniformly levied by the indige¬
nous rulers on all who were subject by law to pay. For the majority of the
chiefs, the prime objective must have been to hand over to the District Com¬
missioner at least the requisite amount. The necessity of collecting from
all house owners might not have been recognized from a conceptual basis
or adhered to from an expedient one. Over and above the consideration of
the facility with which the total amount due could be collected from larger
towns is the possibility that the burden of the tax fell on those areas or indi¬
viduals judged by the headman or chief to be better able to pay than the less
affluent or isolated villages and farms.
A study of the Sierra Leone Protectorate house tax during its first
decades possibly raises more questions that it provides answers. The extent
to which a chief undermined his traditional authority and position by the mere
act of assessing and collecting for the Government cannot be isolated from
the effects of other types of demands put upon an indigenous ruler.
It is not apparent that the imposition of the tax provided as much in¬
centive to earn money for its payment as it might have an excuse for young
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men to leave the chiefdoms to seek their fortunes, and incidentally their tax
95
monies. The effects of the tax requirement on the populace were most
noticeable in instances of abuse. However, despite the spectacular nature
of some of the cases, there were not, in real numbers, very many recorded.
It can be suggested that given the nature of the tax system and the existence
of customary tribute systems, the frequency of exploitation of a deliberate
and extraordinary nature was small. It is more likely that the majority of
the people who were assessed were victims of honest mistakes of indigenous
authorities attempting to do the best they could with a system they neither
comprehended much of the time nor within which they could feasibly work.
95. See S. L. A. C42 1904 20 June 1903 Govr. King-Harmon; and




IN THE SIERRA LEONE PROTECTORATE
Introduction
The judicial system introduced with the establishment of the Protecto¬
rate was a clear reflection of the British governing philosophy. The courts
of those indigenous rulers incorporated in the Administration were recog¬
nized, and to be utilized in a modified form. Little or no effort was made
to determine the workings of these courts, or indeed if they were the most
binding courts among the diverse Protectorate peoples. Nevertheless the
Courts of the Native Chiefs were regarded in a uniform manner, with certain
types of cases removed from their jurisdiction and harsh punishments and
practices curtailed for the protection of the populace. The preservation of
the indigenous court system was sought to avoid the necessity of a large
corps of Government judges and the disruption of the customary ways of life
as little as possible. Removal of cases involving 'non-natives' from the in¬
digenous courts was indicative of the Government's desire, among other
things, to shield or extricate the protected peoples from the evil influences
of outsiders, the Creoles in particular.
Whereas the administration of the house tax provided the greatest
source of direct contact between district administrators and indigenous rul¬
ers, the administration of justice was that part of the system of British rule
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which had the greatest effect on the majority of the Protectorate population.
Although the judicial functions of secret societies remained officially un¬
altered, even their powers were potentially or actually affected by the for¬
mal constitution of Chiefs' Courts.* With the power of the Colonial Govern¬
ment behind him, the chiefdom ruler in many cases may have had much
greater command over his subjects than previously enjoyed. It was to his
court alone that numerous cases could be taken for their settlement to be
binding in the eyes of the Protectorate Administration. Enforcement of de¬
cisions made by indigenous authorities other than the chief was regarded as
a subversion of his authority and detected offenders were punished accord¬
ingly. It therefore was the case that the populace was required to submit to
the jurisdiction of the chief's court, or surreptitiously to resort to other,
customary, sources for justice.
In addition to alterations within the indigenous judicial system, in¬
cluding the now restricted Chiefs' Courts, the Protectorate inhabitant was
directly affected by British justice. For criminal offences he was subject to
an alien law. As will be seen in the specific context of the Human Leopard
Society investigations and trials, he was liable to have his house searched,
be bound and carted off into unfamiliar surroundings and subjected to an
inexplicable and seemingly interminable detention. It would be argumenta¬
tive whether release from detention would be more or less confusing than
1. See Chapter V, footnote 43
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trial in an alien court with its incomprehensible proceedings.
The Structure of the Protectorate Courts 1896-1903
The judicial responsibilities of the indigenous rulers and the District
Commissioners remained virtually unchanged from those originally outlined
in the Protectorate Ordinance of 1896 until the Protectorate Courts Juris¬
diction Ordinance of 1903. Cardew's original Ordinance needed little major
alteration in the jurisdictional delimitations beyond dealing with the contro¬
versial subject of land matters. Questions of land title 'arising exclusively
among natives' were returned to the province of the Chiefs' Courts in 1897.
J
It was not until the Protectorate Ordinance #33 of 1901 that a distinction was
made within such cases, and those land disputes between two or more Para¬
mount Chiefs were placed under the authority of the District Commissioner
in his court. Beyond the land adjustment, and the assumption of the District
Commissioner's Court of jurisdiction over debts claims by 'native' store
license holders, the provisions of the Protectorate Ordinance #11 of 1897
which related to the courts, were largely points of clarification. The 1896
Ordinance had reserved to the District Commissioner in his court the power
to deal with matters or offences relating to certain secret societies, cases
arising out of faction or tribal fights and matters which were made offences
by the provisions of the Ordinance itself. By implication these areas were
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of the Native Chief; by Ordinance #11 of
1897 they were specifically restricted from his review.
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Although criminal cases involving 'natives' were to be heard and
determined by the Court of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs, in
certain criminal cases when the person charged was a 'native,' the District
Commissioner alone had jurisdiction. The wording of the original Ordinance
was apparently considered unclear in this section, as indeed in many others,
for it was revised in 1897 to specify that the offence had been 'committed by
a native on a person not native.' This clarification was in keeping with the
2
fact that any disputes, civil or criminal, which involved'non-natives' either
amongst themselves or between them and 'natives' were not subject to the
review of any court in which a 'Native Chief' sat.
Nowhere in the Protectorate Ordinances of 1896, 1897 or 1901 is there
provision for appeal from the Courts of the Native Chiefs nor for the District
Commissioner's supervision of those Courts. The latter was considered one
of the major responsibilities of the district officer and must be presumed to
have derived from the previously mentioned 'elastic clause' granting him
authority to settle any matters which might lead to breaches of the peace or
occasional disaffection.
The Courts of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs, and of
2. Protectorate Ordinance #20 of 1896 defines a 'native' as being "any
member of the aboriginal races or tribes of Africa ordinarily resident
within the Protectorate, or in the territories other than the Colony
adjacent thereto." It will be noted that the distinction made between
'native' and 'non-native' by the law differed from that made by com¬
mon usage. See Chapter I, footnote 48.
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the District Commissioner were to be guided but not bound by the laws of the
Colony and English legal procedure. In neither Court was legal counsel al¬
lowed except in matters punishable by death or by the special permission of
the District Commissioner. Monthly returns of all cases which came before
these Courts were to be forwarded to the Attorney General of the Colony.
Recommendation of sentences of excessive fines or prison terms, or of death
by the Court of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs were to be re¬
viewed by the Governor. However, the right of appeal existed only from the
District Commissioner's Court, and only in cases involving Tnon-natives.'
Specifically, decisions in civil cases of fines over<£25, and in criminal mat-
3
ters of large fines, prison or death sentences could be appealed to the
Supreme Court of the Colony as a Court of Appeal.
The Role of the District Commissioner
in the Protectorate Judicial System
In addition to the powers and duties reserved to him by ordinance
specification, the District Commissioner had several important responsibili¬
ties by implication. The supervision of the Chiefs' Courts will be discussed
in another context, but the judicial relationship between the chiefs and the
District Commissioner was of a wider scope than sessions of the Courts of
the Native Chiefs, and of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs.
3. Thet/50, six month sentences beyond which appeals could be made
in 1896 were lowered to</25 and three months by the 1897 Protectorate
Ordinance.
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It fell to the District Commissioner to recommend to the Governor the chiefs
in his district to be commissioned to sit with him in their joint court. With
the advent of the Circuit Court in 1903 the same pattern was used for the
nomination of chiefs to act in that Court as assessor chiefs. Chiefs so singled
out were placed in a position of power above other chiefs, and for better or
worse, identified as being allied with the Government. In addition to the ele¬
vated status, assessor chiefs also received remuneration for their time,
transportation, and general provisions.^
Deposition of Chiefs
Section LXXIX of Ordinance #20 of 1896 made it lawful for the Gover-
r
nor, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to require the deposition of
any Chief who was unfit for his position. Although it was not until 1910 that
5
a Standing Instruction specifically delegated the authority for this act to the
District Commissioners, in practice, as the Governor's representatives in
the Protectorate, these officials from the beginning had assumed responsi¬
bility for initiating and conducting deposition proceedings. The procedures
described in the Instructions closely resemble those followed in the various
recorded deposition cases in earlier years. This is despite the fact that
4. S. L. A. 3408 1909 10 November Acting Circuit Court Judge Van der
Meulen announcing the rejection of a proposal for a fixed scale of
allowances for assessor chiefs by the District Commissioners.
5. Standing Instruction #10 of 1910, 22 August Deposition of Chiefs
(Appendix D)
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prior to the formulating of the Instructions substantial efforts were made to
determine the customary methods of removing chiefs. It is interesting to
note that one recurring aspect of the findings is not mentioned in the Instruc¬
tions: the reported fact that among some of the Protectorate peoples there
was, short of death, no way to be rid of a chief however unpopular or op-
pressive.
Not only was the concept of deposition of chiefs alien to many parts
of the Protectorate, but also certain aspects of the proceedings. In particu¬
lar the use of assessor chiefs was not considered, even by some Government
officials, to be a customary or equitable measure. The authors of the Stand¬
ing Instructions recognized that care should be taken in the selection of the
chiefs who, with the District Commissioner, would hear a case and advise
him in the decision. The assessors were to be of equal standing with the ac¬
cused, and neither closely related to nor at serious variance with him. Al¬
though the objection of the accused chief to specific assessors was allowed
for, in actual fact District Commissioners expressed skepticism of objec¬
tions based on long-standing enmity. Although it was undoubtedly the case
that chiefs sought the removal of assessors who would not be sympathetic to
their cases, it is also likely that the heritage of competition and warfare left
6. S. L. A. 1725 1909 19 April Govr. Probyn 14 June 1910 D. C.
Fairtlough Ronietta; 12 April 1910 D. C. Warren Koinadugu;
2 April 1910 Acting D. C. Vergette Ronietta; 13 April 1910
D. C. Oswell Karene
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conflicts between rulers with which the District Commissioners would not be
familiar.
Beyond the issue of the person of the assessors is the more critical
one of their very presence in passing judgement on other indigenous rulers
in cases brought before the Circuit Court and in land disputes and depositions
alike. It was argued that such a system was not unlike the custom before the
advent of British rule of carrying disputes to neighbouring chiefs. Although
this practice did occur^ the fixing of it onjto British legal procedure, with
no recognition of customary ranking, constituted an alien and disruptive ele¬
ment in an already controversial process. Among the defects of the assessor
system, seen even at the time, included the difficulty in obtaining reliable
O
chiefs of the same ethnic origins and customary laws no less than that of
having the decision recognized by the people of the chiefdom. It was the opin¬
ion of Bowden, based on his then twelve years in the Protectorate, that the
whole principle of trial by outside chiefs was a Government institution with
no place in 'native law.' Calling in a stranger to decide matters would seem
Q
to the 'native' to be handing over authority to the intervening chief. Although
Bowden was referring to the authority of the accused chief being at the mercy
7. See Chapter II, footnotes 54, 55
8. S. L. A. C218 1917 21 November D. C. Bowden Railway; 18 January
1918 D. C. Warren Railway; 19 January 1918 D. C. Hooker
N. Sherbro
9. Pe(tition) 23 1915 26 November C. D. H. During 9 December
D. C. Bowden ? Railway minute on:
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of an outsider, it might also be suggested that the authority of the District
Commissioner would be diminished in the eyes of the populace by being ap¬
parently unable to make a decision without assistance.
'Wholesale bribery and corruption' attended the use of assessor
chiefs in deposition cases and in Circuit Court trials alike. Governor Wil¬
kinson felt that the use of foreign chiefs did little to bring peace and harmony
to the Protectorate/* but the use of assessors in the Circuit Court remained
mandated by law, and in election, deposition, and boundary proceedings by
1 ?
Instruction.
Review of deposition cases in the records shows a semblance of the
procedures outlined in the Standing Instruction to have been more often than
not adhered to. District Commissioners often conducted protracted prelim¬
inary investigations, and at the time of the actual enquiries allowed the ac¬
cused chiefs to question statements and witnesses against himself. How¬
ever, the fairness of the verdicts becomes questionable when unjust practices
were found or presumed to have existed in the proceedings. It was evident
that it did not matter if the District Commissioner followed the right steps if
the wrong people were involved.
In view of the alien and corruptible nature of assessor chiefs, it can
be argued that Bowden exercised poor judgement in basing his recommendation
10. Ibid.
11. P7R. O. 267/577 17 March 1918 c. Wilkinson-Long
12. Section 40 Ordinance #6 of 1903; Appendices D and E
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for the deposition of Paramount Chief Bockari of Nongowa on the opinion of
13
the assessors, which admittedly diverged from his own. As noted in other
contexts, district officers were handicapped in their investigations by their
lack of familiarity with the indigenous languages and their consequent depen¬
dence on interpreters. This latter class of Government officials were found
on a variety of occasions to be susceptible to bribes and given to extortionate
14
practices.
There was no guarantee that Interpreters would correctly translate
the evidence of witnesses; there was the further problem of securing the
relevant and proper witnesses. In the course of the investigations into Fairt-
lough's administration of the Northern Sherbro District it was revealed that
Court Messengers and Interpreters kept complaints from being brought for-
15
ward. It can be expected that similar treatment was given those who came
forth to volunteer evidence contrary to any vested interests an Interpreter
might have in a given case.
In investigations of crimes, district officers would in many cases de¬
tain for questioning and testifying people 'named' as eye-witnesses. Provided
13. P. R. O. 267/603 19 March 1924 #106 Slater-Thomas Bowden
enclosure See Chapter V footnote 55
14.' P. R. O. 267/468 16 April 1903 #83 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
Maxwell enclosure; S. L. A. C201 1913 14 October Acting D. C.
LeMesurier Railway; P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c.
Wilkinson-Long Ellis C. O. minute on:; See also Chapter II
footnote 45, Chapter V footnote 103
15. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long 17 January
Shorunkeh-Sawyerr enclosure
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that the legal capabilities of the district officer were great enough to detect
perjury and contrived stories, valid witnesses might be obtained in this
fashion. Certainly there were few safeguards against this defect in the Pro¬
tectorate system of justice, or in any other then or since.
In disputed boundaries and chieftaincies, election, and depositions,
the selection and reliability of witnesses was a serious issue over which the
district administrator had potentially more control. Although the records
identify the testifiers by their title or occupation, there are no indications
whether the administrators heard anyone who came forward or made a con¬
scious effort to choose those people most qualified to address the question of
an old boundary, a succession line or an aspect of chiefdom history. There
was no apparent effort to determine if the witnesses were considered worthy
by the people, either by virtue of age, position, or having been present at
some past event relevant to the case. With many of these issues one can only
raise questions, and offer, amid speculations, skepticism, and contingencies,
the observation of Page that nearly always 'in native quarrels, much mendac-
1 fi
ity is mixed up with some truth.'
The implications of deposition proceedings for the indigenous ruler
were many and serious, a fact admitted by the Government in the Standing
Instruction. Although colonial administrators time and again warned that de-
16. S. L. A. 4432 1904 8 November Govr. Probyn 1 January 1905
D. C. Page Bandajuma
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position was to be regarded as an extreme measure, the truth of the matter
was that the judgement of Protectorate district officers to whom the initia¬
tive was left varied. Wilkinson's major objection to the system in the Sierra
17
Leone Protectorate was that the 'personal element enters every case.'
Despite the fact that the personal element entered most of his considerations
of his departmental and Protectorate staffs, Wilkinson had a valid point in
this respect. It was in the context of the revelations of Fairtlough's arbi¬
trary depositions that the Governor proposed legislative revisions which
would have counteracted the tendency of 'certain District Commissioners
18
being more ready than others to proceed against Paramount Chiefs.' The
disfavour with which Wilkinson was viewed at the Colonial Office can be
measured by the fact that this timely and apparently sensible recommendation
for an amendment based on the Gold Coast's deposition commission was re¬
jected.
It would be of scant comfort to the chiefs deposed by Fairtlough in his
later years in the Northern Sherbro District to know that it was the cumula¬
tive effect of their reported removals which led to the investigation of his ad¬
ministration. Although some were reinstated it can be seriously questioned
whether the influence and position of many rulers would not be adversely
affected by having their actions and authority challenged by the Government
17. P. R. O. 267/588 12 December 1920 c. Wilkinson-Milner
18. Ibid.
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and by being subjected to public trial and conviction.
The subsequent effectiveness of Paramount Chief Soko of Bongor, who
was reinstated after being tried and found guilty of tax offences by the Circuit
Court Judge, remains a matter of speculation. The records do not single him
out for noteworthy behaviour of any nature. In the eyes of Maxwell that fact
probably would justify his intervention on Soko's behalf, for the District Com¬
missioner urged the Judge to fine the chief, not imprison him. The latter
punishment 'would have made it almost impossible to keep Soko as chief and
19
he is as satisfactory as the average Mendi chief.'
Although the Instructions stated that 'it may be possible to allow a
chief to remain in his chiefdom and to exercise his powers up to the time of
20
the enquiry' the damaging effects complained of by Madam Humoynaha of
living under suspicion are more likely to have been the case. She petitioned
Governor Wilkinson that her position as Paramount Chief of the Nongowa
Chiefdom had been gravely diminished as a result of Bowden's prolonged in¬
vestigations into complaints against her. As it had not been possible to con¬
ceal the enquiries the people allegedly had come to regard her as having no
21
authority as the Government itself was in the process of questioning it.
19. S. L. A. 2641 1909 26 June Acting D. C. Bowden Railway
15 November D. C. Maxwell Railway
20. Standing Instruction #10 of 1910, 22 August Deposition of Chiefs
(Appendix D)
21. P. R. O. 267/577 17 March 1918 c. Wilkinson-Long enclosures;
S. L. A. C218 1917 21 November D. C. Bowden Railway
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Depositions were in all cases disruptive to the chiefdoms in which
they occurred. No matter what the circumstances or how justifiable the in¬
vestigation and removal of a ruler, there would always be disputing factions
left in the wake of the proceedings. In proportion to the number of chiefs
during the years under consideration, the average of two Paramount Chiefs
removed in a year did not constitute a great number being affected by the de¬
position powers of the Governor. Early cases were often of those who were
unable to cease exercising their former prerogatives. However, the remain¬
ing cases were based on complaints which ranged from over-assessment and
embezzlement of taxes and using the position of chief and rights to tribute to
commercial advantage, to drunkenness.
District Commissioners and Indigenous Languages
The inability of a district officer to comprehend or communicate in
the dialects of the people he was dealing with caused a variety of problems
which have already been discussed. The official attitude toward the acquisi¬
tion of 'a knowledge of a native language' was a frequent topic over the years.
A typically ambivalent policy emerged which was consistent with the princi¬
ples on which the Protectorate Administration was founded. On the one hand
government officials deplored being dependent on their allegedly inferior
subordinates for translation of virtually every passing remark not uttered in
English. On the other hand it was felt that District Commissioners had more
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important things to concentrate on, and the learning of a 'native language'
22
was best left to the Assistant District Commissioners.
There were practical difficulties about making the knowledge of a lan¬
guage a condition of employment or even of promotion in multi-lingual West
Africa. Within Sierra Leone itself it was felt that there were too many lan-
23
guages of too limited areas. Although the retention of a political officer in
one area for a period of time would have increased his knowledge of the local
languages, such a decision would have been in opposition to the practice of
rotating officials throughout the Protectorate.
The resultant decision, in 1908, to encourage English which was 'the
language of the Colony and increasingly of the Protectorate'^ was only par£
a pragmatic decision, and ultimately only a temporary one. Although
fluency in an indigenous language was undoubtedly considered desireable by
most colonial administrators from a point of view of expediency and accuracy,
it can be suggested that there was an underlying reluctance to descend to the
level of the people they were ruling. Encouraging the Protectorate inhabi¬
tants to learn English was a policy which was short-lived and incompatible
with the prevailing sentiments about educated Africans and contamination of
22. P. R. O. 267/478 5 June 1905 #237 Probyn-Lyttleton Circuit
Judge Hudson enclosure
23. Ibid.; P. R. O. 267/505 12 September 1908 #417 O. A. G. Haddon-
Smith-Crewe
24. P. R. O. 267/505 12 September 1908 #417 O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-
Crewe Colonial Office minutes on:
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the indigenous population with European ways.
Gratuities based on language proficiency examinations had existed
since 1905. The system was increasingly extended to include allowances for
lower and higher standards and some conformity to standards which existed
elsewhere in the Empire.
By 1910 those eligible for the language allowances and the require¬
ments of the standards were detailed in a circular. Candidates for the Lower
Standard were required only to translate orally twenty sentences dictated to
them. However, in order to receive a gratuity for achieving the Higher Stand¬
ard, a candidate had to compile a vocabulary of 300 words over and above
those used in the ten written sentences of five words each. An oral exam was
25
also administered to these candidates.
Despite the financial incentive provided by this system, Sierra Leone
remained 'the only West African country where the knowledge of one native
language was not compulsory' in 1915, and did not appear to have existed.
There is a discrepancy between the allegations made by Wilkinson in 1916,
that 'most members of the Protectorate administrative staff have useful work-
27
ing knowledge of one or more local dialects' and the statements of district
administrators at the mercy of interpreters.
25. Sierra Leone Government Circular #75 26 September 1910
26. P. R. O. 267/567 11 December 1915 #630 Merewether-Bonar-Law
27. P. R. O. 267/571 18 May 1916 #191 Wilkinson-Bonar-Law
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District Commissioners and Legal Training
Protectorate administrators undoubtedly felt more handicapped by
their linguistic disabilities than by their generally scant and imperfect know¬
ledge of English law and legal procedures. However, not unsurprisingly, cer¬
tain of the provisions of the Protectorate Ordinances of 1896, 1897, and 1901
were criticised by members of the Freetown legal profession who were given
to scrutinizing the methods of the Protectorate Administration. Although the
Honourable A. J. Shorunkeh-Sawyerr and his colleagues were often retained
by clients in the Protectorate, it was not unusual for them to unsolicitedly
defend what they considered to be the rights and interests of the Protectorate
peoples against the Colonial Government.
The Freetown Bar Association was not alone in thinking that the judic- 1
ial functions of the District Commissioner exceeded those justly carried out
2 8
by one without 'a fair knowledge of the law.' Although little was made of
this situation during Cardew's administration, it can be supposed that the
District Commissioner's lack of legal training was a factor in the reduction
in 1897 of sentences he could impose without recourse to Freetown. From the
time of King-Harmon's arrival the matter became one of increased concern in
other respects. Attorney General Smyly alerted the new Governor to the
problem of District Commissioners being unable to make the proper juris-
28. P. R. O. 267/459 6 December 1901 c. 41 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
7 November Shorunkeh-Sawyerr enclosure
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dictional distinctions. As a result returns of the Court of the District Com¬
missioner and Native Chiefs were not unlikely to show proceedings of sheep
larceny which, involving only 'natives,' should have been under the authority
of the Court of the Native Chief.^
*
As cases involving Creole and European traders, and residents in the
Protectorate, came before the District Commissioner in his court, his legal
deficiencies were not only more conspicuous, but also more often drawn to
the attention of the authorities in Freetown and London. King-Harmon soon
came to believe that complaints of 'crude and peculiar procedures and con¬
clusions of District Commissioners in Courts' were well-founded. However
noble might be their motives, their ignorance of the law and of legal proce¬
dure was considered by Governor and Attorney General alike to be 'an in¬
superable bar to (the District Commissioners) securing the confidence of the
30
people in the Protectorate as dispensers of justice.'
"In deference to the views of educated natives of the Colony, headed
O 1
by Sir Samuel Lewis," the Governor decided to relieve District Commis¬
sioners of all jurisdiction in grave cases involving serious or capital punish¬
ment and to appoint a properly qualified judge to go on circuit and administer
29. S. L. A. 4386 1901 no date Acting D. C. Greaves; Panguma;
7 October Attorney General Smyly
30. P. R. O. 267/459 6 December 1901c. 41 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
and Smyly enclosure




law with authority and capacity. This plan was incorporated into the Pro¬
tectorate Courts Jurisdiction Ordinance, #6 of 1903, which provided for the
establishment of the Circuit Court. The Court of the District Commissioner
and Native Chiefs ceased to have any jurisdiction; the civil authority of the
Court of the District Commissioner was limited to land disputes between
Paramount Chiefs, and any actions or suits involving 'non-natives' and all
debt recoveries not in excess of</50. Criminal cases punishable by the max¬
imum of three months imprisonment and pflO fine would be determined by the
District Commissioner in his court. For a large number of serious crimi¬
nal matters he had the authority to hold preliminary investigations and to dis¬
charge or commit the accused party for trial before the Circuit Court or the
Supreme Court of the Colony. The enormity of this responsibility and its
dependence on legal training will be closely examined in the context of the
Human Leopard Society trials.
Appeal from the District Commissioner's Court was provided for 'any
person, not being a native' in any criminal matter and in civil cases where
fines above c^TlO had been imposed. 'Native' holders of store licenses also
could appeal under the latter qualification. Monthly returns of all criminal
proceedings before the District Commissioner were to be forwarded to the
Attorney General. It was the opinion of one holder of that office, D. F.
Wilbraham, that these returns should also include all civil cases. His pro-
32. P. R.O. 267/459 6 December 1901 c. 41 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
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posal to that effect was rejected by the then Chief Justice, Sir P. C. Smyly,
on the grounds that the work of the Supreme Court was so great that the Judge
would not have sufficient time to devote to the revision of the magisterial
returns.^
34
Despite the fact that the Circuit Court, 'a premature system' in the
eyes of the Assistant Under-Secretary of State, had been necessitated by the
lack of legal capabilities of the district administrators, their judicial func¬
tions beyond the precincts of the Circuit Court increased. Concessions Ordi¬
nances and the Protectorate Native Law Ordinance, #16 of 1905, required the
District Commissioners to assume a variety of quasi-judicial functions rang¬
ing from attesting to deeds to supervising the Combined Courts.
Within four years of having numerous matters removed from their
authority, District Commissioners received an increase in magisterial pow¬
ers by the Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction Amendment, Ordinance #16 of
1907. Offences which were not recognized by customary law, which were the
creation of statutory law such as cruelty to animals and violations of the Bush
Fire Prevention Ordinance, were placed under the jurisdiction of the District
Commissioner's Court. However, trial with assessors was extended to all of
his court cases in 1913, whether dealing with civil or criminal, customary
35
or statutory matters.
33. P. R. O. 267/544 24 December 1912 #550 Merewether-Harcourt
3 December Attorney General Wilbraham speaking of 1909 enclosure
34. P. R. O. 267/475 9 January 1905 telegram Probyn-Lyttleton
Antrobus minute on:
35. P. R. O. 267/551 20 August 1913 #387 Merewether-Harcourt
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Proposals in 1918 for a Penal Code for the Protectorate reflect the
fact that the situation had not improved over the years. The inability 'of the
average District Commissioner to clearly grasp the law' allegedly hampered
his administration. By misconstruing the wording, let alone the meaning, of
a statute or an ordinance he reportedly was prevented in his executive capac¬
ity from going further and prosecuting where no actual offence had been com¬
mitted. Greenwood, acting as Attorney General, referred also to records of
trials, committals for trials, and depositions which showed no offence or ones
36
of a different nature from the charges. Injustices suffered by Protectorate
inhabitants as a result of these defects in the legal system were considered
by others of the Crown Legal Officers to be insignificant compared to those
which they felt would result from a codification of the laws. The matter was
87
still being debated in 1924.
The Circuit Court
The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was extensive and can best be
seen in relationship to the diverse cases which came before it in connection
with the Human Leopard Society. In any civil proceeding in which matters
of 'native law or custom' were concerned, two or more assessor chiefs
36. P. R. O. 267/578 24 August 1918 #275 Wilkinson-Long 16 April
1819 Acting Attorney General Greenwood enclosure
37. P. R. O. 267/581 9 May 1919 #581 Wilkinson-Milner Puisne and
Circuit Judge Parodi enclosure; P. R. O. 267/605 18 August 1924
#275 Slater-Thomas
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could sit with the -Judge and give their opinions. Criminal cases in which
'natives' were involved required the presence of such chiefs, but in neither
instance were their decisions binding on the Judge.
The decisions of the Circuit Court Judge were final, a fact which met
with displeasure among the Creole population in particular. Although the
Judge was of the Supreme Court of the Colony and to be guided by the prac¬
tices and procedures of that Court, members of the non-indigenous Protec¬
torate population apparently did not regard the justice meted out by the Cir¬
cuit Court Judge as being on the same level with that of a jury-assisted judge
in a Colony court bound by English law.
As seen subsequently in the case of D. F. Wilberforce, a British sub¬
ject who was a Paramount Chief in the Protectorate, certain criminal cases
could be committed by the District Commissioner for trial before the Su¬
preme Court. The difficulty arose when these Government administrators,
lacking the knowledge or experience to make the distinction, wrongfully as¬
signed cases to the Circuit Court. At best such mistakes exposed the Gov¬
ernment to charges of unlawful detention; often it meant a trial or mistrial in
the Circuit Court before an alert barrister would take on the case of those
subject to British law in the Protectorate who were less legally astute than
the likes of Wilberforce. It is not unreasonable to suggest, especially in
view of the fact that District Commissioners were used as Circuit Judges on
occasion, that some cases were settled in the Circuit Court which were beyond
207
its jurisdiction.
Human Leopard Society cases involving both British subjects and
peoples indigenous to the Protectorate presented such difficulties as holding
separate trials with the same witnesses. Ultimately, as will be discussed
further, the problem was solved by the creation of a Special Commission
Court with wider jurisdiction and powers than the Circuit Court.
A petition to His Most Gracious Majesty George the Fifth from the
National Congress of British West Africa in 1920 included several grievances
concerning the Courts which echoed complaints made over the years in
Sierra Leone. The absence of appeal from the 'highest Aboriginal Court,'
which in the case of Sierra Leone would be the Circuit Court, and of trials
without a jury, particularly in capital offences, were considered 'inimical
to the interests of the people.
At the end of the first year of circuits, Protectorate administrators
and Circuit Judge Packard submitted their evaluation of the new judicial
system. Among the advantages cited were those of exposing Paramount
Chiefs to English Court procedures and availing the accused and the admin¬
istrators alike of expert legal knowledge and proceedings. The fact of their
position being diminished in the eyes of Creoles, Paramount Chiefs, and the *
38. The HUMBLE PETITION of the National Congress of British West
Africa by its Delegates now in London to HIS MOST GRACIOUS
MAJESTY GEORGE THE FIFTH ... 19 October 1920 (document in
the possession of this author)
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populace was of more apparent concern to district administrators than the
double work load of preliminary hearings and Circuit trials and difficulties
39
in keeping witnesses for the latter.
The District Commissioners were not alone in perceiving a general
belief that the Government had placed the Circuit Judge over them. Packard,
upon learning this in conversation with various chiefs, attempted to explain
the situation to the rulers. However, he was skeptical of their understanding
of the District Commissioner's position as 'the English theory of the separa¬
tion of judicial and executive powers is entirely novel to the natives and con¬
trary to all their experiences.'^® Although there is no indication whether or
not it took the people the 'year or two to comprehend it,' Packard's assump¬
tion that such a prevalent opinion might interfere with the work of the officers
was borne out by their statements.
The Creoles purportedly viewed the establishment of the Circuit Court
as an expression by the Government of lack of confidence in its 'incompetent'
41
Protectorate administrators. Oswell reported from the Karene District that
chiefs did not respond as rapidly to orders or summonses, nor kept the roads
39. S. L. A. 2033 1904 14 May Acting Circuit Judge Packard;
S. L. A. Clll 1904 21 October C. S. Haddon-Smith;
P. R. O. 267/473 7 December 1904 #307 Probyn-Lyttleton enclosures
40. S. L. A. 2033 1904 14 May Acting Circuit Court Judge Packard
41. S. L. A. Clll 1904 21 October C. S. Haddon-Smith 8 November





cleared. Whether these comments were accurate assessments of the reac¬
tions of the Protectorate people or a reflection of the injured egos of the Dis¬
trict Commissioners, the fact remains that such observations did not occur
again in the records.
Some logistic defects in the Circuit Court System were considered to
be temporary. Others hopefully would be solved by the passage of Ordinance
#33 of 1905 which amended the Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction Ordinance to
allow the Governor to appoint District Commissioners to act for the Circuit
Judge. It was felt that such a provision would make possible an earlier trial
in cases where delays would be damaging to the case, and would also aid the
43
prestige of the District Commissioners.
In appears contradictory that at the same time that Probyn was legis¬
lating for District Commissioners to be able to judge cases in the Circuit
Court, he was also advising that they not prosecute cases in that court, but
only collect evidence and order witnesses.^ Neither his suggestions nor the
warnings of the Legal Assistant to the Secretary of State were heeded. Dis¬
trict Commissioners were 'appointed as a matter of course without regard to
42. S. L. A. Clll 1904 21 October C. S. Haddon-Smith 7 November
Acting D. C. Oswell Karene
43. P. R. O. 267/473 14 December 1904 #307 Probyn-Lyttleton
44. P. R. O. 267/478 3 July 1905 #298 Probyn-Lyttleton
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legal knowledge and competency as Risley had feared. Circuit Judge
Hudson had specific condemnations of the preliminary hearings and prosecu¬
tions conducted by Page and Fairtlough in critical Human Leopard Society
AO
murder cases. They were poor opponents for such able legal practitioners
as Shorunkeh-Sawyerr and Thompson in submitting admissible evidence,
handling evidence and presenting the case for the Crown.
Combined Courts
Before the Protectorate was declared, 'non-natives' settling in a
chiefdom had no effective authority to whom they could appeal other than the
chief. Therefore they found it judicious to recognize that authority in many
instances. With the passing of the Protectorate Ordinances these residents
and settlers who were not indigenous to a chiefdom were placed outside the
authority of the chiefs, as the Ordinances expressly excluded them from the
jurisdiction of the Courts of the Native Chiefs.
The Ordinances provided the Creoles with a legal means of collecting
47
debts, but also placed them under government. The relationship between
the people of a chiefdom, and 'strangers' or 'non-natives' was significantly
45. P. R. O. 267/484 8 June 1906 #156 Probyn-Elgin Risley minute on:
Judge Townsend, unable to do his 1912 Koinadugu circuit, advised
the Governor to have whomever relieved Stanley be Presiding Judge.
Mr. Bailey, the replacement, had only that year been promoted from
Assistant District Commissioner. S. L. A. C(ircuit) J(udge) #8 1912
7 March W. R. Townsend
46. See Chapter V, footnotes 113, 114
47. .Fyfe, History op. cit. p. 551
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altered. Some of the latter took advantage of their new position to ignore the
chiefs altogether. Others acted on the assumption that they could pursue
courses of dishonest practices and intimidation without fear of being reported
to the District Commissioner who alone had legal redress for such matters.
However, the increased volume of complaints and disputes arising
from the presence of a growing number of settlers and residents in the Pro¬
tectorate was a factor which contributed to the creation of the Circuit Court.
The Circuit Court neither succeeded in alleviating the District Commis¬
sioner's workload nor in improving the situations which were causing these
disputes and grievances.
The records of the Circuit Court for any given year show large num¬
bers of cases between Protectorate peoples and non-indigenous settlers and
residents. Seven main Paramount Chiefs representing 'all the races and
tribes' of the Panguma District met with Anderson in 1905. Among the is¬
sues discussed was the fact that the chiefs 'were powerless to expel traders
from their towns as the traders would refuse and threaten to report the chief
for spoiling trade.' It was Anderson's opinion that 'there is no doubt that the
Sierra Leone traders have made the chiefs greatly afraid by their threats,
48
and the chiefs are losing authority in their own towns.'
The attempts of the Protectorate Native Law of 1905, Ordinance #16,
to regulate the affairs between these groups, and consequently reduce the
48. S. L. A. 4042 1904 2 May 1905 D. C. Anderson Panguma
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amount of friction and conflict between them assumed a variety of forms, in¬
cluding provision for Combined Courts. Any Paramount Chief in whose chief-
dom a considerable number of Europeans, Sierra Leone traders, mission¬
aries or others non-indigenous to the Protectorate had settled or were resid¬
ing could apply to the District Commissioner to appoint one or more of them
to sit as a joint judge with the chief in civil disputes which arose between them
and the members of his chiefdom. The jurisdiction of these Combined Courts
was limited to cases where the claim, fine, or damages did not exceed>flO,
and in which the title to land was not involved.
During the first two decades the Combined Courts never worked suc¬
cessfully in the majority of the places where they were instituted. The init¬
ial problem to be overcome was the inability of the chiefs to comprehend
their right to apply for a joint judge. Thereafter, failures were unanimously
attributed to the inability of either side to realize and use the powers of the
49
court to the fullest effect and no further. Bowden and Warren both reported
gradual improvement over the years, particularly in the matters of jurisdic¬
tion. Such progress, coupled with the fact that the Combined Courts 'relieved
50the District Commissioner of trivial cases,' meant that no serious conside-
49. P. R. O. 267/531 5 May 1911 #238 Merewether-Harcourt Bowden
Ronietta District report; P. R. O. 267/565 28 April 1915 #198
Merewether-Harcourt Hooker Karene District report; S. L. A. 3063
1907 24 July D. C. Page N. Sherbro
50. P. R. O. 267/574 16 April 1917 #93 Wilkinson-Long Warren Karene
District report; P. R. O. 267/577 20 March 1918 #76 Wilkinson-Long
Bowden Ronietta District report
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ration was given to abolishing these courts.
Some areas were not receptive to Combined Courts as the 'non-natives'
51
could not agree to one of them being in a high position; often other means
were being employed to settle conflicts. Several of the recorded extra-legal
methods for solving disputes between indigenous and non-indigenous parties
included settlers' associations in some towns along the Railway, and Bowden's
use of the legally defunct Court of the District Commissioner and Native Chief.
As Northern Provincial Commissioner, Bowden used his wide latitude
of initiative to include in this court all transactions the District Commissioners,
chiefs and 'non-natives' conducted together. The most important branch of work
was 'the regulating of intercourse of native and non-native, especially in the
sub-districts of Port Lokko and Bombali where there are large non-native
52
settlements.' Even less information is available about the settlers associ¬
ations reported by both Maxwell and Warren to have existed in some of the
large trading centres in the Railway District since at least 1911. The 'gene-
53ral informal cooperation between settlers, and with chiefs,' which Maxwell
felt in 1908 was part of the reason no Combined Courts had been called for,
51. P. R.O. 267/503 16 April 1908 #140 Probyn-Elgin Maxwell
Railway District report
52. P. R. O. 267/586 6 April 1902 #144 Wilkinson-Milner Bowden
Northern Province report
53. P. R. O. 267/503 16 April 1908 #140 Probyn-Elgin Maxwell
Railway District report
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presumably evolved to these formalized associations. Though without legal
standing, these associations were deemed of great value in settling petty dis-
54
putes both among settlers and between settlers and 'natives.'
Although records of neither category of quasi -legal forum are appar¬
ently available for examination, it can be suggested that their measures of
success were largely if not wholly due to the absence of the statutory re¬
strictions which hampered and confused the joint judges of Combined Courts.
The Courts of the Native Chiefs
Knowledge of the Chiefs' Courts is derived largely from the opinions
and 'observations' of the colonial administrators provided by annual district
reports and occasional enquiries into the workings of these courts. Although
the records do not state the District Commissioner's presence in chiefs'
'barris,' the fact of his personally attending sessions of Chiefs' Courts can
safely be assumed from the familiar tones in which the proceedings and cus¬
toms of these courts are described. District administrators were continually
55
claiming the 'supervision' of these courts as their most important duty.
Presumably this was in reference to visiting them while on patrol and not
solely to an overview of their activities from Headquarters.
The assessment of the Chiefs' Courts based largely on information so
54. P. R. O. 267/532 1 June 1911 #267 Probyn-Crewe Maxwell
Railway District report
55. P. R. O. 267/540 15 June 1912 #244 Merewether-Harcourt
Maxwell Railway District report
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acquired is not only biased from being the Government's point of view, but
also of questionable accuracy. The question must be raised if the Chiefs'
Court sessions seen by District Commissioners were typical of the cases
and decisions normally found in those courts. It is possible that in places
where ajudication of disputes was done by some other customary body, such
as the inner circles of a secret society, the cases conducted before the chief
in the presence of the District Commissioner essentially were contrived for
his benefit. On the other hand, chiefs who had continued to exercise more
wide-ranging jurisdiction and to inflict more harsh punishments than the
Protectorate Administration allowed might be likely to modify their behavior
when officials of the Government were in attendance.
The practices of the Chiefs' Courts described by petitioners against
a chief's decision, or revealed in appeals from the Chiefs' Courts and in in¬
vestigations of chiefly abuses are unreliable for giving a true image of the
average Chiefs' Courts. However, the value of evidence thus acquired should
not be totally dismissed. Stanley, as Northern Provincial Commissioner in
1921, noted that appeals to the District Commissioners tended to increase in
areas most in touch with trade centres where 'the natives were more sophis-
56
ticated.' As a result he discounted a survey of appeals as an accurate
means of assessing the Chiefs' Courts.
56. P. R. O. 267/591 22 June 1921 #312 O. A. G. Maxwell-Churchill
Stanley Northern Province report
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The full range of personality and philosophical differences among the
District Commissioners is most apparent in the ways in which they viewed
the usefulness and the workings of these courts. Warren was consistently
negative in his opinions, while Maxwell provided realistic and constructive
criticisms. Much of the discrepancy between divergent points of view stemmed
from the fact that some colonial administrators considered their role as being
to guard against oppression and others as being to instill the values, if not the
practices, of the English legal system.
Bowden complained of excessive fees and fines, endless delays and
adjournments to extract additional fees; but underlying these and other evils
deriving from the alleged lack of established procedure was his objection to
the alien concept of the indigenous court. It was his interpretation that it was
a court of compensation, not of justice, whereby an offence was made good by
money and wrongs were not punished.^ Administrators such as he tended to
see their roles in a different light from that of men like Wallis who accepted
5 8
the deficiencies of the chief's court but appreciated its merits.
The issue of the powers of the District Commissioners over the Para¬
mount Chiefs revealed the attitudes of the administrators toward the indige¬
nous ruling system in general and the judicial system in particular. Fairt-
57. P. R.O. 267/542 17 September 1912 #406 O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-
Harcourt Bowden enclosure
58. Wallis, C. B. "In the Court of the Native Chiefs in Mendeland"
Journal of the Africa Society XVI July 1905 p. 405
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lough considered himself handicapped without any measure which would 'in-
59
flict summary punishment before the assembled people' on a chief who had
abused his judicial powers. The power to fine lost effect through the delays
of getting the Governor's approval; the right to recommend deposition was
considered even by Fairtlough to be extreme in such cases. Relying on the
power to take over cases from the Court of the Native Chiefs, vested in the
District Commissioners by Ordinance #33 of 1905, presented practical diffi¬
culties of not having the time to review and hear large numbers of cases.
When the defects of the Chiefs' Courts were weighed against the im¬
plications of either reforming or abolishing them, the inevitable conclusion
reached was that self-government was best, with the Government only to give
adequate supervision to prevent oppression.^
The manners in which the chiefs used their judicial powers varied with
'the wisdom and integrity of the chief and the backward and forward state of
1
development of the chiefdom and the people. The early reports of chiefs
and headmen hearing cases outside their jurisdiction, and the continual ones
of rulers failing to use the full extent of their powers and to enforce their de¬
cisions were not made in the tones of condemnation used for chiefs who were
59. P. R. O. 267/542 17 September 1912 #406 O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-
Harcourt Fairtlough enclosure
60.' P. R.O. 267/542 17 September 1912 #406 O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-
Harcourt Colonial Office minutes on;
61. P. R. O. 267/548 28 February 1913 #91 Merewether-Harcourt
Bowden Ronietta District report
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ambitious or corrupt. Administrators were more prepared to make allow¬
ances for faults of the system or uncontrollable incompetence than they were
for abuses of the system and avarice. As a result the issues most frequently
discussed in annual district reports and periodic assessments of the courts
were those of fines, fees and 'betting.'
The system of 'betting' between litigants was deplored on the grounds
that it either kept the poor from getting a case heard or went so high that one
62
was obliged to borrow. Efforts to discourage this practice seemingly were
not successful as references persist throughout the period under review. Not
all administrators agreed as to the evils of this and other practices of the chief
in his court. Stanley reported in 1916 that 'betting' still continued in Mende
and Temne courts, and although this 'very old practice' built trivial cases
63
into something big he did not judge that it impeded justice.
The system of bringing a case before a ruler by depositing a fee was
open to bribery and corruption however rooted in customary law and proce¬
dure. Increasingly frequent references were made to exorbitant fees making
it difficult for people to get redress, and to the court being regarded prima-
62. P. R. O. 267/484 3 April 1906 #80 Probyn-Elgin Paling Bandajuma
District report; P. R. O. 267/503 16 April 1908 #140 Probyn-Elgin
Maxwell Railway District report
63. P. R. O. 267/571 12 May 1916 #182 Merewether-Bonar-Law
Stanley Ronietta District report
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rily as a source of revenue. The latter accusation was acknowledged by
Government officials as being a valid means for the chief to uphold his posi¬
tion, many of the traditional ways of acquiring wealth being forbidden him
under British rule. However, the tendency, especially in the less remote
areas, for chiefs to abuse the systems of fees, and fines, was one of greater
concern as the complaints became more common.
Profit was made from fees not only by setting high prices on cases
but also by postponements and adjournments, and consequent demands for
new fees. Excessive fines were another source of grievance among the Pro¬
tectorate people and administrators. However, various recommendations to
restrict or remove the chief's power to fine were turned down in view of the
light shed on the custom by Fairtlough. The complaint Bowden voicejon be¬
half of appellants to his court was that innocent relatives were fined if the
65
guilty party could not pay the fine. Fairtlough placed this fact in the per¬
spective of the family to whom the culprit then had to make good. It was his
observation that this system, with its responsibilities and obligations, was
a deterrent to crime and 'to break it down would be to eliminate all that is
64. P. R. O. 267/540 17 May 1912 #210 Merewether-Harcourt Warren
Karene District report; P. R. O. 267/565 28 April 1915 #198
Merewether-Harcourt Hooker Karene District report; P. R. O.
267/571 12 May 1916 #182 Merewether-Bonar-Law Stanley Ronietta
District report




good in the African's constitution.'
From differences shown in any given year between the reported use¬
fulness and effectiveness of Chiefs' Courts in the various districts a pattern
of regional and ethnic distinctions emerge despite changes of personnel. If
District Commissioners could agree on nothing else in their evaluations of
these courts, they apparently recognized as a common denominator the ef¬
fects of trade, the Railway, and non-indigenous inhabitants of the Protecto¬
rate.
Upon transferring in 1916 to the Northern Sherbro District after four
years in Koinadugu and one in Ronietta, Stanley expressed a comparison
which the records clearly bear out: "Unlike the courts of Koinadugu, here
as a rule the chiefs insist on substantial fees in civil cases and usually de¬
mand whole or part of the value of the property in dispute be brought into
6 Y
court for the more speedy enforcement of their decisions." The reason
was not hard to find for Stanley or many other District Commissioners who
identified the bad influences of the'non-natives whom the native regards as
petty lawyers and is guided by their advice which usually is to not abide by
6 8
the decision of the chief until he had appealed to the D. C.' Whereas ex¬
cessive fines and fees were characteristic of reports from the Railway Dis-
66. P. R. O. 267/542 17 September 1912 #406 O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-
Harcourt Fairtlough enclosure
67. S. L. A. C. S. 348 1917 19 September Secretariat 20 November
D. C. Stanley N. Sherbro
68. Ibid.
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trict, bribery and corruption in the Chiefs' Courts were rarely cited in
Koinadugu. In addition, the volume of complaints and appeals to the District
Commissioner was noticeably different from one region to the next. Despite
his general low opinion of Chiefs' Courts, Colonel Warren could distinguish
between those near trade centres and those further removed. He attributed
the greater number of complaints from the former in Karene to'intercourse
with civilisation which decreases the native's respect for his own courts and
fiQ
disinclines him to accept his chief's decisions.'
Based on his diverse experience in the Railway and Ronietta Districts,
Bowden offered the assessment of the changes in the Chiefs' Court which was
circulated among colonial administrators:
"Few complaints come from remote chiefdoms away from the
railroad where the people are still content to abide by the
findings of their own courts, and chiefs and principal men are
unsophisticated and prepared to act on the lines of their fore¬
fathers. Chiefdoms nearer the railroad have been open to
trade for a long time and in perpetual contact with strangers;
this has led to a sense of right and wrong but not always on
proper lines. Chiefs and principal men have too often in¬
creased in cunning rather than wisdom, and show a tendency
to manipulate simple customary law to the advantage of them¬
selves or their friends. Native customary law decisions often
used to be made re: expediency rather than right and the indiv-
ual was content to merge self in the community and not question
such a criterion. Now the individual is beginning to think in
terms of personal rights and wrongs and is no longer content
with such an expression of opinion. Such a state of affairs is
not transient but must increase and develop. It is essential
69. P. R. O. 267/574 16 April 1917 #93 Wilkinson-Harcourt Warren
Karene District report
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that native courts take cognizance of it and move with it, for
reform of the courts must come from within.
Distinctions which were made between the ability of chiefs from dif¬
ferent ethnic, or 'tribal,' groups to exercise their judicial powers centred
mostly on the Temne. Hooker's designation of the weak chief being the curse
71
of the 'Timini' country was intended as an explanation of the frequent ref¬
erences he and other District Commissioners in the Karene District made to
the excessive fees, and lack of enforcement of decisions in the Courts of the
Native Chiefs. It might also be suggested that he had provided an indication
of the fact that among the Temne the chief, however powerful, might not be
the customary source of judicial power.
The implications for the position of the chief and for the judicial sys¬
tem of such a possibility are significant. In situations where the ruler's
power was rooted in, for example, the Poro Society and was not dependent
on his performance of a duty not his traditionally, his position would not be
compromised by the charade of judging cases in a Court of the Native Chief.
However, if in order to carry out duties imposed by the Protectorate Ordi¬
nances a chief tried to usurp the power of an indigenous institution in which
he had no major role, he would risk his effectiveness for Government pur¬
poses and whatever his customary influence he had enjoyed.
70. P. R. O. 267/548 28 February 1913 #91 Merewether-Harcourt
Bowden Ronietta District report
71. P. R. O. 267/565 28 April 1915 #198 Merewether-Harcourt
Hooker Karene District report
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Chiefs who were within their rights hearing cases and making deci¬
sions were not necessarily unaffected by the advent of British rule. The ef¬
fects of trade, traders, the desire for revenue, and some specific alterations
of his jurisdiction and powers have already been examined. His authority was
further undermined by the 1905 Protectorate Courts Jurisdiction Amendment
Ordinance which provided for District Commissioners to remove from the
chief's jurisdiction any case in which the latter was deemed interested or
unlikely to give a fair and impartial trial. At the same time it was made
legal for chiefs to send people to the district gaol. Although District Com¬
missioners hailed this innovation, it could be considered an indication of
further deterioration of the chief's power in his court.
The fact must not be lost sight of that the amount of authority and
respect individual chiefs commanded in their own rights greatly affected the
record of their courts. Such a fact would be especially likely in those areas
where men of wealth, military prowess, or other influence were able to rise
to a ruling position. With rare exceptions, the records do not single out
these rulers in terms of the effectiveness and viability of their courts. As
a consequence it is difficult to assess the successes and failures of innova¬
tion for failure might be due to the weakness of the chief or his position, and
successes equally attributable to the personal strength of a chief, not the
universal merits of the new method.
Shuffrey, District Commissioner in Northern Sherbro, reported in
224
1919 that the chief of Imperri had introduced a written code of court proce¬
dure with the object of preventing certain common abuses. The government
officer was astute enough to realize that although the rules were 'simple and
72
effective, general adoption would be premature.' It might be noted at
this point that an earlier administrator had been successfully taken in by an
impressive compilation of 'Laws Governing The Native Court.'
In 1904 Warren gave permission for Momolu Massaquoi, Paramount
Chief of Gallinas, to hold a Poro to 'confirm' these laws and to explain them
71
to the people. Both the document itself and the fact of the Poro being ex¬
ploited for extortionate purposes by this chief, who was deposed two years
later for abuse of his position, point to its being a contrivance to impress
the District Commissioner and not a legitimate innovation of the indigenous
judicial system.
Customary recourse to outside chiefs was cited as the basis for the
system of assessor chiefs, and for the 'native appeal courts' set up by H. G.
Warren. His objection to an appellant having to pay court fees both to his
own chief and to the chiefs to whom the District Commissioner referred the
case led him to recommend having a paid chief for every tribe in the Karene
District. Finna Baka was the first whose annual present was increased so
72. P. R.O. 267/582 11 July 1919 #332 O. A. G. Evelyn-Milner
Shuffrey Northern Sherbro District report
73. S.L. A. C61 1904 5 May Acting D. C. Wallis Sherbro 20 March
1904 M. Massaquoi; 17 May D. C. Warren Bandajuma
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that he would undertake appeal cases without taking court fees. The re¬
cords do not show that this method was extended to a representative ruler of
each ethnic group in the Karene District or any subsequent districts under
Warren's administration. Neither is there any indication that the chief did
not continue to collect fees.
Bowden used his initiative to tamper with the judicial system but did
so knowing the adverse effects of attempting to apply European remedies to
the defects within the indigenous court. However in certain cases he found
that with caution two or three chiefs 'of good repute' could be appointed to
hear cases in lieu of the District Commissioner. No pretence of such a
'Native Appeal Court' being rooted in customary practice was made by Bow¬
den although Wilkinson was inclined to exaggerate both its origins and use¬
fulness. Bowden, who had introduced this type of court in several districts,
regarded it purely as an experiment and a convenience, as it freed him 'for
75
more interesting pursuits.' Its application was limited as it embodied a
singularly European idea not readily understood or accepted by the inhabi¬
tants of many areas. Seemingly, this appeal court was better received in
the Karene District than Ronietta where Bowden felt that it needed constant
backing as it enjoyed little respect or power in the eyes of the people.^
74. S. L. A. 2250 1909 17 May D. C. Warren Karene
75. P. R. O. 267/586 6 April 1920 #144 Wilkinson-Milner Bowden
Karene District report
76. P. R. O. 267/580 27 March 1919 #164 Wilkinson-Milner Bowden
Ronietta District report
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Ideally, such should have been the criterion for the assessment of each in¬
digenous court.
It is ironic that British administrators criticized the absence of an
established code of law among the peoples of the Protectorate. The conse¬
quent interpretation of customary law being left to the individual chief's
'caprice,' or judgement, was not at all dissimilar to the manner of justice
available to the British subjects. Some would even say that Bowden's com-
77
plaint that all people were not equal in the eyes of the 'native court' could
be applied to courts outside the Protectorate of Sierra Leone.
In the final analysis, administrators might deplore the practices of
the indigenous court but they were not in a position nor of an inclination to
do away with it. The fact that all courts have some abuses and defects was
highlighted by the difficulties experienced in the use of English law and legal
proceedings in the Protectorate. The deficiencies of this system were most
clearly evident in the context of the investigations and trials of persons al¬
legedly associated with the Human Leopard Society.





AND THE PROTECTORATE ADMINISTRATION
Introduction
Among Protectorate peoples there existed secret societies with, to
varying degrees, political, social and religious significance. Such societies
perhaps can be loosely paralleled to the Masonic lodges in Freetown: non-
members knew they existed but only the initiated could provide accurate ac¬
counts of meaning, procedure and activities. I wish to deal with two types
of the secret societies which British colonial administrators encountered in
the Sierra Leone Protectorate: the Poro Society; and those societies whose
alleged purpose was to secure human flesh, the Human Leopard, Human
Alligator and Human Baboon Societies.
Much has been written on the subject of the true purposes for which
these societies existed, both at the time and subsequently. This study is to
explore the political significance of these societies and how the colonial ad¬
ministrators viewed and treated them. The resultant effects of such atti¬
tudes and action on the indigenous power structure and on the people of the
Sierra Leone Protectorate also will be considered.
The exclusion from consideration of other secret societies of the
first category is deliberate. With the exception of the Ragbenle of the
Temne, none of them constituted the combined political, economic, social,
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and religious force of the Poro. Although the Ragbenle will not be dealt
with separately it would appear from the contemporary observations of
Northcote Thomas and the more recent ones of McCulloch that the political
generalisations concerning the Poro are equally applicable to the Ragbenle
in those areas where it predominated over the Poro.
Poro
The general principle underlying the government of the Protectorate
was, according to Standing Instruction #9 of 1910:
"that the administration of the Protectorate chiefdoms is left
in the hands of the paramount chiefs: native law and custom
regulate the authority and powers of the paramount chiefs, and
distinguish between the powers such chiefs can exercise 'suo
moto' and those larger powers which can only be exercised by
a chief after he has consulted with the principal men of the
chiefdom. "
The policies and practices of administering the Sierra Leone Protectorate
from 1896 to the date of the cited document were consistent with its stated
principle. Some of the difficulties encountered in attempting to determine
the role of the Poro Society in the indigenous political structure derive from
such non-specific frames of reference of which these 'native law and cus¬
tom', 'larger powers' and 'principal men' are typical. Ordinances
1. Sierra Leone Governor's Standing Instruction #9 of 1910 22 August
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2 3
identify'Paramount Chiefs,' 'Chiefs,' and'Tribal Authority' but leave
undefined the 'poro' over whose Taws' the District Commissioners had
jurisdiction when such laws were the origin of disputes.^
In none of the Ordinances pertaining to the Protectorate is the Poro
Society referred to in the same context with the Tribal Authorities, the
powers of the chiefs, nor native laws and customs. No Standing Instruc¬
tions nor Government laws imply a relation between the rarely-cited Poro
and the individuals and institutions which were the basis of indirect rule in
the Protectorate.
Background of Relationships
Between the Poro Society and the Government
It is not possible to contend that British administrators either inad¬
vertently overlooked the Poro or failed to identify it as a significant power
2. Protectorate Ordinances #20 of 1896 and #33 of 1901, section II of
Part I: "Paramount Chief is a chief who is not subordinate in his ordi¬
nary jurisdiction to any other chief." "'Chief' means and includes a
Paramount Chief and such other chiefs or headsmen as are by native
customary law the councillors or assistances of any such Paramount
Chief. "
3. 'Tribal Authority' was not defined until the Protectorate Native Law
#16 of 1905. Section 58 contains the description: "the expression
'Tribal Authority' when used in this Ordinance shall, if not inconsis¬
tent in the context, mean Paramount Chiefs and their Councillors and
men of note or Sub-Chiefs and their councillors and men of note. "
Subsequent ordinances, such as the 1912 Forestry and 1913 Palm Oil
Concession Ordinances, use the 1905 definition of 'Tribal Authority.'
4. Protectorate Ordinances #20 of 1896, section 71; and #33 of 1901,
section 101
5. The vesting in the District Commissioner of jurisdiction over dis¬
putes originating from Poro laws should be considered the exception.
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factor when they were formulating the plan for the administration of a Pro¬
tectorate over the Sierra Leone hinterland. At various times throughout the
1800's the Freetown Government had been enlisted to combat trade restric¬
tions placed by the Poro Society which purportedly interfered with trading
interests. In such cases pressure was brought to bear on the Government
by those commercial concerns which were the targets of the Poros to inter¬
vene on behalf of the merchants and traders.
Fyfe cites among others, several Poros on timber, in the areas of
the Rokelle and Bumpe Rivers, which prompted the merchants to enlist the
aid of government troops. Furthermore, the report that an 1882 Poro os¬
tensibly held to crown a king in the lower Jong area was a cover to boycott
Creole trade resulted in a series of events which culminated in bloodshed. ®
It was readily apparent from these and other encounters with the Poro So¬
ciety that it exercised a great deal of influence.
Such incidents caused the Government to have their Travelling Com¬
missioners making treaties in the early 1890's to impress upon the chiefs
that they were still free agents, but at the same time to warn them against
using Poro to restrict trade. It was also clear to observers that the Poro
Society had been instrumental in organising the Mende Uprising in the 1898
Hut Tax Revolt and in maintaining the secrecy which surrounded its plans.
Consequently, the various contacts the Government had with the Poro during
6. Fyfe, op. cit. pp. 226, 298, 439
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the 19th century could only have indicated the existence of an institution of
significant power and influence over a large number of Protectorate peoples.
Yet only negative recognition was given to it in the forms of the previously
mentioned jurisdictional delimitation and an 1897 Ordinance prohibiting the
7
use of the Poro to restrict commerce.
Administrators in Sierra Leone justified the Ordinance on the
grounds that 'the Poro against gathering produce was destructive to trade
O
and had a pernicious effect on prosperity.' Alldridge maintained that a
Poro prevented the gathering of fruit at the proper season, decreased man¬
ufacturing of palm oil which caused the reduced consumption of imported
9
goods and thus affected the revenue of the Colony. Although contemporary
sources dealt with the Ordinance restricting the Poro primarily in terms of
its economic implications there were passing references to the political
fact of removing this power from the chiefs.
Beneath the level of official non-recognition of the Poro Society there
existed an assortment of connections between the Poro and the Protectorate
Administration. It is instructive to study the various ways in which the
Poro was viewed before discussing the likely explanations for the Govern¬
ment's policy toward the Society.
7. Ordinance #14 of 1897
8. P. R. O. 267/478 15 June 1905 #262 Probyn - Lyttleton Wallis
enclosure
9. Alldridge, T. J. The Sherbro and Its Hinterlands (London, 1901)
p. 305
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In light of the published accounts of the significance and uses of the
Poro Society these aspects will be considered only where they bear upon the
manners in which the Sierra Leone Government regarded the Poro Society
and the consequent effects of the role of the Poro in the indigenous political
structure.
The arrival of Governor Leslie Probyn at the end of 1904 marked the
renewal of recorded efforts to enforce the 1897 Ordinance. Probyn was an
agriculture enthusiast. However lacking he might have been in knowledge
and training he had no dearth of energy and ideas when it came to matters
concerning the agricultural and commercial development of the Protecto¬
rate. He, like his predecessors, saw only that a Poro placed on the collec¬
tion of palm kernels was detrimental to the trade of palm oil obtained from
kernels picked at a presumably earlier date than the Poro restrictions
allowed. On his first tour in the Protectorate Probyn hoped that he had
'induced the natives to change the Poro on palm and to substitute for it a
law making it a crime to pick unripe nuts but stating that it was never a
crime to pick ripe ones unless labour was needed for plantation work.' ^
Throughout the years that Probyn was Governor, reports he re¬
ceived from his District Officers and dispatches he sent to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies were a chronicle of chiefs who were 'applying Poro
10. P. R. O. 267/478 14 June 1905 #259 Probyn - Lyttleton
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more rationally with regard to trade interests' ^ and of District Commis¬
sioners who were working hard to get the chiefs to cooperate in the removal
of Poro restrictions on the collection of palm kernels.
With the exceptions of George William Page, who showed himself to
be a particularly perceptive and knowledgeable District Commissioner, and
an unidentified post-war agricultural officer, no other Government officials
indicated any understanding of the use of the Poro to regulate trade practices
beyond the arrogant assumption that it was either a deliberate act of sabo¬
tage or an indication of ignorance. In 1909 Page noted that with a number of
bush disputes around farming time the chiefs placed a Poro against collec-
12
tion of produce rather than settle the disputes. However much this prac¬
tice was lamented for its effect on trade this was at least acknowledgement
of practical application of restrictions generally regarded by colonial ad¬
ministrators to be arbitrary. Ten years later, long after the zealous Pro-
byn had been replaced by Governors whose preoccupations lay in other fields,
a member of the Agriculture Department applauded 'the effective husband¬
ing of the (palm) crop directed by Poro regulations. ' It was his observation
11. For example: P. R. O. 267/493 26 April 1907 #144 O. A. G. Haddon-
Smith-Elgin Maxwell report on newly formed Railway District enclosure
12. The complaints of sub-chiefs and headmen of the Jong Chiefdom, Nor¬
thern Sherbro District, against P. C. Alice Gaye included her failure
to settle palm disputes with the result that the Poro was left on the
trees, the nuts rotted, and the petitioners 'suffered accordingly'.
S. L. A. 4424 1909 21 December to D. C. Page of Sherbro and N. Sherbro
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that the greatest waste of produce occurred 'when the farming right has de¬
volved on a Mahometan or non-native for whom the Poro rule has no sanc¬
tion.'^
The Poro Society in fact is attributed by McCulloch, in Peoples of
Sierra Leone, with the coordination of production, the regulation of trade
14
practices, and the provision of labour to those in need of it. Probyn him¬
self had alluded to the latter function when he deferred to the need for work¬
ers on plantations as an acceptable reason for prohibition of produce col¬
lection.
The intent of the prohibitive Poro was to enforce a closed season,
to ensure, in the words of Roy Lewis, 'that the people should do farm work
in the right order.
In other respects Government associations with the Poro Society
showed no greater depth of involvement or understanding. Emigration to
Liberia, or confiscation across the Liberian border of young men for servi¬
tude in the Congo, was met with appeals from chiefs and District Commis¬
sioners for the Government to give official sanction to the native laws which
would prevent any native from crossing the border without permission of
13. P. R.O. 267/582 11 July 1919 c. O. A. G. Evelyn-Milner
14. McCulloch, M. Peoples of Sierra Leone (London, 1950) pp. 32, 33
15. Lewis, Roy Sierra Leone: A ModernTior trait (London, 1954) p. 66
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the Tribal Authority. Although the Secretary of State quite logically saw
no reason why these laws were not sufficiently strong without Government
backing, he did not prohibit Probyn from incorporating the principle in the
17
1905 Protectorate Native Law Ordinance. However, in 1907, Lord Elgin
drew the line at authorizing by ordinance chiefs to appeal to the Poro to
support such native laws. Thus a distinction is made between supporting or
invoking a native law, and appealing to the Poro Society to do so. Conse¬
quently there appears no legislation mandating Poro laws or Poro support
of laws. However, there did occur a series of noteworthy incidents sur¬
rounding King-Harmon's approval of Warren's 1904 proposal to use the
Poro Society to strengthen and enforce the native laws.
Europeans in the Poro Society
Harold Galway Warren, an Irish military officer who had ravaged the
1 O
Bumpe country during the 1898 Hut Tax Revolt, -LO now took it upon himself
to join a Poro Society in the same area, the Bandajuma District. During
16. S. L. A. 1264 1904 16 March Acting D. C. Wallis Sherbro; also
reported to Colonial Office P. R. O. 267/472 8 April 1904 c. King-
Harmon-Lyttleton; S. L. A. C42 1904 5 April D. C. Warren Banda¬
juma letter to Colonial Secretary Haddon-Smith
17. Section 51 of Ordinance #16 1905 makes it 'unlawful to harbour or
assist any native who has left the Chiefdom to which he belongs with¬
out first notifying the Tribal Authority and without complying with the
native law respecting journeys from or residence out of the territory
which is subject to such Authority. '
18. Fyfe, op. cit. p. 569
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'this enlightening experience' he maintained that he and a Dr. Lattermore
had 'learnt more about the people we have to deal with in the few days we
were shut up in the bush than (we) could have in ten years.' His unchecked
enthusiasm for using the resources and presumed good auspices of the So¬
ciety may have been well-intended but was misguided.
The Poro he was then authorised to permit for the purposes of con¬
firming and explaining the 'laws governing the native court' unfortunately
became the vehicle for extortion and the cause of rumours of another im¬
pending uprising. Warren's explanation of the events on which the rumours
were based is simple to the point of possibly being naive:
"The native laws being put in force by all Paramount Chiefs,
obviously took many meetings to accomplish them, and these
meetings gave rise, as I anticipated, to misconceptions. To
hear the laws explained the people were made to pay a fee.
When I saw chiefs taking too much money I stopped the 'porro'.
The various but uniformly alarmist reports reached the ears of C.
Braithwaite Wallis, District Commissioner of the adjoining Sherbro Dis¬
trict. They caused him to fire off a series of dispatches and personal let¬
ters aimed much less at being an attack on Major Warren than at calling the
crisis to the attention of the Governor and bringing the turmoil, which was
allegedly affecting trade, to a halt. Among the misconceptions which arose
was one which maintained that the Government helped the chiefs with 'the
19. S. L. A. C42 1904 5 April D. C. Warren Bandajuma letter to Colonial
Secretary Haddon-Smith
20. S. L. A. C61 1904 17 May D. C. Warren Bandajuma
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District Commissioner's Poro' which the people were forced to join and to
pay a very high fee for. The other major variation to the rumours centred
on the people taking advantage of the two white men joining the Poro, by
holding a second, secret one to make war because the chiefs had forced them
21
to join 'the District Commissioner's Poro.'
The reports of threatened disturbances were dismissed by Freetown
after enquiries so superficial that the memory of warnings and uprisings in
the same area did not appear to have lasted the six years since 1898. War¬
ren's explanation was accepted without comment. Sadly, far more was made
of the manner in which Wallis spoke of an officer who was his senior than of
the actual folly committed by that senior officer.
It was Warren's belief that Wallis was 'out of his province to criticize
my actions with respect to the Poro, and his condemnation of my adminis-
22
tration is an unwarrantable impertinence! The Colonial Secretary agreed
with Warren and reprimanded Wallis' criticism of an officer senior to him¬
self in the Colonial Service concerning an action approved by the Governor.
He did, however, begrudgingly acknowledge Wallis' point that he had done
his duty to report the rumours. This concession was no doubt prompted by
Wallis' reminder that both he and Warren, his senior officer by only a few
21. Synthesis of reports from traders and D. C. staffs enclosed in S. L. A.
C61 1904
22. S. L. A. C64 1904 17 May D. C. Warren Bandajuma
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months, had experienced the 1898 Hut Tax Rebellion, rumours of which also
23
had been ignored.
The issue of Europeans entering the Poro Society is particularly in¬
teresting in light of the official non-recognition of this institution. There
was not only controversy over the possible advantages to be gained by such
an undertaking, but also conflicting opinions about the feasibility and advisa¬
bility of intruding into the sacred domain of the Poro.
In the cases of both Major Warren and the Government Anthropolo¬
gist, Northcote Thomas, who visited Sierra Leone in 1914 and attempted to
join the Poro Society of Yonnibanna, at least one District officer displayed
common sense and realistic appreciation of the workings of the Society.
Wallis' condemnation ofWarren's behaviour was as much due to the disturb¬
ances such action had caused as to the presumptuousness of the Bandajuma
District Commissioner's assumption that he could infiltrate the ranks of the
Poro. Wallis spared no words. It was his conviction that:
"
any European can go into the Poro bush and learn the secrets
of these people I do not for a moment believe, and still less can a
District Commissioner do so. This opinion is strengthened by
the reports constantly being brought to my office, the gist being:
1. the Poro into which the D. C. has entered is a fraud resented
by the natives 2. the natives regard their poro as absolutely
sacred and never open it to strangers. "
"A European official who conceives that he will learn the carefully
guarded secrets of these people by joining or going through the
23. S. L. A. C61 1904 30 June, 12 July C. S. Haddon-Smith; 9 July D. C.
Wallis
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ceremony of joining one of their most cherished and sacred so-
cities only demonstrates in a marked degree an astonishing
ignorance of the natives, their fetish societies, and the suspi¬
cious and superstitious nature of the African character.
Although Wallis was upbraided for such remarks, he was, unbeknownst to
him, vindicated at a later date by several of his experienced colleages.
At the time of his post-retirement tour of the Protectorate, All-
dridge had spent well over thirty years in Sierra Leone, twelve of which
were as District Commissioner of the Sherbro District. His reaction to the
reports that one or two Europeans had been initiated into the Poro Society
was that 'they could only have been admitted into the outermost circle.'
Alldridge did not consider this a singular achievement, likening a member
of the outer circle, 'which the majority of the men and boys join', to a
" 'Tommy' of the British Army" who has no voice and exists to be instruc-
25
ted and carry out orders.
Page thwarted the efforts of the Government Anthropologist to join
Bai Sherbro's Poro in Yonnibanna in a manner which Wallis and Alldridge
would have applauded. His decree that 'no Government officers were to en¬
ter Porro without first applying to the Governor' seemed motivated less from
24. S. L. A. C61 1904 5 May D. C. Wallis Sherbro
25. Alldridge, whose requests 'for increased retirement pension for excep¬
tional work done in Sierra Leone or a job in a better climate' were
turned down, retired in May 1905 and was awarded the I. S. O. as 'suit¬
able recognition for his services.' P. R.O. 267/482 25 May 1905 letter
Alldridge-Lyttleton. The changes he witnessed in Sierra Leone since
he came in 1871 as a businessman are recorded in his expressive trave¬
logue A Transformed Colony (London, 1910) p. 194
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his skepticism that 'any European would ever become initiated into the inner
workings of the Porro' than from the reaction the chief had to the request.^
The Paramount Chief found Thomas' suggestion:
.. in fact one of great surprise to me and my people, which
was under deep consideration for his being European but his
making us to understand he was authorised by the government
to enter all secret societies we had to against our wish give a
reluctant consent and I thought it advisable to inform of same
before proceeding.
In communicating the incidents to the Colonial Secretary in Freetown,
Page noted that Thomas' application to Bai Sherbro to join the Poro was also
irregular because such institutions were tribal and not under the control of
28
the chief. Whether valid in his assumptions and motivated also by pique
against Thomas' intrusion in his domain, Page relentlessly pursued this and
many other matters with the result, if even coincidental, that the interests
29
of the people were defended. The Tow opinion of native' a Colonial Office
official accused him of possessing was certainly not evident in Page's con¬
frontation with Thomas.
Whereas Warren had joined a Poro without prior or subsequent author
isation, Thomas was not able to gain entry to Bai Sherbro's Poro even by
declaring that the Governor had given him permission to do so. Bai Sherbro,
26. S. L. A. C315 1916 17 November 1914 D. C. Page Ronietta
27. S. L. A. C315 1916 19 November 1914 Bai Sherbro-Page
28. S. L. A. C315 1916 as recorded by Thomas and relayed to the Colonial
28. Secretary 16 November 1914
29. P. R. O. 267/564 23 February 1915 #89 Merewether-Hareourt Calder
minute on Page's Ronietta District report for 1914
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a canny chief with years of association with European traders and Govern¬
ment officials, was not about to be impressed by parchments bearing the
Governor's seal or by the mere words of an unfamiliar white man. The
Paramount Chief's recourse to the District Commissioner of the Ronietta
District served to open for debate the issue of Government sanction of
Europeans entering the Poro Society. This topic had not been discussed in
1904, for Warren's action had neither been reported to the Colonial Office
nor elicited recorded comment from Probyn or Haddon-Smith, the Colonial
Secretary.
The staffs in Freetown and London regarded the entire question of
whether Europeans should join the Poro Society with the same mixed feelings
which underlay their whole policy about the Society. Merewether straddled
the thin line with Colonial Office officials between wanting to know more
about the Society and not wanting to alienate the chiefs by attempts to acquire
this knowledge. However, his original authorisation to Thomas could no
longer stand without qualification in the face of the apparent reluctance of
the Paramount Chief.
The Colonial Secretary informed Page that the Anthropologist had
been 'dispatched by the government to study the customs of the people, and
given 10 for the purpose of initiation (fee) into a secret society'. The Dis¬
trict Commissioner was not to hinder him if the chief and people were
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willing. For his part Thomas was advised to keep the district officers
31
informed of his movements and intentions.
Although Haddon-Smith's instructions appear to be belated as the
Paramount Chief had already expressed his reluctance in his letter to Page
and in his alleged lack of cooperation in supplying Thomas with carriers, the
orders were not without effect. Thomas' final report, published in 1916,
contains a chapter on the Poro Society of Bai Sherbro. It is doubtful, how¬
ever, that the Paramount Chief, even under pressure from the government,
provided anything more than superficial views of the Poro Society nor that
he revealed any of its secrets.
Removed from the scene, Colonial Office personnel strongly regret¬
ted the loss of this 'priceless opportunity' to learn about the Poro Society.
In an after-the-fact and self-contradictory dispatch, Secretary of State
Harcourt instructed the Governor to not limit Thomas' realm of investiga¬
tion so long as the Anthropologist first obtained the permission of the Dis-
op
trict Commissioner involved. * As Page's feelings on the subject of Euro¬
peans trying to join the Poro Society were explicit and had been the original
cause of Thomas' failure, the Colonial Office had merely succeeded in issu¬
ing a statement which revealed the same ambiguous position as had been
expressed by the Freetown Government.
30. S.L.A. C315 1916 20 November 1914 C. S. Hollis-Page
31. S.L.A. C315 1916 20 November 1914 C. S. Hollis-Thomas
32. P. R.O. 267/564 31 January 1915 Merewether-Harcourt draft
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Poro and the Administrative System
Wallis probably knew and understood as much about the Poro in 1905
as anyone in Sierra Leone during the years under consideration. Even so,
in summing up the relationship between the Government and the Poro Society
he assessed the policy of the Government far more accurately than the
tractability of the Poro: "Let the chiefs rule the people and by our policy,
diplomacy, justice, judgment and sympathy (we) shall enlist chiefs and the
people on our side and then Poro will be under our good influence. At
no time does it appear to have been seriously contended that the opposite
effect could be obtained, and that the Poro Society could be used directly to
bring the chiefs and people into line with the aims of the British Administra¬
tion. With the fundamental belief in interfering with indigenous institutions
as little as possible and the necessity of keeping costs, and consequently
staff, minimal, it is inconceivable that the Protectorate administrators
would have attempted to officially include the complex and evasive Poro
Society in their system. The governing policy remained that Protectorate
rule would be administered through the chiefs despite indications that many
chiefs had little power or influence independent of the Poro Society.
It is apparent from the records that the more that was learned of the
nature and workings of the Poro the more confirmed government officials
33. Wallis, C. B. , "The Poro of the Mendi" Journal of the African Society
v. XVI 1905 p. 188
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became in their conviction that interference was not only undesirable for
the reasons already cited. The resentment of and resistance to any such
action also would make it virtually impossible to execute.
However much information concerning the Poro Society exists in the
Government records is no guarantee that it was possessed by all the colonial
officers. The principle of relying on the initiative of the local administrator
was applied to the acquisition of knowledge concerning the people and tradi¬
tions of his area. Although there were 'reports of District Commissioners
on native laws and customs,' and enquiries were made into various concerns,
there is no indication that the data submitted was systematically compiled
34
and circulated. To the contrary, the practice in many cases was to for¬
ward the findings to the Colonial Office and file copies with the Colonial Sec¬
retary in Freetown. Nor can it be assumed that the majority of the district
officers had the time or inclination to peruse the back records of their prede¬
cessors or of the Colonial Secretary.
With the Poro Society and related issues as with any other part of the
traditional power structure, the understanding a District Commissioner had
of the indigenous institutions and the role they played among the diverse Pro-
34. Among the few exceptions was the outcome of the survey concerning the
methods of removing chiefs. This information, gathered throughout
1909 and early 1910 from district officers (S. L. A. 1725 1909), was
incorporated into Standing Instruction #10 1910 of 22 August. This
printed document of guidelines on The Deposition of Chiefs was dis¬
tributed to the District Commissioners. See Appendix D
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tectorate peoples depended largely on that individual's background and abili¬
ties. It was necessary that he be able to comprehend and apply any infor¬
mation provided him, such as that included in the guidelines to be used in
the removal of a chief. However, speculation as to the extent such guide¬
lines were followed is heightened by the selection by Fairtlough of both the
Paramount Chief and the Nain Banna of the Kwaia Chiefdom as assessor
35
chiefs. Such a determination implied an equal status of the two positions
although Fairtlough, in other contexts, had revealed his knowledge of the
fact that the Nain Banna, Pa Nembana, was not equivalent to the Paramount
Chief. 36
Although this action took place some years previous to the issuance
of the Standing Instruction cited above, it is indicative of knowledge of indig¬
enous political structure not being consistently applied. As a consequence
the relative positions and authority of the Paramount Chief and the Nain
Banna would undoubtedly be affected by the Protectorate Administration
providing them with identical roles in the Circuit Court. Similar effects on
the indigenous political structure will be seen as a result of political officers
misconstruing or misapplying information about the Poro Society.
The extent to which a District Commissioner was both perceptive and
capable of drawing upon whatever depth of experience in other regions he
35. S. L. A. 5511 1903 19 January 1904 D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta
36. See: S. L. A. 963 1901
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possessed affected the way he regarded such traditional institutions as the
Poro Society. Consequently the personal characteristics of district officers
and turnover in personnel very likely produced an erratic implementation of
the policy toward the Poro Society as each administrator interpreted facts
and events differently and relied on differing sources of information. In
addition, misrepresentation, poor judgment, and misplaced trust must have
occurred in some cases which concerned the Poro Society, its laws or its
authority. Under the administration of one District Commissioner chiefs
might be regarded as dependent on the observance of their Poro oaths while
the succeeding administrator might consider the Paramount Chiefs as the
supreme powers in their respective chiefdoms.
Poro and the Chief
The policy of ruling through the chiefs, with due accord given the
'Tribal Authority' and the 'native law and customs', was for the most part
probably a harmless expedient. For the general purposes of the Protecto¬
rate Administration it apparently was not deemed necessary to ascertain
who in fact were the 'leading' or 'principal' men of a chiefdom nor who de¬
termined 'native law', beyond the identifications made by the chief. It was
the opinion of one political officer that the first problem of any enquiry was
the determination of the Tribal Authority. William Douglas Davies Bowden
had found during his 18 years in the Protectorate that he could 'choose one
of several bodies, equally well called the Tribal Authority'. In the 1924
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case referred to, the then Commissioner of the Central Province had quite
logically selected 'the elders who signed or marked the chief's election' and
37
'missed the cream of the Tribal Authority. ' Nevertheless, among the
responsibilities of the District Commissioner were those of presiding over
the election of the. Paramount Chiefs as well as over any enquiries which
might lead to their deposition. Both areas of consideration relied heavily
on the testimony of the leading men of a chiefdom and on the precepts of
customary law and tradition.
Although the Government had gone to some effort to determine the
traditional practices among different Protectorate peoples for removing
their chiefs, no such undertaking was made with respect to variations in
customary selection processes. The Standing Instruction for the Deposition
of Chiefs pointed to a great diversity of roles played by the various Tribal
Authorities in the removal of a chief. It is open to conjecture how equitable
was the basically uniform Government procedure for the election of chiefs
when it can safely be assumed that there existed the same divergence in
roles of the Tribal Authorities in the process of choosing a chief as in re¬
moving one.
This defect would be all the more operative when it is borne in mind
that the Poro Society did not exist in some areas, and that its functions and
37. P. R. O. 267/603 15 January 1924 c. Slater-Devonshire Bowden
enclosure
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relation to the chief varied among those people where it was found. These
O O
facts and that of the Poro Society being 'the source of the chief's authority'
were known to colonial administrators. Indeed, the relative position of the
chief and the Poro Society was sufficiently well understood for the Inspector-
General of the West African Frontier Force in 1912 to state that:
"In some cases the paramount ... chiefs are men without much
influence in their districts, in other words, they are not the
real rulers of the people; while in others the chief, though a
strong man, derives his power to a great extent from a secret
society. It therefore frequently happens that the Government
does not know with whom it has to deal. The real power in
the country rests with the secret society whose proceedings
and sentiments are difficult to learn."
As early as 1898 this situation had been acknowledged by Protecto¬
rate administrators. Capt. C. E. Carr, District Commissioner of Banda-
juma, in his testimony before Chalmers, observed that 'the chief's authority
depends on his character and the position he holds in Jugu or Poro.
Frequent, although inexplicit, references to 'Poro laws,' 'Poro
staff men as witness,' 'withdrawing into the Poro bush to consider the evi¬
dence,' or 'being questioned by the Poro' occurred continually in contexts
38. Among the places where this fact was a matter of contemporary record
are: P.R.O. 267/522 17 April 1910 c. Probyn-Crewe Lukach enclo¬
sure; Thomas' government and published reports; S. L. A. C42 1916.
The District Commissioners in replying to Merewether's enquiry about
'the use of native institutions as media of education' identified the tri¬
bal areas which had 'no Porro or corresponding society.'
39. P.R.O. 267.542 1 Sept. 1912 secret. Merewether-Harcourt
Wilkinson enclosure
40. Parliamentary Papers 1899 vol. LX c. 9388, 9391 The Chalmers
Report Appendix I p. 12
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which affirmed the belief that the Poro Society in many areas was the source
both of the chief's authority and of the laws of the community. ^ Indeed, the
whole issue of using the Poro Society to confirm and enforce laws of the
chief is indicative of the Government's consciousness of Poro constituting
the power beyond the chief and the customary laws. However, there was
never any attempt to formally identify the Tribal Authority as being the Poro
Society. Nor was there any reference to the role of the Poro Society in the
proceedings of electing or deposing a chief.
McCulloch designates the approval of a chief's appointment as one of
the former functions of the Poro Society among the Mende. It is further
noted that by 1950 "it was not unusual for the council responsible for electing
42
the Chief to be 'sworn' by the Poro before the election. " The election or
deposition of a chief by a Tribal Authority which did not include the powerful
men of the Poro Society would be an act which would have significant reper¬
cussions. It can be presumed that the new chief, without the support of the
Society and lacking traditional position in the chiefdom, would be unable to
41. See: S. L. A. 2199 1908 14 May petition of Francis Fawunda
Paramount Chief, Mano Sakrim; S. L. A. 4332 1904 30 January 1905
D. C. Page Ronietta; S. L. A. 407 1901 petition of Sheaffah Domgbay
Chief of Marema, Sowa
In addition, Thomas clearly stated that the function of the Society was
to maintain the chief's authority. Thomas, N. Anthropological Report
on Sierra Leone (London, 1916) p. 143
42. McCulloch, op. cit. p. 33 The inference is clear that the Poro So¬
ciety was no longer automatically incorporated in the selection process
even by the indigenous political structure.
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execute the responsibilities expected of him by the Protectorate administra¬
tors. In the case of a deposition, the rightful chief in the eyes of the Poro
Society, and thus of the people, would continue to act as chief and would fur¬
ther undermine the position of the one recognised by the Government.
According to McCulloch, "the Poro Society of the Mende helped pre¬
serve the dignity of secular rule by decreeing that disputes affecting impor¬
tant members of the community be heard and settled in the enclosure by a
43
secret tribunal consisting of men chosen from the upper grades. " This
function has several implications for the Protectorate Administration's non-
recognition of the Poro Society, and its traditional ways. The Poro may well
have continued to hold their own trials, with the possibility arising of a chief
or important man being removed from his position by the Society but not by
the Government which continued to deal with him. It must also be considered
that the public trials or enquiries conducted by district administrators would
cause the degradation of the person and position of the chief which the Poro
sought to avoid.
There is a further likely consequence of the policy followed by the
Sierra Leone Government regarding the Poro Society. That is that during
the period under consideration the shift in the Society's role in the election
of chiefs referred to by McCulloch had already begun to occur in some areas
of the Protectorate. Such a situation not only is significant for the outcome
43. Ibid.
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of the proceedings but also for the role of the Poro Society in the indigenous
political structure. The Government's policy of not recognising the Poro
Society, and causing it to be excluded from those election and deposition
proceedings where the Tribal Authority designated by the chief and district
officers and the inner circles of the Poro did not coincide, would be a major
factor in the alteration of the Society in its traditional functions.
However realistic and pragmatic the policy of non-recognition of the
Poro Society may have been, it was therefore not without its consequences
both for the Protectorate administrative system and the indigenous power
structure. This was not limited to the appointment and removal of chiefs.
Similar consequences are found in cases when the chiefs and the tribal
authorities came into conflict and when the chiefs were accused of violating
native laws. In such instances the secrecy which surrounded the Poro So¬
ciety became as problematical as the lack of determination of 'Tribal Au¬
thority' and 'native law'.
Poro and the 'Tribal Authority'
As has been seen the Government's solution to the dilemma of not
knowing with whom it had to deal was to deal consistently with the chiefs.
The corollary of this practice was to ignore the Poro, however much it
44
might be, in the words of Wallis, 'the governing body and ruling power.'
44. Wallis, op. cit. p. 183
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The bias in favour of the chief resulting from such a policy would cause his
interpretation of what constituted 'native law' and Tribal Authority' to carry
a great deal of weight in points of conflict. Such a tendency would make sus¬
pect any decisions or actions based on what was believed to be native law or
on the opinions of those presumed to be the principal men.
For many cases a strong argument can be made for equating the Poro
Society with the 'Tribal Authority' or 'leading men,' and establishing them
as arbiters of 'native law. '
Lukach's introduction to his 1910 Bibliography contains a discussion
of the 'chiefdom':
".. . which represents to the natives their State, their Parlia¬
ment, their distributor of property and labour, the machinery
by which their economy and social condition is regulated and
adjusted. "
"In it is bound up the code of manners and etiquette which regu¬
lates the conduct of the people towards each other, respect for
their seniors is impressed on the young and tyranny on the part
of the chief is made difficult by his powerlessness to act in de¬
fiance of the views of his councillors of 'principal men' who
reflect public opinion.
These details are almost identical to the functions of the Poro specified by
McCulloch, and to a lesser extent by Thomas.
Fairtlough and Oswell, in replying to the Governor's enquiries about
the traditional ways of removing chiefs, dealt with the procedures for getting
rid of a 'troublesome chief or one who unjustly broke tribal rules.' Fairtlough
45. P. R. O. 267/522 17 April 1910 c. Probyn-Crewe Lukach enclosure
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specified that 'the chief would be killed by the porro men.'^ Oswell, des¬
cribing the identical situation, reported that 'the chief would be taken to the
47
bush and killed by his own big men.'
From such parallel situations and descriptions the inference is clear
that the big men or principal men or advisors referred to in ordinances can
be understood to be the Poro leaders in areas where the Society was power¬
ful.
Cases of councillors or leading men complaining of the tyranny of
their Paramount Chiefs on the grounds of Poro violations also contribute to
the argument that the Poro leaders and the 'Tribal Authority' were one and
the same in the traditional political system, and continued to be so regarded
in the eyes of the indigenous population. In such instances, disputes between
the chief and his advisors may be construed as conflicts between the Para¬
mount Chief and his traditional source of power and authority. Settlements
of serious disputes in favour of the chief would thus alienate him from the
Poro Society, in turn diminishing the effectiveness of his position for both
Government and traditional purposes.
As a general rule, cases against chiefs were rarely proven to the
satisfaction of investigating government officers. However, flagrant abuse
of traditional laws and customs, and unanimity on the part of the Tribal
46. S. L. A. 1725 1909 14 June 1910 D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta
47. S. L. A. 1725 1909 13 April 1910 D. C. Oswell Karene
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Authority as to such charges, were more likely to be the cause of a chief's
deposition than complaints of misuse of those powers and responsibilities
conferred on a chief by the government.
Paramount Chief Alice Gaye of Jong, Northern Sherbro, was de¬
posed after investigation into complaints that the men she placed over the
people were not men of note, that she had abandoned her lawful husband and
traditional chief's town and took a slave as her husband, placed 'Porroh' on
palm trees and refused to settle bush disputes, and abused her 'Porroh'
oath by failing to administer justice impartially and by receiving bribes.
The fact that the grievances were brought forward by the sub-chiefs and
headmen recognised by the Government contributed greatly to the investiga-
48
tion proving the charges to be true.
'Poro Laws'
As the government officers either did not have or did not apply details
about the workings of the Poro Society, the accuracy of decisions in cases
which specifically centred on Poro activities or laws are as questionable as
in the situations discussed above. District Commissioners had to uphold the
power of the chief and accept his word, for example, that a petitioner against
a heavy fine had in fact broken native custom by holding a meeting in the Poro
48. S. L. A. 4424 1909 20 November Chiefs and headmen to D. C. Page
N. Sherbro; 21 December A. D. C. Reaney findings to Page; 3 January
1910 Page report
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bush and making a sacrifice allegedly without the knowledge of the Tribal
Authority. ^ In cases where female Paramount Chiefs levied fines for such
50
alleged misdeeds as 'joining a foreign Poro' or 'putting Poro on the country^
it might well be questionned how appropriate it was for any woman to judge
the activities of the Poro Society, let alone how capable she would be to do
so.
N. C. Hollins, who first served as a district officer in Sierra Leone
in 1910, maintained that by Mende law women could not, strictly speaking, be
elected Paramount Chiefs. The fact that some were put up to the Govern¬
ment and accepted as such proved nothing, for chiefs of old had to be big in
the Poro bush and therefore had to be men. 'The so-called women chiefs were
51
to some extent dummies.' Despite the fact that Government officials knew
that the Poro Society was for men, and that women chiefs were in all likeli¬
hood only nominally initiated, administrators rarely had a choice but to ac¬
cept these nominees and to adhere to their policy and support the decisions
of their chiefs.
Whether rightfully Paramount Chief, and by consequence initiated
49. S. L. A. 3516 1909 17 September D. C. Maxwell Railway
50. S. L. A. C218 1917 from evidence taken during investigation into
charges which led to the deposition of Madam Humonyaha, Nongowa
chiefdom Railway District
51. Hollins, N. C. "Mende Law" Sierra Leone Studies June 1928
v. XII p. 28
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into the outer circles of the Poro Society; or put forward by the Society as
a puppet chief, the position of the female Paramount Chief in the Protecto¬
rate appears an ambiguous one. In neither circumstance would she neces¬
sarily be privy to the secrets, proceedings and decisions of the powerful
inner circle of the Society. Laws could be made by that body independent of
the chief. Additionally, under either set of circumstances surrounding her
election, the female chief's influence would seemingly be negligible unless
she enjoyed the support of the Poro.
Madam Yoko, from all appearances, was a singularly powerful chief
who extended her influence considerably during the years she was allied with
the Government. However, it could be argued that, as she derived her pow¬
er from the active support of the Government, it is unlikely that the Poro
53
Society also backed her. Perhaps alienation from the indigenous power
structure was a factor in her death, allegedly a suicide, because she had
54 fbeen 'too enterprising'.
The unqualified recommendation for the deposition of a Paramount
Chief based primarily on complaints concerning Poro which could not be
52. Little, op. cit. p. 245 "... any woman who becomes Paramount Chief
must be initiated, but remains a junior member. " Alice Gaye, Para¬
mount Chief of Jong, N. Sherbro testified to the fact that she had had
to be initiated into the 'boy's Porroh. ' S. L. A. 4424 1909 21 December
A. D. C. Reaney deposition findings-Page
53. See footnotes 59-61
54. P. R. O. 267/517 5 October 1909 #524 O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-Crewe
Fairtlough enclosure
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substantiated by public testimony is open to criticism. Even if he had spe¬
cific evidence against the chief, the investigating administrator would still
have lacked sufficient knowledge of the Poro Society to evaluate the charges.
Accordingly, Bowden's judgment and the justice of his decision are ques¬
tionable in the deposition of Paramount Chief Bockari of Nongowa chiefdom,
Central Province, for, primarily, breach of Poro customs.
The evidence showed that the chief was not a Poro man 'but it was
not a commonly known fact when he stood for election'. Among other things
he was accused of judging cases which involved 'the spoiling of a Porro law'
although he had no right to, not being a Poro man.
The charges against Bockari as well as his defence were admittedly
incomplete due to the code of silence concerning Poro matters. According
to a sub-chief, one of his accusers, "There were a number of other things
that he did to break the Porro laws but I cannot mention them before non-
Porro people and women. " Such was the rule for most of the proceedings,
conveyed by Bowden to the Colonial Secretary with his report and recom¬
mendation.
The recommendation for deposition was accepted by Governor Slater
despite Bowden's admission that:
"Chief Bokari continued to deny that he had ever offended any
Porro laws or customs but the Assessor Chiefs refused to ask
him any more questions as they were of a secret nature which
alone could bring out the truth. "55
55. P. R. O. 267/603 19 March 1924 #106 Slater-Thomas Bowden enclosure
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It is interesting to note that the ill-fated Bockari was the successor
to Madam Humonyaha whose deposition in 1917 had also been based, to a
lesser extent, on Poro complaints. Considering the fact that one of Bock¬
ari's accusers testified that 'according to native law the chief is the head of
Poro' it is open to speculation how first a woman, and then a man who not a
Poro member, were selected as chiefs of an area so apparently conscientious
ible-
about Poro regulations. It is even more incredjalotts. that the fact that Bock¬
ari was not a member of the Poro was 'not commonly known' by the people
in his chiefdom when he was elected.
Consequences of the Protectorate Administration's
Policy toward the Poro Society-
Cases where an unjust decision was reached on the basis of what was
erroneously believed to be the leading men and/or customary law and tradi¬
tion, or from ignorance of the Poro Society give rise to certain questions.
Consideration must be given to how many similar incidents occurred which
were not brought to light, and of how the Protectorate people and the indige¬
nous political systems were affected by these misinterpretations of laws,
traditions and power structure.
McCulloch and Little suggest functions of the Poro which were known,
56
at least to Wallis and Newland, but not acknowledged or acted upon during
56. Wallis, op. cit. pp. 183, 187; Newland, H. Osman Sierra Leone: Its
Peoples, Products and Secret Societies (London, 1916) p. 129
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the first quarter of this century. The Poro Society's roles in the settlement
of disputes within and between chiefdoms; achievement of uniformity in so¬
cial customs and government among scattered and largely independent com¬
munities; and making, interpreting and enforcing moral and secular laws
57
were critical. Accordingly, an entire level of judicial and legislative
action was beyond the reach of the Protectorate administrators. In addition,
it is regrettable that it was not feasible to refer the numerous chiefdom
boundary disputes to the Poro Society. The resultant settlements could only
have been more accurate, binding and rapidly attained than those of the Dis¬
trict Commissioners and their assessor chiefs.
Although the reasons for not incorporating the Poro Society in the
Protectorate Administration have validity, nevertheless there are important
consequences of excluding an institution with such diverse influence. Not
only was the internal power structure of the indigenous political system af¬
fected but also the effectiveness of the Paramount Chief and the Tribal Au¬
thority as parts of the British Administration and as traditional rulers.
Some effects on the position of the chief have been cited. Beyond
such considerations as women being Poro chiefs, the selection of the wrong
person to be chief or the wrongful removal of a ruler is the overall one of
the effect of the Government policy toward the Poro on the critical relation-
57. Little, Kenneth "Mende Political Institutions in Transition" Africa
January 1947 v. 17 #1 pp. 11, 12; McCulloch, op. cit. pp. 29, 32, 33
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ship between that institution and the chiefs. The Paramount Chief's basis of
power shifted from his traditional source, in many cases the Poro Society,
to that of the Protectorate Administration. The powers, responsibilities,
and restrictions of the Paramount Chief were well delineated while the Poro
E O
Society remained largely outside the sphere of government interference. °
It is within the realm of probability that requests of chiefs to obtain
Government approval for various uses of the Poro indicated either that the
chief lacked sufficient position in the Society or that the sanction was to be
taken advantage of by either the chief or the Poro Society.
In the execution of many of his functions for the Protectorate Admin¬
istration the chief would not only lack the authority and support once de¬
rived from the Poro Society but also would potentially incur its opposition to
various of the modernising projects of the colonial government. The chief
became increasingly required to implement such non-traditional undertakings
as vaccination programs, sanitation schemes, experimental farms and ver¬
nacular schools. In so doing he moved further away from the interests of the
Poro Society, which both Little and Kilson identify as being resistant to the
CQ
changes brought about by colonialism.
58. Indeed, Little views 'the official limitations on the prerogatives of the
chief as a substitute for the balance of political authority which might
in former times have been supplied by the influence of the Poro. '
Little, "Mende.. . " op. cit. p. 19
59. Ibid, p. 18; Kilson, Martin Political Change in a West African State
(Cambridge, Mass. , 1966) p. Ill
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References to the more recent power of the Poro Society reflect on
trends which undoubtedly commenced during the years under review. In re¬
turn for "the Poro's considerable influence 'behind the scenes' " the chief
apparently, according to Little, "was expected to uphold the interests of the
Poro in the face of extraneous and opposing forces, such as Islam and
60
Christianity." Upholding such interests would compromise the chief in
the execution of his government duties and create a conflict between the tra¬
ditional and modern requirements of his position.
Little's contention is that it is a moot point how far the chief's office
could be divested of its traditional significance without undue loss of the
61
popular respect which constituted its most valuable asset. It can be ar¬
gued that the assumption of non-traditional functions would cost the chiefs
the support of the Poro Society and consequently the traditional significance
enjoyed from their association with the Society. The post-World War I
peasant disturbances cited by Kilson as having been aimed at the property,
person and authority of the chiefs^ surely are as indicative of loss of pop¬
ular respect as of opposition to changes being executed through the agency
of the chiefs and the chiefs' inabilities to uphold the Poro interests.
It would appear that not only did the relation between the Poro and the
60. Little, "Mende... " op. cit. p. 19
61- Tbid-
62. Kilson, op. cit. p. Ill "... as they were the main agency through
which colonial change touched and affected the rural masses. "
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chief alter as a result of colonial rule, but also the functions of that Society.
Little asserts that the changes brought about administratively to Mende po¬
litical institutions are largely reflected in the altered status, significance
fio
and implication of the chief's office. However, the Protectorate Adminis¬
tration's non-recognition of the Poro Society affected the political institutions
of the Mende far beyond that of the chieftaincy. The role of the Poro in many
of its traditional functions was deliberately or inadvertently curtailed. The
focus of the Society's attention shifted to opposition of colonial innovations.
The altered relationship between the Paramount Chief and the Poro Society
as a consequence of British Administration of the Sierra Leone Protectorate
'freed Poro from the interference of the chiefs. Combined with the fact
that the Poro Society was not supervised by the Government, this state of
affairs provided the Society with opportunity to abuse traditional preroga¬
tives.
McCulloch cites as one of the functions of the Poro the supplying of
'young initiates to work for farmers during the busier periods of the farm-
ing season. Little's reference to the same practice is in terms of 'stipu¬
lating that each village shall supply a given number of initiates, on each of
whom a substantial fee is levied.' He notes that although he does not want to
63. Little, "Mende... " op. cit. p. 50
64. Kilson, op. cit. pp. Ill, 112
65. McCulloch, op. cit. p. 11
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imply that all chiefdom Poros are the subject of extortionate practices, 'so-
called native customs are sometimes used, and are the main remaining
cloak, for illegal purposes.'^®
The enumerations of the Poro's 'opposing forces' raises serious ques¬
tions about those numerous chiefs cited by colonial administrators as being
devout Christians and Mohammedans. In the event that such chiefs were not
Poro chiefs in areas where the Poro Society had a strong influence, it would
follow that they did not receive the benefits of Poro support. Thus it would
be probable that their positions as chiefs were seriously handicapped.
The position of the Reverend Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce is worth
considering in this context. As noted by Fyfe, United Brethren in Christ
missionaries disapproved of the Poro although they recognised it as the
strongest political force in the country. D. F. Wilberforce himself wrote
of 'the formidable and binding force of Poro laws among the Sherbro'^ many
years prior to becoming a Paramount Chief of a Sherbro chiefdom. It is
open to confecture whether alienation from the Poro Society contributed to
his being implicated in Human Leopard murders, as a consequence of which
69
he was relieved of his religious and secular responsibilities.
66. Little, "Mende. .. " op. cit. pp. 19, 20
67. Fyfe, op. cit. p. 555
68. Wilberforce, D. F. Sherbro and the Sherbros or a Native African's
Account of His Country and People (Dayton: United Brethren Publishing
House, 1886)
69. See: subsequent section for further discussion of Wilberforce and other
chiefs possibly implicated in these murders because of their educations.
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Although Kilson and Little maintain that throughout the 20th century
educated Mende and Temne joined and participated in the Poro Society and
70
its activities, it is questionable whether such a phenomenon was true dur¬
ing those years when the Society was resisting colonial influence and changes.
Governor Merewether in one of his many efforts on behalf of Protec¬
torate education enquired of the District Commissioners whether it would
be possible to utilise 'native institutions as media of education.' The re¬
sponse is typified by Hodgson's declaration that "to bring Porro proceedings
into the light of day and to use the Poro as a means of education, as under-
71
stood by white men, would be to the native mind inconceivable." It is
unlikely that these Christian, Mohammedan, and educated chiefs who under¬
took to join the Poro Society progressed any nearer to the inner circles than
Warren or Thomas.
In view of the reactionary, anti-colonial tendencies displayed by the
Poro Society it is not likely that the Protectorate Administration could have
utilised it as a governing body or exploited it as a modernising agency had
the Government seriously desired to do so.
70. Kilson, op. cit. pp. 256, 257
71. S. L. A. C42 1916 9 February D. C. Hodgson Koinadugu
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Human Leopard and Related Societies
Background
"The 'Human Leopard' covers his body with a leopard skin when
about to attack his victim, crawling upon all fours in order to deceive. He
carries a very sharp three -pronged, short-handled knife of country make,
and carefully watching his opportunity, when an unsuspecting man, woman,
boy, or girl is found quietly working in a secluded part of a farm he will
suddenly rush from his concealment in the jungle behind the victim, pounce
unperceived on him, and thrust his knife into the neck, severing the verte-
72
brae," 'In such a way as to produce wounds resembling those which would
be given by a leopard's claws. ... As soon as the victim is murdered the
body is dragged to a convenient spot where it is cut up and the flesh and in¬
ternal organs are distributed. The bones are left and are sometimes buried.
The blood and fat are used to smear the borfima and the flesh is eaten. The
flesh is sometimes eaten on the spot, sometimes taken home and eaten, and
73
some may be sent to absent members. "
74
In a similar fashion murders committed by the Baboon and Alligator
Societies were done to resemble death caused by those respective animals
and involved the appropriate skins and tools. In whatever ways the details
72. Alldridge, T. J. A Transformed Colony (London, 1910) pp. 274-275
73. P. R. O. 267/555 5 June 1913 Griffith letter to Harcourt
74. Beatty notes that 'alligator' was the local name for crocodiles.
Beatty, K. J. Human Leopards (London, 1915) p. 9
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of the killing varied, crimes of this class, or attributed to such societies,
constituted one of the most preoccupying and serious problems British colo¬
nial officials faced in the administration of the Protectorate during the period
under review.
The relationship between the British colonial administration and the
people they were protecting was inevitably affected by the intensified search
for murders committed by these societies and by the incidents related to the
arrests and trials of hundreds of people. Suspicion became evident on both
sides; and the fear, intrigue, and presumed resentment on the part of the
Africans was matched by the disillusionment and frustration experienced by
the colonial officials.
Prior to the assumption of a Protectorate in 1896, British adminis¬
trators in Freetown interfered very little with the domestic institutions of
the people in the Sierra Leone hinterland. Prevention of slave-raiding, and
of inter-tribal wars which would disrupt trade were the main areas of Gov¬
ernment interest.
However, when the traditional detectives, the Tongo Players (Tonga
Dancers), had some three score 'human leopards' put to death in the Im-
perri Country in 1890, Governor Hay invoked Turner's Treaty in order to
make the area part of the Colony, and thus subject to British jurisdiction.
The anticipated effect of such activities so near the Colony on the trade
which the Government sought to protect and foster was undoubtedly a large
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factor in his decision.
The act of incorporating the Imperri Country into the Colony was not
accompanied by any administrative changes, nor were the Frontier Police
given any additional authority. Indeed, the Frontiers were reminded to 'not
interfere with domestic institutions. ' When the murders recommenced the
following June and the Government took no action, the chiefs resorted once
more to the Tongo Players.
"A great fire was lighted and the Tongo Players were directed to
throw into the fire all persons whom they found to be cannibals ... it is
asserted that as many as eighty persons were burnt to death, a number of
them anticipating their fate and of their own accord throwing themselves into
75
the flames. " Although Beatty's description is colourful, it is also proba¬
bly at least slightly inaccurate.
Fyfe, whose objectivity will far surpass Beatty's in any test, records
a situation where 'at least a hundred ... were seized as human leopards,
76
were tied up until their relatives paid Neppo a fine, then burnt to death.'
The exact numbers of those voluntarily or otherwise consigned to the pyre
were not determined, but 'the pyramid of calcined bones' was reported by
77
Alldridge to be 'about four feet high'.
The circumstances surrounding the Imperri murders in the 1890's
75. Ibid, p. 5
76. Fyfe, op. cit. p. 506
77. Beatty, op. cit. p. 5
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represent a microcosm of those related to similar incidents throughout the
early years of the Protectorate. Present on the larger scale was the same
lack of consensus as to both the motivating reasons for the crimes and the
measures which would end them. Inertia and lack of initiative of men like
Garrett and investigating tactics which 'terrorized people into giving evi-
78
dence' were not merely characteristic of the Imperri country in the 1890's.
The same differences from one government officer to the next in diligence,
responsible supervision of staff, and just application of law and order can
be seen in any area of the Colony and Protectorate where the alleged opera¬
tions of unlawful societies are examined.
Objects of Secret Society Murders
There was lack of agreement on the part of contemporary observers
in the early 1890's as to the reasons for the seemingly high rate of activity
of the Leopard Society, and consequently of the detective Tongo Players.
The eminent Freetown barrister, Samuel Lewis, believed that the upsurge of
murders was motivated by political revenge. This view was shared by others
including Garrett who had become the officer in charge of the area where the
crimes were most prevalent. However, Alldridge and others subscribed to
the school of thought that the murders were committed in order to obtain
parts of the body to make 'Borfima' ('Borfimor'), a medicine which was
78. Fyfe, op. cit. p. 545
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meant to confer great powers. Such conviction was not to be daunted by
observations, like Lewis', that the bodies of the Imperri victims had not
79
been mutilated.
Proponents then and later of the Borfima theory are in accord that it
was a medicine credited with such qualities as ensuring the owner power and
good fortune, honour and awe in the eyes of his people, and assistance in
80
trade bargains and the White Man's court. The medicine itself was vari¬
ously described as being 'a dirty-looking parcel wrapped in dirty, greasy
cloth and containing nails or iron of some sort, pebbles or cowries, grey
powder (powdered human skull mixed with semen), often the horn of a small
deer, and sometimes an Arabic text'*^ or 'the white of an egg, the blood,
fat and other parts of a human being, the blood of a cock, and a few grains
82
of rice tightly bound up in a leather package.'
However much there may have been divergence of opinion as to the
ingredients, all agreed on the relationship between the Borfima and the slay-
ings. It had to be reanointed periodically with smearings of human fat and
88
blood in order 'to keep its virtue up to the mark,' that is to say to main-
79. Ibid. p. 507
80. Alldridge, .. . Colony op cit. p. 274; Beatty op. cit. pp. 23-24;
P. R. O. 267/485 4 July 1906 c. Probyn-Elgin Probyn to Major Palmer,
W. A. F. F. Commanding Officer enclosure:; P. R. O. 267/555 5 June
1913 Griffith letter to Harcourt
81. P. R. O. 267/555 5 June 1913 Griffith letter to Harcourt
82. Beatty, op. cit. p. 23
83. P. R. O. 267/555 5 June 1913 Griffith letter to Harcourt
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tain its efficacy.
The fact of unmutilated bodies notwithstanding, many officials during
the years under consideration concerned themselves with the question 'why
the members of the Human Leopard Society ate their victims. ' The records
indicate that men on the spot gave tacit acknowledgement to cannibalistic pro¬
cedures by their references to the places where the bodies of victims had
been consumed. However they did not indulge themselves in theorizing. It
remained for such higher government officers as Probyn and Griffith, who
presided over the 1913 Special Commission trials of scores of people ac¬
cused of Leopard Society activities, to record their opinions for posterity.
Griffith did his profession proud as his original statement, in his of¬
ficial report, was highly qualified and guarded. However, his 'unjustified
belief' that'there was an idea that the eating of human flesh increased a
84
man's virility' was substantially expanded and embellished in his intro¬
duction to Beatty's book. By that time he had founded his 'idea' on the rec¬
ollection that all the principal offenders—the arrangers 'who received the
most coveted portions of the slaughtered bodies'—were 'men of mature age,
past their prime. He offered as possible origins for this practice the
consumption of flesh to preserve inviolable secrecy or to continue the leop¬
ard-acting.
84. Ibid.
85. Beatty, op. cit. p. vii
86. Ibid.
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Probyn, rarely given to qualifications or contingencies, stated that
'in order that the medicine be effective, it is believed that the remainder of
the human body must be eaten up.' ^ It can be argued that he was wrong in
his assertion that 'it may assist Captain Bond to know that, according to the
best information on the subject, the object of the Leopard Society is not
O O
cannibalism.' It is difficult to see how, from the point of view of an ad¬
ministrator or a victim, it was relevant whether the murders were commit¬
ted from a craving for flesh to satisfy dietary or spiritual deficiencies or
ritual requirements.
What is relevant for the purposes of this study is that colonial offi¬
cials in positions with life and death powers believed, as Griffith, that the
object of the Human Leopard Society could be stated with confidence. Wheth¬
er since disproven or not, the objects and 'modus operandi' believed to be
true by colonial administrators were the ones on which they based their de¬
cisions about how to investigate these crimes, measures which would eradi¬
cate them, and the guilt or innocence of people tried for the crimes as the
officials believed them to have happened.
The controversy over the factors which caused secret society mur¬
ders did not begin with the Imperri incidents in the 1890's and has not ended
yet. In more recent years, Little added new dimensions to the political re-
87. P. R. O. 267/485 4 July 1906 c. Probyn-Elgin Probyn to Major
Palmer, W. A. F. F. Commanding Officer enclosure
88. Ibid.
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venge theories by his suggestions that not only the cannibal medicine but the
89
act of murder itself could be used to gain advantage. As investigation of
these activities will show, it is entirely probable that the factors of both po¬
litical revenge and advantage, and quest for rejuvenating powers have been
responsible for murders committed by or attributed to the Human Leopard,
and to a much lesser extent Alligator and Baboon, Societies.
Incidence of Secret Society Murders
Although from time to time reports of Human Alligator and Human
Baboon cases appear, the bulk of the deaths investigated as secret society
murders were attributed to the Human Leopard Society. Furthermore, al¬
though there were cases reported from throughout the Protectorate, this
class of crime occurred primarily in the Mend&and Sherbro areas of the
then Karene and Northern Sherbro Districts. Arrest and trial, conviction
and execution had no respect for money or position as paramount chiefs and
prominent traders spent weeks and even months in the gaol and were hanged
side by side with obscure villagers.
The activities of these societies became a matter of increasing im¬
portance during a period of the early years of Protectorate administration.
Annual district reports faithfully detailed the absence or existence of cases
attributed to them, and delineated the methods used to detect, investigate
89. Little The Mende ... op. cit. p. 233
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and deter these crimes.
In the ten year period between 1903 and 1913 many hundreds of Pro¬
tectorate people were arrested or detained because of alleged involvement in
'secret societies for the purpose of murder.' Over 300 were charged with
murder and committed for trial. Of those actually tried, 96 were convicted
and sentenced to death. During the same period of time 18 Paramount
Chiefs were deposed, deported or executed, and 7 tribal administrations
suspended. Numerous other cases were referred to in dispatches to the
Governors from district officers during this period. However, insufficient
evidence prevented arrests from being made.
An apparent increase in the alleged activities of the Human Leopard
Society, and the actual activities of the colonial administrators can be
traced from the beginning of this century until the First World War. Wheth¬
er or not the actual number of leopard murders rose, the number detected,
or at least attributed to the Leopard Societies, grew noticeably. The im¬
portance that the activities of such societies assumed in the minds of some
colonial administrators is itself a significant factor in determining the ac¬
curacy of statistics and to what extent, if any, the rate of this class of crime
did increase. Over the years there would be as many suggested cures for
this evil as there were administrators. Whether it be opening up the coun¬
try with roads and trade, increased administration, education, or contact
with a higher civilization, the majority of the sentiments expressed shared
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a common attitude that such secret societies were almost inevitable among
these people. The racist invectives were limited to the 'depraved Imperri'
or 'Bulloms' among whom 'ceremonies attended by human sacrifices have
persisted after they seem to have disappeared from among the other peo-
90
pies.' Although no distinction is made here between the Bulloms of the
North and of the South, most Sierra Leone administrators referred to the
latter as Sherbro, as do most modern ethnographers.
Although no doubt originally motivated by sheer moral distaste of
murder and by administrative vigilance, Protectorate district officers in
many cases came to regard the quest for leopard murders and murderers
with something resembling messianic zeal. There is a racist undertone to
the determination of administrators in areas of greatest Leopard Society
activity to not let these offensive practices continue under their noses, to
not be beaten or made fools of by races they considered inferior. A District
Commissioner with a temperament like Fairtlough's seemed to regard the
occurrence of a leopard murder in his district as a personal affront and
challenge.
Pursuit of murderers and search for similar cases conducted with a
vengeance probably, if nothing else, created a false impression of the amount
of crime of that sort that was being committed in the Protectorate. The
90. S. L. A. C20 1909 31 January D. C. Page, N. Sherbro; P. R. O.
267/503 25 April 1908 #209 Probyn-Crewe Maxwell enclosure
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corollary to the natural tendency to keep areas where such crimes were
known to have occurred under surveillance was to not devote precious time,
energy, and manpower to looking for them in parts of the Protectorate
where the activities of such societies were presumed to be limited or non¬
existent.
It is possible that the statistics of the period under review do not
account for murders which were not detected because the secretive nature of
the subject concealed them from vigilant and non-suspecting administrators
alike.
The accuracy of the numbers of crimes that were reported is also
open to question. Confusion with deaths caused by real leopards was an ad¬
mitted problem, but the extent of this confusion is impossible to determine.
In addition,the variety of reasons why members of the indigenous population
would deliberately report or conceal a crime has great bearing on the final
picture of how prevalent the activities of the unlawful secret societies were
in the Sierra Leone Protectorate.
Unlawful Societies and the Judicial System
A government proclamation of 5 May 1892, declaring the use of
Tongo Players illegal certainly did nothing to deter the Human Leopards.
Nor did much of the legislation adopted to deal with this class of crime.
The first ordinance, #15 of 1895, applied only to the Imperri Coun¬
try which remained part of the Colony until 1898. However, even before the
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Protectorate was established over the British sphere of influence in Sierra
Leone, the Governor had assumed the power to arrest or detain any chief
for reason of suppressing the Human Leopard Society, and to banish suspect
chiefs. From 1901 until the end of 1909, when a new Ordinance was passed,
the Ordinance of 1896 was renewed annually.
As the Protectorate administration became increasingly settled af¬
ter the 1898 Rising, its officials were able to turn their attentions to such
problems as the so-called cannibal society murders. British colonial of¬
ficials initially might have been able to overlook the uncivilized aspects of
the alleged murders had they not believed that chiefs, headmen and principal
men of areas concerned were necessarily involved.
This belief appears to have originated with people in the villages
'who have said such a murder as these would be impossible without the
91
knowledge and sanction of the chief.' The widely publicized axiom de¬
rived from such information was that no such event could take place in a
village without the knowledge and sanction of the chiefs and headmen. As
these indigenous rulers were the backbone of Protectorate administration,
the British administrators could not overlook murders which they believed
91. P. R. O. 267/475 17 January 1905 #25 Probyn-Lyttleton; S. L. A. 2131
1908 27 July A. D. C. Reaney; P. R. O. 267/542 24 September 1912 c.
Merewether-Harcourt Fairtlough enclosure; P. R. O. 267/552 11 No¬
vember 1913 c. O. A. G. Hollis-Harcourt Police Magistrate Beatty and
Acting Attorney General Van der Meulen enclosures; see also Human
Leopard Society Ordinances
were perpetrated, perpetuated or at best permitted by the very people they
were relying on to rule in accordance with British policies.
The resurgence of reported leopard murders in the opening years of
the twentieth century may not be wholly attributable to the energies of the ad¬
ministrative staff. The suggestion that such crimes would persist in times
of peace because gratification of the needs for human flesh were more easily
92
satisfied in wartime implies that for a period of time after the Mende
Massacres the members of the Human Leopard Society could remain inac¬
tive.
In 1912 there was a massive round-up of people allegedly involved in
leopard activities, which resulted in 336 arrests by that October for 30 mur-
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ders which were believed to have occurred since 1907. Over 400 people
were eventually arrested, of whom close to half were committed for trial,
including at least 65 chiefs. ^ The tribal administrations of 4 chiefdoms
were suspended. 17 chiefdoms were declared 'proclaimed districts' giving
the District Commissioner virtually unlimited powers to arrest and detain.
Special legislation granting extreme powers to the Governor and establish¬
ing a Special Commission Court to try the cases was approved by the Colo¬
nial Office.
92. P. R. O. 267/468 26 May 1903 #126 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
Fairtlough enclosure
93. Beatty op. cit. p. 13
94. P. R. O. 879/117 Africa (West) #1047: West African Land Committee
testimony of Fairtlough 15 November 1912 p. 210
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The 1912 round-up was the biggest one since the establishment of the
Protectorate but events had been leading up to it. In 1905-06 and again in
1909 wholesale arrests and convictions had occurred. After each incident the
effectiveness of the judicial process had been questioned and more stringent
measures of prevention, detection and punishment had been recommended.
The procedure followed upon the news of a presumed leopard murder
varied not so much in form as in substance. A great deal depended on the
Government officials involved at each stage, both the position held and the
particular person. Information of a murder actually having occurred or
implicating specific individuals in a murder not yet detected would come to
the District Commissioner by a variety of means. Inhabitants of the area
from the chief on down might report the discovery of a body; Court Messen¬
gers and members of the West African Frontier Force on patrol often were
responsible for alerting a District Commissioner to a murder ascribed to a
secret society. One crime came to light when a voice in the dark told Major
Fairtlough of human leopard activities in the village where he was staying.
The role played by Creole detectives, if not convincing by disguise, was
certainly effective by obtaining convictions.
The District Commissioner, or someone acting in his stead, either
instructed the chief to investigate or went himself to do so. Searches for
evidence were carried out and arrests made. In the instance of these pro¬
ceedings being done by the chief, he detained the accused until the District
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Commissioner or his representative arrived to review and perhaps reinves¬
tigate the case. Whichever people the District Commissioner accused or
accepted as accused were then removed to the District Headquarters and de¬
tained without recourse to legal assistance until the District Commissioner
conducted a preliminary hearing in his Court.
Those committed for trial were imprisoned until the Circuit Court
convened. Their trial might be conducted by the same District Commis¬
sioner who had arrested them if the Circuit Judge were unable to be in atten¬
dance. More often, however, the District Commissioner would be called
upon to act as Crown Prosecutor. Lawyers and juries had no place in the
District Commissioner's preliminary hearing. Counsel for the defence was
allowed at the Circuit Court only in criminal proceedings. The Judge, with
the assistance of chiefs chosen to sit as assessors, heard the cases and
rendered the verdicts. Any conflicting recommendation of the assessors
was forwarded to the Governor with the Judge's proposals for the sentences
to be carried out.
The system described above was as fraught with difficulties for ad¬
ministrators intent upon securing convictions as it was for innocent bystand¬
ers to avoid arrest and for the accused to obtain justice.
The theory behind the use of select chiefs to advise the Circuit Judge
was that they would be best able to assess a case, being 'fully conversant
with the habits of the people and the system by which the orders of the chief
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were transmitted.'^ Madam Yoko was a Paramount Chief of considerable
standing in the eyes of the colonial government, as well as of considerable
influence in the sizeable area under her rule. Having sat as an assessor
chief with the Circuit Court for numerous trials, including many leopard
cases, she was certainly in a position to pass judgement on the system. In
these cases, however, she was doubtful that English trial by English law and
practices would catch the murderers. As they were members of a secret
society, it was impossible to get corroborative evidence, the witnesses be-
QC
ing accomplices. Her skepticism was echoed many times by various co¬
lonial administrators, the most vociferous of whom was Page.
It was typical of Page to advocate schemes that would be very effec¬
tive but which were unrealistic to propose. His recommendations for im¬
provements in the court system read as idealistically as a list to Father
Christmas: "a tribunal less trammelled in the practices and procedures of
English law and rules; a presiding officer more familiar with native law and
life than the Circuit Judge; and the acceptance of uncorroborated testi¬
mony. "97
However unacceptable, one of Page's alternate schemes—burning
each town where a human leopard murder occurred—was not as extreme as
95. P. R. O. 267/475 17 January 1905 #25 Probyn-Lyttleton
96. P. R. O. 267/496 2 October 1907 c. Probyn-Elgin Attorney General
Packard enclosure
97. S. L. A. C20 1909 28 February D. C. Page N. Sherbro
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Madam Yoko's proposal that the Tonga Players of old be resurrected to
no
deal with the human leopards. Madam Yoko was well qualified to make
such a statement, according to Packard, 'as she had been a Tonga dancer
herself.
Evidence was one of the most critical problems. Time and again the
refusal of English law to admit the testimony of accomplices as corrobora¬
tory evidence was stated. This opposition prevented the District Commis¬
sioners from committing accused to trial as well as judges from securing
convictions.
Typical of the way the Colonial Office officials refrained from offer¬
ing advice or commentary to its Governors is the 1914 minute of J. S.
Risley, Legal Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the effect that it was a
judge's discretion to accept uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. He
noted that this distinction between law and practice was apparently not under¬
stood by the English judges in Sierra Leone.
Judges were also bound by English rules by which they must discount
evidence if contradicted. Page, speaking of his experience as Prosecutor in
the 1904 trial of Paramount Chie Beah Kindo, referred to the natural ten¬
dency of a defence lawyer to try to lead witnesses to contradict themselves.
He felt however that such contradictions were more apparent than real.
98. P. R. O. 267/512 2 February 1909 #61 Probyn-Crewe
99. P. R. O. 267/525 2 October 1910 Probyn-Crewe Packard enclosure
100. P. R.O. 267/560 16 October 1914 #561 Merewether-Harcourt
Risley minute on:
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Himself able to communicate in Temne, Yellunka and Mandingo, Page was
in a position to offer an intelligent diagnosis of the problem. He attributed
it to the inability of interpreters to 'catch the finer distinctions and meanings
of English words, and the absence of corresponding words in the MendElan-
g^ge! Other than the familiar plea for linguistically capable district
and legal officers, no recommendation for a cure was given.
Bribery and intimidation of witnesses, and the underlying belief of
102
local administrators that the people were 'inveterate liars' contributed to
the pessimism about relying on the English legal procedure and court sys¬
tem for conviction and punishment of offenders under the Human Leopard
Ordinances.
Accusations were levied in 1912 by petition from members of the
'poorer class' against the 'big men, native and Sierra Leone merchants and
traders' of Imperri country. One case in particular was described where
bribery, and undoubtedly intimidation by position were used to protect the
big men behind the killing in 1908 of a boy in 'New London, (the) boy (being)
pledged to (the) owner of the factory, M.S. Margai.' The petitioners stated
that Margai, 'who gets the greatest portion of the dead boy's fat and the liver
for himself and (his) brother Bangall, chief of Gbamgbatook,' spent not only
1^150 to the country that his name should not be called' but also<£26 to
101. S. L. A. C20 1909 31 January D. C. Page N. Sherbro
102. Ibid.
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Interpreter Taylor. The latter expenditure could be considered a good in¬
vestment in light of the fact that Taylor, sent by the District Commissioner
103
to make an enquiry, 'only got some native men.'
The records for 1908 contain only one reported leopard murder in
this vicinity. Taylor investigated 'the cannibal murder of boy Sorbong which
took place at New London.' He found that the crime was done by a wiser
people than previous cases he had been on, and that it was also 'a family
feast of the chief'. Although he succeeded in getting a murderer named,
neither Taylor nor Assistant District Commissioner Reaney was able to
implicate any of the important men, as their informants 'had been warned
off.' 104
It does not stretch the limits of credibility to assert that these two
descriptions are of the same incident. This was not the last time the Margai
name has been linked to the activities of the Human Leopard Society. Wheth¬
er by coincidence or causality the majority of the people named in the July
1912 petition, including the brothers Margai, were arrested in the subsequent
round-ups of that year.
At this time especially the colonial administrators acknowledged the
existence of bribery behind the scenes of investigations and trials alike.
103. S. L. A. C127 1912 8 July D. C. Fairtlough N. Sherbro enclosed
petition.
104. S. L. A. 2131 1908 Acting D. C. Boddy Sherbro; undated Taylor-
A. D. C. Reaney; 29 June Reaney-Boddy
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However, the realisation that 'the chiefs and headmen have great wealth and
power and are using it to thwart us and the law'*88 was rarely proven. The
sentencing to hard labour of a person convicted of intimidating Crown Wit-
1 Ofi
nesses during the Circuit Court trial of Paramount Chief Seh Kainjah
marked an improvement over the state of affairs recorded by the Reverend
King with respect to the 1906 trial of the Reverend Daniel Flickinger Wilber-
force, former Paramount Chief of Imperri. During the trial it reportedly
developed that witnesses had been given 'five demi-johns of rum to influence
them against Wilberforce by the Court Messengers.' The Prosecutor, Fairt-
lough, was said to have ignored statements by witnesses of money and other
107
bribes. Wilberforce's 1912 trial was no less compromised as one of the
judges himself noted that the witnesses for the Crown had been tampered
•«, 108with.
In order to prevent terrorization of witnesses they were kept in the
custody of Court Messengers. However, Circuit Judge Parodi decided such
a measure could be challenged and, in the trial of Ahmadu Kai Kai, Para-
109
mount Chief of Sewa, had the witnesses removed from police influence.
105. S. L. A. C191 1912 2 October Acting D. C. Willans N. Sherbro
106. S. L. A. 1419 1909 7 February 1910 D. C. Page N. Sherbro
107. Board of Missionary Correspondence for Sierra Leone (B. M. C. )
Historical Society of the Evangelical United Brethren (EUB), (for-
merly United Brethren in Christ), Dayton, Ohio King report of
7 May 1906 to UBC Dayton on Wilberforce.
Beatty op. cit. p. 68





As the witnesses then repudiated their former evidence, Fairtlough was
unable to prove complicity in a Baboon murder against this Mohammeda*®
chief whom he previously had praised for his loyalty and abstinence from
. . . 110
drink.
Justice was impeded by the difficulties, both of the colonial officials
in getting evidence and convictions, and the innocent in not getting arrested
and convicted. Investigations were in many cases carried out by unsuper¬
vised Interpreters and Court Messengers. Even supervision by European
officials will be seen to have constituted no guarantee against abuse.
Interpreter Taylor's success in getting a murderer named in 1908
was despite admitted problems of obtaining reliable information. The man¬
ners in which he used 'the free hand' Reaney gave him can well be imagined
in view of the fact that he was, four years later, proven guilty of having ac¬
cepted bribes during an investigation and was relieved of his responsibilities.
Efforts of Protectorate administrators to deal with the crimes of the
unlawful societies in the courts were additionally thwarted by the adroit use
of the law and loopholes in the legal system of defence lawyers. The frus¬
tration caused by the successes of these men was heightened by the fact that
many colonial officials held them, and indeed all Creoles, in low esteem.
Even a person as far removed from the scene as Ellis viewed the lurid con¬
dition of 'the native in his primitive state' revealed in the trials as little
110. S. L. A. C37 1913 27 April 1912 D. C. Fairtlough N. Sherbro
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worse than 'the one baneful element for which the European is responsible—
the native lawyer.' ***
The system did not always work to the advantage of the accused, as
many administrators had come to feel, nor necessarily to further the cause
of justice however that cause might be defined.
A Case Study
The case of Paramount Chief Beah Kindo of Imperri highlights situa¬
tions which, if present in any trial, make questionable the verdicts. Beah
Kindo had in the past reported two deaths which the then District Commis¬
sioner, Fairtlough, had investigated with no satisfactory outcome. Upon
learning of a third mortality in mysterious circumstances, Beah Kindo had
tried his own hand at detective work. His failure to report the death had
been found out by Interpreter Borbor and the Paramount Chief was repri¬
manded for dereliction of duty. Consequently he wrote immediately to Bor¬
bor, for the information of the District Commissioner, to report a fourth
murder which had taken place in July 1904. The Paramount Chief was told
by the Interpreter to investigate. Beah Kindo did so, made several arrests,
111. P. R. O. 267/571 6 July 1916 #259 Wilkinson-Bonar Law
Ellis minute
112. Unless otherwise noted the information in this study is based on
P. R. O. 267/475 1 Jan. 1905 #25 Probyn-Lyttleton; The Weekly
News, Freetown 21 Jan. - 1 April 1905 serialized report and com¬
mentary by A. J. Shorunkeh-Sawyerr; P. R. O. 267/478 5 June 1905
#237 Probyn-Lyttleton Hudson enclosure
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and held these persons for Borbor, who came and took them to Page at
Moyamba.
Two days after Borbor took custody of the prisoners, one of them
named others involved in the murder and was released. Eventually others
arrested by Beah Kindo implicated him for allegedly having had in his pos¬
session a bundle 'wrapped in blue baft and banana leaves' which was sup¬
posed to have contained a leopard knife. It is significant to note that at no
time in any of the proceedings did any of the witnesses admit to having ever
seen the contents of the package.
Borbor arrested the Paramount Chief and numerous others, and re¬
leased the remainder of Beah Kindo's prisoners with the exception of one
who had provided no information. The Paramount Chief and 21 others were
committed for Circuit Court trial by the Court of the District Commissioner
on the testimony of those whom the chief had originally arrested.
The outcome of Page's preliminary hearing was criticized by Judge
Hudson who maintained that many presumably guilty persons had gone free
due to the District Commissioner's lack of legal knowledge and training.
The point of Hudson's criticism was that the Crown could not proceed
113
against those accomplices used as witnesses. It is well to question
whether the outcome of Page's hearing could also be challenged on the same
grounds for committing innocent people on the testimony of those suspect
113. P. R. O. 267/484 8 June 1906 #156 Probyn-Elgin Hudson enclosure
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witnesses.
The Crown's primary interest apparently was to have officials suf¬
ficiently competent to gather information and handle evidence to assure con¬
victions, especially in such important cases as Wilberforce's. Hudson was
also convinced that Wilberforce had gone free in 1906 only because Fairtlough,
114
as Prosecutor, had mishandled the case for the Crown.
Those committed for trial by Page were arraigned before the Circuit
Court in September 1904 and defended by A. J. Shorunkeh-Sawyerr. It is as
well that Page, not Fairtlough, prosecuted this case for the latter was of the
opinion that Shorunkeh-Sawyerr and his fellow at the bar, T. J. Thompson,
115
were probably themselves members of the Human Leopard Society.
Although the testimony and proceedings of the trial and the published
version of Shorunkeh-Sawyerr differ in emphasis and interpretation, they
agree on the major issues and raise serious questions as to the administra¬
tion of justice in this trial and in others which may have suffered similar
handicaps.
Consensus is found on the problems of interpreters, the Prosecutor's
lack of familiarity with legal procedure, admissibility of evidence, and re¬
liability of witnesses. Certain complaints of the defence counselor appear to
be as valid as certain of those made by District Commissioners and judges.
114. P. R. O. 267/484 3 May 1906 #117 Probyn-Elgin Hudson enclosure
115. S. L. A. C120 1912 30 July D. C. Fairtlough N. Sherbro
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When considering the validity of each side's complaints the full implication
of each in terms of a just verdict fairly arrived at is the prime issue.
In the opinion of Shorunkeh-Sawyerr, and indeed as seen by the out¬
come of the trial, Page's lack of legal training did not handicap him in his
role of Crown Prosecutor. To the contrary, the defence counselor com¬
plained that Page was allowed the privileges of a practitioner but not sub¬
jected to the obligations. Specifically Shorunkeh-Sawyerr cited that Page
had irregularly volunteered information and observations and had been al¬
lowed by the Judge to interchange his role of District Commissioner with
that of Prosecutor.
The truth of this accusation was a problem inherent in the adminis¬
trative system of the Protectorate. For whatever comprehensible or justi¬
fiable reasons such a situation existed, the fact remains that the case against
a defendant could be prejudiced by the plurality of the District Commission¬
er's roles. On the other hand, cases were dismissed from courts because
the District Commissioner, in his capacity as law-enforcer or investigating
officer, had compromised his position of Prosecutor.
Ultimately the case of Beah Kindo, as others, came down to choosing
one set of witnesses as being more credible than the other. Confessed ac¬
complices who had seriously contradicted their preliminary hearing deposi¬
tions were favored in the last analysis over the main defence witness, James
Kindo. Page, as Crown Prosecutor, challenged the testimony of James
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Kindo because he was the defendant's son, and cast aspersions on his char¬
acter no less than on his reliability as a witness. It is a point of irony that
James Kindo was subsequently hired and praised by Page as his Interpreter
and promoted by the District Commissioner as Paramount Chief.
Judge Hudson summed up the case to the three assessor chiefs
through interpreters who were later cited by him and Page as having been
inefficient and unreliable. As Page himself knew and often expostulated on,
the role of interpreters is a critical one. Intentional or accidental mis¬
translation could result in an unjust verdict.
Judge Hudson's verbatim summing up appeared in the Weekly News
of 18 March and 1 April 1905. The evidence of the Crown witnesses was re¬
viewed in detail and highlighted; that of the defence was presented in an
abbreviated form, with parts being pointed up as being 'strange. ' Page
subsequently applauded Hudson's ability to deal with the mass of contradic-
116
tions. Hudson's manner of doing so is shown in the following excerpts
from the summing up:
"Possibly Ali Conteh may be mistaken or possibly the other
witnesses, that is a point I ask you to consider. Ali Conteh
is the Chief's Santiggi. It may be he would be inclined to
favour the defence, but consider it. "
"All denied it (looking inside a bundle) strongly and though they
denied I was watching them and I am not satisfied they did not
know what was inside; from the way they denied I think they
knew. "
116. S. L. A. C20 1909 31 January D. C. Page N. Sherbro
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"If what Kindo (James) says is true then all that these witnesses
says is false ... He is the Chief's son, you must consider
whether you can believe that evidence against the word of all
these people. "
When names were being considered to preside over the Special Com¬
mission Court in 1912, Assistant Parliamentary Secretary of State, George
V. Fiddes, ruled out Hudson 'due to his folly and unfairness which caused
117
the breakdown of the previous case against Wilberforce.' 1 The question
must be raised if Hudson displayed similar characteristics at the trial in
which he sentenced Beah Kindo to death.
Measures Taken Against Unlawful Societies
Securing a conviction was but one half of the battle against the activi¬
ties of the unlawful societies. Detection and deterence constituted the other
part of the administration's campaign. In times of large numbers of arrests
the ineffectiveness of the judicial system to eradicate this class of crime
was especially pronounced. Two levels of activity outside the judicial
sphere came to exist: one conspicuous, the other concealed. Deterence
was believed best achieved by frequent military patrols and a concentration
of administrators in Imperri and Timdale, the most active areas of the
Leopard Society. Detection, on the other hand, should be carried out by
secret agents and detectives.
With the interpreting assistance of Chief Wilberforce, Probyn had
117. P. R. O. 267/542 24 Sept. 1912 c. Merewether-Harcourt minutes on:
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warned the people of the Imperri chiefdom at the end of 1904 that troops
would be sent in the event of further murders. Accordingly, upon receiving
intelligence in the spring of 1906 of a murder committed the previous Octo¬
ber, Probyn dispatched 26 men under Captain Bond. The only reasons the
military patrol was not sent to 'live on the country' but was supplied at
Government expense, were to give the new Paramount Chief, Seh Kainjah,
118
a chance and to strengthen his hand.
Probyn praised the Captain to the Colonial Office, saying that Bond's
tact, judgment and insight had kept the patrol from doing more harm than
good.119
It is questionable whether Captain Bond's efforts did do more good
than harm. His method of strengthening the hand of Seh Kainjah, who com¬
plained that his sub-chiefs and headmen would not obey him, consisted of
threatening to quarter the troops on them if they did not swear an oath to
support Seh Kainjah, to refrain from joining the Leopard Society, and to
inform on members and suspects.1^9
The consequences of quartering troops on the people can well be
imagined if the reports of rape and plunder by patrols, and promises of
improved troop discipline by commanding officers, are to be believed. As
118. P. R. O. 267/485 4 July 1906 c. Probyn-Elgin Probyn-Major
Palmer enclosure
119. P. R.O. 267/485 4 July 1906 c. Probyn-Elgin
120. P. R.O. 267/485 4 July 1906 c. Probyn-Elgin Bond enclosure
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the majority of such references were made by district officers there is little
reason to doubt that there was a likelihood that the people would suffer when¬
ever District Commissioners' staff or patrols went out among them.
Of the Northern Sherbro District during the 1912 'crisis' it was not
only reported that many soldiers and Court Messengers were convicted of
robbing natives. Willans found that during his absence 'the whole clerical
staff at district H. Q. Bandajuma sent Court Messengers to various chiefs to
bring in provisions for the troops, and converted them to their own uses
121
without payment to the chiefs.'
Feelings were mixed concerning the usefulness of secret agents or
detectives to infiltrate the ranks of the Human Leopard Society. His experi¬
ence as a district Circuit Officer in the Protectorate notwithstanding, Court
Judge Hudson introduced the idea of importing a London detective of special
skill and experience 'made available by the Home Office to local authorities
for temporary service in the investigation of difficult and obscure cases of
serious crime.' 122 Presumably that suggestion met with the same fate as
Major Fairtlough's that an Indian C. I. D. be hired. Even if they could gain
sufficient mastery of the language, their skin colour would not have gone
unnoticed.
The use in earlier times of a former Sierra Leona Police Inspector
121. S. L. A. C203 1912 4 October Acting D. C. Willans N. Sherbro
122. P. R. O. 267/484 8 June 1906 #156 Probyn-Elgin Hudson enclosure
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to investigate leopard murders was cited by Hudson in his alternate proposal
1 OO
that detectives from Freetown be employed. By the beginning of 1909,
Page was reporting that agents hired from Freetown had become members
of the Society and exposed its workings, and that wholesale executions had
124
followed. Fyfe's reference to the similar success of Colony Police used
in the 1890's, who 'terrorized people into giving evidence,' has already been
noted.
At no time did it occur to any of the colonial officials to apply the
same reasoning used for the rejection of English and Indian spies to the
hiring of Creoles. It does not seem credible that Creoles from the Freetown
Police Force could successfully pass for MendLor Sherbro and thus be privy
to information pertaining to secret society matters.
The more logical course of hiring local people to act as spies was
apparently abandoned after the one recorded instance of their use. The in¬
digenous agents used in 1904 were deemed unfit as private detectives, and
the records do not indicate that any others were used subsequently. It is
likely that any information obtained by these unsophisticated spy systems
was a result, not of successful infiltration, but intimidation.
In spite of the various means tried to deter and detect the activities
of these secret societies, Protectorate administrators consistently main-
123. Ibid.
124. S. L. A. C20 1909 31 January D. C. Page N. Sherbro
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tained that the key to eradicating them was the tribal ruler. This belief no
doubt stemmed as much from pragmatism as from conviction. While on the
one hand it was stated that such incidents could not occur without the know¬
ledge and approval of the chief, on the other hand it was realized that neith¬
er the money nor the manpower existed to terminate these alleged murders
without the assistance of the chiefs. Attempts were made to give official
sanction to what was believed to be a 'native law' making it necessary for
people planning a meeting of a secret society to give notice to and receive
permission from the chief. It was seriously contended that by officially re¬
cognizing this law it would keep unscrupulous chiefs from misusing their
power. In addition such action would strengthen the hand of a weak chief by
125
demonstrating he had Government support.
Support of a weak or sympathetic chief and extraction of promises to
forego Human Leopard activities were typical of methods used by the British
administrators in hopes that such means would bring an end to the unlawful
societies. The soundness of their strategy was belied by events time and
again. Two years after Captain Bond's allegedly therapeutic visit, Seh Kain-
jah, his Speaker and one of his sub-chiefs were arrested in connection with
an alleged leopard murder. Although there was insufficient evidence to prove
126
participation or complicity they were deported from Sierra Leone in 1908.
125. P. R. O. 267/489 22 Nov. 1906 c. Probyn-Elgin Maxwell enclosure
126. S. L. A. 2131 1908 27 July D. C. Reaney Sherbro
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Measures taken in Timdale to bolster up the tribal administration of
Beah Kindo's successor, Humpa Pea Yumbo, seemed successful. In an
impromptu note of commendation, Probyn recorded that despite the fact that
the sub-chiefs had conspired against him, Humpa Pea Yumbo had managed
to get this former centre of the Human Leopard Society in good order. After
several years in which no leopard murders had been reported from his
127
chiefdom, the Paramount Chief was granted a special increment.
That same chief summoned Page to his town in June 1909 claiming
that his sub-chiefs and headmen were about to commit a murder. On the
basis of the evidence brought forward by those same headmen, whose pre¬
vious accusation of the Paramount Chief's role in another earlier murder
had been ignored, Page decided to arrest Humpa Pea Yumbo and 30 Princi¬
pal men of the Timdale chiefdom for a murder committed in 1907.All
31 were convicted of murder by the Circuit Court. While some of the death
sentences were commuted, execution was carried out on many, including
Humpa Pea Yumbo.
It is impossible to come to a conclusion about the validity of the out¬
come of such a convoluted case. There is something inherently suspect
about the charges and counter-charges between the chief and those of his
sub-chiefs and headmen who were not ultimately arrested and tried with him.
The credibility gap widens as the normally level-headed Page was led to
127. S. L. A. 1223a 1908 Probyn note on Col. Treas. record of 24 March
128. S. L. A. C104 1909 18 June D. C. Page (N.) Sherbro
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believe that he was alerted from his sleep by Humpa Pea Yumbo's accusor
because leopards were attacking. He maintained that he heard:
"a bad imitation of leopards in the bush. The acme of effrontery,
audacity, and defiance of law and order has surely almost been
reached when members of this notorious combination persis¬
tently endeavour to commit murder in the very town in which
the District Commissioner is residing and has been for eight
days. There can be absolutely no doubt that the town would
have been rushed had we notmade it clear that we were armed
and would resist attack. "
Page's assurance cannot be shared when the method of this alleged
human leopard is compared to those of others in the records. For what¬
ever reason that Page was meant to believe that the human leopards were
active, he was understandably discouraged that 'with so many of the princi¬
pal men of the chiefdom in custody the members would not for a time at
least remain quiescent.'
Certainly administrators can be forgiven for becoming obsessed with
ending these occurrences which were costly in measurable terms of money
and manhours and intangible expenditures of physical and nervous energy.
It is not surprising that by 1909 Probyn, members of the Executive Council,
and a number of District Commissioners began to request the Colonial Of¬
fice's permission to establish a special tribunal. The extreme nature of the
proposed irregular court is indicated by the fact that the 'evil influence of





This is one of the outstanding examples of the detached and wider
perspective of Colonial Office officials providing a necessary check on the
recommendations and actions of local administrators. Zealous and unortho¬
dox schemes to eradicate the Protectorate of these crimes were inacceptable
whenever they ran in opposition to basic British values and policies or threat¬
ened to expose the Secretary of State to adverse public opinion and criticism.
Although the district officers were in a position to resort to such expressly
forbidden measures as the burning of towns, there is nothing in the records
to indicate that the Colonial Office directives were not heeded in these cases.
The merchants and other literate inhabitants of the area were particu¬
larly given to seeking legal redress, and petitioning the Government about a
wide variety of actual and imagined incidents and injustices. It is safe to
assume that among their observations of irregular practices by Court Mes¬
sengers and Frontier Police they would include any committed by the Euro¬
peans in pursuit of human leopards.
Colonial Office officials, while not unsympathetic to the problems in
Sierra Leone, had to oppose disregarding rules of evidence or founding a
special tribunal which could become another Star Chamber. It was pointed
out that this infamous court was'also based on the assumed inefficiency of
ordinary courts to cope with extraordinary criminal cases. ' The less
130. S. L. A. C120 1912 30 July D. C. Fairtlough N. Sherbro
131. P. R.O. 267/512 2 Feb. 1909 #61 Probyn-Crewe minutes on:
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than encouraging response from the Colonial Office fortunately coincided
with the assumption of direct administration over the most troublesome
chiefdoms.
As "there appears to be but little reason to doubt that most of the
'big' men of Timdale eat human flesh with as much relish as a Sierra Leon-
ean does Bunga (fish)" ^2 British colonial officials were forced to suspend
tribal administration in Timdale and in Imperri until such time as they
1 OO
could find people to be chiefs 'who would not habitually resort to murder.'
Such a course of action was distasteful to colonial administrators for
a number of reasons: direct administration was costly, requiring as it did
an increased concentration of European officers. Furthermore, there was
a philosophical belief in rule through the indigenous authorities. Adminis¬
trators in Sierra Leone were optimistic, however, that direct administration
would be able to maintain control and prevent murders; officials in London
were hopeful. In either case the pressure for special machinery to try ac¬
cused murderers was relieved.
Reinstatement of tribal administration in the two chiefdoms was sought
as rapidly as possible at this time and in 1912 when they and several other
chiefdoms were without Paramount chiefs and principal men. Timdale was
under direct administration from June 1909 to September 1910; Imperri
132. S. L. A. C104 1909 18 June D. C. Page (N.) Sherbro
133. S. L. A. C104 1909 8 May D. C. Page (N.) Sherbro
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from June 1908 to January 1910. However short the colonial administrators
may have felt these periods of suspension to be, they undoubtedly had an
effect on the indigenous political structure.
It was Page's belief at the time of the demise of tribal rule in Timdale
that there was only one person of sufficient standing and force of character
1 OA
to give tribal rule a chance: James Kindoh (Kindo), his interpreter. Page
apparently was not disturbed by James Kindoh's antecedents. Made Para¬
mount Chief of Timdale in 1910 to succeed Humpa Pea Yumbo, Kindoh was
arrested for human leopard involvement in 1912. However, Page's confidence
in James Kindoh is seemingly vindicated by the fact that the Paramount Chief
was one of the few to be re-instated after he was released without being
bound over for trial.
In the other traditional centre of human leopard activity, Govern¬
ment-approved Alfred Gomer Kategbeh, who had been an interpreter in the
Freetown Police Court, was elected Paramount Chief of Imperri in January
1910. He succeeded Seh Kainjah, but his term of office was even shorter
despite praise and support for trying hard and recognition of being handi¬
capped because his people were cannibals.^ His flight from arrest in 1912
)
was halted and he was ultimately deported from Sierra Leone.
With the mass arrests in 1912 constituting so serious a situation that
134. P. R. O. 267/520 on letter from Probyn sent 3 Sept. 1909 to Crewe
135. S. L. A. C37 1913 27 April 1912 D. C. Fairtlough N. Sherbro
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West African Frontier Forces were dispatched from the Gold Coast, and
renewed pleas from colonial officers in Sierra Leone, Harcourt reconsidered
the question of a special tribunal. On the 23d of November 1912, Ordinance
18 of 1912, the Special Commission Ordinance, came into effect. In effect
for one year, this ordinance provided for a Special Commission Court of
three members who, without the assistance of assessor chiefs, would try
people committed for trial before the Supreme Court or the Circuit Court
for offences relating to the activities of unlawful societies.
Rather than the departures from the traditional requirements of tes¬
timony and evidence hoped for by Sierra Leone administrators, the Ordinance
clearly stated that the practices and procedures of the Circuit Court would
be followed, as would be the laws of the Colony. Among the innovations in
procedure as were made was the requirement that the Commissioners had to
concur in convictions. This was a seemingly far more stringent condition
than the previous one where the verdict was essentially dependent upon the
decision of one man. However, the powers granted this court far surpassed
those of the Circuit Court. Those who had waged long and seemingly futile
battles against the unlawful societies were no doubt encouraged by the fact
that even if acquitted one could be expelled from Sierra Leone.
On December 16th 1912 the late Chief Justice of the Gold Coast, Sir
W. Brandford Griffith, convened the first session of the Special Commission
Court. Sitting with him at Gbangbama in Imperri were Acting Attorney
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General Van der Meulen and Police Magistrate Beatty, who subsequently put
his experience to good use and published a coverage of the trials. The
Crown Prosecutor, E. D. Vergette, joined the Legal Staff at this time after
seven years' experience as an Assistant District Commissioner in the Pro¬
tectorate.
Of the 108 committed for trial, the Crown decided to proceed only
against those charged with murder, and for lesser charges only against
'important' men. Many of the 71 for whom a nolle prosequi was entered, and
many of the 294 who had been detained, faced enquiries by the District Com¬
missioners to establish whether or not they were 'a danger to the peace of
the community.' Among those deported on this charge were 64 Principal men
iqp
of the Imperri, Jong and Timdale chiefdoms.
Of the 34 people tried by the special tribune during its five months of
hearing the various murder, accessory, possession and membership cases,
15 were acquitted of whom 11 were then expelled from Sierra Leone. Twelve
others were convicted and imprisoned in Sierra Leone or other Colonies, and
seven were executed.*^
Charges Against 'Important' Men
Bangali Margai, Paramount Chief of the Banta chiefdom, died in
prison before being committed for trial. Milton Edgar Strieby Margai spent
136. Beatty op. cit. pp. 80-82
137. Ibid. pp. 124, 125
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7 1/2 months in custody before a nolle prosequi was reluctantly entered.
Vergette's reluctance derived from both his apparent disappointment in be¬
ing unable to proceed with the charge of murder and his fear that Margai, .
a prominent trader in Bonthe, would bring a claim for damages against the
Government because of his lengthy detention. This fear was not realised
though it can well be imagined that it might have been had the Government
proceeded against this 'intelligent, English-speaking, American mission-
lOO
educated man' with no stronger evidence to corroborate that of com¬
plicity than the 'leopard mark'. This alleged initiation scar on the buttock
had been the subject of continual legal controversy until the Special Commis¬
sion Court in 1913 made the seemingly obvious opinion that such a nonde¬
script scar could not be established as evidence of membership in an un¬
lawful society.
M. E. S. Margai's guilt or innocence was not therefore determined by
a court of law. Although there is no reason to assume that he and others of
his family were not connected with the activities of the Human Leopard So¬
ciety, it is important to note that the people in his locality had good grounds
for deliberately casting suspicion on him. One of the factors in the deposi¬
tion of Bangali from half of his chiefdom in 1904 had been that he "let
'Stribay' use people for forced labour without pay. 'Stribay' lent money to
138. P. R. O. 267/467 23 February 1903 #36 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
139. P. R. O. 267/558 29 June 1914 #42 Merewether-Harcourt Maxwell
enclosure; S. L. A. C71 1913 20 April Crown Prosecutor Vergette
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chiefs who were then in his power and unable to protect their people against
forced labour."
Griffith opposed the publication of trial accounts on the grounds that
probably
"in 50 years time some of the descendants of the men con¬
cerned in these practices (for they are the most important men
in their respective districts) will be men of repute, merchants
of standing, civil servants or professional men."^1
It can be suspected that fear of legal reprisal also contributed to the decision
to not allow the names of the arrested or accused to appear in Beatty's book.
The case of Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce deserves detailed conside¬
ration not only because it 'created exceptional interest locally by reason of
the fact that the accused was a minister of religion and a man well known in
14?
the Colony and Protectorate.' It is also an instructive way to examine
the attitudes of colonial administrators, and the effects on the life of one ac¬
cused of being involved in a leopard murder.
Wilberforce was born of parents whose origins were to greatly affect
his later life. Both were British subjects, his father being a Creole and his
mother from Imperri country within the Colony. Young Daniel was educated
by the United Brethren in Christ (U. B. C.) and sent by them to the United
140. P. R. O. 267/473 13 December 1904 #305 Probyn-Lyttleton
141. P. R.O. 267/555 5 June 1913 c. Merewether-Harcourt Griffith
report enclosure
142. Beatty op. cit. p. 61
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States in 1871 at the age of 14. Upon his return as an ordained minister,
he worked with United Brethren missions and in 1893 was sent to teach in
Imperri. Shortly thereafter he was offered the chieftaincy because of con¬
nection through his mother. However, he declined in favour of his cousin
through whom he hoped to exert a good influence on the people of the chief-
dom.
With the outbreak of human leopard murders in the 1890's Wilber-
force opposed the use of such 'country' methods as the burning of suspects
named by 'witchdoctors' (Tongo Players). It was also reported that he ren-
144
dered great assistance in securing the arrest of the cannibal leaders.
This account of the Reverend J. R. King differs from that of Fyfe
whereby a servant of Wilberforce's in Gbambaia was found murdered early
in 1890. Fyfe further notes that Wilberforce himself seems to have sugges¬
ted the Tongo Players be summoned when ordinary methods of detection had
145
failed. In either case, Wilberforce's subsequent implication in two leop¬
ard murders may well be related to his efforts in bringing the 'cannibal
leaders' to either traditional or British justice.
Under the urging of Cardew, Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce agreed in
1899 to accept the paramount chieftaincy of Imperri, which had come vacant
143. B. M. C. op. cit. Rev. R. R. Dougherty report of 27 April 1906 to
Rev. S. S. Hough
144. B. M. C. op. cit. Rev. J. R. King report of 7 May 1906 to U. B. C.
Dayton on D. F. Wilberforce
145. Fyfe op. cit. p. 145
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with the execution of his cousin for participation in the 1898 Rising. The
colonial administrators expressed delight with the ascendancy to Paramount
Chief of such an educated, civilised, religious man who had demonstrated
his desire to stamp out the 'cannibal' societies and to institute reforms to
the liking of the colonial officials. However, after completing a tour of the
Ronietta District in 1903, King-Harmon reported to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies that he feared Chief Wilberforce's influence over the
people was not very strong. He attributed this situation to the fact that
'Wilberforce's dress, life, severance from fetish, etc. all place him out of
touch with his wild and lawless subjects, and but for moral support from the
Government, his rule and life would probably come to a speedy end.'
In March 1905 Fairtlough reported that Paramount Chief Wilberforce
had been implicated in a Human Leopard Society murder which had pre-
147
sumably occurred shortly after Probyn's 1904 visit.
Wilberforce's case drew great attention in the documents of the time
and in years to come. For one thing the attitude of colonial administrators
toward educated chiefs was ambivalent. On the one hand was the basic dis¬
trust and disdain which characterised their feelings about educated Africans
in general. Not only had the shifting tide of opinion concerning Creoles in
high positions contributed to this feeling but also the experience most Pro-
146. P. R. O. 267/467 23 February 1903 #36 King-Harmon-Chamberlain
147. S. L. A. C920 1905 7 March D. C. Fairtlough Ronietta
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tectorate administrators had with 'semi-literate chiefs', clerks, Court
Messengers, Frontiers, and administrative staff.
On the other hand the selection of a chief educated in European ways
was always heralded. In addition to the expressed reasons was, no doubt,
the purely practical one of having a chief with whom administrators would
have less difficulty making themselves and their instructions understood.
The alleged involvement of a chief such as Wilberforce in a leopard murder
therefore probably caused Government officials to feel discouragement as
well as vindication of their underlying belief that it was best to not attempt
to Europeanize the indigenous population. The obsession with securing a
conviction against him may well have stemmed from a desire to make an
example of him as a deterrent to future crimes of this sort. It may also
have been generated by less noble sentiments.
A further issue in the 1906 case against Wilberforce was the legal
tangles it caused. He claimed that as naturalized American citizen he was
entitled to a jury trial in Colony courts. Although this claim was never
clearly established, D. F. Wilberforce resigned from his paramount chief¬
taincy, and by virtue of his descent from a Liberated African was then
eligible for trial by the Supreme Court of the Colony.
At the insistence of U. B. C. missionaries, the American Consul
brought pressure on Government officials in Freetown and London to bring
the trial to Freetown. It was felt that Bonthe, although part of the Colony,
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would not be as objective a site. This demand was not met. Nevertheless,
following a defense by the Creole barrister, T. J. Thompson, who likened
his client to Jesus Christ and the trial to Passion Week and the Crucifixion,^
Wilberforce was acquitted in April of 1906 by a jury of 'educated natives.'
It may be presumed that Fairtlough developed his enmity for Thomp¬
son during the course of this trial in which he, as Crown Prosecutor, was
defeated by the Freetown lawyer. Fairtlough was not a man accustomed to
suffering defeat or receiving criticism. Hudson's charge that the District
Commissioner's inept handling of the case had been responsible for Wilber¬
force going free increased not only his low esteem for such men as Wilber¬
force and Thompson but also his personal campaign against the Human Leop¬
ard Society. It can be suggested at this time that the District Commissioner's
future acts concerning this society be seen in the light of a perspective dis¬
torted by this experience.
The year following his acquittal, the Reverend Wilberforce was ap¬
pointed pastor of the U. B. C. Church in Bonthe. He remained active in
U. B. C. work, according to their records, and in 1911 was 'making frequent
150
visits to Imperri ostensibly for Christian work,' according to the District
Commissioner who wanted him kept out of the area.
148. P. R. O. 267/490 2 April 1905 Probyn-Elgin Foreign Office
enclosure from Judge Packard to Elgin
149. Beatty, op. cit. p. 69
150. S. L. A. C7l l5"ll 4 May D. C. Reaney N. Sherbro
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In July 1912 Fairtlough arrested Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce for
involvement in a leopard murder.
The re-arrest of the Reverend Wilberforce prompted the passage of
laws with the specific aim of obtaining his conviction. The cases of non-
natives as well as of natives were to be considered by the Special Commis¬
sion which could recommend expulsion from Sierra Leone even if the ac¬
cused were acquitted. To cover the contingency of Wilberforce being
considered a naturalized American citizen as claimed in 1905, Ordinance 17
of 1912 also allowed for the expulsion of aliens.
Only the creation of the Special Commission made it unnecessary to
pass the law which would have put a non-native charged with a Human Leop¬
ard Society offence under the jurisdiction of Protectorate courts. This pro-
posal was admittedly a deliberate move to prevent Wilberforce from having
a jury trial in the Colony and once again being acquitted. ^
D. F. Wilberforce was defended by four members of the Freetown
Bar, first against a murder charge, and then against the dual charges of
'being a member of the Human Leopard Society and taking part in operations
of an unlawful society.' Insufficient evidence caused a verdict of not guilty
to be entered against the murder charge and he was acquitted of the other
two. The Court stated that as they believed 'he was so connected with the
151. Ordinance #18 of 1912
152. P. R. O. 267/542 7 August 1912 c. O. A. G. Hollis-Harcourt
Acting Attorney General Van der Meulen enclosure
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Human Leopard Society that it was expedient for the security, peace and
153
order of the District that he should be expelled from Sierra Leone.'
He went to Liberia, was referred to a U. B. C. committee on investi¬
gation of character, and in June of 1914 was terminated as a minister.
It was not until an Order-in-Council of 24 February 1923 that his expul¬
sion was revoked. Daniel Flickinger Wilberforce returned to Sierra Leone
where he died a natural death in Bonthe four years later at the age of 70.
Trial testimonies are of as little help to latter-day historians as they
apparently were in many cases to the judges at the time. The court records
of Wilberforce's trials are a welter of contradictions and seemingly aimless
questions with replies which seem, at least from this place and time, to be
irrelevant or incomprehensible.
The case set before the Special Commission Court had been greatly
weakened by the denial of two witnesses of the depositions given at the pre¬
liminary investigation in the District Commissioner's Court. Therefore,
much of the proceedings concentrated, understandably, on attempting to get
these two critical witnesses to return to their original statements which
corroborated the evidence given by informers as to the presence of Wilber-
153. Beatty, op. cit. pp. 68-69; Sierra Leone Expulsion Order of
24 May 1913
154. Minutes of the Annual Session of 1913 p. 16 U. B. C. West African
Conference Historical Society EUB Dayton, Ohio; Woman's
Evangel xxxiii #6 (June 1916) p. 221 UBC publication Dayton, Ohio;
Sierra Leone Outlook XVIII #2 (March 1927) p. 11 UBC publication
Dayton, Ohio
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force in the vicinity at the time of the murder.
Although it is not possible to judge whether Wilberforce was involved
with the activities of the Human Leopard Society, it is possible to suggest
some factors which bear on this matter. It would be naive to assume that
neither his education nor his calling would preclude his involvement with
such an association. However, presuming his innocence, for argument's
sake, the question then arises why he was named in connection with human
leopard crimes. The very factors which King-Harmon identified as aliena¬
ting Wilberforce from his subjects may have made him sufficiently inaccept-
able as a ruler for them to seek his removal in this fashion. It is equally,
if not more, likely that the revenge theory could be applied to those seeking
retribution for lives lost as a result of Wilberforce's actions in the 1890's
leopard murders.
A Decline in Reported Leopard Murders
At the end of 1913 the powers given to the Special Commission Court
to recommend expulsion were transferred to the Circuit Court. Periodic
references to Baboon, Leopard and Alligator Society murders appear, but
as Fairtlough observed in his 1915 report of the Northern Sherbro District,
the numbers of detected murders had decreased greatly. He attributed this
phenomenon to several factors including the patrolling by members of the
West African Frontier Force, the deportation of so many people after 1912,
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and the fact that the people were far better at concealing their crimes.
It is possible to interpret the drop-off of deaths attributed to the ac¬
tivities of unlawful societies in several other ways. The momentum of hys¬
teria may have burned itself out with the last great purge of 1912, or been
halted by turnover in the administration from the level of the chiefs up to
that of the Governor.
In whatever way these deaths are considered--as caused by real or
human leopards or from a political or purely administrative point of view--
the apparent dramatic decline in incidence after the 1912 purge must be
viewed as much in terms of actual decrease of deaths as of a change in the
attitude of the colonial administration. It can be argued that the focus of
attention shifting away from the unlawful societies is attributable to an actual
decline in their activities, and therefore to a reduction in the need for con¬
stant vigilance.
However this explanation does not allow for the self-fulfilling pro¬
phecy which was seemingly operative until 1913. The more concerned co¬
lonial administrators had become about secret society murders, the more
they had looked for them. The more they had looked for murders ascribed
to secret societies, the more they had found. It is unlikely that a man like
Fairtlough relaxed his vigilance; certainly he did not seem to believe that
155. P.R.O. 267/565 21 May 1915 #262 Merewether-Harcourt
Fairtlough enclosure
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the crimes had ceased, but that fewer numbers were being detected.
The advent of World War I had bearing in several respects on this
matter. During the war the European staff in the Protectorate was signifi¬
cantly reduced, and its attentions diverted to other concerns. As a result of
the war there was amarked turnover in personnel in the Sierra Leone Gov¬
ernment.
Newcomers to the British administration in Sierra Leone would not
likely have been significantly exposed to Secret Society legend and history.
Most officials were probably briefed about their activities. However, it
would seem unlikely that the majority of the new additions to the Protecto¬
rate staff would go in quest of these murders with the conviction and zeal of
administrators who had years of first-hand experience with such cases.
The more recently appointed District Commissioners and Governors
lacked the pioneer experiences of a Fairtlough, Alldridge, or Cardew. In¬
stead of being aged or tired professional soldiers or businessmen-turned
treaty-maker, they came to Sierra Leone in the years preceding and during
World War I groomed for colonial service. They came with youth, good
health, and diversified education and training. This new breed showed a
tendency to look more to the future and to concentrate on development than
to eradicate presumed evils and to search for potential trouble spots.
Fairtlough's deposition of an unusually high number of chiefs in 1915
and 1916 led to an investigation of the cases. The findings revealed a scan-
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dalous state of what the records refer to as 'maladministration.' Grossly
over-assessed tax lists, arbitrary judicial decisions, and payment of incen¬
tives to clerks and Court Messengers which far exceeded their annual salaries
characterized the judgment with which this, the most experienced, District
Commissioner had administered the Northern Sherbro. More alarming than
the revelation that this 'rough and unpolished soldier' had been divorced for
violence was that in 1910 Probyn had expressed the fear that Fairtlough's
ICC
long stay in Sierra Leone had undermined his health. It was felt by Wil¬
kinson and the Colonial Office staff alike that his qualifications were probably
more those of a pioneer than an administrator in a settled country and it
i C7
would be well if he retired after the war ended.
At the age of 48, Edward Charles d'Heillemer Fairtlough retired after
23 years service in Sierra Leone on a pension of£400 a year.1^ It is left
to speculation at which stage of his administrative career his judgment be-
IRQ
came warped, his energy sapped and his usefulness impaired. This is
not an idle question in view of the fact he was personally responsible for the
majority of the arrests made of people suspected of involvement in Human
Leopard Society activities during the period under consideration.
The entire issue of leopard murders and their apparent decrease can
156. P. R. O. 267/572 28 October 1916 c. Wilkinson-Bonar law minutes on:
157. Ibid.
158. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long Fiddian minute
159. P. R. O. 267/574 24 January c. Wilkinson-Long
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be approached from an angle additional to the one of cessation of administra¬
tive vigilance. Were there really as many murders as was believed, by ad¬
ministrators and perhaps indigenous population alike ?
In September 1917, girls attacked by an ape were taken to the North¬
ern Sherbro District Dispensary where the Dispenser and the West African
Frontier Force soldiers present concluded the wounds had been the work of
a human baboon. Lt. Cross, the officer in charge, led a search of two vil¬
lages. The result of 'this illegal and ill-considered act' was that 'plundering
took place and a girl was raped.' 160
The above case was but one example of innocent villagers being
abused because it was wrongfully believed that unlawful societies were re¬
sponsible for the injuries or deaths caused by an animal. As a result of this
'regrettable mistake' Wilkinson forwarded to the Colonial Office information
about such attacks and deaths by leopards, crocodiles and baboons.
A year earlier Stanley in fact had prepared a report of similar cases
1 fi 1
he had encountered during his years in the Protectorate. Such detailed
instances of mistaken identity, chiefs travelling long distances with bodies
of leopards and crocodiles containing human remains apparently are avail¬
able only after 1911 and only in areas where Stanley had been. As he served
160. P. R. O. 267/575 18 September 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long
161. S. L. A. C247 1916 30 September D. C. Stanley N. Sherbro 30 Sept.
Printed as Confidential #17 1916 and 'dispersed' but not to London
until 18 Sept. 1917 See Appendix F
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as District Commissioner in four of the then five existing Protectorate dis¬
tricts at one time or another, it cannot be assumed that such occurrences
were limited to Stanley's jurisdiction.
The sources of information leading to investigations, arrests, deposi¬
tions, deportations and executions must be carefully examined to reveal ul¬
terior motives. The mere hint of such motives must place under suspicion
the veracity of the information, and even the existence of a murder. In the
case cited above, the Dispenser and some of the N. C. O. 's of the Frontier
Force deliberately misled the officer in charge, who had only been in Sierra
Leone nine months and had been reading up on the Human Leopard Society.
Stanley stated that the probable motive was the desire to revert to a prior
state of affairs of uniformed natives receiving good treatment from terror¬
ized natives.
The motives aside, this incident is not the only case of a suspicious
source of information. Some alleged murders were not discovered for
years and only then when someone decided to turn informant. 'The acci¬
dental presence of an ex-W. A. F. F. who called a Court Messenger to a dy-
■j
ing boy' led to the arrest of Ahmadu Kai Kai. Often it was a Court Mes¬
senger who relayed alleged information to the district officer.
Fairtlough specifically cast aspersions on the corps of Messengers,
162. P. R. O. 267/575 18 September 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long Stanley
enclosure
163. P. R. O. 267/571 6 July 1916 #259 Wilkinson-Law
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saying as they were all nominees of chiefs, and all chiefs were members of
secret societies, it followed that the Court Messengers were therefore
1 fi4
either members or controlled by the societies. This conviction did not
keep Fairtlough from using his Messengers to their fullest, unrestricted
capacities. It is ironic that neither Fairtlough nor his colleagues refrained
from acting on information provided or relying fully on investigations con¬
ducted by a class of people many officials considered more debilitated in
their half-educated, half-civilized state than the indigenous population they
were governing.
When considering the question of how many murders actually were
committed, one must also look to the chiefs and villagers as possible
sources of erroneous information. The forces motivating people to make
false reports could be many: compliance with British orders in order to
clear their name out of fear of reprisal for failure to report; belief and fear
that such societies did exist and the desire to have them eradicated; to stir
up trouble or implicate someone else.
In order to rid themselves of officials who bribed and threatened, to
bring an end to patrols that looted, extorted, burned and raped, or even for
fear of wrongful accusation and conviction one might well perjure oneself
and offer up names, dates, and descriptions of an imaginary event or a real
one of which they had no real knowledge.
164. P. R.O. 267/551 17 Sept. 1913 c. Merewether-Harcourt
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With forces like these at work, and indigenous government officials
with sufficient motive for creating the impression of a human, not real,
leopard death, it is difficult to accept at face value the statistics provided
by the initially unquestionning British administrators.
Political Implications of Leopard Murders
The methods of investigation, and court procedures undoubtedly
caused the arrest and even conviction of innocent people. One of Lord
Crewe's objections to a Special Tribunal was that they tended to convict
someone, 'even if not the guilty one.
However, no government has arrived at a fool-proof system of jus¬
tice, and it would be a mistake to assert that all chiefs accused of involve¬
ment in secret society activities were innocent. However, it is not incred¬
ible to consider implication by administrative definition as a convenient way
to get rid of an unpopular chief. Seh Kainjah's sub-chiefs and headmen had
to be threatened to obey him. King-Harmon expressed concern about the
hostility and disobedience encountered by Chief Wilberforce. The subse¬
quent astonishment of government officials that such an educated, religious
man would fall to such depraved depths does not take into account the posi¬
tion taken by the Reverend Dougherty at the time of Wilberforce's first ar¬
rest. Dougherty, who was Principal of the Albert Academy and the American
165. P. R. O. 267/512 2 Feb. 1909 #61 Probyn-Crewe
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Vice-Consul, reported to U. B. C. Headquarters that he believed 'Brother
Wilberforce was a victim of a desire of the interior natives to get rid of him
166
on account of his foreign education and training.'
Of more recent times, Little suggests that cannibalistic murders may
have been committed for the purpose of casting suspicion, in the eyes of the
British administration, on some local political figure, such as the Para¬
mount Chief. By discrediting the latter, the murderer would hope to secure
his removal. '
Dougherty maintained that the prevalent theory that no cannibalism
could take place without sanction and participation of the chief 'made it pos¬
sible for members of the tribe to commit cannibalism and thus implicate an
1
unpopular chief.' Despite D. F. Wilberforce's termination from the ser¬
vices of the Church, a U. B. C. missionary who had known him and lived in
his area during the years in question was adamantly of the same belief as
169
Dougherty when she was interviewed by the author many years later.
The government axiom, like the government ruling policy in general,
had inherent contradictions. At one and the same time colonial officials
166. B. M. C. op. cit. Dougherty report of 8 December 1905 to Hough
167. Little, Mende op. cit. p. 233
168. B. M. C. op. cit. Dougherty report of 27 April 1906 to Hough
169. Interview with Mrs. Mary Albert Hough 22 August 1966 Dayton, Ohio.
Mrs. Hough went as a missionary with her first husband the Rever¬
end Albert, after whom Albert Academy is named, to rebuild the
U. B. C. Mission at Rotifunk in 1899. Her associations with and
years in Sierra Leone did not end with the drowning death of Albert,
for she subsequently married the Reverend S. S. Hough.
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arrested chiefs for complicity yet spoke of assisting other chiefs who 'feared
secret societies existed.' There is a contradiction between the assertion
that the chief had to give permission for all secret society meetings, and
reports of cases such as one where "a trial by ordeal to 'make medicine' was
170
held unknown to the chief and without his permission." The fact that it is
not evident that all chiefs were aware or apprised of events in their areas,
taken in conjunction with the fates of so many upright Government-supported
chiefs supports the possibility that there might be explanations as valid as
Reaney's contagion theory:
"I can't think that D. F. Wilberforce when first made chief
could have contemplated being a member of the Human Leopard
Society, nor Goma Kategbeh, nor Humpa Pea Yomba. On ac¬
cession each intended nothing else but to run straight and aid
in ending the Leopard Society, yet each succumbed to some
influence and became implicated. I don't know what influence—
maybe the hope of aggrandisement or fear, but the fact is any
elected to rule in Timdale or Imperri in recent years falls
victim."
Reaney's description is of a self-perpetuating situation. Adminis¬
trators were watchful of areas where leopard murders had occurred pre¬
viously. These district officers would be more likely to detect such crimes
than administrators who had not been alerted to the presence of unlawful so¬
cieties in their areas. It is therefore possible that had other chiefdoms
been under the scrutiny of Timdale and Imperri a succession of other chiefs
170. S. L. A. 2241 1907 21 November A. D. C. Bowden-Acting D. C.
Paling Railway
171. S. L. A. C145 1912 28 August Acting D. C. Reaney N. Sherbro
would likewise have been arrested.
The fact that many of the chiefs who were implicated in these crimes
were educated need not imply that alienation from their people caused them
to be deliberately framed. The very qualities which might be argued as
alienating factors were ones which placed the chiefs in the limelight and in
constant contact with the British officials. Such conditions would increase
c
the changes of detecting criminal activity.
Although after 1913 administrators would increasingly voice skepti¬
cism of the extent of unlawful society murders and would refer to their po¬
litical overtones, these men were unable or unwilling to explore this topic
further. Nor did they extend it to the possibly logical conclusion that the
chiefs had been framed. This omission does not necessarily detract from
the suggestion that one of the political uses of the secret societies was to
implicate and thereby get rid of an unpopular ruler. It is one thing to be
removed in time from the obsession that one was surrounded by the opera¬
tions of murderous secret societies, and to admit to arbitrary actions and
assumptions. It is quite another issue to expect Protectorate administrators
to undermine the fundamental premise on which an administration of indi¬
rect rule was based. In order to work effectively through the chiefs, co¬
lonial officers had to believe that the position of chief was the one of ultimate
power, influence and source of information in the indigenous political sys¬
tem. Such an assumption would be incompatible with any which raised the
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question whether or not important happenings could take place in a chiefdom
without the knowledge and sanction of the chief.
There are unlimited reasons for trying to get rid of a ruler. Most
political systems incorporate methods for achieving such an end, but not
infrequently illegal or even violent means are resorted to. It is not possible
to state whether or not political murders of the type under consideration
were part of the indigenous political system. The records do not indicate
or infer whether such societies and their activities were a structural re¬
course for the general populace or the big men on their behalf, or purely an
external organisation not necessarily involving the big men. In either case
the method of implicating a chief could be used with the knowledge and ap¬
proval of many or of only a few.
Personal gain or revenge could equally well be motives for the re¬
moval of a chief or other 'big men' as unpopularity or incompetence. The
actual removal of a political rival would be the most obvious gain. Alter¬
natively, use of terror tactics could be effective in undermining the position
of a chief.
It must be acknowledged that the chiefs were in an ideal position to
use similar methods. Furthermore, the fact that initial investigations in
many cases were left to the chiefs, like Beah Kindo, provided them with
172
ample opportunity 'to vent revenge and come down on an enemy.'
172. Hough op. cit.
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A variation on the intimidation theme was provided by George Do¬
mingo, Madam Caulker's Speaker in Shengeh. After her deposition, he
threatened to denounce people as belonging to the Human Leopard Society
I HO
unless they chose him or his nominee as Paramount Chief.
If the proceedings of the unlawful societies were sufficiently secret
to exclude the bulk of the population, it would then be possible for the people,
in addition to the colonial administrators, to be convinced that such activi¬
ties were widespread and did in fact involve the indigenous rulers. Such a
situation has several implications for the political structure and for the
power of the chief. Belief that the leopard or a similar society was opera¬
ting in their area could cause the people either to fear their rulers, or to
turn against them not wanting to experience the hardships brought about by
patrols and investigations. A further recourse was to abandon their rulers
174
and flee to Liberia as reportedly happened in 1919.
The position of the few chiefs who, after being accused and acquitted,
were allowed to return to their chieftaincies was seriously affected. On the
one hand, they were no longer able to maintain control over the people, who
either had wanted them convicted or were terrified that they had been guilty
and would resume unlawful society activities. On the other hand the fact
that these chiefs were undoubtedly under constant surveillance and suspicion
173. P. R. O. 267/511 5 January 1909 c. Probyn-Crewe
174. P. R.O. 267/591 20 May 1921 #255 O. A. G. Maxwell-Churchill
Ross enclosure
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by the District Commissioners would undermine their power and effective¬
ness as tribal authorities.
The variables concerning reports made or neglected to be made re¬
flect on the issue of the total volume of secret society murders. They also
indicate possible areas of effect on the Protectorate administrative system,
and the indigenous chiefdom administration beyond the overt removal of a
tribal ruler.
Attacks of real leopards or other animals being reported as the work
of human agents could be done to intentionally mislead, or as a result of 'a
175
great disposition on the part of adults to attribute attacks to human agents.'
The converse could equally be true: failure to report any leopard attacks
would be logical if the people, believing that the secret societies were at
work, were trying to avoid revenge, patrols and mass arrests. In either
case statistical evidence of these crimes suffers accordingly.
Such silence was not always without consequence. Stanley reported
that 'in such cases it was not unusual for unscrupulous people to take advan-
17fi
tage of reluctance to report leopard attacks.' People undoubtedly re¬
frained from coming forward with information concerning leopard deaths or
177
leopardmurders because political officers traditiona^disbelieved them,
175- Ibid.
176. P. R. O. 267/575 18 September 1917 c. Wilkinson-Long Stanley
enclosure
177. Ibid. ; also Sierra Leone Government Confidential Print #17 of 1916
dated 30 September
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and they saw the futility of notifying a colonial administrator whose investi¬
gations and trials left the guilty free and innocent people convicted. Fear of
accidental reprisal at the hands of the Government or revenge of the secret
societies were probably less conscious factors than the fact that most Pro¬
tectorate people were not accustomed to taking indigenous matters to the
British authorities.
The Paramount Chief had every reason to fear that he would automa¬
tically be accused of some degree of involvement in any cases he reported.
Thus on the one hand the chief was expected, as part of the Protectorate ad¬
ministration, to assist in the efforts to end the activities of the unlawful so¬
cieties. On the other hand, however, the chief was under suspicion and in
many instances surveillance, and was kept from providing information which
might help to achieve this end by the administration itself. Certainly his
effectiveness for purposes of Protectorate administration was restricted in
this instance.
There are also political connotations of motives for Paramount Chiefs
sending in reports of leopard attacks and deaths. The desire to appear fa¬
vourably in the eyes of the British administrators is as likely as the one to
point the finger of suspicion at someone else. A chief might therefore ad¬
vance his position with the Protectorate administration at the same time
that he eliminated opposition in the chiefdom.
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Further Implications of Leopard Murders
In addition to the suggested effects on indigenous power and political
structures cited previously, there is the overall consideration of the social,
political and economic stability of a chiefdom being upset. The frequent re¬
moval of chiefs and principal men would cause their normal functions and
responsibilities to be neglected until their successors were elected and es¬
tablished in office. Searches, extortion, plunder, exodus and mass arrest
disrupted everyday life as well as agriculture and trade. Those who were
arrested and released or acquitted often returned to find they had suffered
loss of property, income, dignity and reputation. Many fell to ill-health
during the months of detention in the gaol. Whether one had been guilty or
not, suspicion would always be in the minds of the British administrators
and one's kith and kin.
The incidents surrounding these unlawful secret societies and their
alleged activities no doubt affected the manner in which British administrators
regarded the Protectorate peoples in other respects, other than suspicion of
acquitted rulers. District officers expressed contempt for people given to
such practices, and many came to believe that the entire population of these
areas was corrupt or corruptible. Certainly such negative opinions cannot
be considered a healthy basis for the relationship between the inhabitants of
the Protectorate and their administrators. In many cases there was an atti¬
tude of futility surrounding the efforts of some District Commissioners to
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both advance the condition of life of the people and to eradicate their evil
practices.
The successful administration of the Sierra Leone Protectorate de¬
pended as much on the trust of the indigenous population as of the adminis¬
trators. The episode under consideration could not have failed to have
undermined the position of the administration and their attempts to instill
respect for the British system of justice. Officials of the Government
seemingly were allowed to rape and plunder. Many people would not dis¬
tinguish between one uniformed official and another. Hence European offi¬
cers would be regarded with fear and distrust, or with resentment for not
preventing the abuses. The impartiality and integrity of Court Messengers,
Interpreters, and assessor chiefs were publicly questioned. However, pub¬
lic censure or dismissal of a Court Messenger or Interpreter would be little
consolation to a family of a person executed on the basis of information
or testimony provided by that official. Furthermore, the records do not
show any inclination on the part of colonial officials to reconsider cases in
which officials subsequently found to be unreliable had been key figures.
District Officers regarding bearers of information as liars would also do
little to encourage people to turn to the Government with their complaints
and local disputes.
It would be unlikely that the average person could see the subtle dif¬
ference between being convicted and deported, and acquitted but still deported.
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The introduction of the values and practices of the English judicial system
was foremost among the aims of the Protectorate administration. However,
the detentions, bribery, procedural difficulties, bias, and presumed mis¬
carriage of justice surrounding the human leopard cases could only have had
the opposite effect.
It is significant to add that the main concern of all colonial officers
was to apprehend the murderers and bring to an end the unlawful societies.
The suspension of tribal administrations was regretted, but probably more
for the inconvenience and cost incurred than for the fear of irreparable
damage to the indigenous political structure. Deportations were made to
rid the area of presumed troublemakers to maintain peace and order. This
state of affairs was desired as much for the sake of the people to resume
their normal lives as for the administrators to have the fewest possible
problems. Beyond the expressed hope that punitive measures would drive
people away from these societies there appears to be no consciousness on
the part of British administrators of the possible impact of the incidents of
this period on the system of tribal rule, the lives of the people, and the re¬
lationship between the Protectorate inhabitants and Protectorate adminis¬
tration.
In most cases neither the administrators nor the governed were able
or inclined to identify with the aims and interests of the other. As difficult
as it was for Protectorate administrators to see beyond their immediate
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concerns to consider the effects on the indigenous population, it would be






Education was not an important aspect of colonial policy until the lat¬
ter years of the period under review. This fact was entirely in keeping with
the prevailing sentiments about educated Africans which also contributed to
the principles of governing through the chiefs and upholding the 'tribal sys¬
tem.' Maxwell, in one of his many amateur anthropologist reports, des¬
cribed the 'native' who had been drawn from his 'tribal System through inju¬
dicious methods of education or other causes' as one who had 'developed a
craving for outward and less admirable forms of European civilisation,
professed to despise his own people and chief, and become a morally deteri¬
orated being.' *
Such a statement was representative of the attitudes of most colonial
administrators at the turn of the century. Locally, reaction against the
Creoles combined with the philosophy of keeping protected peoples separate
and unspoilt. This was first reflected in educational policy by the decision
to open a school at Bo for, as Porter says, 'sons of chiefs and potential
chiefs, and later for others who would have ordinarily gone to Freetown for





The Bo Government School
Although there were a number of mission schools in the Sierra Leone
Protectorate at the turn of the century, the Sierra Leone Government did
not have control over their curriculum or standards. In 1904, to assure fu¬
ture generations of enlightened and literate chiefs, Probyn proposed the es¬
tablishment of a school for the sons and nominees of chiefs. The school was
to be located at Bo, a commercial center in the Bandajuma District, a pre¬
dominantly Mende area. The selection of this site reportedly was made
4
because empty railway construction bungalows were available.
The details dispatched to Lyttleton were for 'a technical and agricul¬
tural school limited to sons or nominees of Paramount Chiefs,' and intended
for 200 students from the ages of seven to eighteen. It was suggested that
the 7-11 group be the constructive level, receiving object lessons and learn¬
ing conversational methods, while the 10-14 year olds would continue these
pursuits, and commence a normal elementary program. The last four years
were to be devoted to technical training in agriculture, carpentry or iron
work, as well as general education in politics, history, sanitation, science
and mathematics. All levels would be interested in developing imagination,
2. Porter, op, cit. p. 68
3. See Riddell, op. cit. and Sumner, D. L« Education in Sierra Leone
(Freetown, 1963)
4. S. L. A. C42 1916 April 20 N. Sherbro
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observation powers, proficiency in numbers and ability to measure, equate,
and exchange. Moral aims included the inculcating of tidiness, order, sys-
R
tern and a sense of responsibility. Their living conditions and wearing ap¬
parel were to resemble customary, not European ones. Such aspects were
to prevent students from becoming contemptuous of 'native' life as they did
when educated in Freetown.
The foundation stone was laid on the thirteenth of September 1905 at
a ceremony to which Paramount Chiefs were invited, and those who attended
7
received cash presents to encourage their support of the school. Haddon-
Smith, as the Officer Administering the Government, stated in his speech
that the proposed course was designed to make the Chiefs' sons 'good and
g
useful, and capable rulers in their chiefdoms.'
In March of 1906 the Bo School opened, and as a political institution
with 'peculiar aims and character' was outside the ordinary jurisdiction of
the Education Department. It was not until 1923 that it was suggested that
the school be put under that department for administrative purposes. The
Principal was the Reverend James Proudfoot, who had been the General
5. P. R. O. 267/473 30 December 1904 #320 Probyn-Lyttleton
6. Porter, op. cit. p. 68
7. S. L. A. 4924 1905 13 September O. A. G. Haddon-Smith A sum of
^f47/10 was presented to 12 Paramount Chiefs in attendance.
8. P. R. O. 267/491 2 February 1906 letter from E. W. Blyden to
Secretary of State Lord Elgin
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Superintendent of the United Methodist Free Church. He was assisted by
Thomas Smith, who succeeded him in 1914.
The composition and the calibre of the staff varied during the eighteen
years under review. The underlying principle was to have a core of Euro¬
pean masters with African interpreters who were to become teachers as they
learned from the Europeans. This system would allow the Government to
reduce expenses as they replaced European teachers with African. The
documents are not clear as to whether the 'native' or 'African' interpreters
were people indigenous to the Colony or to the Protectorate. However, it
can be inferred that they were the former for they were found to be unsuit¬
able on the grounds that Sierra Leone schools did not teach the Bo curricu¬
lum.^
With the institution of the prefect system in 1911 and the revision of
Government policy against employing Bo graduates, the staff at the Bo School
underwent a change in composition. When the Phelps-Stokes Commission
visited the school in 1920 they found a European Principal and eight 'native'
teachers, all but one of whom were ex-pupils. The exception was the Mo¬
hammedan Arabic teacher. Three of the four Europeans assigned to the
school were on leave at the time, but this did not prevent the Commission
9. P. R. O. 267/485 11 July 1906 #219 Probyn-Elgin;
P. R. O. 267/539 3 April 1912 #130 Merewether-Hareourt
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from giving the staff and school a favourable report.
Products of the Bo School
In June of 1908 Mr. Proudfoot's three year trial period was up, and
it was necessary for Haddon-Smith and the acting Colonial Secretary, Evelyn,
to evaluate his work and the success of the school. In the dispatch to Lord
Crewe containing these reports, Haddon-Smith noted that although he felt the
school was a success, the results would not show for some years until the
boys returned to their chiefdoms. From the ground-breaking ceremony
promise that no pupil would be employed by the Government to the time when
the first Bo pupils were about to graduate and return to their chiefdoms, the
Government fully intended that the boys would settle down to leading useful
lives assisting in chiefdom affairs and educating their people. Such a policy
was founded on the unrealistic desire to educate without stimulating interests
and ideas which would spoil the graduate and alienate him from his customary
ways of life. To reinforce this ideal, the Government closed many possible
escape routes from the chiefdom by refusing to employ Bo graduates in any
Government services.
The first indication that the students might not be able to assume the
10. Jones, Thomas Jesse Education In Africa: A Study of West, South
and Equatorial Africa by the African Education Commission, under
the Auspices of the Phelps -Stokes Fund and Foreign Mission Soci-
ties of North America and Europe (New York, 1922) p. 115
11. P. R. O. 267/504 26 June 1908 #311 O. A. G. Haddon-Smith-Crewe
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responsibilities designated for them was the introduction of the prefect sys¬
tem four years after the school opened. Chiefs were asked if they would
agree to an extended course which would better prepare the boys. This re¬
quest purportedly was based on the assumption that most of the pupils would
want to open schools in their chiefdoms. As Government -supported pupil-
teachers, the prefects would receive class and individual instruction and^6.
A not insignificant feature of the prefect system was that it would enable the
Principal to decrease the number of 'natives' on the staff, who had proven
12
unsuitable in their duties. The system was so successful that by 1914
there were both junior and senior prefects, whom the new Principal intended
would become assistant teachers at Bo, and teachers in the Government Ele-
13
mentary Day Schools.
The same year that the prefect system was begun Proudfood institu¬
ted another program, subject to the approval of the chiefs, which would sup¬
plement the training received at Bo and provide additional useful skills.
When the boys finished they would be too young to take any important part or
exert any real influence in their chiefdoms. Furthermore it was believed
that the sudden change from school discipline to the freedom of 'native'
social life would render them liable to lose many of the advantages of their
training. As a result, several boys each year were attached to the Agricul-
12. P. R. O. 267/522 12 April 1910 #134 Probyn-Crewe Proudfoot
enclosure
13. P. R. O. 267/560 22 September 1914 c. Merewether-Harcourt
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ture Department for three years after they had finished their course at Bo.
As it was necessary to avoid any semblance of Government employ¬
ment, the agricultural scholarship program had to be carefully devised and
carried out. Hopkins, the Director of Agriculture, and his assistant, N. W.
Scotland, planned the syllabus for each successive year, and sent annual
progress and conduct reports to the Principal of Bo, as the pupils were still
officially attached to Bo School. As early as 1914 the number of annual
14
scholarships was increased from three to five.
In addition to the practical advantages of further training tiding sen¬
ior students over the transition years and providing knowledge which would
be of great value in the management of chiefdoms, this program was con¬
sistent with the underlying education philosophy of colonial administrators.
Intelligent tillers of the soil was the desired alternate occupation to ruling
a chiefdom of any of the indigenous population who received education. The
attitude prevalent among Sierra Leoneans that manual labour was degrading
was to be avoided at all costs.
However, the majority of the students were not affected by the pre¬
fect or agricultural scholarship schemes, and they were returning to their
chiefdoms upon the completion of their courses at Bo. The fears of the po¬
litical and educational officers were realized, for many of the pupils were
14. S. L. A. C. S. 548 1913 14 December Proudfoot; P. R. O. 267/560
22 September 1914 c. Merewether -Hareourt enclosure
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reportedly not leading useful or exemplary lives in the chiefdoms, and the
chiefs were disappointed with the way their sons had turned out.
Although there were some chiefs' sons who, upon returning home, had
assumed worthwhile positions assisting their fathers, it appears that most did
1 C
not. The District Commissioners in their reports noted that Bo graduates
became petty traders, professional letter- and petition-writers, and one had
16
been convicted for activities in the Human Leopard Society. The district
officers agreed with Proudfoot and Smith, who had repeatedly urged the Gov¬
ernment to rescind the regulation banning Bo graduates from employment in
the Government Services.
By the middle of 1914 Merewether had instructed the District Commis¬
sioners to get the chiefs' reactions to the removal of the ban. The replies
confirmed the statements of the Protectorate administrators and the officials
at Bo. Even in the Koinadugu District, every chief spoken to by Stanley was
reported to have said that the Bo School would hold greater attraction if pupils
17
were allowed to enter the Government Service, preferably in the Protectorate.
At the end of October the restriction was partially removed, and
15. P. R. O. 267/560 16 October 1914 #561 Merewether-Harcourt
Fairtlough Northern Sherbro report
16. S. L. A. D. C. Railway #6 1915 30 December 1914 Warren;
S. L. A. C42 1916 29 February 1915 D. C. Stanley Ronietta
17. S. L. A. C. S. 352 1914 31 July D. C. Stanley Koinadugu
The consensus of the other chiefs interviewed by all the District
Commissioners, and recorded in this minute paper, was the same
as the Koinadugu chiefs.
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employment in schools, or in such departments as Agriculture, Forestry or
18
Roads was recommended. It was not until 1916 that Bo School graduates
were allowed to take the Civil Service Entrance Examinations. Eight of the
first nine who sat the exam passed and six of the second nine. Of the suc¬
cessful candidates, most became 6th grade clerks with District Commis¬
sioners, while three became temporary teachers at Bo, and one an assistant
19
teacher at the Government Elementary Day School at Bumpe.
Although the removal of the ruling prohibiting employment of Bo stu¬
dents in Government Service did not prevent boys from becoming petty trad¬
ers, letter-writers or wastrels, it did increase the opportunities available
to the young men. By 1920 seven former Bo boys were on the staff at Bo,
another ran the Government Anglo-Vernacular School at Gbangbama, and the
Medical Department had hired others as Public Vaccinators. In 1923 Bo
graduates were also teaching at the Government School at Baiima, learning
rice-planting at Gbapp, running an experimental farm at Makene, and pur¬
suing successful commercial careers with European firms. Others had be¬
come second class forest rangers, assistant inspectors of produce, and one
20
was a fifth grade sanitary inspector.
18. S. L. A. C. S. 352 1914 Circular 31 October 1914
19. P. R. O. 267/578 25 July 1918 #235 Wilkinson-Long
20. Jones op. cit. p. 115; P.R.O. 267/580 30 January 1919 #55
Wilkinson-Milner; P.R.O. 267/583 7 November 1919 #332
Wilkinson-Milner; P.R.O. 267/600 20 March 1923 #118
Slater -Devonshire
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Evaluation of the Bo School
The continuation and success of the Bo Government School for the
sons and nominees of Chiefs depended largely on the chiefs viewing it with
favour. This critical fact was not overlooked by the Government in their
evaluation of every facet of the school, as seen in considerations already
discussed.
District Commissioners, experiencing difficulty in recruiting stu¬
dents and collecting fees, attested to the fact that the Bo School was not pop¬
ular with many of the chiefs. The number of students attending the school
had risen from 83 in September 1906 to over a hundred two years later.
However, by 1914 the students numbered 83 again, and consideration was
given to decreasing the fees. In April of that year the District Commission¬
ers were advised to discuss the school with the chiefs, pointing out the ad¬
vantages, and finding out their complaints. The replies centered on the
dissatisfaction of the chiefs with the way the students turned out and con¬
firmed the belief of the Protectorate administrators that in most cases the
chiefs would be willing and able to pay the fees if they wanted their sons to
21
attend the school.
These reports contributed to the decision to partially rescind the ban
on employing Bo pupils in the Government service, and led to an alteration
21. S. L. A. C223 1913 (filed 1916) circular 15 April 1914 to, and
reports June and July 1914, from District Commissioners;
S. L. A. C42 1916 29 February D. C. Stanley Ronietta
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in the fee system. The fee for the first chief's son or Tribal Authority nom¬
inee remained^10, but the fee for each successive son or nominee was re¬
duced to^5. Another of the chiefs' objections was removed by the new regu¬
lation that if a chief died and the Tribal Authority refused to pay his son's
fees, the Government would remit the fee for the remainder of the time the
boy was at Bo,^
By restricting admission to 7-10 year olds and establishing a one year
probation system, Smith hoped to avoid some of the problems created by
having pupils who were past the average school age. The 18-23 age group
was found to be difficult to discipline, past the learning stage, and bad ex¬
amples for the younger students. Pupils expelled for such offences as forg¬
ing the Principal's name to obtain funds, stealing, and soliciting the wives
23of teachers were not likely to give the chiefs a favourable impression of
the school. Beyond these measures, however, nothing else was done to alter
the recruitment methods in order to prevent unsuitable candidates from being
sent to Bo School, and returning home as bad examples of graduates. Smith's
suggestion that the District Commissioners assume most of the responsibility
for the selection of candidates for admission was immediately rejected by
Merewether. It was the Governor's contention that it would be unwise to so
22. S. L. A. C. S. 158 1914 20 April C. S. Evelyn
23. S. L. A. Education) #6 1912 5 January Proudfoot;
S. L. A. Education) #75 1912 9 June Proudfoot
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alienate the chiefs on whose goodwill the success of the school largely
depended.^
The changes which were made in 1914 had very little effect on the
attitude of the chiefs toward the school for they did not reach the root of the
problem. Changing times, and increased interest in education, not a reali¬
zation of the chiefs' continued dissatisfaction, prompted Merewether to rec¬
ommend that a commission be established to look into various aspects of
Protectorate education, particularly the Bo School.^ deHart, the Assistant
Colonial Secretary, felt that a parting of the ways for Protectorate education
had been reached. He saw the issue in terms of whether the Bo School was
to continue to preserve its tribal character or to degenerate into an organi¬
zation for 'creolizing' the natives of the Protectorate. In his words,
"The issue was comprehended in the original notice of 1905 and
the decision then was the school was to be in the strict sense a
native institution. The policy of the present principal is in
direct opposition to the tribal objects with which the school
was founded and the institution is little by little breaking with
its traditions. The time has come when the objects of Protec¬
torate education must be clearly defined; it is not necessary to
uphold the Proudfoot regime. The question if the tribal nature
of the school should continue to be the essential feature is cor¬
related with the larger question as to the part it is intended
the tribal system shall play in the future administration of the
Protectorate. If it is to be desired to allow the tribal system
to gradually languish, there is probably little object in trying
to retain the attachment of the pupils for their respective
tribes. But there is nothing to show that the Government wishes
to see the extinction of the tribal system. On the contrary the
24. P. R. O. 267/564 25 February 1915 #93 Merewether-Harcourt
25. S. L. A. C307 1915 (filed 1916) 6 November 1915 Gov. Merewether
342
very existence of Bo with its stated objects appears to indicate
that its extinction is not desired by the Government. On the
other hand the vitality of the tribal system is almost certain
to become impaired as the economic development of the Pro¬
tectorate increases and it will be necessary to support the
tribal system even more strongly than in the past."26
In response to the request for their views on Protectorate education
and the Bo School, the District Commissioners submitted detailed reports
/
throughout the early months of 1916. Warren observed that the majority of
the Bo students he had talked with knew nothing about their own chiefdoms,
their indigenous political structure or laws. As Fairtlough believed that a
knowledge of native laws and practices could only be obtained by listening to
the counsel and advice of the elder men when assembled in the native court,
he felt that the prime object of the Bo School scheme was unattainable under
the existing conditions.^
A citizenship course introduced by Smith was designed 'to counteract
in some measure the disintegrating influences at work in the Protectorate.'
This was to be achieved by promoting good inter-tribal relations, explaining
the methods by which the country was governed, and showing what public
O O
monies were raised and expended. Such a course was not, however, a cure
for the evils to which many of the chiefs and District Commissioners objected.
26. S. L. A. C307 1915 (filed 1916) 27 September 1915 Assistant
C. S. deHart
27. S. L. A. C42 1916 11 March D. C. Warren Karene; 20 April
D. C. Fairtlough
28. P. R.O. 267/570 3 March 1916 #78 O. A. G. Hollis-Bonar-Law
Smith enclosure
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The chiefs and elders were cited as objecting to a different aspect of
the same problem. They maintained that an English education had alienated
their boys, for Bo pupils returned to their chiefdoms, often in European
clothing and requiring a hammock while they travelled, ridiculed the ways
29
of their people, and refused to do manual labour.
Such grievances were not only valid but an inevitable result of the
self-contradictory education policy of the Colonial Government. Certain
Protectorate administrators came to appreciate the incompatability of the
dual objectives of educating and refining the allegedly future chiefs, but at
the same time expecting them to return willingly to their chiefdoms. The
consensus among District Commissioners was that the Bo School was not a
success in terms of its stated aims. Several Government officers doubted
whether it was advisable to educate the future chiefs along basically English
lines. Such an attitude is understandable in view of the fact that most agreed
that 'all the best chiefs who really command the respect of their people, who
are just and popular and efficient rulers, are men without any European edu-
Of)
cation whatever.' Certainly the record of those chiefs accused and con¬
victed of Human Leopard Society crimes includes a large number of the edu¬
cated indigenous rulers. James Craven, who had seen duty in all of the Pro¬
tectorate districts, categorically stated that none of the chiefs he knew who
29. Ibid. ; 6 February D. C. Bowden Railway
30. S. L. A. C42 1916 29 February D. C. Stanley Ronietta
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spoke English would be among those he might recommend to represent the
31
Protectorate on the Legislative Council.
It was Warren's belief that education of the ordinary working class
would be much more valuable. However, if the Bo School were to be main¬
tained, he urged that courses in tribal law and histories of individual chief-
doms be included in the curriculum. Major Fairtlough and William Douglas
Davis Bowden, then of the Railway District, believed that the best solution
would be the establishment of schools in each district, with Bo perhaps
32
transformed into a higher school or technical university.
The years following World War I saw an awakening of interest in edu¬
cation, partly as additional funds were available, and partly as International
concern in the problems of colonial education had been engendered by the
League of Nations mandate system. Committees and commissioners were
formed to investigate existing conditions, and to make recommendations for
policy statements and guidelines.
The impact on Protectorate education of the findings of the Phelps-
Stokes Commission and the Advisory Committee on Native Education in Brit¬
ish Tropical African Dependencies was negligible for the period under con¬
sideration. However, they are worth noting for the conditions they were
examining were the ones which had come into being and prevailed during the
.»
31. S. L. A. CI 16 1916 22 May D. C. Craven Koinadugu
32. S. L. A. C42 1916 11 March D. C. Warren Karene; 20 April D. C.
Fairtlough N. Sherbro; 6 February D. C. Bowden Railway
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years of this study.
The descriptions of the Government School for the Sons and Nominees
of Chiefs at Bo given by the Phelps-Stokes Commission indicates that very
little had been done to alter the policies concerning the school or its curricu¬
lum by 1922. The few changes which were prompted by the findings of the
District Commissioners in 1916 and could be afforded in the ensuing years
of depression occurred outside the precincts of the Bo School. Throughout
each analysis during these years, that institution was to maintain its 'pe¬
culiar aims and character.'
Government Elementary Schools
The Government scheme to further education in the Protectorate by
awarding grants to mission schools which met Government standards was
not a success. A recurring suggestion of Proudfoot and Smith, who as Prin¬
cipals of the Bo School were responsible for the inspection of mission schools,
had been the establishment of village schools. Although it was recognized
that expenditure on Protectorate education would have to be increased, there
was little agreement or planning about the manner in which increased funds
might be expended.
The first concrete steps taken resulted in the establishment of the
Government Experimental Day School at Bumpe which opened in 1915. It
differed from the subsequent 'Anglo-vernacular' schools established in
Baiima in 1917, and Gbangbama and Gambia in 1917. Intended as a feeder
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school for Bo, the Bumpe school was to be restricted to 'select pupils
chosen from the strata of society slightly but not much beneath Bo.' ^
English, reading, spelling, arithmetic, writing, obedience to au¬
thority, elementary hygiene, object lessons, clay-modelling, and practical
agriculture were taught by two teachers sixteen periods of three to four
34
hours each a week at Bumpe. However, the vernacular schools did not
attempt more than the 3 R's and a little colloquial English, and as they were
for children, no industrial instruction was given.^ Each of the schools re¬
ported an average weekly attendance of between 25 and 35 pupils.
All four schools were under the jurisdiction of the Bo School. In ad¬
dition they were staffed almost entirely by ex-Bo pupils from the time of
the removal of the Government restriction on their employment, until 1923
when the four schools were handed over to Njala Training College. In 1923
six students from Njala College who had received previous training were
considered competent to open small village schools. Schools were estab¬
lished in the Zimmi, Jimmi and Gbangbama chiefdoms of the Southern Pro¬
vince, and the Pendembu, Boajibu and Ngaema in the Central Province. At
the end of their first year in operation the total enrollment of the six schools
33. S. L. A. C. S. 297 1914 15 July Govr. Merewether;
P.R.O. 267/570 3 March 1916 #83 O. A. G. Hollis-Bonar-Law
34. S. L. A. C. S. 297 1914 19 April Acting Bo Principal deLisle; 4 May
35. P.R.O. 267/571 12 July 1916 #271 Wilkinson-Bonar-Law;
P.R.O. 267/571 5 September 1916 #368 Wilkinson-Bonar-Law
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numbered 261.^®
The reliability of school attendance statistics is affected by the fact
that no indication is made of the turn-over rate of students nor the frequency
of attendance of regular students. As a result it cannot be assumed that
these ten schools were educating the approximately 380 students to the full
extent of the curriculum. On the other hand, a far greater number were re¬
ceiving some education although the numbers and the impact are impossible
to determine.
The Njala Agricultural Training College
The Agricultural (also referred to as the Vernacular) Training Col¬
lege established at Njala at the end of 1919 was designed to prepare pupils to
run small village schools of the vernacular type, and recruited some of its
first students from the top classes of the Bumpe and Baiima schools. The
importance of and need for education for the improvement of agriculture had
been cited for many years before the Agricultural Training College at Njala
was conceived. Agriculture was the mainstay of the Sierra Leone Protecto¬
rate, and to foster new techniques and introduce new crops, the Government
had instituted a variety of programs. These programs ranged from agricul¬
tural and district officers planting model farms and gardens and giving ad¬
vice and instruction to farmers, to agriculture courses given at Bo and
36. Sumner, D. L. Education in Sierra Leone (Freetown, 1963) pp. 154-5;
P. R. O. 267/605 27 August 1924 #387 Slater-Thomas
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scholarships provided for Bo graduates to the experimental farm at Njala.
Such measures, however, affected a limited number of people and in
1917 a training college for agricultural teachers was proposed. Wilkinson
had to defend the proposal against the objections of Ellis, Principal Clerk in
charge of the West African Section at the Colonial Office. The Governor's
persistence probably added to his unpopularity at the Colonial Office for his
education ventures were never met with whole-hearted enthusiasm.
The Governor saw the aim as being to obtain a body of teachers, ad¬
mittedly inferior in literary knowledge, but superior in agricultural know¬
ledge and able to read and write in their own vernacular. These in turn
would help give the country a population also able to read and write in their
own language, speak simple English and keep simple accounts, and practice
o n
agriculture with intelligence and interest. When the school opened in 1919
three hours of literary instruction were given a day, the remainder of the
O O
time being devoted to agricultural study.
The training college was not intended to produce agricultural experts,
but graduates capable of teaching basic agricultural facts to village children
of 10 years and under. Therefore it was considered most important that the
pupils live in an agricultural atmosphere, and be exposed to and participate
in plant, soil and method experiments. Njala, in the Ronietta District, was
37. P. R.O. 267/585 28 August 1917 #261 Wilkinson-Long
38. P. R.O. 267/583 23 October 1919 #481 Wilkinson-Milner;
P. R.O. 267/575 28 August 1917 #261 Wilkinson-Long
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the location selected for the College as it was the site of the permanent
plantation and experimental farm run by the Agriculture Department since
1913.
Lack of funds and European staff delayed the implementation of plans
for the College, but by the end of 1918 Michell, a European Master at Bo,
was seconded to build the college, and in June 1919 appointed Principal. An
African Assistant Principal and several African teachers completed the staff.
D. L. Sumner states, in Education in Sierra Leone, that candidates
for admission were nominated by the Tribal Authority and selected by the
Principal. Students in training were admitted on the understanding that they
were expected to establish schools in their chiefdoms upon completion of the
OQ
course, which was paid for by the Government. * There is no indication in
the available records of the extent to which this recruitment method was
used.
The College opened with 30 pupils, some of whom were sons of chiefs,
and students from the Bo, Bumpe and Baiima schools who could read and
40
write English and Mende. The statement in the first report on the College,
that as soon as Temne textbooks were prepared Temne classes would be
opened,^* implies that the initial students were Mende. Sumner notes that
39. Sumner, op. cit. p. 154
40. P. R. O. 267/583 5 December 1919 #535 Wilkinson-Milner
41. Ibid.
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handbooks in three of the 'native' languages, written in English characters,
were used at the College.^ It is not specified when the other two languages
were introduced nor what was the third language. Certainly the use of such
materials was consistent with the overall policy against educating along
European lines.
Wilkinson, always optimistic about the expansion of education in the
Protectorate, hoped that a starting class of 30 every six months would yield
60 teachers a year after the completion of their three year course. This as¬
piration was not fulfilled in the years under consideration. However, the
enrollment of 50 students when the Phelps-Stokes Commission visited Njala
at the end of 1920 had more than doubled by the end of 1924. The Commis¬
sion noted that due to the negligible education facilities in the Protectorate,
the Training College was compelled to accept pupils with little or no previous
43
education. It became apparent that it was impossible to prepare boys with
no education to become teachers in three years, despite the low standard
aimed at. Of the initial students, six who had prior training opened the
schools in 1923 already referred to. By 1925 only two additional teachers
44
had been produced.
The new Director of Education in 1923, F. C. Marriott, criticized
the College as 'a replica of the Bo School without the advantage of European
42. Sumner, op. cit. p. 154
43. Jones, op. cit. p. 115
44. Sumner, op, cit. pp. 154-5, 233
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supervision.'^ Michell had been transferred, leaving Njala to the Senior
Tutor, D. L. Sumner. The anticipated close coordination between the Agri¬
culture and Education Departments had not occurred; indeed, the European
Agriculture Instructor did not arrive until 1924. Ellis' doubts at the concep¬
tion of the Training College plan were borne out. Attainment of an advanced
level of general education and proficiency in English were necessary before
students could learn, let alone instruct, the rudiments of agricultural sci-
46
ence.
In 1925 Slater ordered an investigation into the operation and results
of the Njala Agricultural Training College. The far-reaching plans for the
College consequently drawn up by the Governor and Marriott were never put
into effect. When the Njala Training College was closed in 1928, its 80 pupils
47
formed the nucleus of the new Central Protectorate College at Koyeima.
The close of the period under review found Government-sponsored
education in the Protectorate in a state of flux. Reassessment of aims and
methods were being made to meet the changing conception of the needs and
of the direction of future development of the Sierra Leone Protectorate.
45. P. R. O. 267/600 31 March 1923 #145 Slater-Devonshire Marriott
enclosure
46. P. R.O. 267/574 30 June 1917 #179 Wilkinson-Long Ellis C.O.
minute on:; Sumner, op. cit. p. 172




The essence of the form of indirect rule established in the Sierra
Leone Protectorate was to control and govern through the individuals and in¬
stitutions which customarily commanded the authority and respect of the in¬
digenous population. Putting such a principle into practice was not without
consequences for the Administration and for some of the indigenous rulers
thus recognized. In many places this policy was instituted without much ap¬
parent effect on the position of the chiefs who were accepted by their people
as being the legitimate rulers, or on the relationships between such rulers
and their subjects. However, investigation of pre-colonial history and power
structures indicates that the conditions which existed throughout the Sierra
Leone hinterland in the 1890's were by no means suited, from an indigenous
point of view, to the uniformity of British administration.
One of the initial consequences of the establishment of British rule
was the dislocation of political relationships within and between independent
local, or chiefdom, units. Certainly it was the intention of the Colonial Gov¬
ernment to regulate contact between 'tribal' groups which in the past had as¬
sumed the forms of raids and warfare. There is no indication that adminis¬
trators anticipated the controversies over rightful succession to chieftaincies
and disputed chiefdom boundaries which resulted not only from the 1898 Re-
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bellion but also from the act of recognizing fixed ruling hierarchies and
chiefdom borders.
For Government purposes, ruling through the chiefs was as efficient
as such a marginally-supervised administration could be. Despite the an¬
noyance of the above mentioned disputes, district administrations on the
whole considered the system the most feasible and expedient means of ad¬
ministering justice to the populace and collecting the tax. The rulers desig¬
nated to be chiefs additionally were called upon for such matters as to pro¬
vide labour for Government public works, supply food and carriers for
Government officials and troops, and cooperate with forestry, sanitation,
agricultural and transportation schemes. Although many of the require¬
ments placed on the chiefs and headmen were derived from customary rights
and powers, such as the recruitment of labour, the uses to which, in this
case, the recruited labour was put often were not customary.
Individual chiefs were singled out as being incompetent, lazy, cor¬
rupt, disloyal or uncooperative. On a number of occasions the Governor
had to depose chiefs, either for alleged abrogations of customary laws or
for failure to carry out Government duties properly. The question must be
raised if the symptoms displayed in these cases were a result of the inade¬
quacies of the person or of the policy of placing non-traditional demands on
individuals who might lack any customary position or authority. Without a
doubt there were cases of chiefs whose influence was minimal because the
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power in the chiefdom rested with another person or persons, or with an
institution such as the Poro. In such instances it must be wondered how effec¬
tive a ruler could be for the purposes of the Protectorate Administration. The
constant support which was being given a number of chiefs apparently did little
to enhance the position of a chief maintained in this manner except to enable
him to fulfill the minimum requirement of collecting the tax. Even this pro¬
cess, and any additional ones such as the recruitment of labour, were undoubt¬
edly conducted with the convincing assistance of members of the Frontier Po¬
lice, Force, or Court Messengers.
There were cases of rulers being reprimanded, imprisoned, and even
deposed for continuing to exercise authority over peoples not considered by
the Government to be under their jurisdictions. Such uses of former preroga¬
tives no doubt held chiefs in good stead with their subjects but either cost them
their positions or placed them in suspect and precarious ones in the eyes of
the Government. The obverse is likely to have been true: that formerly
powerful chiefs who cooperated with Protectorate administrators lost their
previous authority and influence in the eyes of their subjects.
One question which colonial administrators did not allow themselves
to raise during the period under review was if it were possible to preserve
established institutions while using them for alien purposes and thereby
transforming their character. Although the differential effects of trade,
transportation, and general exposure to 'strangers' were observed, as on
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the Chiefs' Courts, district administrators were limited in the means avail¬
able to them to deal with these phenomena. The uniformity of administration
and the principles underlying indirect rule left only small areas of initiative
to alter the administration of some areas and not of others. In a like manner,
Protectorate officers were handicapped by having to uphold the authority of
Government-recognized chiefs whom they knew to be despised or even, in
some cases, not the choice of the people.
The position of the chief was affected by other effects of British rule
beyond those of questionable selection and alienating duties. He was provided
with opportunities in modern forms of wealth, most of which were related to
his position in the Protectorate administration. Although not all chiefs and
headmen were stipend recipients, all were eligible for payment for each
Court Messenger nominated, each labourer recruited for Government public
works, and for each mile of road kept clear. Incentives to chiefs in the forms
of annual presents and cash prizes were given in recognition of the need to
maintain the position of the chief, as well as to use this position to influence
the people to adopt improved agricultural techniques, or sanitary habits.
Further grants were made for specific responsibilities such as the mainten¬
ance of Government rest-houses and ferries.
Although conversion of political position into economic advantage was
by no means without precedent prior to the establishment of the Protectorate,
it can be argued that the above sources of income did little to preserve,
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strengthen or uphold the position of the chief as intended by the colonial ad¬
ministrators. Not only was the source of chiefly wealth no longer traditional
in most cases, but also it was contingent upon his advancing schemes which
were alien in nature, and which could serve to undermine the chiefly authority
on which the British were relying.
Although the details of economic policy and its implementation are
beyond the scope of this administrative study certain aspects bear mention.
The roles played by the need for peaceful trade conditions in the establish¬
ment of the Protectorate and by the need for revenue to finance the Adminis¬
tration in the introduction of a tax have been discussed. In light of these
facts, the Colonial Government considered the development of transportation
in the Protectorate to be necessary in order to tap the resources. The con¬
struction of the railroad, team lines and feeder roads, and the supervision
of the building and maintenance of bush roads and cart-tracks were consis¬
tent with the needs of the Administration but not with its objectives.
There is apparent in all areas of government activity a determination
to forestall, wherever possible, 'Europeanizing,' or 'Creolizing' influences.
The use of indigenous rulers and institutions, the provision of selective edu¬
cation for a limited few, and the subordinate role of non-European personnel
each reflects the prevailing aversion to educated Africans. Consequently,
the Protectorate inhabitants were to be protected from forces which would
disrupt their customary ways of life.
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Hindsight reveals the inconsistency of the Administration's expecta¬
tion of such incompatible behaviour as working on roads and railways and
acquiring tax money and the taste and means for European goods; and re¬
maining rooted in the villages and being unquestionably affiliated to the chief
and customary life. However, within the context of the governing philosophy,
this discrepancy was not often seen in terms of cause and effect. As late as
1920 district administrators were upset by the fact that the Africans who
were going into trade were leaving the villages.
There was no place in an orderly, regulated administration for the
freedom of movement and migrations of individuals and large groups of
peoples which had characterized the Sierra Leone hinterland prior to the
advent of British rule. Coupled with the desire to prevent the deterioration
of the Protectorate inhabitants, the need for control prompted colonial ad¬
ministrators to reinforce allegedly customary restrictions on unauthorized
movement out of one's chiefdom. Government legislation in the forms of
Vagrancy Laws and establishment of Tribal Administrations in Freetown
were aimed at maintaining what the Colonial Government considered to be
the status quo in the same way that economic measures reflected this objec¬
tive.
The policy for land grants to 'non-natives' was sufficiently restrictive
to prevent the development of plantations or other individual or corporate
enterprises of any scale. The Government alone was in the position to de-
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velop the resources of the country and this was clearly not the intention. A
distinction must be made between efforts to preserve and improve existing
conditions, and those to develop the potential of the Protectorate. Forest
preserves, bush fire prevention lanes, and sanitary zones are indicative of
the former. So too were the model farms which were designed to show im¬
proved agricultural techniques. It was not until the years following the First
World War that significant efforts and expenditure were undertaken to change
agricultural conditions in Sierra Leone. The role of agriculture in education,
particularly at Njala, has been cited. Similarly the diversification and spe¬
cialization of Department of Agriculture personnel in these years reflect the
changing outlook of framers of International, British and Colonial policy
which began to affect all areas of rule in the Protectorate.
The impact of many of the post-war proposals and changes, such as
the commencement of swamp rice cultivation and re-evaluation of colonial
education policy, was not readily apparent at the end of the period under re¬
view. However, the years of the third decade of the twentieth century be¬
longed to a new era of Protectorate Administration. The processes of
change within indigenous political, social and economic institutions had been
set in motion by the diverse and basically inflexible requirements of the Brit¬
ish Administration no less than by the very presence of administrators, other
Government officials and traders. The effects of these forces, most notice¬
able in some Chiefs' Courts, were part of the inevitable transformation of
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indigenous ways which, though deplored by colonial officials, were to spread
throughout the Protectorate as the influences of British rule were increas¬
ingly widely felt.
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THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS OF THE COLONY AND .
PROTECTORATE ON THE SANITATION OF TOWNS '
IN THE COLONY AND PROTECTORATE.
The following Instructions have been issued by His Excellency the
Governor on the subject of sanitation of Towns in the Colony and
Protectorate.
1. Introductory. The wealth of a district is dependent upon
the health of the population, and such health is largely dependent
upon the sanitation of the towns in the district. One of the most
important duties therefore devolving upon the Political and Medical
Officers in the Colony and Protectorate is to endeavour to bring about
an advance in sanitation.
.. *
I 2. General Principles- It is not possible to lay down rules
respecting sanitation which can be of universal application, because
the situation of a town, or its water supply, or other local conditions, •
may be such that the rules could not be applied in their entirety. The
following suggestions should be taken as illustrating the general
■■ .principles of sanitation, the observance of which should be impressed
■[■ upon the Chiefs whenever occasion offers
y;rS . . . . ' ■
/ ■■ ■ . ,'(«.) Clearings. Within the limits of the town the ground should
: ' . be kept well drained, and there should be no holes digged nor
depressions allowed whefe stagnant water could collect.
> There should be no heaps of rubbish, and broken down houses g
should be levelled. Where necessary, drains should be made •
beside the roads to carry off the rain water, and the houses
f V .themselves should be kept clean and in good order.
v,: };■: Surrounding the town should be cleared a belt of land not less
'• than 200 yards in width. This belt would naturally form a
• i '*''*• circular clearing around the town, and will consequently be .
r
' • traversed at certain points by open drains carrying off all sur-
'■ ■'' • face water from the town. As the town extends, bush should '
'■■■■■ be cleared so as to maintain perpetually the width of 200 yards.
•[}' * Cultivation on this belt should be only on its outer two-thirds. .
, , » It frequently happens that the Porroor Buodu Bush is less than
. 200 yards from the town. In such cases, no portion of this
: . ' bush should be cleared. This is partly for political reasons
'
• (eg. the quite legitimate objections of the people), partly v\
\ because, as a result of the rules ^yhich regulate behaviour with '
respect to such bush, the proximity of the latter is not at all y
detrimental to sanitation. \_cf also Instruction 3.]
'
• 1 ' ' ' • ' ■ • • ' •
(b.) Streets. The streets in the town should be laid out on a
regular plan', and not twist'between the houses cork-screw
• ' fashion. :" -y-V-' .
1 llu MIAMI JULLVO jiivuiu IJ\+ ti will 4i\j IV jv IVVL niuVf iiiwijui
from the eaves of the houses on either side ; other streets
should beat least 10 feet wide. Along the streets the people
. . should be encouraged to plant shade or fruit trees ; the streets
► • and spaces between the houses should be kept clean of all
undergrowth.
During recent years a tendency has been noticed (especially
in the case those towns traversed by, or adjoining improved
roads ) to abandon all the old types of town formation, and to
build houses on each side of the main road ; this tendency
leads to the town becoming much more extended in area than
. formerly, and should not be discouraged, provided that
sufficient ground is kept cleared at the back of the houses.
(c.) Refuse. All vegetable and house refuse, etc., should be
collected daily, deposited on selected areas outside the town,
. and burnt at the end of the week on the cultivated land.
Cow-dung should of course not be allowed to remain in the
streets, but as it is used for various purposes no rule is needed
with respect to its disposal.
( df) Latrines, Cesspits &c., At different places on the cultivated •
portion of the clearing, shallow trenches should be digged for
latrine purposes. These should be about 12 to 18 inches
■ f wide, and 9 inches deep, the earth removed to form the trench
to lie alongside. . Excreta should be deposited by persons
squatting with one foot on each side of the trench, their backs
being towards the already used part of the trench. The
"trenching ground should not be near a stream or marsh, and
it should be guarded from flooding by a shelter and drain.
The trenches should be across the line of fall in the ground.
". '•' The custom of using a stream or river as a latrine should be
strongly and continually discouraged.
' Cesspits are not necessarily (objectionable, bdt when used they
should not be near wells or' streams, or too near dwellings.
• ' Rain water should not be allowed to flood them. They should
not be used when nearly full, buj; should be either covered
with earth, and a new one made, or emptied and the contents
buried in the cultivated area outside the town away from
water. ,1. ' •. ■
1
(e) Water. The place from which drinking waiter is got should
be above the village, and reached by a special path. As the
drinking water is always carried by women and children, this
• place is often conjoined with the washing place for women,
the women washing at a point below that from which they
\ take the water, but using the same path to reach it.
• Washing places for clothes should be below this and reached
by another path, and the path for men should be still further
down. From this spot up to a point a short distance above
• that whence the drinking water is obtained, the river should
be kept cleared of grass, old logs, and other obstructions to a
f. free flow of water, and for the same distance each bank to the
breadth of a yard or two should be kept clear, not of timber
.: • trees, but of all grass, weeds, and low bush.
J;-',, When, as sometimes happens, a town has to depend on well
water, the well should be fenced around, and no bathing or
washing of clothes allowed in the immediate neighbourhood.
•.The area for 5 or 6. feet around well tops should be raised
about one foot platform fashion, either with baked clay or
broken stones,'so as to prevent puddling in waste water by feet.
: ...To prevent the entrance of surface drainage, a shelter should
1st******' uic i bciat? i iy, vvuhjii uiieb uuiii man ana came
• and causes disease in, both, haunts a great number, if not all
streams and river banks in the Protectorate, and as it has
been shown that their habitat is close to streams (viz within
l;.' about 50 yards), the banks of streams at washing places,
ferries, places where cattle are watered, &c, should be kept free
, . from bush for about 50 yards. This fly requires not only
running water and high dry banks, but also the shade of low*
' "
7 ' ' bush.
, An open space should be reserved for cattle when driven in the
town at night. They should not be allowed to roam about
the town at night. . They should not be allowed to occupy
'
7 ruined houses closely surrounded by occupied houses. If all
rubbish is collected daily the cattle will soon learn that they
will find no food in the streets, and they will not wander
about to look for it.
Many cattle die or lose flesh through disease carried by the
. . Tsetse Fly. Some of these diseases might be prevented by
making clearings away from water for the herding of cattle,
'
. who could be watered if necessary in early morning or late
evening, as the Tsetse fly bites chiefly when the sun is high.
3. Native law in favour of good sanitation. It will
be found that where a town is governed by a good Chief, the chief prin¬
ciples of sanitation are observed. Moreover close questioning of the
older men will show that these principles are strictly enjoined by native
law. It is important, therefore, to remember that an unhealthy town
is one wherein native laws and customs, are departed from : the chief
should be supported to the utmost by the Political and Medical Officers
in enforcing the native laws with respect to sanitation.
The fact may be mentioned here which will be of interest to newly
appointed Assistant District Commissioners, although it is of course
well known to District Commissioners and others acquainted with the
country; many customs and many apparent superstitions are connected
with the preservation of health: for .example, there maybe, not far
from a road leading to a town, a piece of land which is regarded by
all as being the habitat of a " devil," and is consequently never entered.
Enquiry will often, show that this piece of land is the catchment area of
the town's water supply 1 \_cf Instruction 1 (a).]
4. Methods of improving sanitation.
; 1 i. / . . . »
. . Backward, Districts. If any part of the district is specially
' backward in sanitation, it will be found that the most
business-like and quickest method of bringing about an
improvement is to select one or two representative towns
( the town of the Paramount Chief shoulJ be invariably
• included), and to give special attention to the sanitation of
the towns thus chosen. When such towns have been selected
' after discussion by the District Commissioner and the District
• Medical Officer, the former should visit each town where he
should point out to the Chief and the latter's Headmen in
detale the exact changes which should be carried out in order
to improve the sanitation of the town. • If possible, the Medi-
'. ' cal Officer should accompany the District Commissioner and
•
. should explain the reasons why the laws of sanitation should (
be observed ; if possible he should show the chief's headmen
. • and especially some of the women, specimens of bad water
etc.', through a microscope.
('»•) Visits. After the first visit each such. town shouid be
! *
m periodically visited by the District Crmiml»>*t«npr or theriiutLLn Kfitnmi :ti at li • imul.i \ ,* 4
inai uv IU2) uwii native lawa puwci is given wu puiuan uiiicnucio
against sanitary laws.
The selected towns having been thus improved, it will be
Comparatively easy to bring about a similar improvement in
other towns.
Political and Medical Officers passing through a cleanly town
should make a point of praising the Chief for the condition
in which his town is kept.
5-. Prizes.
( a.) Swords. Prizes for sanitation, not exceeding two in number
for any one district, will be given yearly.
They will take the form of ornamental swords, and will be
1 allotted in November of each year by the District Commis¬
sioner with the advice, when possible, of the Medical Officer.
The sword will be a personal decoration, and will, save in the^
exceptional case hereafter mentioned, be returned to the
Government on the death of the holder without any compen-
* '■ sation to the holder's family. It will also be given up should
the holder allow his town to fall back into an insanitary
condition, for it must be clearly understood that the prize is
'• given not only for improving the sanitation of a town, but also
for keeping that town in a good sanitary condition.
*» 11:
The swords will not in future be engraved with the winners'
names : the names on those already engraved will be deleted
when necessary.
The sword will be -accompanied by an illuminated vellum
certificate, which will remain the absolute property of the
Chief and his family. No Chief will be eligible for more than
one sword, but for every fresh success he will be awarded an
additional vellum certificate. On any Chief obtaining five
such certificates, his sword will become the absolute property
of himself and his family.
(b.) Money Prizes. A money prize maybe awarded to a Chief
who, having won a sword for his own town, has, shown
exceptional energy afterwards in bringing about the improve¬
ment of other towns under him.
(c.) The fact that these prizes are given, and the reasons for
which they are given, should be made known as widely as
possible by District Officers,
6. Small Pox. The attention of Chiefs and Headmen is
particularly drawn to the following, rules to assist them in suppressing
small pox when it occurs in their midst:—
(a.) Cases not to be Concealed. Chiefs should discourage the
concealment ol persons suffering lrom small pox in their
towns or villages, and should in no case drive them out of
the town to spread the disease in other places, but should see
that every case is sent to and kept at the houses or huts which
have been specially prepared outside the town.
| 'S. ■ <
(A) Isolation. On the occurrence of a case of small pox
. immediate steps should be taken for its isolation, and for this
i' purpose a temporary building should be erected without
delay.
It should be built at least half a mile from the town and well
riff main Hhtdirl, aHrt ih «meh u thai thp KH'V illmrr
in int: eveni cm Miieiu puA uicdMii^ uui in a iuwh ui vina^c,.
the isolation hut should be constructed by the Chief without
payment, as it is for the protection of his own people.
• At the end of the epidemic, the hut will be burnt.
The Chief or Headman of each town or village will make the
necessary arrangements with the respective friends or relatives
for the maintenance of such persons as have been isolated.
. ' (c.) Strangers. In the case of strangers in any town or village
falling sick of small pox, the chief or Headman should main-
r tain the sick strangers as if they were his own people and
notify the Paramount Chief of his expenses in connection there¬
with, who will forward the claim to the District Commissioner
for his consideration.
■ f . ' 1 * . ' "
(d.) Officers to be Informed of Outbreaks. Chiefs, and Paramount
Chiefs in particular, should inform their respective District
Commissioners, or any Government Officer, when small pox
breaks out in their country so that the assistance of the District
* Medical Officer may be given them, and every effort should
be made by the people to carry 'out the instructions of the
Medical Officer in order to get rid of the disease as quickly as
. possible.
* ,(e.) Vaccination. Even when small pox does not prevail in the
country. Chiefs should encourage all their people to be
vaccinated, because persons who have been vaccinated every
seven years are not liable to contract small pox, and even if
they do, the attack is never severe.
i •' ' ': V
,1 > District Medical Officers will instruct such persons as they
may consider capable of learning how'vaccination is performed
and carried on, so that every one may be vaccinated and
made safe from the disease.
; _V1
/ Paramount Chiefs visiting the towns of their chiefdom should
* * personally urge the necessity of carrying out all sanitary rules,
especially those dealing with small pox, as all such rules are
' for the bjnefit of the people whom the Government desire to
*
■ assist.
. District Commissioners and District Medical Officers should
on every available occasion point out the necessity for every
person being vaccinated, especially children and young adults,
and should endeavour to obtain the consent of Chiefs, Headmen
and Bundu women to vaccination forming part of the Porro and
Bundu ceremonies.
, 7. These instructions supersede all previous circulars on the subject.
" '
. > •
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The following Instructions for the collection of House Tax in the
Protectorate issued by direction of His Excellency the Governor in
substitution of Standing Instruction No. 2 of 1908, are published for
the information and guidance of District Commissioners of the Colony
and Protectorate.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COLLECTION OF
HOUSE TAX IN THE PROTECTORATE ISSUED
BY DIRECTION OF HIS EXCELLENCY
THE GOVERNOR.
1. The general principle with respect to the House Tax is that
the assessment is made by the Paramount Chief, and that all payments
are made to the District Commissioner in the presence of the
Paramount Chief.
2. ASSESSMENT. If the political staff were sufficiently
numerous it would be the best course for the assessment of all the
Cbiefdoms in a District to be made by the District Commissioner or
by Officers acting under him. This is not practicable at present and
consequently the assessment has to be left to the Paramount Chiefs.
It is not intended that the Paramount Chiefs should report the result
of their assessment in writing to the District Commissioner. This
would be a hardship for a great many Chiefs. When payments of House
Tax are made it will be sufficient if the Paramount Chief informs the
District Commissioner that the amounts paid are correct and agree
with the assessment made by him or by persons acting under his orders
and for whom he is responsible. When a Chiefdom is divided into
sub-Chiefdoms the Paramount Chief may, if he informs the District
Commissioner, delegate his responsibility for the correct assessment
of the Sub-Chiefdoms to the sub-Chiefs in charge.
In practice it will be found that the previous year's assessment will
be taken as the starting point from which the amount to be paid for
the current year is calculated ; the Paramount Chief (or Sub-Chief as
the case may be) will be required to verify the statements made by
the headmen respecting the tax for which they are liable ; he will also
be responsible for the presence of representatives of all the towns and
villages in the Chiefdom and may be regarded as making a false assess¬
ment if he fail to notify the absence of any of his headmen at the place
and time of house tax collection fixed by the District Commissioner.
The Paramount Chief aided by the headmen of the different towns
should also inform the District Commissioner if in any town there are
non-natives who are liable to pay tax directly to the District Commis¬
sioner.
Apart from the assessments made by the Chiefs, District Commis¬
sioners should arrange to check in detail one or more Chiefdoms
every year.
This system will not enable the District Commissioner to detect
every error in the assessment, but it will deter Paramount Chiefs from
submitting false assessments.
If the assessment for a year were less than the assessment for the
preceding year in any Chiefdom, the decrease would be an indication
that some explanation was necessary. If it were well known that from
any cause there had been a considerable increase in the prosperity of a
Chiefdom and there were no increase in house tax some explanation
would also be necessary The above would justify a Distict Commis¬
sioner in refusing to accept a Chief's assessment as accurate, and in
proceeding to verify it. If the assessment submitted by the Chief
were found to be incorrect then he would be liable to be dealt with
under Regulations No. 10 of 1909 of 5th May 1909.
3. PAYMENT OF HOUSE TAX. All payments of house
tax will be made to the District Commissioner in the presence of the
Paramount Chief.
It should be made widely known that every Sub Chief or headman is
entitled to pay his tax in person provided the payment is made in the
presence of the Paramouut Chiief; but no payment should be accepted
from a Sub-Chief or headman in the absence of the Paramount Chief
unless with the knowledge and concurrence of such Chief. In the
majority of cases Sub-Chiefs and headmen will prefer to pay their tax
in person to the District Commissioner and should be encouraged to do
so. Thus the only tax money handled by the Paramount Chief
will be that for the towns and villages of which he himself is headman.
Paramount Chiefs will as a rule be found to welcome this system; it
gives them less trouble than when they have to collect from individual
headmen, and it safeguards them when headmen bring in less tax than
the amounts for which they are responsible. Where, however, a District
Commissioner thinks that the adoption of this system would be prema¬
ture he may collect the whole tax for a Chiefdom through the Paramount
Chief but he should submit a report giving the reasons in each case.
District Commsissioners should however make it clear to all that it is
not the intention of the Government to in any way diminish the power
of the Paramount Chiefs over their people in matters of native adminis¬
tration, but that the above scheme is intended to assist the Chiefs in
what is a Government matter.
4. The House Tax will usually be collected in the Paramount Chief's
town in each Chiefdom or in some other town in the Chiefdom fixed
by him. In some cases where Chiefdoms are large it may be desirable
for the tax to be collected in two or more centres in the Chiefdom ;
these will be fixed by the District Commissioner in consulation with
the Paramount Chief. In other cases where adjoining Chiefdoms
are very small it may be advisable tb fix one centre or two or more
Chiefdoms, but these will be exceptional cases.
5. By law house tax becomes due on January 1st. Before this date
1—V • • O •• I II r • . ■ I < a
in which the collection is to be made. Before the beginning of k
month he should notify the Paramount Chiefs of the Chiefdoms he
intends visiting that month. He should endeavour to have the house
tax collection completed before the end of the fourth month unless
there'are special reasons for the delay.
6. When the Paramount Chief has assembled his people the
District Commissioner will proceed to collect the tax from each in¬
dividual payor and to check the amounts paid by reference to the
assessment list for the preceding year, or to the assessment list for the
current year in cases where the Chief submits one in writing. The
Paramount Chief should present the headmen as this makes him
personally responsible for the presence of all the headmen including
those of any new towns or villages which have been built since the
collection of the preceding year. A headman paying in less tax than in the
previous year should be asked to explain, and in most cases if he is able
to give the names of those who have died or have removed to other
towns, and if his statements are corroborated by the Paramount Chief his
explanation will be accepted. In some cases it may be necessary for .
the District Commissioner to make a note with a view to future
checking. Headmen should always be asked if there are any new houses
in their towns as some make a practice of keeping the money for the
new houses apart and alleging as an excuse for non-payment for these
houses that they were not asked for the tax for them.
A District Commissioner should also make notes of any impending
changes in towns of which he is informed by the Paramount Chief or
headmen, with a view to correcting the assessment lists for the coming'
year.
7. Non-natives will in all cases pay tax directly to the District Com¬
missioner, but, unless in exceptional cases, natives of other tribes (e. g.
Timene or Susu traders living in Mendi towns) should pay through
the headmen of the towns in which they live.
• Paramount Chiefs and headmen of towns should be asked for the
names of any non-natives living in their towns and of any natives of other
tribes who have not paid to them in order that complete collections may
be made
8. When the tax for any town or village has been paid, a receipt
will be made out from the counterfoil book provided for the purpose.
This receipt shows the name of the payor, the town, chiefdom, number
of houses and amount paid and these particulars are also entered on
the counterfoil which should be signed by the payor or in cases where
he cannot write, by some person who witnessed the payment, preferably
a Government Official. The former system of giving one receipt to
the Paramount Chief for the total amount of tax paid at one time by
the Headmen in his Chiefdom may still be continued where the District
Commissioner considers there are special reasons for its continuance;
but when the system of giving receipts to individual payors has been
adopted it should not be altered without the permission of the
Governor. When one receipt is given for the total amount paid it is
difficult to get satisfactory evidence of individual payments in the
event of disputes arising.
The receipts are numbered consecutively, and as the whole or greater
part of the tax for a Chiefdom will be collected by the District Com¬
missioner during his stay in that Chiefdom, it follows the whole or
greater number of the Receipts for that Chiefdom's tax will be in
consecutive order. Where it happens however that after leaving a
Chiefdom a District Commissioner receives a further payment on
account of the tax for that Chiefdom, he should make a cross reference
on the counterfoil to the number of the counterfoil of the last receipt
given wnen ne was in ine ^nieiciom, ana on ine ia&i mciiuuncu
counterfoil he should also make a cross referense to the number of
the counterfoil or counterfoils relating to the subsequent payment.
9, In addition to the receipt or receipts given, a District Commis- 303
sioner will also give House Tax Cards. Each person making a
payment on account of House Tax will receive a number of House
Tax Cards equal to the number of houses in respect of which payment
has been made bv that individual. These cards are to be given by the
headman making the payment to the house owners in his town. Collec¬
tion of tax from individual house owners is obviously impossible and it
is equally impracticable for each house owner to attend at the time of
payment to make sure that the full payment is made ; but the above
system enables every house owner to receive a Government token
showing that the money he paid has reached the hands of the
Government.
On the 1st May in each year each District Commissioner should
submit a Requisition to the Colonial Secretary for such number of house
tax cards as he considers will be required in his District during the
ensuing year. It is essential that Requisitions should be made ori May
ist in order that the Colonial Secretary may have ample time to get
these cards from the Crown Agents. Before the period when the
House Tax becomes due in each year the Colonial Secretary will send
each District Commissioner the number of cards requisitioned for.
The house tax cards will be on coloured cardboard and will be
stamped with the year in respect of which the house tax is paid ; they
will also differ from those in use during the previous year in the colour
of the card or by some simple printing device. The distinctive colour .
or design of the cards will be kept confidential until the cards are
actually forwarded to the District Commissioners.
The District Commissioners should keep the house tax cards in safe
custody till they are actually handed to the individuals making payment
on account of house tax.
District Commissioners should make a point of explaining to natives
the reason why the cards are issued ; that they enable every man who
pays tax to have a token that his money has actually been received by
the Government, and that they enable every headman to be certain that
non-natives in the town have paid. Natives should be advised to keep
the cards with care as" in the event of disputes the possession of the
card may be of service.
A house owner removing after payment of the tax would naturally
take his card with him as evidence that he had paid ; the house tax
receipt for the town would remain in the town to be checked by any
officer making an assessment after house tax collection.
For audit purposes the receipts and counterfoils will be regarded as
completing the tax, but District Commissioners should see that no
unauthorised person has access to the House Tax Cards.
After house tax collection is completed they should check the
cards remaining with the number originally received and the number
issued ; and at the end of the year they should destroy any unexpended
cards they have and should then send a certificate to this effect
to the Colonial Secretary.
10. In certain cases hardship might result from the collection of the
tax ; e.g. destruction of a village by fire after the tax became due but
before the pieriod of collection, the presence of people incapacitated by
age or infirmity from earning the amount of the tax. The District
Commissioner may, after full enquiry and pending the approval of the
Governor, not collect the tax due in cuch cases ; but he shall submit for
approval by the Lrovernor a report on eacn v_meiaom wnere he has
exercised this power.
n. REBATE.
Payment of rebate is regulated by section 52 of Ordinance No. 33 of 369
1901 (The Protectorate Ordinance) as amended by Ordinance No. 13
of 1905.
The whole of the commission of 5% will be paid to the Paramount
Chief. Any subdivision between the Paramount Chief and the headmen
must be left to the Tribal Authority.
The commission may be paid immediately after the collection of
house tax is completed for any one Chiefdom, or may be witheld to a
later date in the year at the discretion of the District Commissioner.
When a District Commissioner is not satisfied with the manner in
which the house tax has been paid by a Chiefdom he may withold the
whole or any portion of the rebate ; he shall enter in the house tax
assessment book the reasons for witholding the rebate or any part of it
and at the end of the collection for his District for the year he shall
submit for the information of the Governor a list of the cases where the
rebate has beert withheld with the reasons in each case. He shall also
submit a list of all cases where a rebate of 2*^% has been paid to
Sub-Chiefs.
12. PAYMENT OF TAX BY NON-NATIVES.
All non-natives are by law liable to pay their tax due directly to the
District Commissioner.
Each District Commissioner shall keep a list of all non-natives in his
District showing the number of houses owned or occupied by each, the
town and Chiefdom in which each lives. An official inspecting a town
will thus be able to determine if the assessment has been made
correctly. House tax in" respect of houses owned or occupied by non-
natives may be paid either at District Headquarters or at any place of
collection of the tax.
House tax cards as well as receipts should be issued to non-natives
as this will enable headmen of towns to know if non-natives have paid
•- their tax.
13. PENALTIES.
Any Chief or headman who fails to pay the amount of tax due in
respect of his town cr village in the manner above described at the
proper place of collection shall be treated as a defaulter unless he can
give a satisfactory reason for his default. In such cases the District
Commissioner shall inform the headman that he must pay the amount
due within a specified time; otherwise he will be proceeded against
under Sections 56, (57) and 96 of "The Protectorate Ordinance 1901 "
(No. 33 of 1901.)
14. MISCELLANEOUS. District Commissioners when visiting a
Chiefdom for the purpose of house tax collection should arrange co
collect moneys due for store and other licenses and to issue such licenses.
It will therefore be necessary for the District Commissioners to take
with them the necessary licence books.
It will also be found advisable for District Commissioners to hear
and decide many local disputes at the places of collection of house
tax and to discuss with the Chiefs and headmen matters of interest and
importance to the Chiefdom.
It may also be advisable to hear and determine Court cases at some
of the places of collection and District Commissioners should lake with
. « . « ~ /•** . r% 1
15. From the date of these Instructions, Circulars Nos. 44/4262/1904
and 51/5007/1904 of 28th October 1904 and 12th December 1904
respectively, Standing Instruction No. 2 of 1908 of 25th April 1908 and
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STANDING INSTRUCTION. 371
Secretariat No. 9 of 1910.
APPENDIX C
FROM
THE HONOURABLE COLONIAL SECRETARY
TO
DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS.
Authority of District Commissioners over Chiefs-
The general principle underlying the government of the Protectorate
is that the administration of the Protectorate chiefdoms is led in the
hands of the paramount chiefs : native law and custom regulate the
authority and powers of the paramount chiefs, and distinguish between
the powers which such chiefs can exercise suo motu and those larger
powers which can only be exercised by a chief after he has consulted
the principal men of the chiefdom. Although the administration of
the Protectorate is thus left in the hands of the chiefs, it must be
remembered that the Governor, as representative of His Majesty, occu¬
pies a position which may be described as being that of the Paramount
Chief over all paramount chiefs. The Government also have imposed
by Ordinance certain laws upon the inhabitants of the Protectorate,
e.g., the House Tax Law, that part of the Criminal Law which deprives
the chiefs of the power to hear and determine serious charges, etc.,
District Commissioners, as representatives of the Government, are,
consequently, entrusted with the duty of making the natives comply
with the Government's orders, and their jurisdiction or authority in such
cases is based either upon Ordinances such as " The Protectorate
Courts Jurisdiction Ordinance 1903," "The Protectorate Ordinance
1901," "The Protectorate Native Law Ordinance 1905," etc., or upon
the general power which the Government derives from the fact that it
occupies a position analogous to that of Paramount Chief over all the
paramount chiefs in the Protectorate.
2. The successful manner in which District Commissioners have
controlled the administration of the Protectorate is very largely due to
the tact and skill which they have shown in inducing chiefs to carry
out the policy of the Government, by giving the chiefs advice with
respect to such policy instead of " ordering " the chiefs, in a peremptory
manner, to comply forthwith with the orders of the Government. It is
obvious, however, that there are cases in which a District Commissioner
is bound to give definite and precise orders to natives in the Protectorate,
and the object of this Standing Instruction is to explain to newly
appointed District Commissioners what action should be taken in the
3- If an order is given to a native of unimportant position in the
country, and he refuses to earrv it out, the correct method for the
enforcement of the order is to tell the headman, subchief or paramount
chief who has immediate control over the recalcitrant native to compel
the latter to carry out the order. "The Protectorate Native Law Ordi¬
nance" (No. 16 of 1905) provides, by section 49, that a Paramount
chief may send such recalcitrant persons to the Government Prison at
the District Headquarters.
4. If the order is given to a headman or subchief, and is disobeyed,
the correct method is to request the paramount chief to compel the
recalcitrant headman or subchief to comply with such order. Such
headman or subchief may also be sent to the Government Prison
under Ordinance No. 16 of 1905, section 49. ' i
5. If the Order is given to a paramount chief, and the latter fails
to comply with the order, considerable judgment must be shown by the
District Commissioner, because refusal by a paramount chief to comply
with a Government order, although a very serious matter, may be '<
caused by stupidity of the chief, by some mistake made by the Inter¬
preter when the order was given, or the disobedience may be an act of
defiance on the part of the chief; and, finally, it may even be the first
overt act of a wide-spread rebellion. The experienced District Com-
/missioner learns by enquiry or from observation to which of the four •'
causes mentioned the disobedience should be attributed and he acts
accordingly :—
(a.) Disobedience by paramount chief owing to stupidity.
The method usually followed in such cases is to get a friendly
y paramount chief to " talk sense " to the chief in default.
.' (6.) Disobedience through mistake of Interpreter.
j ■ >. Failure to comply with an order under such circumstances
. is not disobedience.
fr; j
(c.) Disobedience by a paramout chief as an act of defiance.
; 1 v I" such cases an experienced District Commissioner usually
■'' ■*' reproves the chief and explains to him, for a second time,
v. ; ' the reasons why the order was givenfinally he informs the
'
: chief that he must comply with the qrder by a given
;. 1 ! v, date. Before the date fixed arrives the • District Commis-
y sioner usually arranges that one or two neighbouring para¬
mount chiefs shall visit and prove to the defiant paramount/ ■
chief the folly of defying the Government. If no paramount
chief can be found to thus advise the recalcitrant chief, the y
fact that such chief cannot be found indicates that force
may be required to ensure compliance with the order. /
(d.) Disobedience by a paramount chief, which is the first overt / "
• " act in a rebellion.
It is very necessary to remember that disobedience of this
kind cannot, when it arises, be distinguished from cases of
the kind referred to at the end 0/ paragraph (c) supra.
6. The enforcement of legitimate authority over chiefs can be •
carried out in one of three ways. By " The Protectorate Amendment
Ordinance 1909" ( No. 6 of 1909)—[ The corresponding Law for the
Sherbro District is the " Sherbro Native Courts Amendment Ordi¬
nance" (No. 3 of 1909)], power is given to the Government to t
depose a chief, and, as an alternative to the full penalty of deposition,
power is given to the District Commissioners, subject to the approval
of the Governor, to fine a thief a sum not'exceeding j£io. Thirdly
: in the last resort, legitimate authority may have to be enforced by an .
armed force. 1 '•■V\
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7- The force ot L-ourt Messengers is not intended to l>/ an armed
force. The utmost that Court Messengers are expected th do in this
direction is to suppress brawling, or to assist ( when so ordered by the
District Commissioner) the paramount chiefs or subchiefs to carry
out orders made by such chiefs. If a paramount chief refuses to
comply with an order in spite of having been urged by brother para¬
mount chiefs to comply with the order, there is no great risk in
employing Court Messengers to enforce the order, because the fact
that the neighbouring paramount chiefs consider that the order
given is a just one, and have advised compliance, indicates that the
difficulty is confined to the individual paramount chief who is in
default: even in such cases, however, if the paramount chief appears
tcr be supported by a considerable section of the people in his chiefdom,
it is better not to attempt to enforce the order by means of the Court
. Messengers.
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8. In the case last mentioned, and in the case of a paramount chief
refusing to obey an order under circumstances which show that there
are other paramount chiefs who are supporting him in his refusal,
Court Messengers are not to be used. In such cases, the District
Commissioner should apply for an armed force to maintain his authority.
I-
9. A nehvy appointed District Commissioner will learn from this
Standing Instruction that, by advising chiefs and explaining matters
of Government policy to them thoroughly and quietly, the necessity
for giving peremptory orders rarely arises. He will also learn that the
power to fine up to fio is one which should be rarely exercised:
it should only be exercised in the case of continued and persistent refusal
to comply with a definite order: under no circumstances should a
threat to fine be made when an order is given for the first time.
The newly appointed District Commissioner will also gather that
■
power of deposition is one which is never adopted save with great
reluctance. Finally, it has been made clear that the force of Court
Messengers is not intended to be! relied upon as an armed force, and,
in order that the importance of this principle may be fully realized, it
' should be remembered that the principle in question was adopted,
after full consideration by the Secretary of State (Secretary of
State's Confidential despatch of the nth October 1906).
iU • ' - •' •• .. ,y\
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1
Deposition of Chiefs-
By the Protectorate Amendment Ordinance 1909 (No. 6 of 1909)
and the Sherbro Native Courts Amendment Ordinance 1909 (No. 3 of
1909) the Governor, subject^ to the approval of the Secretary of State •
for the Colonies, may depose any chief in the Protectorate or in Sherbro
(Colony.)
2. While the power to depose is vested in the Governor and not in
the District Commissioners, a Standing Instruction to District Commis¬
sioners is necessary for the following reasons : The Governor may
depose a chief directly (i.e. for acts which have come immediately
under his notice), but a District Commissioner is the representative of
the Governor in his District and the usual intermediary between the
Governor and the chiefs, and it is obvious that in the majority of cases,
any action affecting the chiefs will be taken through the District
Commissioners. It is advisable therefore to lay down certain principles
for the guidance of District Commissioners in dealing with acts of chiefs
which in their opinion render it undesirable that the chief should take
any further part in the management of the affairs of his chiefdom.
The deposition of a chief is relatively- infrequent, and District Commis- ;
sioners, especially those newly appointed, might experience considerable
difficulties in the management of such cases if no principles were laid
down for their guidance. It is not intended, however, to prescribe by
law the procedure in connection with the deposition of a chief, nor is it
intended to impose by law any further conditions and restrictions than
at present exist.
3. The Protectorate of Sierra Leone (including in that also the
Sherbro portion of the Colony) is inhabited by a number of tribes
differing in language, and, to a certain extent, in customs. In some
directions this difference in customs is very material. For instance,
the position of a paramount chief amongst the Temnes, who have
probably been settled , in this country for some 400 or 500 years, is
different from hjs position amongst the Mcndis who are much more,,
recent invaders. In the first case, custom has established a certain
sanctity arouna tne omce ana person 01 rne cniei; in ine secona, in
many cases, the chief is still little more than a leader in situations
where concerted action is required. Other tribes occupy positions
intermediate between these two. Such differences will materially affect
the action to be taken in different parts of the Protectorate, and local
conditions will require to be fully considered before recommendations
are made. But, in spite of these differences, it is possible to find some
principles generally applicable.
- 4. Like other inhabitants, chiefs are subject to the statutory law
of the country and are liable to be punished for offences against that law;
it is not intended that a chief should be punished twice for the same
offence and, consequently, deposition will not, as a rule, follow the convic¬
tion of a chief in the District Commissioner's Court or the Circuit
Court. Exceptional cases may, of course, occur ; a chief who had been
sentenced in the Circuit Court to penal servitude for life would obviously
require to be deposed to enable the government of his chiefdom to be
carried on.
5. In the majority of cases requiring deposition the necessary
preliminaries will be an enquiry held by the District Commissioner into
the conduct of the Chief and a report to the Governor by the District
Commissioner based on that enquiry.
II. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH AN ENQUIRY
WITH A VIEW TO THE DEPOSITION OF A
CHIEF SHOULD BE HELD.
6. These circumstances may be of two kinds :
(a.) Deliberate disobedience of important instructions given by
the Government to the chief, or acts of open defiance.'
( ' indicating actual or intended rebellion.
(b.) Persistent and flagrant rpisgovernment of his chiefdom and'
oppression of his subjects.
7. Deposition may be required for acts of flagrant disobedience
after the procedure recommended in Standing*Instruction No. 9 of
1910, has been tried and has been found to be ineffective; these acts
in principle are very closely allied to acts of rebellion.'.
8. The steps to be taken after open rebellion obviously require no
consideration here.
In cases of threatened rebellion the important point is to ascertain how'
far the responsibility rests on the chief, or how far he is merely the
expression of a state of discontent among his subjects ; should he be
the prime mover in the threatened rebellion and the principal person
responsible for causing and fermenting the feeling of discontent, he
should, in addition to any further punishment, be deposed as unworthy
of confidence in the part of the Government. In circumstances where,
however, he is being forced into rebellion, but is not the most active
agent in planning it, a lesser punishment than deposition might meet the
case.
9. In the majority of cases when deposition is required, it is for mis-
government and oppression. The individual circumstances must be
considered in each case. It may be desirable in some cases to try the
other means indicated in the above mentioned Standing Instruction, to
remonstrate with the chief, to get other chiefs to advise him, or to fine
him, before proceeding to the extreme step of considering his deposition
on account'of the continuance of the misgovernment; in other cases, it
jnay be desirable to institute deposition proceedings forthwith. Where
a chief is by birth and by position representative, where the feeling in a
chiefdom, while objecting to his acts, yet recognises him to be the
proper person to remain chief, then every other possible course should
be tried before deposition was resorted to. Where on the other hand a
chief had been appointed more through intrigue than by a well recog¬
nised hereditary right, there would be less hesitation in considering his
deposition. Another important factor for consideration is when a chief
has not only oppressed his people but has represented that this was
done with the approval of, and for the benefit of, the Government.
10. The deposition of a chief is a very serious administrative act
•and may have far reaching consequences not only as regards the
particular chiefdom affected, but as regards other chiefdoms, if it should
be done for reasons which from a native point of view are inadequate.
Neither chiefs nor people in the Protectorate are accustomed to the
tradition of years of good government and respect for law and order.
All the chiefs at present ruling can remember when the law of the
stronger was the most powerful and most continuously acting law in the
country; when it was considered no discredit, though it was relented,
for a chief to exercise his power in an arbitrary manner; and when a
chief could frequently only make himself obeyed by exercising this
arbitrary power. With these traditions it is not surprising that many
chiefs should still commit acts which, from a European standpoint, are
acts of oppression and should, even when they are right in principle,
be too extreme in their action. Mistakes of this sort occur even in
civilised countries atnd will only be lessened as respect for law and order
increased. Deposition in such cases would be a mistake, would weaken
the authority attaching to the office of chief since it would make chiefs
afraid of exercising that authority in any form, and would encourage the
more unscrupulous of their subjects to disregard the chief. In the
punishment of chiefs for misgovernment, the important point of view as
a rule is not the European but the native, the manner in which the most
enlightened native opinion regards the behaviour of the chief, and
whether this native opinion considers him fit to remain a ruler.
III. CONSTITUTION OF THE TRIBUNAL INVESTIGA¬
TING THE BEHAVIOUR OF A CHIEF WITH A
VIEW TO DEPOSITION.
11. The foregoing shows the importance, not only of getting evidence
as to the acts complained of, but of getting the view responsible native
opinion takes of those acts.
12. For this purpose it is desirable that the Court should consist of
the District Commissioner of the District and not less than two assessor
chiefs. These assessors should be of the same standing as the accused
and of the same or similar tribes, but need not necessarily belong to the
same administrative District. In their selection care should be taken
to ensure that they are not closely related to the accused and, which is
quite as important, that they are not known to be at enmity with him.
The District Commissioner will select the assessors before the enquiry
is held and will communicate their names to the accused chief. The
accused chief should be given the right to name a third chief as
assessor: if he wishes to exercise this right this third assessor, will be
summoned by the District Commissioner in the same manner as the other
assessors. The accused chief may object to one of the assessors on the
ground that he is his enemy. A District Commissioner of some expe¬
rience will as a rule know the feelings of the chiefs well enough to avoid
ithis;; Swit it may happen, and the District Commissioner should then
eitfliw select another assessor, or ask a number of the paramount chiefs
either to nominate an assessor or to state In their opinion if the object
tion raised is a reasonable one. •, •
IV. PROCEDURE.
13. "A". Anterior to the enquiry.
It is advisable to remember that Chiefs are rulers and are possessed
of considerable powers and that nothing should be done to diminish the
importance of the office in the eyes of the people, nor, as far as can be
avoided, to degrade the chief concerned. It should be made clear that
action is taken because the chief is believed to have violated native
laws and principles of native administration.
It may be possible to allow a chief to remain in his chiefdom and to
exercise his powers up to the time of the enquiry. In other cases it may be
desirable to remove him from the chiefdom either because it would be
impossible to get any evidence so long as he was in the chiefdom or.
because feeling might be so strong against him that it was unsafe for
him to remain. In such cases the chief should reside, pending the
enquiry, in another chiefdom or should be instructed to come in to
District headquarters and stop there till the enquiry is held.
Where a chief has been plotting rebellion it may be necessary to
arrest him and detain him in gaol.
The nature of the charges laid will determine the action to be taken
in each case.
14. The accused chief should be given formal notice of the charges
laid against him, and these charges, while put in general terms, should
be as clear as possible ; he should also be told that further details can
be given him if he so desires. *
When he is in charge-of another chief pending the enquiry this chief
should also be made acquainted with the nature of the charges.
15. "B" PROCEDURE AT THE ENQUIRY.
The circumstances of the case will determine whether the enquiry
should be held in the chiefdom affected or at District headquarters or
elsewhere. The enquiry should be held with considerable ceremony,
more than is customary at the District Commissioner's Court, and the
procedure should resemble that applicable to a Criminal trial, but
somewhat greater scope should be allowed in the evidence of
witnesses on both sides. The chief should not be put in the dock.
Every facility should be afforded him to call witnesses in his defence.
The evidence should be taken down in full and the chief allowed to
cross-examine witnesses. The assessor chiefs should also be invited
to examine the witnesses.
16. • After the defence, the assessor chiefs should be asked whether
in their opinion the charges brought against the accused have been
proved; these opinions should be given in open Court and should be
written down.
17. The further point which has now to be considered by the District
Commissioner and assessors is whether the charges proven are so grave
as to warrant the extreme penalty of deposition ; it is advisable that
this should be considered by the District Commissioner and assessor
chiefs in private before any announcement is made in court. In the
private meeting the views of the assessor chiefs should be taken and
written down ; should there be any difference of opinion between them
and the District Commissioner, their reasons should also be taken
down.
18. The accused chief should then be informed in open court of the
decision arrived at by the District Commissioner and the assessors;
but it should be made clear that this is not a final decision but the
uovernor. Where, as may happen, tne assessors recommend a less
severe penalty than the District Commissioner considers would meet the
case, the decision given by the District Commissioner in court should
be very carefully worded to prevent any damage to his prestige, should
the Governor (as in rare cases may happen) decide in favour of the lesser
penalty. The accused chief should be informed that the full report of the
proceedings and not merely the recommendations of the court of enquiry
will be forwarded to the Governor, and that any appeal he may desire
to make may be transmitted at the same time or sent direct to the
Governor. He should be given a reasonable time, i.e. a few days, in
which to decide, and a note of his decision should be made on the
-proceedings.
19. NATURE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT
MAY BE MADE.
Deposition may be recommended.
In other cases the evidence may shew that a less penalty than depo¬
sition would meet the case. This should not happen frequently, as the
District Commissioner should avoid instituting deposition proceedings
unless he has in the first instance satisfied himself that the charges are
of a grave nature.
In some cases a fine may meet the case. In others the temporary
absence from the chiefdom under the care of another chief in the same
or in another district would be a suitable course to pursue. This recom¬
mendation should not be made, however, unless it is the spontaneous
recommendation of the assessor chiefs and they are of opinion that it is
the most suitable punishment for the offence proven against the accused.
"C". PROCEbURE SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENQUIRY.
20. As soon as possible, a full report of the proceedings with the
opinions and recommendations of the assessor chiefs and of the District
Commissioner shall be forwarded to the Colonial Secretary for submis¬
sion to the Governor. A note Should be made in the proceedings
showing whether the accused chief had intimated his intention to
appeal.
21. When deposition is recommended, the District Commissioner
has to decide what course is to be adopted as regards the chief, pending the
receipt of the Governor's decision. Obviously the exercise of his powers
as chief must be suspended and the principal men of the chiefdom
should be instructed to arrange for the carrying on of affairs. In
Temne chiefdoms there are officials (possessing different titles in
different parts of the country ) whose duty it is to manage the chief¬
dom when for any reason the chief in unable to do so. Amongst the
Mendis it is generally the Chiefs Speaker or " Lavari " who under¬
takes this. The temporary arrangements necessary will as a rule be
left in the hands of these officials unless, of course, they have been
implicated in the chief's wrongdoing and have been accused with him.
22. When deposition is recommended, it is inadvisable that the
accused chief should remain in his chiefdom. In some cases, he may
be allowed to live in an adjoining chiefdom; in others, it may be advisable
to keep him at headquarters in charge of the headquarters chief. In1-
extreme cases, it may ba necessary to lodge him in gaol.
The District Commissioner will, naturally, consult the assessor chiefs
and may, if he think fit, consult the principal men of the chiefdom
affected as to the best course to adopt witn respect to the place at
which, and the conditions under which, the accused should be kept
pending the receipt of the Governor's decision, but the District Com¬
missioner must be the sole judge as to the action to be taken, since the
jresponsibility for the satisfactory administration of his district is his.
PROCEDURE AT THE CEREMONY OF
DEPOSITION.
23. This should be made as formal as possible.
The assessor chiefs should be warned to attend, and the chief affected
informed of the receipt of the Governor's approval of the deposition.
Representatives of the chiefdom should be summoned. The chief to
be deposed should attend with the insignia of his office and, after the
announcement of his.deposition has'been made, those insignia should be
handed,over by him to the care of the principal men/ Insignia given
by the Government, such as a staff, should, of course, be taken charge
of by the District Commissioner.
24. When deposition is recommended, the District Commissioner
has further to consider whether deportation is necessary. When the
offence is one committed against the Government, deportation is
obviously indicated ; it would not be wise to allow a chief deposed for
disloyalty to remain in a chiefdom to serve as a focus for further
trouble. When the offence is one of mal-administration and oppression
the question, to decide is whether the regent or new chief will be able
to carry on if the deposed chief is allowed to remain in the chiefdom
and possibly to intrigue against him. An important point is the size and
power of the following the deposed chief can command. The assessors
and principal men of the chiefdom will be able to give much useful,
advice on this subject, and the District Commissioner will do well to be
guided by their advice.
When deposition has accurred, for instance, for incompetence due to
senile decay or to persistent and hopeless intemperance, it will, as a rule,
be quite safe to allow the deposed chief to remain in his chiefdom. It
should be noted, however, that deposition will be necessary for these
reasons only in cases where the chief has refused to listen to advice
from the District Commissioner and other chiefs to appoint a regent:
and it should be made quite clear that if he in any way interferes so as
to hamper the action of the regent or the new chief, he will be deported.
25. It will not be practicable to proceed with the election of a new
chief immediately after deposition; and a regent will be required. In
some of the tribes, their organisation provides for this and there is no
necessity for any special arrangement; amongst others, such as the
Mendis, the Lavari or chief's speaker will take his place pending the
appointment of a new chief; but where the Lavari has been associated
with the chief in his act of oppression this course may be undesirable
and other arrangements may be required. These should be left to the
principal men of the chiefdom aided by the assessor chiefs. The •
District Commissioner, however, should see that the Regent is formally
appointed and brought before him in open Court before the proceedings
are closed. It has to be decided whether the deposed chief should be
allowed to take any part in the appointment of a regent. If he has
been deposed for open rebellion or for acts in defiance of Government
orders he should not be so allowed. If his deposition is due to mal¬
administration he may be so allowed, provided the principal men of the
chiefdom and assessors chiefs so advise the District Commissioner.
V. EXPENSES OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
26. As a general rule, the expenses of proceedings so far as assessor
chiefs are concerned should be borne by the chiefdom concerned and
not by the Government. Witnesses should pay their own expenses.
27. It is a native custom that when outside chiefs are called to settle
a dispute they should receive presents in money or in kind for their
• 1 • - - - - il. . • 1 * 1 -A. it. i . .
an opinion too unfavourable to the side making the present. To secure
impartiality it is advisable that the District Commissioner should fix
what he considers to be a reasonable sum for the expenses, should
receive this from the people of the chiefdom and, in their presence, pay
it to the assessor chiefs. In certain cases, it may be desirable for the
Government to bear all or part of the expenses. This might occur
when the enquiry is prolonged, when long journeys have to be made to
the place of enquiry, or in time of great poverty. When the enquiry is
held for offences committed against the Government, the Government
should in all cases bear part of the expense. In addition to payments
to the assessors for their services, it may be necessary to make some
payment to the chief of the town in which the enquiry is held, in the
rare cases in which the enquiry is held in another chiefdom and not at
District headquarters.
VI. CONCLUSION.
The foregoing taken in conjunction with Standing Instruction No. 9
of 1910 shoilld provide some assistance to District Commissioners in
investigating serious complaints against the administration of the chiefs
, in their districts, and, while primarily intended for paramount chiefs, may,
in certain cases, require to be applied to subchiefs.
•K.K;'
Colonial Secretary's Office,*
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T-.- ALL DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS.
By direction o£ His Excellency the Governor the following instruc-
tions, prepared by the District Commissioner of the Karene District, are
forwarded for your information and guidance and that of the Assistant N





r 12th September, 1917.
Procedure to be followed in regard to the settlement of ~
boundary disputes in the Protectorate.
Ji'"
.. . hAll boundary disputes between chiefdoms should be settled by the i ,
District Commissioner himself and the following procedure carried
out:— .
■.rW
(a) The District Commissioner should be assisted by one or more <■
Paramount Chiefs selected from those that have no local interest in the case.
(b) The area in dispute should be visited and the best evidence
procurable should be obtained and carefully heard and determined.
(c) The boundary should be marked out by cutting a road and
erecting beacons along the boundary. After the road is cut it should be
planted with some tree that grows readily from cuttings, such as the
native plum tree, cotton tree, or the bamboo. i ;
#r..' v.
(d) In the event of a river or stream forming part of the boundary
no road need be cut, but a beacon should be erected at the point where it
forms the boundary and again where it ceases to be the boundary.
(e) After the boundary has been marked out a description in detail
should be submitted to headquarters for the Governor's approval, and
when approved, it should be recorded in the Intelligence Book and the
*x t-i I « t h .1 I . a .1 tV I . n
( / ) in addition to recording the settlement ot the boundary in the
'
Intelligence Book, a reference should be made on the skeleton map of the
district chiefdpras, giving the page in the Decree Book—thus ' VV '
v ' » • • *
BUtA CHIEFDOM. • - <
Decree Book Vol. 2 pages 14-r-17.
ROMENDI CHIEFDOM.
(<7) It is most important that the names of all Court Messengers and
other Government officials who were present when the boundary was
marked out are recorded, together with the names of the Tribal Rulers and
Assessor Chiefs.
%
(h) It should be part of the settlement that the boundary* road
should be kept open, one chief keeping the right and the other chief the
left of the road clean.
(?) The contending parties should work the boundary.
(j) These instructions should be read with those issued under
Circular 83/4936/1906.
2. In cutting a boundary road the following suggestions should be
—found useful.{indjjvlaidiJ-ijmriably.adopt. —
I fix various points along the boundary and connect up these points
; by getting one of the Assessor Chiefs to give me the direction by beating
his drum at the point which I am connecting up, which should not be more
than .two.miles apart. I then divide my party up into the following
order :—
(a) One Court Messenger, the District Commissioner, the chiefs who
have the dispute, and two road-cutters. The road-cutters just clear
sufficient bush to mark the line and are relieved every ten minutes or so
from the relieving gang B. . •
{b) Relieving gang, about ten in number, in charge of a Court
Messenger and one of the Tribal Rulers. •
(c) Road-cutters, any number from 50—100, in charge of a Court
Messenger and Tribal Rulers widen the road made by A.
(d) Road-makers, 50— 400,Under a Messenger and the other Asses'
sor Chief and his staff, make the road, erect beacons.
, ^ District Commissioner,
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I have the honour to report that a case recently occurred near Pujehun
in which a leopard attacked a man named Songa who defended himself with a
machete and succeeded in wounding the leopard so severely that it abandoned its
victim but was unable to' escape (its two forefeet were practically severed) and
was subsequently despatched by the man's friends. The leopard, a very old female
specimen, was carried in Pujehun on a pole and its victim managed to walk to the
hospital, where hewas able to give a very clear account of what occurred. Unfortunately, >'
although not very severely mauled, Songa died two days afterwards probably from
shock and a weak heart or, possibly, from blood poisoning and a weak heart. He
was attended by the Medical Officer, to whom the dead leopard was presented.
2. As this district has a bad reputation in regard to secret societies I am, ■>
tempted, very briefly, to relate my own experiences in connection with such matters .
terminating as they have with the above very interesting case. It has struck me
also that they may be of interest to Assistant District Commissioners who have recently
joined the service and who have not yet (tame into contact with such matters ; they
may also help them to appreciate the necessity of approaching such cases with an open
mind. . *
3. In 1911 the disappearance of a boy in Tonko Limba country, in the Karene
District, was attributed to a Human Alligator Society. I committed four persons for "
trial in connection with this case who were convicted and Sentenced to death. The ,v
evidence was based on confessions which led to the finding of the .bones of the boy
and the marks of fires where he had been cooked and eaten. The prisoners also >
confessed in open court. (Townsend, C. J., Samuel Barlatt, Crown Prosecutor.)
4. Shortly after the above arrests were made, a man was brought into my v
office at Batkanu who stated that he had been attacked on the road by two young
leopards, which he had beaten off with a stick. He displayed scratches on his head
and shoulders, but they were not severe. I was inclined to be suspicious at the time
and to think that perhaps he had been sent to the office purposely to mislead me. I.
now have no reason whatever for disbelieving his story. Mr. Hooker will probably
remember about this case.
5. Almost immediately after the above case Paramount Chief Alimaini Suri,
of Tambacka Chiefdom, in the same district, reported two women missing .whilst
drawing water in the evening from the river, and asked permission to make medicine
to find out the cause, as he suspected Human Alligator Societies, or rather hinted
at them.- I visited Tambacka a few weeks later and stayed in the chief's compound ;
whilst I was there one very large and one small alligator (crocodile to be more correct)
they had gorged. I was present , when these crocodiles were cut opon ; in the
stomach of the big one was found some twists of human female hair, some pieces
of blue country cloth, and two copper and brass finger rings which were at once
identified as the property of the missing women by friends and relations who were gg^
present. One of the rings was presented to me and is still in my possession. There
was general rejoicing at the death of the crocodiles. Mr. Hooker knows about
this case.
6. Previous to this several persons were reported to have disappeared in the
Malal Chiefdom of the same District under suspicious circumstances. A number of
arrests were made, hut the accused persons were released by me for want of evidence,.
* but were subsequently re-arrested when I visited the Malal Chiefdom and obtained
fresh evidence. I committed these persons for trial, Mr. Hoojker committed others
in connection with the same case, and a considerable ,number of convictions were
obtained in the Circuit Court (Van der Meulen, Ag. C.J.)/on charges of being
members of an unlawful society. / ;■
7. In 1911 the late Chief Tamba Kira, of Symiria Chiefdom, Koinadugu District, .
informed me shortly before his death that he feared there were secret societies in his
chiefdom, that they existed there many years ago, but were stamped out by burning
persons against whom there was very strong evidence. Two years later a series of
deaths occured in this chiefdom under circumstances of the very greatest suspicion,
Full inquiries were held, but the evidence was insufficient to commit anyone for trial.
Shortly afterward a fresh death occured, the victim's skull exhibiting the same small
round holes in pairs, the centres of the holes being exactly equi-distant apart as was the
case in the previous victims. These holes suggested an instrument like an ordinnry
steel kitchen fork with two- prongs, and could not in my opinion possibly have been
inflicted by either a leopard or a hyena. The thinnest parts of the skull were pierced.
A numher of persons were commited for ti'ial but, unfortunately, the evidence was not
sufficient to bring them to trial. The following year fresh deaths occured in the same
neighbourhood. The paramount chief and principal men of the chiefdom were
convinced that these and the previous cases were the work of an unlawful society.
Again the evidence was considered insufficient to bring the accused persons to trial
although they were commited. At the request, however, of the chief and headmen of
the chiefdom, about twelve of them were deported from the district. Since then I
understand no further deaths of a suspicious character have occured in that
neighbourhood.
8. In 1912 the late Chief Kalawa informed me that he suspected that some
members of a secret society were coming over to his chiefdom from Bomballi country,
and that he was having them watched. The Chief of Safroko also hinted at the same
thing. Nothing transpired in these chiefdoms, but some time afterwards, whilst I was
staying in the chief's town, a large leopard was killed. The body was placed on a litter
at night, a bandage was tied round its head completely covering its face, and it was
paraded round the town amidst great rejoicing, the bearers dancing. I was never quite
certain why the leopard's head was bandaged, i.e., whethor it was regarded as a witch, the
villagers hoping the death of the leopard involved the death of a witch, i.e., a human
leopard, or whether young people and women were tabooed from seeing a leopard's face
as is the case with the end of an elephant's trunk, which none fyut hunters may see. I
considered it better not to enquire too closely into the question, No objection was made
when the ceremony was over to my removing the bandage and examining the leopard's
teeth, The interpreter and some of the court messengers know about this case,
9. In the same year Llnet fla JKullu, ot the ivultu Unietdom, in the extreme south¬
east corner of the Koinadugu District, travelled a great distance to report that a child
had been killed by a leopard in a village close to his own town. The chief stated that
the leopard had also killed a number of sheep, and had eventually been killed by a hunter.
He produced the leopard's' skin, stating that his sole reason for reporting the case was
that he did not wish the chiefdom to get a bad name. He also stated that in former
days leopard societies existed in that part of the country but had been stamped out by his
forefathers by burning persons against whom there was very strong evidence ; on the
other hand, he did not believe any societies of the kind existed at the present day, but
leopards were common, Over a year later I was travelling in that part of the country
when the chief once more reported that a leopard was active in a neighbouring village.
This leopard was actually shot whilst I was in the chief's town, and skinned by a court
messenger. I made a record of the first case in the complaint book at Kaballa. The
interpreter and some of the court messengers know about the second case,
10. In 1914 the paramount chief of the Warra-Warra South Chiefdom, in the
same district, an "old blind man who resides in a village called Yagala, situated in a
mountain a few miles from Kalialla, was seized and bitten in the leg by a leopard whilst
lying on his bed one afternoon. The regent chief suspected this to be the work of a
secret society and made a number of arrests. From the evidence I heard it appeared
that the accused persons had openly boasted, probably in a spirit of jesting bravado,
that they possessed the power of turning into leopards at will, but that they always took
care to confine their operations to goats, sheep, fowls and antelopes, arid had nothing to
do with the accident to the chief. The chief himself, when well enough tq give
evidence, dispelled any doubt on the matter by statipg that he was perfectly certain that
a real leopard had attacked him, as he had not only heard it prowling and snuffing round
the house, but had also smelt it. It was proved also that goats had been recently killed
round the village. The accused persons were dismissed with a word of advice.
11. At the end of 1915 a man was killed by a leopard in the Kunniki Barrinn
Chiefdom, of the Ronietta District. The chief and headman of the village at once
reported the circumstances to me and seemed much perturbed lest their good reputation
should suffer. From their account I had no reason to believe that death in this case had
been caused by anything other than a real leopard. The victim was asleep in his
kunko when a leopard entered in the night, sprang upon him, and broke his neck.
The following night a sheep belonging to the dead man was tied in the same kunko
and was seized and killed by a leopard. I visited this chiefdom earlv in 1916 and the
chief complained that the neighbouring Tiinne Chiefs were laughing at him over this
case and were openly hinting at the existence of a secret society. I accordingly
investigated the case and heard evidence. The dead man was a stranger from Futajallongh,
who had come \Vith a friend to trade. His friend was still in the chief's town when I
arrived and he expressed himself satisfied that deceased had been killed by a real leopard,
but asked me to furnish him with a certificate to the effect that 1 had investigated the
circumstances and was satisfied as to the cause of death, as he would be asked questions
by deceased's relations when he returned to his country and reported the matter. This
I did. He remarked that in his own.country not only leopards and hyenas, but alsojions,
sometimes killed people.
12. In 1916 the younger of two brothers, professional snake charmers, met his
death through snake bite whilst dancing in public with a tree cobra, the deadliest of
West African snakes, round his neck. The headman at once arrested the elder brother,
who had previously danced with the snake, and brought him, together with the cobra,
which had not been killed, and all witnesses before me, and appeared in great trepidation
lest T should imagine that a secret snake society existed in his village.
13. The above facts have led me to draw the following conclusions in regard to 386
secret societies in this Protectorate. 1
. (a) That they are not as common as is generally supposed.
(b) That they are unorganised and not connected. The membership is usually
• small and confined to a few people in one or possibly two or three adjacent villages. '
( c ) That the object of the societies is not cannibalism, but witchcraft, i.e., that the
"ambition of the members is to liecome "witches" and to be able to turn into leopards
or other wild animals at will. As they cannot obtain this end, they do the best
they can by imitating leopards, etc., as closely as possible with great secrecy, and the •
..ceremonies which such secrecy would naturally involve. Their reward is the
mystery and terror they create in the minds of other natives who, from their childhood
onwards, have firmly believed that certain persons through witchcraft possess the power,
of turning into wild animals. In the Gambia a similar class of person existed
(fortunately very rare) known as " Buah," or witch, i.e., a person who possessed the
evil eye and who had the power of gradually killing people by merely associating with
them or looking at them. I have seen a man brought to me after being most
unmercifully handled by a crowd of indignant natives for stating that he possessed those
powers, refusing to accept advice to make a solemn declaration that he possessed no such
powers and had made the statement as an idle boast. This man agreed to leave the
, district before he would make such declaration ; in other words, he was prepared to
submit to anything rather than 'admit he did not possess the powers that were
attributed to him.
(d) That all the chiefs I haye come inj» contact with are very fully alive to the
evils of such secret societies and they are only too willing to do their best to stamp them
out, provided they are not afraid, and see that the possibility of deaths caused by
wild animals are recognised. \ 1' . ■ •
(«) That deaths which may have been caused by wild animals may
subject of political plots. < - , ;Y '
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
I. Government Records and Publications
A. Unpublished Official British Archives, Public Record Office,
London
Colonial Office series 267 contains Governors' dispatches to
the Secretary of State and letters to the Colonial Office relating
to Sierra Leone from other government departments, public
agencies, and individuals. Ordinances can be found in Colonial
Office series 269, the Sierra Leone Royal Gazettes in 271.
The Colonial Office Confidential Prints, series 879, are dis¬
patches and reports reprinted and bound by topic, for circula¬
tion and use within the Government/Colonial Office.
The Minutes of Evidence, Correspondence and Draft Report of
the West African Lands Committee (1046-1048) and papers
relating to medical and sanitation matters (especially 999 and
1031) were among those relating to West Africa which were of
most value to this study.
B. Published Official Sources
1. Parliamentary, or Command, Papers
Certain reports and correspondence were made public by
publishing them as volumes of Parliamentary Papers,
arranged chronologically not topically.
The following Command Papers were among those used:
Parliamentary Papers 1899 Cmd. (command paper) 9388
and 9391 The Chalmers Report; 1913 Cmd. 6961
Measures Adopted to Deal With Unlawful Societies in the
Protectorate; 1923 Cmd. 2374 Memo by the Advisory
Committee on Native Education in British Tropical African
Dependencies; 1926 Cmd. 2744 Report by Ormsby-Gore
on visit to Africa.
2. Statistical Information and Miscellaneous Data
a. Annual Reports for Sierra Leone in the Blue Books of
Statistics are Colonial Office Series 272 and also avail¬
able at many libraries including the National Library of
Scotland, Edinburgh; and the New York State Library,
Albany.
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b. Colonial Office Lists are located, among other places,
in the libraries of the Colonial Office and the Royal
Commonwealth Institute in London and the National
Library of Scotland in Edinburgh. These publications
are particularly useful for information concerning
Colonial Servants.
C. Sierra Leone Government Archives Fourah Bay College,
Freetown
At the time this writer used the Archives they were still in the
approximate order made by C. H. Fyfe. His catalogue of the
holdings can be found at the Colonial Office Library and in the
Sierra Leone Room of the Fourah Bay College Library, and
are particularly useful for the contents of three of the four
rooms in which the archives were stored in 1968. Although
Letter, Minute, Intelligence and Decree Books, and Circulars
and Standing Instructions found in rooms 2 and 3 were consul¬
ted for this study, the greatest portion of available research
time was devoted to the contents of room 4.
Most of the unique material pertaining to the Protectorate was
in the form of unbound local minute papers. These files would
originate with letters, reports or petitions from the Governor,
Colonial Secretary, department heads, district administrators,
non-government agencies and associations, or private citizens.
In theory, all subsequent comments and reports on the matter
were to be included in that file. In practice it was not unusual
for other papers to be started on particular aspects of a larger
issue, for example, proposals for reforms in the house tax
assessment and collection systems arising from the reports on
Fairtlough's maladministration of the Northern Sherbro District.
The unbound papers and files are grouped in tied bundles arranged
by year in numerical order for those minute papers originating
from the Colonial Secretary, and otherwise by descriptive cate¬
gories such as PE(titions), A(uditor), CJ (Circuit Court Judge),
and DC for various districts- The tendency in the earlier years
of the 20th century appears to have been to make these topical
distinctions as infrequently as possible. As a result it is pre¬
dominantly the latter years of the 1899-1919 minute papers which
are bound in numerous category divisions. Certain minute papers
were re-numbered and re-classified as confidential. Similar to
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Colonial Office Confidential Prints, these files would contain
parts or all of related minute papers of past years.
Many cited items are missing and there are obvious gaps in
sequences of such items as Decree and Intelligence Books no
less than of minute papers. Use of the existing material is
hampered by the fragile, deteriorating state, particularly of
the unbound, bundled papers. Nevertheless, the contents of
the Sierra Leone Government Archives provide incomparable
insights into the administration of the Protectorate from the
local point of view. Whereas the minutes of the Colonial
Office were instructive of policy formation and domestic and
Imperial priorities, the local minute papers reveal the daily
undertakings and attitudes of the administrators, and, to a
lesser extent, of the administered.
II. Manuscript Collection
The collection of the Evangelical United Brethren, housed at their
Historical Society in Dayton, Ohio, contains the reports and cor¬
respondences of the United Brethren in Christ missionaries. In
addition, there are conference and session minutes and U. B. C.
publications. Woman's Evangel and Sierra Leone Outlook were two
periodicals issued by the U. B. C. Specific pamphlets and books are
listed in that section of these bibliographical notes.
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Addenda
Page 361 bottom line 'cover the well, and it should be enclosed to
prevent cattle approaching.'
Page 362 bottom line 'between them. Both officers should point out
to the chief'
Page 363 bottom line 'winds will not blow from it to the town.'
Page 383 bottom line 'were caught in the river on large iron hooks
baited with large pieces of meat which'
